M. TVLLI CICERONIS

ACADEMICA

THE TEXT REVISED AND EXPLAINED

BY

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PREFACE.

IN 1874 I published a small edition of the *Academica*, which is now out of print. The present volume is, however, not a revision of the earlier, but a new work, written on a larger scale from a fresh and extended study of the text, language, and subject-matter of the treatise.

While I have tried in the first place to bring my own reading of the ancient authors to bear on the elucidation of Cicero's work, I have not neglected such modern aids to its study as it seemed of importance to consult. It is to be regretted that these modern aids are comparatively few, and the fact will I trust excuse some of the imperfections in my work. Important and interesting as the *Academica* is, it has received far less than its fair share of attention from scholars. My volume of 1874 was the first English explanatory edition of the dialogue since the time of Davies (1725), while abroad there has been none since that of Goerenz in 1810. Special articles or pamphlets relating to the *Academica* have been exceedingly rare, even in Germany; of such I have consulted all to which I could get access. On the other hand I have made no attempt at an exhaustive examination of the numerous histories of philosophy, or fragments of histories, which deal with the doctrines discussed in this treatise. Such works are very often not written from a competent examination at first hand of the ancient sources. Of those that have

been so written, the work of Zeller far transcends the rest in importance for such studies as those with which I have been here concerned.

Some illustrative matter which I had intended to include in the notes has been abandoned from want of space. In particular I hoped to indicate throughout the work the relation in which the doctrines discussed in the *Academica* stand to similar doctrines put forward in modern times. I trust that it may be possible for me to deal with this subject in a separate publication at some future time.

The scantiness of my leisure has prevented me from passing the work rapidly through the press; hence some irregularities and changes of plan have crept in for which I owe an apology to the reader. Some of these are mentioned in the "Addenda and Corrigenda." The index has been prepared with special care, and I hope it will render the book useful in some degree as a work of reference. The plan of writing the critical notes in Latin is so obviously convenient and has been so extensively adopted that it needs no apology.

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ADDENDA AND CORRIGENDA.

P. 9, n. 6. For *N. D.* § 6 read N. D. 1 § 6.

16, n. 2, l. 1. Dele *nunc*.

30. The number 10, referring to n. 10 should be placed at the end of the preceding sentence.

37, n. 9. For *Acad. Post.* the Lincoln Coll. MS gives the title *M. T. Ciceronis quoddam de Academicis fragmentum;* for *Acad. Pr.* no title.

52. Add Hirzel, Untersuchungen zu Cicero's philosophischen Schriften III (Leipzig 1883). I greatly regret that this elaborate and important work did not reach me till more than half of my book was in type. The third volume deals (besides other matters) with the history of Scepticism and the sources of the *Acad. Priora*. With the main doctrine of the latter part, viz. that Cic. in the concluding portion of the *Lucullus* drew from a work by Philo, I cannot agree. I still hold that Cic. adapted to the needs of his dialogue a work or works by Clitomachus. The adaptations needed were slight. Some remarks on H.'s arguments will be found below and in my nn. on the latter part of the *Lucullus*.

55. The phrase 'irresistible impression' is not accurate as a rendering of *καταληπτικὴ φαντασία*: see n. on 1, 41.

57, n. 1. Add the pamphlet by Hoyer, De Antiocho Ascalonita, Bonn 1883.

,, n. 7. Read 'Zeller's supposition...expand, is wholly erroneous.'

68. I found the readings of the Lincoln MS given in the Oxford ed. so unsatisfactory for the *Acad. Post.* that I intended not to record them for the *Acad. Pr.* When my book was about half printed I was enabled (by the courtesy of the College authorities) to examine the MS, and from 2 § 60 onwards I quote it from my own collation. I can only mention here a few of its readings in *Ac. Post.* and the earlier part of *Ac. Pr.*

1 § 1 audissemus—eisdem. § 2 que iam pridem, changed (m. 2) to *quo iam pr.* § 5 possum scribere. § 9 a poetis...inchoasti. § 10 malent; the words *et qui Graeca poterunt* are *not* omitted. § 13 correpta. § 17 Stageritem. § 20 inchoatum est neque credo desit absolutum (sic). § 21 ad augendum—prima in natura (*not* in pr. n.). § 27 effecta. § 28 cohercente. § 29 sit inter. § 32 numquam —diffinitiones. § 34 discedit—eisque—utebantur. § 37 praua. § 41 comprehendibile (*not* comprehensibile). § 43 at ab Antiocho

—nunc desciscis—discidium. At the end is written 'Haud amplius comperitur. Non plus reperitur, tanta fuit negligentia atque inscitia eorum qui iam nos multis seculis anteierunt. Qui sue inertie et ignorantie utinam praemia digna ferant.'

II § 1 urbanus admodum. § 2 in Asiae pace—percuntando—se male discere. § 5 reliqui qui. § 6 populares illustrisque. § 7 qui scire sibi uidentur dicere—dicendo et audiendo. § 8 praescripta et quasi imperata. § 12 duos. § 13 duos—suspicamur—nihil quidem. § 14 similes. § 16 in hoc quam. § 17 faciundum—nec uerum—censuerant. § 18 disserant. § 22 eae—una aut—modo autem. § 27 sapientisque satis sit. § 28 ut id—fluctuari. § 29 abhorret. § 30 primum. § 33 se ei non. § 34 conuincti ac iudicio—uidemus (for dicemus; was iudicemus in the archetype? Cf. § 98 iudicem). § 38 omnino loqui. § 40 intersit posse. § 41 eorum quae uidentur. § 45 fecit. § 47 in somniis. § 48 non inquam. § 49 faciendum. § 50 ut si. § 52 nec uinolenti. § 54 ita se habeant. § 55 inter sese.

p. 68. As to the Munich MS I have been able to learn nothing, though I have made inquiries of the authorities there.

Last line but one on the page. For 'Baiter (B)' read 'Baiter (B in the cr. nn. to book I, Bait. in those to book II).'

pp. 85 sq. In the headings of the pages for *ACADEMICORUM POSTERIORUM* read *ACADEMICORVM POSTERIORVM* and similarly *ACADEMICORVM PRIORVM.*

I § 6, n. on appellat. For *corpuscula* cf. fragm. 10 and for *atomus* 2 § 125.

§ 17, n. on quasi heredem. In the fifth line, for '32 (bis)' read '32, 33'.

§ 18, n. on exhibiturum. In the last line but one, for 'Fin. 5, 31' read 'Em. 111.'

§ 23. The number 23 should be opposite l. 5 of the text, not l. 6.

§ 26, n. on earum rerum. In the second line, for 'paraphrases' read 'periphrases'.

§ 28, n. on ultro citroque. In the last line but one, after the word 'expression' insert 'as the equivalent of *ultro citroque*'.

§ 29, n. on. necessitatem. In the second and third lines of the second column, for ἀνάγκην read ἀνάγκη and for εἱμαρμένην read εἱμαρμένη.

§ 35 omnia quae. Possibly we should read *om. quaecumque.*

§ 36, n. on neutra. In the fourth line, for περιτὰς read περιττάς.

§ 39 sensus et mentem. Cf. Macrob. somn. 1, 14, 20 Critolaus Peripateticus constare eam (*animam*, wh. Macr. treats as = *animum*) de quinta essentia.

§ 41, p. 152. In cr. nn., last line, for *qualia* read *quale.*

Fragm. 31, at end. For 135 read 137 (also in note).

II § 16. The number 16 should come opposite l. 21 of the text, not l. 16.

II § 16, n. on incognita. In Plin. n. h. 10, 120 condita is prob. a corruption of cognita.

§ 21, p. 200. In the first line of the first column of the nn., for § 96 read § 95.

§ 23, n. on quibus solis. Hirzel 3, 277 bases an argument on the notion that *quibus* = *uirtutibus*.

„ n. on artem uiuendi. Hirzel, 3, 279 n. implies that this definition was distinctively Antiochean, which is not the case.

§ 27, n. on proditur. In the last line, for *libri* read *uiri;* see § 101, n. on Epicuri capite.

§ 29 duo haec maxima. Hirzel 3, 277 argues that Antiochus must have differed from the Stoics in giving φυσική a position subordinate to ethics. Surely the later Stoics, at least, agreed herein with Ant.

§ 30, n. on lucem eripere. At the beginning of the n. insert 'so § 105,' and in the 4th line for § 109 read § 103.

§ 31, n. on dicemus. In the seventh line from the bottom, for 1, 46 n. read 1, 44 n.

§ 35. Hirzel 3, 254 n. proposes to eject as gloss all from *ex hoc* to *nota,* on the ground that the argument is disturbed. But he forces *ex hoc* to mean 'as a logical inference from this' which is quite unnecessary, and he fails to see that the words *sed... nota* imply (though they do not state) that the sceptic regards probability as his justification for making statements (cf. § 32). Hence the question *quod est* etc. is quite natural.

§ 39, cr. nn. For 14 read 15 and in n. on l. 19, for B. read Bait.
„ l. 14. For *quas* perhaps we should read *quasi;* cf. § 32 probabile et quasi ueri simile, and many other things of the kind.

§ 40. Hirzel 3, 256 sq., 264 raises many difficulties (imaginary, as they seem to me) regarding the development of the argument. Some of them rest on a misconception of *contra*, which does not mean 'in answer to' but 'on the opposite side' (cf. 1 § 13).

§ 43, n. on subtilitatem. For 1, 6 read 1, 7.

§ 47 Hirzel 3, 260 n. has a long mistaken argument, based on a misunderstanding of the phrase *falsa uisa,* which merely means 'impressions not proceeding from solid realities' and not 'impressions portending untruly' (with reference to μαντική etc.).

§ 50, p. 238. In l. 7 of the first column of the nn., for § 133 read read § 132.

§ 71 cum quaereret: iterative subj.; hence the change of mood from *placebat.*

§ 92 festiue. Pluygers, Mnemosyne IX conj. festinanter, needlessly. Cf. Diu. 2, 35 quam festiue dissoluitur (of a logical difficulty); ib. 107 festiue et breuiter (of an argumentative statement).

§ 96. I think it highly probable that Cic. wrote *inuidiosius;* cf. 2 §§ 144, 146.

II § 102, l. 9. Hoc quiuis is an error for haec q. and the cr. n. should run 'haec quiuis : *hoc q.* H etc.'

§ 102, l. 9 poetam. Cf. Cornif. 2, 20 Lucilium poetam.

§ 110 uersatus. The MSS reading *uersatur* is very possibly right.

§ 112 huic loco. Almost certainly a corruption of *hoc loco ;* cf. § 14.

§ 114, last line on the p. For 1, 46 read 1, 45.

§ 121 magni quidem muneris. Possibly a corruption of *magni prouidendi m.*; the error being due to the contraction for *pro*, viz, *p* with a bar across the lower part of the down stroke.

§ 135, n. on l. 5. For 1, 34 n. read 1, 35 n.

§ 137 huic Stoico. Cf. § 98 eo Stoico.

INTRODUCTION.

§ 1. *Cicero as man of letters and student of philosophy.*

It would seem that Cicero's love for literature was inherited from his father, who, being of infirm health, lived constantly at Arpinum, and spent the greater part of his time in study[1]. From him was probably derived that strong love for the old Latin dramatic and epic poetry which his son throughout his writings displays. He too, we may conjecture, led the young Cicero to feel the importance of a study of philosophy to serve as a corrective for the somewhat narrow rhetorical discipline of the time[2].

Cicero's first systematic lessons in philosophy were given him by the Epicurean Phaedrus, then at Rome because of the unsettled state of Athens. His lectures Cicero attended at a very early age, even before he had assumed the toga virilis. The pupil seems to have been converted at once to the tenets of the master[3]. Phaedrus remained to the end of his life a friend of Cicero, who speaks warmly in praise of his teacher's amiable disposition and refined style. He is the only Epicurean, with, perhaps, the exception of Lucretius, whom the orator ever allows to possess any literary power[4]. Cicero soon abandoned Epicureanism, but his schoolfellow, T. Pomponius Atticus, received more lasting impressions from the teaching of Phaedrus. It was probably at this period of their lives that Atticus and his friend became acquainted with Patro, who succeeded Phaedrus as head of the Epicurean school[5].

[1] *De Leg.* II. § 3.

[2] Cf. *De Or.* II. § 1 with II. § 5.

[3] *Ad Fam.* XIII. 1, 2, Phaedrus nobis, ...cum pueri essemus, antequam Philonem cognouimus, ualde ut philosophus, postea tamen ut uir bonus et suauis et officiosus probabatur.

[4] *N. D.* I. § 93, Phaedro nihil elegantius, nihil humanius. For Phaedrus, cf. also *Fin.* I. 16; *ib.* V. 3 (which shews that Ph. was at Athens in 78); *Leg.* I. 53; *Att.* XIII. 39, 2 (where Cic. begs Atticus to lend him some of Ph.'s books); also *Att.* XVI. 7, 4. Phaedrus was dead in 51, having succeeded Zeno as head of the school and bequeathed the succession to Patro (*Fam.* XIII. 1, 2). The son of Phaedrus, Lysiades, had a wide circle of acquaintances at Rome (*Phil.* V. 13).

[5] *Ad Fam.* XIII. 1, 2.

At this time (i.e. before 88 B.C.) Cicero also heard the lectures of Diodotus the Stoic, with whom he studied chiefly, though not exclusively, the art of dialectic[1]. This art, which Cicero deems so important to the orator that he calls it 'abbreviated eloquence,' was then almost the monopoly of the Stoic school. For some time Cicero spent all his days with Diodotus in the severest study, but he seems not to have been much attracted by the general Stoic teaching. Still, the friendship between the two lasted till the death of Diodotus, who, according to a fashion set by the Roman Stoic circle of the time of Scipio and Laelius, became an inmate of Cicero's house, where he died in B.C. 59, leaving his pupil heir to a not inconsiderable property[2]. He seems to have been one of the most accomplished men of his time, and Cicero's feelings towards him were those of gratitude, esteem, and admiration[3].

In the year 88 B.C. the celebrated Philo of Larissa, then head of the Academic School, came to Rome, one of a number of eminent Greeks who fled from Athens on the approach of its siege during the Mithridatic war. Philo, like Diodotus, was a man of versatile genius: unlike the Stoic philosopher, he was a perfect master of both the theory and the practice of oratory. Cicero had scarcely heard him before all inclination for Epicureanism was swept from his mind, and he surrendered himself wholly, as he tells us, to the brilliant Academic[4]. Smitten with a marvellous enthusiasm he abandoned all other studies for philosophy. His zeal was quickened by the conviction that the old judicial system of Rome was overthrown for ever, and that the great career once open to an orator was now barred[5].

We thus see that before Cicero was twenty years of age, he had been brought into intimate connexion with at least three of the most eminent philosophers of the day, who represented the three most vigorous and important Greek schools. It is fair to conclude that he must have become thoroughly acquainted with their spirit, and with the main tenets of each. His own statements, after every deduction necessitated by his egotism has been made, leave no doubt about his diligence as a student. In his later works he often dwells on his youthful devotion to philosophy[6]. It would be unwise to lay too

[1] *Brutus*, § 309.

[2] *Ad Att.* II. 20, § 6.

[3] *Ad Fam.* XIII. 16, 4. *T. D.* V. § 113. *Acad.* II. § 115. *Fam.* IX. 4. *N. D.* I. 6.

[4] *Brutus*, § 306. In *N. D.* I. 6, Cic. mentions, as his four principal teachers, Diodotus, Philo, Antiochus, Posidonius. For Philo's teaching, cf. *N. D.* I. 17; *ib.* I. 113; *T. D.* II. §§ 9, 26. Cotta, the interlocutor in *N. D.*, was one of his pupils and adherents; cf. *ib.* I. 59.

[5] *Brutus*, l. c.

[6] *Rep.* I. § 7. *T. D.* V. § 5. *De Off.* II. §§ 3, 4. *De Fato*, § 2.

much stress on the close relation which subsisted between the rhetorical and the ethical teaching of the Greeks; but there can be little doubt that from the great rhetorician Molo, at this time Rhodian ambassador at Rome, Cicero gained valuable information concerning the ethical part of the Greek philosophy.

During the years 88—81 B.C. Cicero employed himself incessantly with the pursuit of philosophy, law, rhetoric, and belles lettres. Many ambitious works in the two departments last mentioned were written by him at this period. On Sulla's return to the city after his conquest of the Marian party in Italy, judicial affairs once more took their regular course, and Cicero appeared as a pleader in the courts, the one philosophic orator of Rome, as he not unjustly boasts[1]. For two years he was busily engaged, and then suddenly left Rome for a tour in Eastern Hellas. It is usually supposed that he came into collision with Sulla through the freedman Chrysogonus, who was implicated in the case of Roscius. The silence of Cicero is enough to condemn this theory, which rests on no better evidence than that of Plutarch. Cicero himself, even when mentioning his speech in defence of Roscius, never assigns any other cause for his departure than his health, which was being undermined by his passionate style of oratory[2].

The whole two years 79—77 B.C. were spent in the society of Greek philosophers and rhetoricians. The first six months were passed at Athens, and were almost entirely devoted to philosophy, since, with the exception of Demetrius Syrus, there were no eminent rhetorical teachers at that time resident in the city[3]. Probably by the advice of Philo himself[4], Cicero attended the lectures of that clear thinker and writer, as Diogenes Laertius calls him[5], Zeno of Sidon, now the coryphaeus (so Philo entitled him) of the Epicurean school. In Cicero's later works there are several references to his teaching. He was biting and sarcastic in speech, and spiteful in spirit, hence in striking contrast to Patro and Phaedrus[6]. It is curious to find that Zeno is numbered by Cicero among those pupils and admirers of Carneades whom he had known[7]. Phaedrus was now at Athens, and along with Atticus, who loved Phaedrus beyond all other philosophers[8], Cicero spent much time in listening to his instruction, which was eagerly discussed by the two pupils[9]. Patro was probably in Athens at the same time, but this is nowhere

[1] Cf. *Brutus*, §§ 312, 322, 323.
[2] Cf. *Brutus*, §§ 312, 314, 316.
[3] *Brutus*, § 315.
[4] Cf. *N. D.* I. § 59, where the advice is described as having been given to Cotta.
[5] VII. 1, § 35.
[6] Cf. *N. D.* I. § 93 with *Tusc.* III. 38.
[7] *Ac.* I. § 46.
[8] *D. F.* V. § 3.
[9] *D. F.* I. § 16.

explicitly stated. Cicero must at this period have attained an almost complete familiarity with the Epicurean doctrines.

There seems to have been no eminent representative of the Stoic school then living at Athens. Nor is any mention made of a Peripatetic teacher whose lectures Cicero might have attended, though M. Pupius Piso, a professed Peripatetic, was one of his companions in this sojourn at Athens[1]. Only three notable Peripatetics were at this time living. Of these Staseas of Naples, who lived some time in Piso's house, was not then at Athens[2]; it is probable, however, from a mention of him in the *De Oratore*, that Cicero knew him through Piso. Diodorus, the pupil of Critolaus, is frequently named by Cicero, but never as an acquaintance. Cratippus was at this time unknown to him.

The philosopher from whose lessons Cicero certainly learned most at this period was Antiochus of Ascalon, now the representative of a Stoicised Academic school. Of this teacher, however, I shall have to treat later, when I shall attempt to estimate the influence he exercised over our author. It is sufficient here to say that on the main point which was in controversy between Philo and Antiochus, Cicero still continued to think with his earlier teacher. His later works, however, make it evident that he set a high value on the abilities and the learning of Antiochus, especially in dialectic, which was taught by him after Stoic principles. Cicero speaks of him as eminent among the philosophers of the time, both for talent and acquirement[3]; as a man of acute intellect[4]; as possessed of a pointed style[5]; in fine, as the most cultivated and keenest philosopher of the age[6]. A considerable friendship sprang up between Antiochus and Cicero[7], which was strengthened by the fact that many friends of the latter, such as Piso[8], Varro, Lucullus and Brutus, more or less adhered to the views of Antiochus. It is improbable that Cicero at this time became acquainted with Aristus the brother of Antiochus, since in the *Academica*[9] he is mentioned in such a way as to show that he was unknown to Cicero in B.C. 62.

The main purpose of Cicero while at Athens had been to learn

1 *D. F.* V. § 6, etc.
2 *D. F.* V. § 8.
3 *Ac.* II. § 4.
4 *Ib.* § 69.
5 *Ad Att.* XIII. 19, § 5.
6 *Ac.* II. § 113.
7 *Ac.* II. § 113. *De Leg.* I. § 54. Plutarch says that Antiochus joined Cicero's Roman friends in urging him to return to a political career, on the death of Sulla.
8 Piso is sometimes called a Peripatetic, sometimes a follower of Antiochus (as in *Fin.* V. 7, 8). The agreement between the two schools on matters of ethics was so close that the names 'Peripatetic' and 'Antiochean' are sometimes interchanged. Cf. *Att.* XIII. 19, 4. In *Fin.* V. 75, Piso makes a comparison between Staseas and Antiochus to the advantage of the latter.
9 II. § 12.

philosophy; in Asia and at Rhodes he devoted himself principally to rhetoric, under the guidance of the most noted Greek teachers, chief of whom was his old friend Molo, the head of the Rhodian school[1]. Cicero however formed while at Rhodes one friendship which largely influenced his views of philosophy, that with Posidonius the pupil of Panaetius, the most famous Stoic of the age. To him Cicero makes reference in his works oftener than to any other instructor. He speaks of him as the greatest of the Stoics[2]; as a most notable philosopher, to visit whom Pompey, in the midst of his eastern campaigns, put himself to much trouble[3]; as a minute inquirer[4]. He is scarcely ever mentioned without some expression of affection, and Cicero tells us that he read his works more than those of any other Stoic author[5]. Posidonius was at a later time resident at Rome[6], and stayed in Cicero's house. Hecato the Rhodian, another pupil of Panaetius, may have been at Rhodes at this time. Mnesarchus and Dardanus, also hearers of Panaetius, belonged to an earlier time, and although Cicero was well acquainted with the works of the former, he does not seem to have known either personally.

From the year 77 to the year 68 B.C. when the series of letters begins, Cicero was doubtless too busily engaged with legal and political affairs to spend much time in systematic study. That his oratory owed much to philosophy from the first he repeatedly insists; and we know from his letters that it was his later practice to refresh his style by much study of the Greek writers, and especially the philosophers. During the period then, about which we have little or no information, we may believe that he kept up his old knowledge by converse with his many Roman friends who had a bent towards philosophy, as well as with the Greeks who from time to time came to Rome and frequented the houses of the Optimates; to this intercourse he added such reading as his leisure would allow. The letters contained in the first book of those addressed to Atticus, which range over the years 68—62 B.C., afford many proofs of the abiding strength of his passion for literary employment. In the earlier part of this time we find him entreating Atticus to let him have a library which was then for sale; expressing at the same time in the strongest language his loathing for public affairs, and his love for books, to which he looks as the support of his old age[7]. In the midst of his busiest political occupations,

[1] *Brutus*, § 316.
[2] *Hortensius*, fragm. 44, ed. Müller.
[3] *T. D.* II. § 61. Plut. *Cic.* IV.
[4] *De Diu.* I. § 130.
[5] *D. F.* I. § 6.
[6] He came to Rome about the time of Marius' death; Suidas *s. v.* Ποσειδώνιος: Plut. *Mar.* 45.
[7] *Ad Att.* I. 10 and 11.

when he was working his hardest for the consulship, his heart was given to the adornment of his Tusculan villa in a way suited to his literary and philosophic tastes. This may be taken as a specimen of his spirit throughout his life. He was before all things a man of letters; compared with literature, politics and oratory held quite a secondary place in his affections. Public business employed his intellect, but never his heart.

The year 62 released him from the consulship and enabled him to indulge his literary tastes. To this year belong the publication of his speeches, which were crowded, he says, with the maxims of philosophy[1]; the history of his consulship, in Latin and Greek, the Greek version which he sent to Posidonius being modelled on Isocrates and Aristotle; and the poem on his consulship, of which some fragments remain. A year or two later we find him reading with enthusiasm the works of Dicaearchus, and keeping up his acquaintance with living Greek philosophers[2]. His long lack of leisure seems to have caused an almost unquenchable thirst for reading at this time. His friend Paetus had inherited a valuable library, which he presented to Cicero. It was in Greece at the time, and Cicero thus writes to Atticus: 'If you love me and feel sure of my love for you, use all the endeavours of your friends, clients, acquaintances, freedmen, and even slaves to prevent a single leaf from being lost...Every day I find greater satisfaction in study, so far as my forensic labours permit[3].' At this period of his life Cicero spent much time in study at his estates near Tusculum, Antium, Formiae, and elsewhere. I dwell with greater emphasis on these facts, because of the idea now spread abroad that Cicero was a mere dabbler in literature, and that his works were extempore paraphrases of Greek books half understood. In truth, his appetite for every kind of literature was insatiable, and his attainments in each department considerable. He was certainly the most learned Roman of his age, with the single exception of Varro. One of his letters to Atticus[4] will give a fair picture of his life at this time. He especially studied the political writings of the Greeks, such as Theophrastus and Dicaearchus[5]. He also wrote historical memoirs after the fashion of Theopompus[6].

The years from 59—57 B.C. were years in which Cicero's private cares overwhelmed all thought of other occupation. Soon after his return from exile, in the year 56, he describes himself as 'devouring

[1] *Ad Att.* II. 1, § 3. *N. D.* I. § 6. Cf. n. 6 on p. 9.
[2] *Ad Att.* II. 2.
[3] *Ibid.* I. 20, § 7. Cf. II. 1, § 12.
[4] II. 6. [5] *Ad Att.* II. 7, § 4 and 16, § 3.
[6] *Ibid.* II. 6, § 2.

literature' with that marvellous man Dionysius[1], and laughingly pronouncing that nothing is sweeter than universal knowledge. He spent great part of the year 55 at Cumae or Naples 'feeding upon' the library of Faustus Sulla, the son of the dictator[2]. Literature formed then, he tells us, his solace and support, and he would rather sit in a garden seat which Atticus possessed, beneath a bust of Aristotle, than in the ivory chair of office. Towards the end of the year he was busily engaged on the *De Oratore*, a work which clearly proves his continued familiarity with Greek philosophy[3]. In the following year (54) he writes that politics must cease for him, and that he therefore returns unreservedly to the life most in accordance with nature, that of the student[4]. During this year he was again for the most part resident at those of his country villas where his best collections of books were. At this time was written the *De re publica*, a work to which I may appeal for evidence that his old philosophical studies had by no means been allowed to drop[5]. Aristotle is especially mentioned as one of the authors read at this time[6]. In the year 52 B.C. came the *De Legibus*, written amid distracting occupations; a work professedly modelled on Plato and the older philosophers of the Socratic schools[7].

In the year 51 Cicero, then on his way to Cilicia, revisited Athens, much to his own pleasure and that of the Athenians. He stayed in the house of Aristus, the brother of Antiochus and teacher of Brutus. His acquaintance with this philosopher was lasting, if we may judge from the affectionate mention of him in the *Brutus*[8]. Cicero also speaks in kindly terms of Xeno, an Epicurean friend of Atticus, who was then with Patro at Athens. It was at this time that Cicero interfered to prevent Memmius, the patron of the great Roman Epicurean Lucretius, from destroying the house in which Epicurus had lived[9]. Cicero seems to have been somewhat disappointed with the state of philosophy at Athens, Aristus being the only man of merit then resident there[10]. On the journey from Athens to his province, he made the acquaintance of Cratippus, who afterwards taught at Athens as head of the Peripatetic school[11]. At this time Cratippus came to visit Cicero at Mitylene, where the orator seems to have passed some time in his society[12]. He was by

[1] Cf. *Ad Att.* IV. 11, § 2 with IV. 8 a, § 1.
[2] *Ibid.* IV. 10.
[3] *Ibid.* IV. 16, § 2.
[4] *Ibid.* IV. 18, § 2, ed. Wesenberg.
[5] *Ad Qu. Fr.* II. 12, § 1, ed. Wes.
[6] *Ad Qu. Fr.* III. 5 and 6.
[7] It is worth noticing that some of Cicero's later philosophical works are distinctly foreshadowed in the *De Legibus*; cf. I. §§ 53 sq., where the *De Finibus* is plainly hinted at.
[8] § 332.
[9] *Ad Fam.* XIII. 1. *Ad Att.* V. 11, § 6. Patro was at Brundisium when Cic. returned from Cilicia (*Att.* VII. 2, § 5).
[10] *Ad Att.* V. 10, § 5.
[11] *De Off.* I. § 1.
[12] *Tim.* § 2, ed. Müller.

far the greatest, Cicero said, of all the Peripatetics he had himself heard and indeed equal in merit to the most eminent of that school[1].

The care of that disordered province Cilicia was enough to employ Cicero's thoughts till the end of 50. Yet he yearned for Athens and philosophy. He wished to leave some memorial of himself at the beautiful city, and anxiously asked Atticus whether it would look foolish to build a πρόπυλον at the Academia, as Appius, his predecessor, had done at Eleusis[2]. It seems the Athenians of the time were in the habit of adapting their ancient statues to suit the noble Romans of the day, and of placing on them fulsome inscriptions. Of this practice Cicero speaks with loathing. In one letter of this date he carefully discusses the errors Atticus had pointed out in the books *De re publica*[3]. His wishes with regard to Athens still kept their hold upon his mind, and on his way home from Cilicia he spoke of conferring on the city some signal favour[4]. Cicero was anxious to show Rhodes, with its school of eloquence, to the two boys Marcus and Quintus, who accompanied him, and they probably touched there for a few days[5]. From thence they went to Athens, where Cicero again stayed with Aristus[6], and renewed his friendship with other philosophers, among them Xeno the friend of Atticus[7].

On Cicero's return to Italy public affairs were in a very critical condition, and left little room for thoughts about literature. The letters which belong to this time are very pathetic. Cicero several times contrasts the statesmen of the time with the Scipio he had himself drawn in the *De re publica*[8]; when he thinks of Caesar, Plato's description of the tyrant is present to his mind[9]; when he deliberates about the course he is himself to take, he naturally recalls the example of Socrates, who refused to leave Athens amid the misrule of the thirty tyrants[10]. It is curious to find Cicero, in the very midst of civil war, poring over the books of Demetrius the Magnesian concerning concord[11]; or employing his days in arguing with himself a string of abstract philosophical propositions about tyranny[12]. Nothing could more clearly show that he was really a man of books; by nothing but accident

[1] Cf. *Tim.* § 2 with *De Div.* I. § 5, *Brutus*, § 250.
[2] *Ad Att.* VI. 1, § 26.
[3] *Ibid.* VI. 2, § 3.
[4] *Ibid.* VI. 6, § 2.
[5] *Ibid.* VI. 7, § 2. *Ad Fam.* II. 17, § 1. *Orat.* § 5.
[6] *T. D.* V. § 22. *Ad Att.* VI. 9, 5.
[7] *Ad Att.* VII. 1, § 1. As to Xeno, cf. also *Ad Att.* XIII. 37, 1; XIV. 16, 4; XV. 21, 3; XVI. 1, 5; XVI. 3, 2. It was at this time that Cic. probably got to know the Epicureans Siro and Philodemus (*Fin.* II. 119).
[8] *Ad Att.* VII. 3, § 2; VIII. 11, § 1.
[9] *Ibid.* X. 8, § 6.
[10] *Ibid.* VIII. 2, § 4.
[11] περὶ ὁμονοίας, *Ad Att.* IX. 9, § 2; cf. too VII. 11.
[12] *Ibid.* IX. 4, § 2; 9, § 1.

a politician. In these evil days, however, no occupation was long to his taste; books, letters, study, all in their turn became unpleasant[1].

As soon as Cicero had become fully reconciled to Caesar in the year 46 he returned with desperate energy to his old literary pursuits. In a letter written to Varro in that year[2], he says, 'I assure you I had no sooner returned to Rome than I renewed my intimacy with my old friends, my books.' These gave him real comfort, and his studies seemed to bear richer fruit than in his days of prosperity[3]. The tenor of all his letters at this time is the same: see especially the remaining letters to Varro and also to Sulpicius[4]. The *Partitiones Oratoriae*, the *Paradoxa*, the *Orator*, and the *Laudatio Catonis*, to which Caesar replied by his *Anticato*, were all finished within the year. Before the end of the year the *Hortensius* and the *De Finibus* had probably both been planned and commenced. Early in the following year the *Academica*, the history of which I shall trace elsewhere, was written.

I have now finished the first portion of my task; I have shown Cicero as the man of letters and the student of philosophy during that portion of his life which preceded the writing of the *Academica*. Even the evidence I have produced, which does not include such indirect indications of philosophical study as might be obtained from the actual philosophical works of Cicero, is sufficient to justify his boast that at no time had he been divorced from philosophy[5]. He was entitled to meet the charge made by some people on the publication of his first book of the later period—the *Hortensius*—that he was a mere tiro in philosophy, by the assertion that on the contrary nothing had more occupied his thoughts throughout the whole of a wonderfully energetic life[6]. His knowledge of philosophy must of course be estimated ultimately by his extant works. These have been severely judged by some leading scholars of recent times, but on wholly insufficient grounds. The tide must one day turn, indeed is even now turning, and due gratitude will again be felt and expressed for the man who has preserved to

[1] *Ad Att.* IX. 10, § 2.

[2] *Ad Fam.* IX. 1, § 2.

[3] *Ibid.* IX. 3, § 2.

[4] *Ibid.* IV. 3 and 4.

[5] *De Rep.* I. § 7. *T. D.* V. § 5, etc.

[6] Cf. *N. D.* § 6. The following are some passages in which philosophy is spoken of or hinted at in the speeches: *Sest.* 47; *Mur.* 63; *Pis.* 37; *Balb.* 3; *Cael.* 39—42; *Phil.* XI, 28; *Marc.* 19; *Deiot.* 37; *pro dom.* 47; *post red. in sen.* 14. When, however, the ancient writers on rhetoric speak of philosophy being useful to the orator, they refer almost entirely to ethical commonplaces. Cf. for example, Sen. *Contr.* I. 7, 17, hic philosophumenon locum introduxit, quo modo animi magnis calamitatibus euerterentur; *ib.* VII. 6, 18, Albucius et philosophatus est et dixit neminem natum liberum, etc. Cf. n. on *Ac.* I. § 8, intima philosophia.

us so much of the later Greek speculation, which is of vast historical value and was doomed to perish in the original Greek. I shall speak hereafter of some causes which have contributed to produce a low estimate of Cicero's work. But there is one piece of unfairness which I shall have no better opportunity of mentioning than the present. It is this. Cicero, the philosopher, is made to suffer for the shortcomings of Cicero the politician. Scholars who have learned to despise his political weakness, vanity, and irresolution, make haste to depreciate his achievements in philosophy, without troubling themselves to inquire too closely into their intrinsic value. From political partisanship, and prejudices based on facts irrelevant to the matter in hand, I beg all students to free themselves in reading the *Academica*.

§ 2. *The Philosophical Opinions of Cicero.*

In the time of Cicero students of philosophy nearly all belonged to one of two opposing camps. The Stoic and the Epicurean systems each had a large following. The Peripatetic sect numbered but a few adherents[1]. The New Academy had only at three periods in its history attracted to it any large number of disciples, once when it was founded by Arcesilas, again under the presidency of Carneades, and lastly when Philo was at its head. Philo himself at the end of his life ceased to preach the pure doctrine of Carneades, and when he died the New Academy practically became extinct[2]. Meanwhile, Philo's pupil, Antiochus, had constructed a combination of Stoicism, Platonism, and Peripateticism, which he dignified by the name of the Old Academy, and for which he secured some support. Of this system it will be necessary to speak hereafter.

In attempting to define Cicero's position with respect to the various contemporary schools of thought, it will be best to follow the division of philosophy (recognised by all the post-Aristotelian teachers), into the three branches of Logic, Ethics, Physics[3]. For the moment we may put aside the last-named branch. The only post-Aristotelian school which possessed a system of physics in all respects peculiar to itself was the Epicurean[4], and physical arguments were not prominent in the controversies of the time. The two main tasks of the later

[1] Cf. Epictetus, *Diss.* I. 19, 20 εὑρήσετε ὀλίγους τινὰς Περιπατητικοὺς καὶ τούτους ἐκλελυμένους.

[2] See *Ac.* II. 11 ista philosophia quae nunc prope dimissa reuocatur and *N. D.* I. 6 where the New Academy is spoken of as 'deserta et iam pridem relicta.'

[3] *Acad.* I. 19, with my n.

[4] I pass by here the few individuals who still described themselves as Pythagoreans, like Cicero's friend, P. Nigidius Figulus (Cic. *Tim.* § 1).

Greek philosophy were, as Cicero often insists, one dialectical, the establishment of a criterion, such as would suffice to distinguish the true from the false; and one ethical, the determination of the summum bonum, or moral standard[1]. It is convenient here to take the dialectical problem first (though in the eyes of the ancients it was infinitely the less important of the two). All that was distinctive of the New Academy was its dialectic[2]. It proclaimed no peculiar views either in ethics or in physics. As the Sceptical school of Pyrrho was practically in abeyance[3], the New Academy had for its own especial property the doctrine that man is so constituted as to be incapable of reaching absolute and certain truth[4]. It was by virtue of accepting this tenet that Cicero became and on all occasions declared himself a follower of the New Academy.

It is easy to see what there was in this view to attract Cicero. His mind was open and unprejudiced, receptive and impressible, to an extraordinary degree, and utterly unfitted for a blind and deaf defence of any fixed dogma. His temperament also was gentle almost to softness, and he entirely lacked the robust confidence in self which distinguishes the dogmatic controversialist. His experience as an orator also inclined him towards the New Academy. He was accustomed to hear arguments put forward with equal persuasiveness on both sides of a case. In other fields too it seemed to him arrogant to advance any proposition with a conviction of its absolute, indestructible and irrefragable truth. One requisite of a philosophy with him was that it should avoid this arrogance[5]. Philosophers of the highest repute for ability and sincerity had held the most opposite opinions on the same subjects[6]. To withhold absolute assent from all doctrines, while giving a qualified assent to those which seemed most probable, was the only prudent course[7]. The diversities of view which the most famous intellects exhibit, ought, said Cicero, to incline thinkers towards charity and toleration, and to repel them from the fury of dogmatism. Men ought to teach and enlighten one another in a spirit of gentleness and moderation[8].

[1] Cf. *Ac.* II. 29.

[2] *Ac.* II. 70 with n.

[3] See below, p. 54.

[4] For the more precise limitation and definition of this doctrine see below, p. 55.

[5] *Diu.* II. 1 quod genus philosophandi minime adrogans maximeque et constans et elegans arbitraremur quattuor Academicis libris ostendimus; also *Ac.* I. 45.

[6] Cf. Varro, *Eumenides* XV (Riese), postremo nemo aegrotus quisquam somniat tam infandum quod non aliquis dicat philosophus; Seneca, ἀποκολοκυντ. § 2 facilius inter philosophos quam inter horologia conueniet.

[7] *N. D.* I. 1 quid est temeritate turpius aut quid tam temerarium atque indignum sapientis grauitate atque constantia quam aut falsum sentire aut quod non satis explorate perceptum sit et cognitum sine ulla dubitatione defendere?

[8] *Tusc.* II. 5 nos ipsos redargui refellique patiamur; quod ei ferunt animo iniquo qui certis quibus quam destinatis-

In positiveness of assertion there seemed to Cicero to be something reckless and unseemly, and destructive of that dignity, balance, and control which distinguish the Roman ideal of character[1]. He frequently urges arguments also, which have had countless parallels in modern times, to show that the untrammelled conflict of opinion is necessary to the progress of thought. To freedom of speculation Greece owed the pre-eminence of her philosophers[2]. Wherever authority had loudly raised its voice, there philosophy had pined. Pythagoras is quoted[3] as a warning example, and the baneful effects of authority are often depicted[4]. The true philosophic spirit, Cicero said, requires us not to maintain with obstinacy one view of a subject, but to study all views. It is a matter of duty to discuss all aspects of every question, after the example of the Old Academy (*i.e.* the immediate successors of Plato and of Aristotle[5]). Those who demand strict dogmatic formulas are mere busybodies[6]. The Academics glory in their freedom of judgment. They are not compelled to defend an opinion whether they will or no, merely because one of their predecessors has maintained it[7]. So far does Cicero carry this freedom, that in the fifth book of the *Tusculan Disputations* he maintains a view entirely at variance with the whole of the fourth book of the *De Finibus*, and when the discrepancy is pointed out, refuses to be bound by his former statements, on the plea that he is an Academic and a free man[8]. 'Modo hoc modo illud probabilius uidetur[9].' The Academic sips the best of every school[10]. He roams in the wide field of philosophy, while the Stoic dares not stir a foot's breadth away from Chrysippus[11]. The Academic is only anxious that people should combat his opinions, for he makes it his aim, with Socrates, to free himself and others from the mists of error[12]. If he finds it easier to detect error

que sententiis quasi addicti et consecrati sunt; nos qui sequimur probabilia et refellere sine pertinacia et refelli sine iracundia parati sumus. Cf. too *N. D.* I. 5, and *Diu.* II. 28 soli sumus (i. e. *Academici*) quibus licet uerum exquirere sine inuidia. So the passage should be read; MSS and edd. omit *quibus*. Also *Tusc.* V. 83 nos (*Academici*) cum pace agemus.

[1] *Diu.* II. 1.

[2] *Tusc.* II. 4.

[3] *N. D.* I. 10.

[4] *Ac.* II. 8 with my nn.; *N. D.* I. §§ 10, 66.

[5] *Tusc.* II. 9.

[6] *N. D.* I. 10.

[7] *N. D.* I. 17 auditorem aecum, libero iudicio, nulla eius modi astrictum necessitate, ut mihi uelim nolim sit certa quaedam tuenda sententia. Cf. *Ac.* II. §§ 9, 120, 137.

[8] *Tusc.* V. 33 tu quidem tabellis obsignatis agis mecum et testificaris quid dixerim aliquando aut scripserim. Cum aliis isto modo, qui legibus impositis disputant, nos in diem uiuimus; quodcumque nostros animos probabilitate percussit, id dicimus; itaque soli sumus liberi. Cf. too *ibid.* § 83.

[9] See *Ac.* II. 121 with my n.

[10] *Tusc.* V. 82 libas ex omnibus.

[11] *Ac.* II. 143.

[12] *Tusc.* V. 11 ut nostram ipsi sententiam tegeremus, errore alios leuaremus.

than to discover truth, the fault lies in the nature of things, and not in him[1]. The New Academy at all times dwelt much on the critical and destructive side of the Socratic and Platonic teachings[2]. It interpreted the constructive dialogues of Plato by the light of the 'dialogues of search,' and maintained that the founder of the Academy never dreamed of setting forth his doctrines as anything more than attempts to find the truth. This view of Plato's dialogues seems to have been pretty widely accepted in Cicero's time, even by dogmatic teachers[3].

While rejoicing in this boundless freedom of thought, Cicero indignantly repels the charge that the Academy, though claiming to seek for the truth, effaces the distinction between the true and the false, and can therefore find no truth to follow[4]. Truth is identified with probability and not with certainty[5].

Another consideration which attracted Cicero to these tenets was their evident adaptability to the purposes of oratory, and the fact that eloquence was, as he puts it, the child of the Academy[6]. Orators, politicians, and men of letters had ever found their best nourishment in the teaching of the Academic and Peripatetic masters[7], while the Stoics and Epicureans cared nothing for power of expression. Again, the Academic tenets were those with which the common sense of the world was most in sympathy[8]. The Academy moreover was the school which had the most respectable pedigree. Philo was the successor, in a direct line, of Socrates and Plato. All other systems, which could not trace their origin to these philosophers, had a plebeian appearance[9]. The philosopher who best preserved the Socratic tradition was most estimable, *ceteris paribus*, and that philosopher was Carneades[10], whom Philo unhesitatingly followed at the time when Cicero heard him.

Before we proceed to state the ethical views of Cicero, it will be convenient to discuss one or two matters which concern his entire attitude with regard to philosophy. Though he described himself as a New Academic, he has in modern times far oftener been named

[1] *N. D.* I. § 57. *Ac.* II. 32.

[2] *Ac.* II. 74 with nn.

[3] See my nn. on *Ac.* II. 74.

[4] *N. D.* I. 12 non sumus ei quibus nihil uerum esse uideatur; *Off.* II. 7 non sumus ei quorum animus uagetur errore.

[5] This position is fully explained in *Ac.* II. and in the nn. on the text.

[6] *Parad.* § 2 nos ea philosophia utimur quae peperit dicendi copiam; *Fat.* 3, cum hoc genere philosophiae quod nos sequimur, magnam habet orator societatem; cf. also *Tusc.* I. 7; *Off.* I. 3.

[7] *Fin.* IV. 5.

[8] *Parad.* § 2.

[9] *Tusc.* I. 55 licet concurrant omnes plebeii philosophi; sic enim ei qui a Platone et Socrate et ab ea familia dissident, appellandi uidentur; cf. *Diu.* I. 62.

[10] *Tusc.* V. 11, etc.

an Eclectic[1]. It may be questioned whether the title is suited to any of the ancient writers on philosophy. At any rate the application of the name to Cicero, without strict limitation and definition, may easily lead, as it has led, to serious misconceptions regarding his position. Many of the writers who dub Cicero 'eclectic' appear to think that they thereby cast on him a grave reproach. The note or mark of eclecticism present to the minds of these writers is want of originality. Now to charge Cicero with want of originality betrays a failure to catch the spirit of the age in which he lived. It was an age of exposition and commentation, not an age of original thought, and this is just as true of the Greek world at that period as of the Roman. No substantially novel views of philosophy had been propounded since the time of Carneades; indeed we might say since the time of Arcesilas. It was tacitly assumed on all hands that any one who pursued philosophy must needs attach himself to one of the existing schools. There was absolutely no demand whatever for views of truth which professed to be new[2]. Originality in a philosopher, far from being looked upon as a merit, would rather have been treated as a sin. Changes indeed, most profound and momentous, were in progress. Old dogmas and formulas were continually on the lips of the philosophers, and old controversial battles were incessantly fought over again, yet the spirit of the combatants was vastly different from that of their intellectual forefathers. The change however did not proceed from the speculations of any individuals, but was part of a general movement in culture and society.

Further, to speak of Cicero as an 'eclectic' is to lead unwary readers to misapprehend, in particular, the standpoint of the New Academy. The eclectic makes it his business to appropriate parts of different systems, and weave them into a consistent whole. But the New Academy was bound by the very condition of its existence to refrain from inculcating any particular doctrines. Its one function was to breathe into its disciples the spirit of criticism, to drive out from their minds that confident spirit of dogmatic assertion, which like some wild and savage monster (so Cicero has it[3]) dominated the adherents of all the other philosophies. This task accomplished, the New Academy left its alumni absolutely free to accept any tenets whatever. They were bound to consider all arguments which could be advanced for or against all doctrines, and then, striking a balance of probabilities,

[1] Kirchmann, in the Introduction to his translation of the *De Finibus*, calls Cicero 'das echte Muster eines Eklektikers.'

[2] The lament of Seneca (*N. Q.* VII. c. 32) that philosophy should be still only in its infancy is almost unique.

[3] *Ac.* II. 108.

to adopt those views which appeared to have the advantage. But any utterance of the New Academic was to be taken merely as expressing his estimate of the probabilities at the moment. If his estimate changed, he not only might but must change his doctrine. There was indeed nothing in the principles of the New Academy to prevent one of its followers from accepting the Stoic scheme, or the Epicurean scheme whole and entire, if he could conscientiously say that he had made a thorough examination, and was merely giving expression to what he supposed at the moment to be probably true. As a matter of fact, tradition in a large measure influenced the New Academic in the acceptance and rejection of doctrines. But there was nothing that could fairly be described as a New Academic system. For example, the most intimate pupils of Carneades were unable to say what his real opinion was concerning the question of questions for all the thinkers after Aristotle, the summum bonum[1].

We must now turn to another point. It has been supposed by many scholars, on the strength of certain passages in the *Academica Posteriora*, that Cicero had for a time abandoned the views he learned from Philo, and resumed them just before the *Academica* was written. In § 13 Varro charges Cicero with deserting the Old Academy for the New, and Cicero seems to admit the charge. But one of the phrases used by Varro (*tractari autem nouam*) points to a solution of the difficulty. Varro evidently means that Cicero, having in earlier works copied the *writings* of 'Old Academic' philosophers, is about to draw on the literary stores of the New Academy. In composing the *Republic*, *De Legibus*, *Consolatio*, *Hortensius* and other works, he had used writings which were in the phraseology of the day all classed as 'Old Academic,' a term under which the earlier Peripatetic and Academic literature was ranked, along with the soi-disant 'Old Academic' treatises of Antiochus. As the works just mentioned were entirely ethical or political in their bearing, the use of them involved no abandonment of the one thing needful for the follower of the New Academy, the Carneadean dialectic. That a modified acquiescence in the ethical opinions of Antiochus was, in Cicero's view, quite compatible with the spirit of critical inquiry which he had learned from Philo, is shown by another passage in the *Academica Posteriora* (§ 7), which has caused much unnecessary trouble to the commentators. Cicero there states that he, in common with Varro, regards with favour ('*probamus*') the 'uetus Academia,' which the context shows to be the 'uetus Academia'

[1] *Ac.* II. § 139.

was expounded by Antiochus[1]. As Cicero is on the very point of attacking the Antiochean dialectic, his approval can only be intended to refer to the ethical and physical sides of Antiochus' system. As the duty of doubt and the theory of probability had not been set forth in any work, either Greek or Roman, for thirty or forty years, Cicero's advocacy of the Philonian dialectic might well appear to Varro as an act of desertion[2]. It must also be remembered, whenever Cicero speaks of the 'uetus Academia,' that he dissented entirely from that estimate of Plato's early successors, for which Antiochus contended, and maintained that from Socrates to Philo no Academic teacher had been a dogmatist, so that to speak of an Old and a New Academy was a mistake[3].

We can now pass to Cicero's view of the ethical problem. The determination of an ethical standard was in the eyes of the post-Aristotelian philosophers the grand purpose, end and aim of philosophy, which was emphatically defined as 'the art of conduct' or 'the art of living' (*ars uiuendi*[4]). All speculative and non-ethical doctrines were merely estimable as supplying a basis on which this practical art could be reared. This is equally true of Pyrrho's scepticism and of the dogmatism of Zeno and Epicurus. If the dogmatists objected to the dialectic of the New Academy, it was only because in their opinion it logically led to the subversion of morality[5]. Cicero is therefore greatly concerned in the *Lucullus* to prove that probability is sufficient to afford that stable basis for moral practice which he felt to be necessary. The New Academics generally took firmer ground in ethical matters than the Sceptics[6], and Cicero often went beyond his own friends in this respect. Thus in the *De Legibus*, when the conversation turns on a question in morals, he begs the New Academy, which has introduced confusion into these subjects, to be silent[7]. There can be no doubt that Cicero was deeply influenced throughout his life by the scheme of ethics which he had learned from Antiochus. In all Cicero's works which touch on moral or political questions that philosopher is mentioned with great respect[8]. But all systems which seemed

[1] The same qualified approval of Antiochus is given in many other places; e.g. *Fin.* III. 6; *Ac.* II. 139.

[2] The words *nunc desciscis* in *Ac.* I. 43 have reference only to the course of the dialogue; 'you are in the act of revolting' merely means 'you are on the point of explaining your revolt.'

[3] *Ac.* I. 13; I. 43 etc. There is possibly an allusion to this in *Orator* § 46 ego me saepe noua uideri dicere intellego cum peruetera dicam sed inaudita plerisque.

[4] *Ac.* II. § 23 with n. Cf. *Off.* I. 5 quis est qui nullis offici praeceptis tradendis philosophum se audeat dicere?

[5] *Ac.* II. §§ 29, 53, 58.

[6] Sext. Emp. *P. H.* I. 226.

[7] *Leg.* I. 39.

[8] Cf. e.g. *Leg.* I. 55.

to assure to moral principles a sound basis had for Cicero a great attraction. He was, in his later days, fascinated by the Stoics almost beyond the power of resistance. In respect of their ethical and religious ideas he calls them 'great and famous philosophers[1],' and he frequently speaks with something like shame of the treatment they had received at the hands of Arcesilas and Carneades. Once he expresses a fear lest they should be the only true philosophers after all[2]. There was a magnificence about the Stoic utterances on morality, more suited to a superhuman than a human world, which allured Cicero more than the barrenness of the Stoic dialectic repelled him[3]. In a remarkable passage[4], he assents to the distinctively Stoic doctrine that virtue is incapable of degree, and expressly rejects the position of Antiochus that a life enriched by virtue but unattended by other advantages might be happy, but could not be the happiest possible. He begs the Academic and Peripatetic Schools to cease from giving an uncertain sound[5], and to allow that the happiness of the wise man would remain unimpaired even if he were thrust into the bull of Phalaris. In another place he admits the purely Stoic doctrine that virtue is one and indivisible[6]. These opinions, however, he will not allow to be distinctively Stoic, but appeals to Socrates as his authority for them[7]. Zeno, who is merely an ignoble craftsman of words, stole them from the older philosophers of the Academy. This is Cicero's general feeling with regard to Zeno, and there can be no doubt that he caught it from Antiochus who, in stealing the doctrines of Zeno, ever stoutly maintained that Zeno had stolen them before. Cicero, however, regarded chiefly the ethics of Zeno with this feeling, while Antiochus so regarded chiefly the dialectic. It is just in this that the main difference between Antiochus and Cicero lies. To the former Zeno's dialectic was true and Socratic, while the latter treated it as un-Socratic, looking upon Socrates as the apostle of doubt[8]. On the whole Cicero went beyond Antiochus in his sympathy with the Stoic ethics. Not at every point, however, for while Antiochus accepted without reserve the Stoic paradoxes, Cicero hesitatingly allowed them, though he admitted that they were Socratic[9]. Again, Antiochus subscribed to the Stoic theory that all emotion was sinful;

[1] *N. D.* I. 4.

[2] *Tusc.* IV. 53; cf. too *Diu.* II. 150 quorum licentiae nisi Carneades restitisset, haud scio an soli iam philosophi iudicarentur.

[3] Cf. *Off.* III. 20.

[4] *Tusc.* V. §§ 21—31, esp. § 23.

[5] *Tusc.* V. 75. The word used is *balbutire*, on which August. ciu. d. IV. 30 thus puns 'has superstitiones quas iste *Balbus* uelut *balbutiens* vix reprehendit.'

[6] *Off.* II. 35.

[7] *Tusc.* V. 34.

[8] See my nn. on *Ac.* II. 74.

[9] *Paradoxa* § 4. *Ac.* II. §§ 136, 137. *Tusc.* III. 10.

Cicero's temperament led him to refuse it with horror[1]. On some questions, as we have already seen, Cicero wavered. In the *De Finibus* he argued that the difference between the Stoic and Peripatetic ethics was merely one of terms; in the *Tusculan Disputations* he held it to be real. The most Stoic in tone of all his works are the *Tusculan Disputations* and the *De Officiis*[2].

The third branch of philosophy, that concerned with natural phenomena, was in Cicero's age accounted of small importance compared with ethics. Physical investigations were only valued for the effect they might have on ethical speculation or practice. Cicero esteemed physical science mainly as a form of culture[3]. The atomism of the Epicureans and the pantheistic materialism of the Stoics were alike directed to securing for the wise man the perfect repose of mind which was necessary for the full realisation of his ethical ideal. In all ancient systems, theology was recognised as a division of natural science. The religious element in Cicero's nature inclined him very strongly to sympathise with the Stoic views of the grand universal operation of divine power. Piety, purity, and moral good were impossible in any form, he thought, if the divine government of the universe were denied[4]. He was grieved that Carneades should have found it necessary to oppose the beautiful Stoic theology, and he defends the great sceptic by the plea that his one aim was to rouse men to the investigation of the truth[5]. The fatalistic and pantheistic aspect of the Stoic physics, which was accepted by Antiochus[6], Cicero rejected, as became a follower of Carneades, who had spent much of his life in ridiculing the Stoic εἱμαρμένη. In the general outlines of physics, Cicero chiefly followed Antiochus, whose scheme is propounded in the *Academica Posteriora.* That philosopher, while owing much to the Stoics, drew largely upon the *Timaeus* of Plato, a work which Cicero knew and translated, though like all other readers of the dialogue he found it hard to understand[7]. Many of the Stoic notions which entered into the Antiochean physics were ultimately derived from Aristotle, but the physical treatises of that philosopher were in Cicero's time inaccessible, or at all events

[1] *Ac.* II. 135.

[2] In *Tusc.* V. 13 Cicero says it is better to sip at the cup of Stoicism than to drain it—'Stoicorum ista magis gustata quam potata delectant.'

[3] *Ac.* II. 127.

[4] See esp. *N. D.* I. §§ 3, 4. Cf. also the statements at the end of *N. D.* that the Stoic arguments about the gods are nearer truth than the rest; and *Diu.* I. § 8; II. § 148.

[5] *N. D.* I. 3 and 4; *Tusc.* V. 83.

[6] *Ac.* I. 29.

[7] *Fin.* II. 15. This dialogue of Plato exercised a more powerful and wide-reaching influence over the subsequent history of Greek thought than all his other writings put together.

unread, even by the Peripatetics themselves[1]. The later Peripatetics had adopted many Stoic doctrines in physics, as in ethics and dialectic, which they at the same time gave out as Aristotelian. Hence Antiochus, and Cicero with him, often supposed himself to be following Aristotle, when he was really treading in the track of Zeno.

Thus far I have spoken almost entirely of the effect produced on Cicero's mind by the ethical and physical speculations of the Stoics and Antiochus, inasmuch as these teachers influenced him more powerfully than any others. Very few words are needed to characterize his estimate of the Peripatetic and Epicurean schools. The former was not very powerfully represented in his time. Peripateticism had long since been penetrated through and through by the spirit of Stoicism. The Peripatetic teachers of Cicero's age appear to have confined themselves almost entirely to the discussion of ethical questions, and in the treatment of these they were often only divided from the Stoics by the finest of lines[2]. The principal point in dispute between the two schools was whether (as the Stoics said) virtue was the sole constituent of happiness, or whether (as the Peripatetics maintained) other endowments contributed to happiness, though to an utterly infinitesimal extent. One curious fact shews the decadence of the Peripatetic school at this time: the intellectual descendants of the author of the 'Organon' were notorious for their ignorance of logic[3]. While not much influenced by the school, Cicero generally treats it tenderly for the sake of its great past, deeming it a worthy branch of the true Socratic family. His feeling for the Epicureans was wholly different. Though he often compliments them on their gentle dispositions and their love for one another[4], he expresses nothing but contempt and loathing for their philosophy. In physics they stood as absolutely alone as did the New Academy in dialectic; their system was grossly unintellectual and they dispensed with the use of mathematics[5]. Their ethical doctrines excited in Cicero only disgust; dialectic they eschewed, and they crowned all their errors by a sin which the great orator could never pardon, for they were completely indifferent to every adornment and beauty of language.

[1] Grote's *Aristotle*, Vol. I. ch. 2.
[2] Cf. for example *Off.* III. §§ 11, 35.
[3] *Tusc.* IV. 9; *Fin.* III. 41.
[4] See n. on *Ac.* II. 115 Epicureos tam bonos, tam inter se amantis uiros.
[5] *Acad.* I. § 6 with nn.

§ 3. *On the aim of Cicero in writing his philosophical works, and their character.*

In the preceding sections some idea has been conveyed of the intellectual atmosphere in which Cicero lived, and the opinions concerning philosophy which he adopted. For the right appreciation of his philosophical works, one thing more is wanted, a clear notion of the objects he set before himself in writing them, and of the conditions under which they were written. Many of his modern critics have not had the patience to inquire what it was that he set himself to accomplish, and have condemned him for not achieving what he never intended to achieve.

We have already seen that the last idea which could have entered into the mind of Cicero or his contemporaries would have been that of creating a new philosophy. He depended entirely on his predecessors, and so drew necessarily upon Greek sources. There is not one of his works (if we except the third book of the *De Officiis*), which he does not freely admit to have been derived from the Greek.

When Cicero began to write, Latin may be said to have been destitute of a philosophical literature. Philosophy was a sealed study to those who were not thoroughly familiar with Greek. That the cultivated Roman public had some superficial acquaintance with the names and leading characteristics of the chief Greek philosophers is shown by the allusions which meet us in the Roman literature of the stage from an early period[1]. But this slight and dim knowledge came entirely through Greek sources. Down to Cicero's time there was a strong prejudice against the teaching of philosophy in Latin, similar to that which led Antonius the orator in his consulship to close the schools of the teachers of rhetoric who gave their lessons in Latin. Throughout his life Cicero was a strong advocate for the use of Latin in imparting all forms of culture to the Roman youth[2].

[1] I append a list of passages containing allusions to philosophy and philosophical reflections which I have marked in Ribbeck's *Fragmenta:* Ennius v. 340; Pacuuius: vv. 83—92, 348, 366—7; Attius: vv. 142, 296, 422; Trabea: v. 6; Caecilius: vv. 259 sq., 264, 266; Turpilius: vv. 9, 143; Afranius: v. 298; Pomponius entitled a play 'philosophia'; Laberius: vv. 17, 36, 72 sq. 98, p. 301; Incerti Auctores ap. Ribbeck II. p. 120, v. 48; *ib.* p. 125, v. 75. Cf. too Ter. Andr. 57, 960; Eun. 264. Some remarks on the knowledge of philosophy in early times at Rome will be found in Baldi, die Gegner der griechischen Bildung in Rom, p. 7. For Pacuvius cf. Munro on Lucr. v. 318, 320.

[2] *Off.* I. 1 ipse ad meam utilitatem semper cum Graecis Latina coniunxi neque id in philosophia solum sed etiam in dicendi exercitatione feci. The passage which follows is interesting.

Such philosophical literature as existed in Latin when Cicero began to write was almost entirely Epicurean, and that too (putting Lucretius aside) of a very miserable character. C. Amafinius, mentioned in the *Academica*[1], was the first to write, and his books seem to have had an enormous circulation[2]. He found a host of imitators, who obtained such a favourable reception that, in Cicero's strong language, they took possession of the whole of Italy[3]. A certain Rabirius and one Catius an Insubrian, of whom scarcely anything is known but their names, were two of the most noted of these writers[4]. Cicero assigns various reasons for their extreme popularity: the easy nature of the Epicurean physics, the fact that there was no other philosophy for Latin readers, and the voluptuous blandishments of pleasure when proposed as an ethical end. This last cause, as in one passage he seems to allow, must have been of small importance. It is not a little remarkable that the whole of the Roman Epicurean literature was almost exclusively devoted to the physical side of the system[5]. The Romans had as yet a strong practical basis for morality in the legal and social constitution of the family, and in their political life, and did not feel the need of theoretical systems, though the extinction of liberty was soon to produce the same effect it had occasioned in Greece. On the other hand the general decay among the educated classes of a belief in the supernatural, accompanied as it was by an increase of superstition among the masses, caused many readers to turn with avidity to a philosophy which offered a purely mechanical explanation of the universe.

These Roman Epicureans are continually reproached by Cicero with their uncouth style of writing[6]. They are bad translators of bad originals[7]. He indeed confesses he had not read them[8], but we may well believe that the reports he followed were true. A curious question here arises, how it was that Cicero, in speaking of the Roman Epicurean literature, never mentioned Lucretius. Probably at this time the poems of Lucretius had not yet made their way, and Cicero, unable to include the great poet in his sweeping condemnation, and unwilling to allow that anything good could come from the school of Epicurus, preferred

[1] I. § 6.

[2] *Tusc.* IV. §§ 6, 7 (a passage of great interest but too long to quote).

[3] *Tusc.* IV. 6 commota multitudo contulit se ad eam potissimum disciplinam; *ib.* § 7 Italiam totam occupauerunt; cf. *Fin.* II. 44 populus cum illis facit.

[4] Catius was not the same man as the epicure and friend of Horace (see Cic. *Fam.* XV. 16, 1).

[5] As regards Amafinius, Rabirius and Catius, this conclusion follows from *Ac.* I. § 6, and the casual mention in *Fam.* XV. 16, 1.

[6] *Acad.* I. § 6; *Tusc.* IV. §§ 6, 7; *ib.* II. 7 and III. 33; *Fin.* III. 40.

[7] *Fam.* XV. 19, 2.

[8] *Tusc.* II. 7.

to keep silence concerning a little-known writer, about whom his readers would not expect him to express an opinion[1].

Cicero hated and despised Epicureanism most sincerely, and one of his chief aims in undertaking his philosophical works was to stem the tide of its popularity in Italy. At the same time, as a patriot, he felt shame that the literature of his country should be destitute just where Greek was richest. He often tries by the most far-fetched arguments to shew that philosophy had left its mark on the Italian peoples in early times[2]. We have seen that there were many men of culture who did not object to philosophy so long as it was taught and read in Greek. To these he replies with indignation, accusing them of being untrue to their country[3]. It would be a glorious thing, he thinks, if Romans were no longer absolutely compelled to resort to the Greeks[4]. He will not even concede that Greek is a richer tongue than Latin[5]. As for the alleged incapacity of the Roman intellect to deal with philosophical inquiries, he will not hear of it. It is only, he says, because the energy of the nation has been diverted into other channels that so little progress has been made in this direction. The history of Roman oratory is referred to in support of this opinion[6]. If only an impulse were given at Rome to the pursuit of philosophy, already on the wane in Greece, Cicero thought that it would flourish and take the place of oratory, which he believed to be expiring amid the din of civil war[7]. He moreover clearly foresaw that the abolition of the old constitution of the state would drive many Romans in future to seek consolation in abstract studies[8].

There can be no doubt that Cicero was penetrated by the belief that if he wrote on philosophy he would do his country a real service[9].

[1] It is difficult to decide whether the Epicurean prose literature was published before or after the death of Lucretius. If, with Mr Munro, we interpret the boast of Lucretius in V. 336 that he wrote of Epicureanism in Latin 'primus cum primis,' to mean that he was the first Latin Epicurean writer in order of time, the matter would be settled. But it is not altogether certain that the expression 'primus cum primis' has this sense; and if it had, we should not be bound to take Lucretius *au pied de la lettre.* In I. 66, for example, he says that Epicurus was the first man who dared to face the gods without terror, and in I. 117 that Ennius was the first Italian who gained fame from Helicon; statements not literally true. On the other hand Lucretius' words 'auia *Pieridum* peragro loca' must be taken to indicate that he was the first Latin Epicurean *poet*, so that even if Rabirius did write before Lucretius, he cannot be identified with the poet mentioned by Ovid (*Pont.* IV. 16, 5), Velleius and Quintilian.

[2] *Tusc.* IV. 3.

[3] *Ac.* I. 10; *Fin.* I. 4—6; *ib.* III. 5.

[4] *Diu.* II. 5 magnificum illud etiam Romanisque hominibus gloriosum, ut Graecis de philosophia litteris non egeant; cf. *Orat.* 22 esset egregium non quaerere externa, domesticis esse contentos.

[5] *Fin.* III. 5; *N. D.* I. 8; *Tusc.* III. §§ 10, 16. Some of these passages almost look as though they might be meant for answers to Lucretius' laments about the 'patrii sermonis egestas.'

[6] *Tusc.* I. 5. [7] *Tusc.* II. 5.

[8] *Diu.* II. §§ 4, 5.

[9] Cf. *Leg.* I. 5 where the writing of

In his enforced political inaction and amid the disorganisation of the law courts, it was only by such work that he could render any service at all[1]. He is within his right when he claims praise for not abandoning himself to idleness or worse, as did so many of the most prominent men of his time[2]. For Cicero, idleness was at all times misery, and in those evil days he was spurred on to exertion by the deepest sorrow[3]. Philosophy took for him the place of forensic oratory, public harangues and politics[4]. It is strange to find Cicero making such elaborate apologies for devoting himself to the study of philosophy, and a careless reader might set them down to egotism. But it must never be forgotten that at Rome all literary and artistic pursuits were merely the amusement of the wealthy; the total devotion of a life to them seemed well enough for Greeks, but for Romans unmanly and unpractical[5]. Politics, oratory and war were the only worthy lifelong occupations for the Romans of wealth and ability. There were plenty of Romans, even in Cicero's time, ready to condemn literature and art altogether, as effeminate inventions of the Greeks. Some, while not objecting to other forms of literature, despised philosophy, and thought any Roman statesman degraded who meddled with it[6]. Others, like the Neoptolemus of Ennius, thought a little learning in philosophy was good, but that a great deal of it was a dangerous thing[7]. Some few preferred that Cicero should write on other subjects[8]. To these he replies by urging the pressing necessity there was for works in Latin on philosophy.

Still, amid much depreciation, sufficient interest and sympathy were roused by his first philosophical works to encourage Cicero to proceed. The elder generation, for whose approbation he most cared, praised the books, and many were induced both to read and to write works on philosophy[9]. Cicero now extended his plan, which was at first only tentative, so as to bring within its scope every topic which Greek philosophers were accustomed to treat[10]. Separate topics in philosophy

history in Latin, in competition with the Greeks is described as a patriotic task; also *Phil.* II. 20 me omni genere monumentorum meorum perfecisse ut meae uigiliae meaeque litterae et iuuentuti utilitatis et nomini Romano laudis aliquid adferrent.

[1] *Diu.* II. 1; *Off.* II. § 4; III. §§ 2—4.

[2] *Diu.* II. 1; *Off.* II. 4.

[3] Consol. fragm. 13, ed. Müller; *Tusc.* V. 5; *Ac.* I. 11, etc.

[4] *N. D.* I. 6.

[5] For Roman feeling on this subject cf. *Off.* I. §§ 19, 71, 153; also *Tusc.* II. §§ 1, 4; *Off.* II. 3; *Fin.* I. 1.

[6] *Fin.* I. 1 quibusdam et eis quidem non admodum indoctis totum hoc displicet, philosophari. Among these, for example, was Hortensius. In *Orator* § 11 we hear of people who, while not objecting to the pursuit of rhetoric, repudiated any attempt to treat it in connexion with philosophy. Cf. also *Ac.* II. 6; *Arch.* 12; *Phil.* II. 20.

[7] *Tusc.* II. 1; *Fin.* I. §§ 1, 3.

[8] *Fin.* I. §§ 1, 11. Among these was Atticus.

[9] *Diu.* II. 5; *Off.* II. 2.

[10] *Diu.* II. 4.

could not be thoroughly understood till the whole subject had been mastered[1]. This design then, which is not explicitly stated in the two earliest works which we possess, the *Academica* and *De Finibus*, required the composition of a sort of philosophical encyclopaedia. In accordance with Greek precedent, Cicero claimed to have his books on rhetoric and politics, nearly all of them published before the writings which belong to philosophy in the modern sense, included in the circle of his philosophical works[2]. It is no part of my plan to enumerate or characterise these writings separately. I can only speak of the leading features of the whole group, and in detail of the *Academica* and one or two works more or less closely connected with it.

It will be necessary now to consider the method on which Cicero constructed his philosophical treatises. As we have seen, he made no claim to originality. He did not even suppose himself to possess a special and technical knowledge of what had been written on the subject[3]. His early education, however, and subsequent reading had given him a good general acquaintance with the principles of the post-Aristotelian schools, which he desired to explain to his fellow-countrymen. But he never ventured to set forth those principles according to any fashion or arrangement of his own. His books are in no sense compilations from a number of different sources. When he wished to set before his readers the view taken by any school about any particular topic, he selected some one work relating to it, by an acknowledged master of the school. This he kept to very closely indeed; his writings are, in fact, to a great extent translations, though free translations, from the Greek sources. In no other way could the enormous mass of literature, which he poured forth in the last few years of his life, have been produced[4]. He constructed his philosophical works very much in the manner after which Livy constructed his history. Cicero took no pains to conceal the comparatively humble rôle which he proposed to himself. Frequently, indeed generally, he indicates the Greek works on which he draws. What he specially

[1] *N. D.* I. 9.

[2] *Diu.* II. 4. On the wide meaning of the word *φιλοσοφία* in the Greek writers, see Brandis, *Entwickelung d. griech. Phil.* pp. 4 sq. Strabo claimed geography as a branch of philosophy.

[3] Cf. *Off.* I. 2 philosophandi scientiam concedens multis, quod est oratoris proprium, apte distincte ornate dicere, quoniam in eo studio aetatem consumpsi, si id mihi assumo, uideor id meo iure quodam modo uindicare.

[4] The following passage lays bare his mode of working: viz. *Att.* XII. 52, 3 de lingua Latina securi es animi. Dices: qui talia conscribis? Ἀπόγραφα *sunt: minore labore fiunt; uerba tantum affero, quibus abundo.* In *Att.* XII. 18, 1 he speaks of writing in memory of Tullia, and says that he would cull for her the choicest flowers of Greek and Latin literature. Yet we know that in writing the *Consolatio* he followed pretty closely one book, that of Crantor, περὶ πένθους.

claims as his own is the style in which they are rendered. Such additions as he made to the originals were prescribed by two requirements, first the form into which the works were thrown—always that of the dialogue—secondly, the interests of Roman readers, for whom episodes and illustrations from the history and literature of their own country were introduced. To speak of the latter class of additions first, it must be remembered that, in the eyes of the average Roman, philosophy in itself lacked dignity[1], and could only be attractive when set in a Roman frame.

All Cicero's philosophical works are written in the form of dialogues; but the dialogue was of the later Greek type, and not of the kind with which we are so familiar from the works of Plato. This form seems to have died with Plato. The later form was much less dramatic, contained much less of question and answer and of repartee, and much more of continuous exposition. The conversation between the characters was confined to a few episodes, and the various conflicting views of the subject discussed were delivered in uninterrupted, or scarcely interrupted speeches of considerable length[2].

Cicero himself mentions two styles of dialogue which he followed, that of Heraclides, who introduced as *dramatis personae* famous men of a bygone time, and that of Aristotle, who always appeared himself as an interlocutor in his dialogues, and played the leading part[3]. He mentions the *De re publica* as Heraclidean, and to the same class belong the *Laelius* and the *Cato Maior*. As Aristotelian he mentions the works he was engaged upon in or about the year 45 B.C.[4], meaning the *Academica* and *De Finibus*, and probably the *Hortensius;* though to the same category belong all Cicero's dialogues, with the exception of the three mentioned above, and perhaps the *De Oratore.* About this work Cicero's language is inconsistent. In one passage (*Att.* XIII. 19, 4) he implies that he regards it as written after the fashion of Heraclides. In another (*Fam.* I. 9, 23) he says it is written 'Aristotelio more.' But according to the definition given in the

[1] *Auctoritas;* see *Cat. m.* § 3. The same spirit in Val. Max. I. 6 ext. I externa... Latinis litteris inserta...minus *auctoritatis* habent.

[2] The Platonic dialogues of course differ very much in form. Lengthy expositions occur here and there in most of them, and form the staple of the 'Laws.'

[3] *Att.* XIII. 19 §§ 3, 4. This passage has been most grievously misunderstood, though it is as plain as words could make it. Prof. Wilkins (Introd. to *De Oratore,* Book I. p. 3) has some excellent remarks on it, but even he falls into one or two slight mistakes, as where he classes the '*De re publica*' with the dialogues written 'Aristotelio more.'

[4] This is what *his temporibus* must mean in *Att.* XIII. 19, 4. In writing those words Cicero therefore cannot have had the *De Legibus* in his mind, as Prof. Wilkins supposes, though of course that work belongs to the Aristotelian class.

former passage of the 'mos Aristotelius' ['in quo sermo ita inducitur ceterorum ut penes ipsum sit principatus'] this judgment is not strictly correct.

It has been explained that Cicero's philosophical works are in substance translations, though free translations, from Greek originals. The Greek works on which they are founded have, with the exception of a few passages, for the most part unimportant, been lost. In fact these works of Cicero are, for most of the subjects with which they deal, the oldest authorities we now possess, and in many portions they are the only authorities. It is therefore of importance to determine how far they can be trusted as representing the sources from which they were drawn. This question can only be decided by laborious investigation into the whole of the existing ancient testimony to the doctrines of the post-Aristotelian schools. In spite of all that has been done in recent times, the task is one which still in substance remains for scholars to accomplish. There can be no doubt at the present moment that a low estimate prevails of Cicero's accuracy and of the value of his writings[1]. Long observation and inquiry has, however, convinced me that this estimate rests almost entirely on misconception or prejudice. It is impossible for me here to treat of the matter to any extent in detail; I can only indicate in a general way what appear to be some of the chief sources of prevalent errors concerning the worth of Cicero's philosophical works. Personal prejudice against the man, derived from a consideration of his political career, has produced much effect[2]. But with this matter I cannot here deal.

The most careless readers cannot fail to find in the philosophical writings of Cicero many superficial contradictions and inconsistencies, much inconstancy in the use of terms, no little inconsequence in argument, and considerable want of lucidity in the arrangement of subject-matter. When these faults are observed it is the practice of some scholars to lay the guilt at Cicero's door, and to let the Greeks go free from blame. Now I do not hesitate to assert that the farther inquiry is pushed into the sources of the post-Aristotelian philosophy, the more plainly will the fact come to light that the defects complained of existed already in the Greek authors whom Cicero copied. In the whole of the Greek philosophy the feeling for consistency is found

[1] Things have greatly changed since Hume wrote 'The fame of Cicero flourishes at present, but that of Aristotle is utterly decayed' (*Essays* II. p. 5, ed. Green and Grose).

[2] The chief promoter of this prejudice has been Mommsen, who has found many to follow him in his admiration for 'men of blood and iron.' Had Cicero by any chance been author of a proscription, he would probably have been one of Mommsen's heroes.

in a very imperfectly developed state. Contradictions which appear to a modern reader superficial and glaring are passed over without misgiving by even a Plato or an Aristotle. In the sense for orderly arrangement and regular development of arguments, and in stringency in the use of technical terms, the whole of the ancient philosophy is very deficient when judged by a modern standard[1]. Now of all the Grêek systems the worst in these respects was that with which Cicero had most to deal, the Stoic. It is not too much to say that it was, in its details, a tangled web of inconsistencies, even as expounded by its highest authorities[2].

It is very seldom that we can bring a passage of Cicero face to face with the Greek passage from which it was translated. Diogenes Laertius, Stobaeus, and other writers of their class give us as a rule only their general impressions of the different philosophies, without naming the portions of the ancient writings from which they drew the impressions. Opinions are vaguely put down to 'Chrysippus' or 'the Stoics,' and so on. When assertions of this kind conflict with assertions ascribed to the same persons by Cicero, scholars have been too ready to jump to the conclusion that Cicero has blundered. They have forgotten that what Chrysippus maintained in one work he denied in another, and that the Stoic system took very different forms in the mouths of its different exponents. Confirmations of Cicero's accuracy often come to light in the most unexpected quarters, and unless a scholar can conscientiously say that he has examined every ancient passage which bears upon any point in question, he will be very rash in pronouncing dogmatically that Cicero is in error[3]. Even where no confirmation exists elsewhere, it is always possible and generally probable that we have some isolated utterance which Cicero alone has preserved.

[1] No ancient philosopher paid so much attention to the definition of terms as Aristotle, yet his laxness in their use is great. For example, almost immediately after distinguishing two such important terms as τέχνη and ἐπιστήμη he proceeds to use them as though the distinction had not been drawn.

[2] Very many of the most characteristic Stoic arguments are 'circular' in form.

[3] Madvig, in his preface to the *De Finibus*, gives a string of passages from that work in which he supposes Cicero to have misunderstood his authorities. With these I shall deal in my forthcoming edition of the *De Finibus*. Among other passages, Madvig also refers to two in the *Academica*. In one of these (I. 26) he accuses Cic. of introducing a confusion in the use of terms, for which, as my note will shew, the Stoics (from whom the passage came through Antiochus) were themselves responsible. In the other passage (II. 99) Cicero has expressed himself carelessly, nothing more. A curious instance of the closeness with which Cic. generally followed his authorities will be found in *Ac.* I. 37, where *minor aestimatio*, a totally inaccurate and objectionable expression, is a literal rendering of the ἐλάττων ἀξία of the Stoic from whom Antiochus took it.

In point of literary execution, no one will doubt that the philosophical treatises of Cicero would compare very favourably with the works from which they were drawn, if we could put the two sets side by side[1]. In one point, however, the Latin of Cicero would be at a disadvantage even in presence of the Greek of Chrysippus. Greek possessed a philosophical terminology which, however imperfect, and however inconsistently applied, was at all events thoroughly familiar to all cultivated readers. Cicero had to create his own terminology in a language which rebelled against being put to such uses. Considering the enormous difficulties of the task, he may be said to have achieved it with success. He tamed Latin (if the expression be permissible) to philosophic uses, and started the language on a path in which it continued to run for ages after Greek philosophy passed away. Few inventors or adapters of language have exercised an influence so far-reaching[2].

§ 4. *The history and contents of the two editions of the 'Academica.'*

a. *Circumstances of their composition.*

Very much misconception has prevailed among editors concerning the relation of the *Academica Posteriora* to the *Academica Priora*. Yet in Cicero's letters the whole matter lies plain to view, and requires only industry for its perception[3].

On the death of Tullia, which happened at Tusculum in February of the year 45 B.C., Cicero took refuge in the solitude of his villa at Astura, which was pleasantly situated on the Latin coast between Antium and Circeii[4]. Here he sought to ease his deep grief by incessant toil. He

[1] Cf. Brandis, *Rhein. Mus.* III. 541 sq.

[2] Prantl, *Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande*, Vol. I, has some most unjust remarks on Cicero's terminology. He severely blames him for attempting different translations of the same Greek term in different parts of his works, and for occasionally employing, to render a Greek word, a Latin word which had been already tried for another purpose.

[3] When I wrote the first edition of this work, I supposed that in it a thorough use had for the first time been made of Cicero's *Letters* for the elucidation of this question. Since then I have read a pamphlet by Engstrand, entitled *De libris Ciceronis Academicis* (Upsala, 1860), in which the subject is properly handled, though with less fulness. Some of the blunders of the older editors had been cleared up by Krische, *über Cicero's Akademika*, Göttingen, 1845. Ranitz's essay, *De libris Academicis*, Leipzig, 1809, is full of ignorance and arrogance and is unworthy of its place in Prof. Mayor's list of works in his *Bibliographical Clue*, p. 57.

[4] *Att.* XII. 40, 3 Asturam sum a te profectus. This shows that Cicero went straight to Astura from Rome, where he had spent the month succeeding Tullia's death at a secluded house in the suburbs; cf. XII. 40, 2 triginta dies in hortis fui, with *Fam.* VI. 18, 5. On the situation of Astura see XII. 19, 1. [The quantity is given in many books as Astŭră, but Servius on Verg. *Aen.* VII. 801 evidently thought the *u* to be long.]

found the mechanic exercise of composition the best solace for his pain, and wrote for whole days together[1]. At other times he would plunge at early morning into the dense woods near his villa, and remain there absorbed in study till nightfall[2]. Often exertion failed to bring relief[3]; yet he repelled the entreaties of Atticus that he would return to the forum and the senate. A grief which books and solitude could scarcely enable him to endure, would crush him, he felt, in the busy city[4].

It was amid such surroundings that the *Academica* was written. During the first part of his stay at Astura, Cicero was busy with his *Consolatio*[5], and possibly his *Hortensius*[6]. The first trace of any intention to write the *Academica* is found in a letter to Atticus, probably written in the earlier days of his stay at Astura[7]. Atticus had a very wide knowledge of history and biography[8], and Cicero often applied to him for minute information about the characters or events mentioned in his dialogues. In the letter in question he asks for just the kind of information which would be needed in writing the *Academica*. The words with which he introduces his request imply that he had determined to undertake some new work to which our *Academica* would correspond[9]. He asks what reason the embassy of which Carneades formed part had for coming to Rome; who was at that time the leader of the Epicurean

[1] *Att.* XII. 14, 3 totos dies scribo; XII. 20, 1 totos dies consumo in litteris; XIII. 26, 2 equidem credibile non est quantum scribam, qui etiam noctibus; nihil enim somni. Also XII. 38, 1; *Fam.* V. 13, 3 and for a later period *Att.* XIII. 10, 1.

[2] *Att.* XII. 15. Cicero speaks much of the quiet at Astura; cf. XII. 16, 1; XII. 26, 2 mihi solitudo et recessus prouincia est. Yet several of his acquaintances had villas close by; these are alluded to generally in XIII. 26, 2. One of them was Q. Marcius Philippus, whose society Cic. seems to have particularly disliked (XII. 16, 1; XII. 18, 1). Another was Cicero's quondam son-in-law, Dolabella (XII. 7, 2). [The letters XII. 9 and XIII. 52, wrongly attributed in all editions, were written at Astura.]

[3] XII. 14, 3; XII. 16, 1; XII. 46, 1; *Fam.* V. 15, 3.

[4] XII. 21, 5 quod me in forum uocas, eo uocas unde etiam bonis meis rebus fugiebam.

[5] The finishing touch had not been given to this when Cicero was on the point of leaving Astura in the middle of May, as may be seen by a comparison of XII. 20; XII. 24; XII. 38; XII. 44. During his stay at Astura Cicero was carrying on together at least three considerable literary tasks concurrently, viz. the *Consolatio*, the *Academica* and the *De Finibus*. As we do not hear of the *Consolatio* after he left Astura, it was probably entirely completed there.

[6] This was written before the *Academica* and *De Finibus*, but we have no means of determining more exactly the date of its composition. A passage in *Orat.* 148 (with which cf. *Fam.* VII. 28, 2) makes it probable that it was begun in 46. The *Hortensiana* which in 56 B.C. Cicero contemplated writing (*Att.* IV. 6, 3) can have had nothing to do with the *Hortensius*.

[7] *Att.* XII. 23, 2.

[8] Cf. *Fin.* II. 67 Attici thesauri, and *Att.* XVI. 13 c. 2, where Cic. says it is impossible for him to write history without the aid of Atticus.

[9] *Ut scias me ita dolere ut non iaceam.* This letter must have been written towards the middle of March. Cicero says (XII. 12, 2) that he writes to Atticus every day; and the twelve letters which precede XII. 23 in our collections were all written from Astura and are certainly all earlier.

school[1]; who were then the most noted πολιτικοὶ at Athens[2]. The meaning of the last question is made clear by a passage in the *De Oratore*, where Cicero speaks of the combined Academic and Peripatetic schools under that name[3]. It may be with reference to the *Academica* among other works that in a later letter he expresses himself satisfied with the progress he has made in his literary undertakings[4]. During the remainder of his sojourn at Astura he continued to be actively employed, but though he speaks of some other literary projects, we find no express mention in his letters to Atticus of the *Academica*. A few days before leaving Astura he declared that however much his detractors might reproach him with inaction, they could not read the numerous works on which he had been engaged, within the same time that he had taken to compose them[5].

On the 14th May[6], Cicero left Astura for Tusculum, which he reached on the following day, having spent a night at Lanuvium. It had cost him a great effort to make up his mind to seek again the house where Tullia had died[7]. The day before he left Astura, Cicero informed Atticus that he had finished ('*absolui*') *duo magna* συντάγματα[8]. These words have caused much difference of opinion among scholars. Madvig[9] (following many earlier writers) interprets the words to refer to the *Academica* and the *De Finibus*. But insuperable obstacles stand in the way of this opinion[10]. Nothing can be more certain than that the *De Finibus* was still in an incomplete condition when Cicero left Astura[11].

[1] The Epicureans had no representative on the embassy.

[2] It is just possible, but hardly likely that the information was needed for the *Hortensius*, and not for the *Academica*. Cf. however II. 137 of the latter work. In XII. 20 and 24 and 38 and 44 similar information is asked about the *Consolatio*.

[3] *De Or.* III. 109; cf. *Att.* XII. 51, 2.

[4] XII. 28, 2 quod me ipse per litteras consolatus sum, non poenitet me quantum profecerim; maerorem minui, dolorem nec potui, nec si possem, uellem. Here however the reference may be to the *Consolatio* only; and *profecerim* may apply only to the progress made in the softening of his grief.

[5] XII. 40, 2.

[6] XII. 41, 1; 42, 2; 43, 1; 44, 3; 46, 1. I formerly, with Krische, assigned the 14th June as the date at which Cicero left Astura. But this must be rejected, since it is impossible to reconcile it with the dates of other letters written during the summer. In XII. 12, 2 Cic. expresses his intention of writing to Atticus every day. If we suppose Cic. to have reached Astura at the very beginning of March and to have left on May 14, his stay lasted about 75 days. For these 75 days we have only 38 letters; yet the number lost cannot be very numerous. Of these 38 letters, Wesenberg assigns 26 to March, 2 only to April, 10 to May. Supposing this arrangement to be correct, the scarcity of letters written in April would be remarkable.

[7] *Att.* XII. 46.

[8] XII. 45, 1.

[9] Preface to *De Finibus*, p. LX.

[10] So Krische, p. 4.

[11] The first allusion to the *De Finibus* is in *Att.* XII. 12, 2; in XII. 28, 3 we find another. In XIII. 5, 1 Cic. tells Atticus that he has just sent to Rome (from Tusculum) the *Torquatus*; i.e. Books I. and II. of the *De Finibus*, as Krische rightly sees, not Book I. only, as Madvig asserts. [If only Book I. was

Another view of the *συντάγματα* is that they represent the *Academica* which was at first divided into two books. Against this Madvig urged a singularly unfortunate objection. He held that the word *σύνταγμα* could not be applied to a *portion* of a work. This judgment is very nearly the reverse of the truth; the fact being that the word nearly always is so applied wherever it occurs[1]. Its use is indeed a very strong argument against the opinion of Madvig, and tells equally against the contention of Krische that the books in question were the *Hortensius* and the *Academica*. The *Hortensius* is never mentioned in Cicero's letters, and it may possibly have been finished before he went to Astura[2]. There is therefore strong ground for supposing that by the '*συντάγματα*' Cicero meant the *Academica* as he first wrote it.

Whatever be the truth on this point it cannot be disputed that the *Hortensius* and the *Academica* must have been more closely connected, in style and tone, than any other two works of Cicero. The interlocutors in the two dialogues were exactly the same, for the introduction of the name of Balbus into some fragments of the *Hortensius* is an error[3].

ready some time after Cicero reached Tusculum, how could Madvig suppose that the whole five books were ready before he left Astura?] In another letter written from Tusculum (XIII. 32, 3) the *Torquatus* is again mentioned. In XIII. 19, 4 at the beginning of July, Cic. says *confeci* quinque libros *περὶ τελῶν*: how then can his *absolui* of the 13th May refer to the same work?

[1] In Cicero's letters *σύνταξις* (*Att.* XIII. 12, 3; 16, 1; XV. 14, 4) is always used of an entire work, while *σύνταγμα* (*Att.* XVI. 3, 1; *Fam.* VIII. 3, 3) and *σύγγραμμα* (*Att.* XVI. 6, 4) are used of separate books or portions of a work. The Latin representative of *σύνταξις* is *corpus* (*Fam.* V. 12, 4; *Qu. Fr.* II. 11 (13) 4), of *σύνταγμα* and *σύγγραμμα* usually *liber*. In their notes on *συντάξεις* in *Att.* XV. 14, 4 the commentators explain it as referring to the several books composing one work, either the *De Gloria* or the *De Officiis*, thus falling into an error, the converse of the one we have just been considering. The *συντάξεις* there are evidently the *De Gloria* and the Ἡρακλειδεῖον mentioned together in *Att.* XV. 27, 2 and again in XVI. 2, 6. The *De Gloria* was in a single book only; it is called *liber* not *libri* in *Att.* XV. 27, 2 and XVI. 6, 4. It is called *σύνταγμα* in XVI. 3, 1, but then of course a work consisting of one book only may be called either *σύνταξις* or *σύνταγμα*. Another indication of Cicero's use of these two words is gained from a comparison of *Att.* IV. 16, 2 with XVI. 6, 4. In the former passage he says that, following Aristotle's examples, he uses 'prooemia' *in singulis libris;* in the latter he declares that he writes a 'prooemium' wherever he begins a new *σύγγραμμα* (not *σύνταξις*, as he should have said according to Madvig's dictum). Cicero in his use of the words agrees exactly with the Greek authors. Very few examples of a different use can be found, though the words are of enormously frequent occurrence. One ex. is in Plut. 1036 E where *σύνταγμα* is used of a work afterwards said to be *ἐν ἓξ βιβλίοις*. Yet this is so exceptional that Volkmann, *Plutarch* II. 216, argues that *σύνταγμα* could not be applied to Plutarch's biographies.

[2] See above, p. 29.

[3] See Krische, p. 5. Owing to the fact that Hortensius appeared in both dialogues, some of the copyists gave to the *Academica* titles properly belonging to the *Hortensius*. Partly in consequence of this, the writers in the middle ages sometimes quoted from the *Academica* under the title of *Hortensius*. These two circumstances combined to produce the widespread belief that the *Hortensius* survived till the XIIth or XIIIth century; whereas it cannot really be traced beyond

The discussion in the *Academica Priora* is carried on at the villa of Hortensius near Bauli; in the *Hortensius* at the villa of Lucullus near Cumae. It is rather surprising that under these circumstances there should be only one direct reference to the *Hortensius* in the *Lucullus*.

The *Academica* in its original form was no doubt sent to Atticus very soon after Cicero reached Tusculum[1]. Probably Atticus, who visited Cicero at Tusculum, made some objections to the way in which Cicero had put learned arguments into the mouths of unlearned men[2]; so Cicero took the book back and added to each division of it a new introduction, returning the book for Atticus' approval[3]. In all probability the extant prooemium of the *Lucullus* is the one which Cicero then affixed. These prooemia constituted a deliberate attempt on the part of Cicero to impose upon his readers a set of statements concerning the intellectual ability and culture of Catulus and Lucullus which he knew and in his own letters to Atticus admitted to be false[4]. I may note, as of some interest in connexion with the *Academica*, that among the unpleasant visits received by Cicero at Tusculum was one from Varro[5].

On the 21st June, Cicero left Tusculum for Arpinum, in order, he says, to arrange some business connected with property there, and also to relieve Brutus from the burden which his assiduous attentions imposed on him[6]. Cicero seems to have been still unsatisfied with his choice of interlocutors for the *Academica*, and the first thing he did on his arrival was to transfer the parts of Lucullus and Hortensius to Cato and Brutus; the part of Catulus he probably added to his own[7]. This plan was speedily cast aside on the arrival of a letter from Atticus, strongly urging that the whole work should be dedicated to Varro, or if

the VIIth. See Schenkl in *Philologus*, Vol. XXXVIII.; Thomas in *Revue de Philologie* III. p. 152; also cf. n. on p. 37.

[1] In XIII. 5 Cic. writes 'misi tibi Torquatum.' The name *Torquatus* here denotes Books I. II. of the *De Finibus*, though only Book I. is occupied with the defence by Torquatus of Epicureanism; in the same way the *Lucullus* contains a speech by Lucullus and an answer to it by Cicero. In XIII. 32, 2 (which must have been written soon after XIII. 5) we find 'Torquatus Romae est, misi ut tibi daretur; Catulum et Lucullum, ut opinor, antea; his libris nova prooemia sunt addita quibus eorum uterque laudatur.'

[2] See below, p. 33.

[3] See XIII. 32, 2 quoted above.

[4] See below, pp. 40 sq. Some of the old editors (Faber esp.) err by supposing that these *prooemia* belonged to the second edition.

[5] *Att.* XIII. 33, 4 de Varrone loquebamur: lupus in fabula; uenit enim ad me et quidem id temporis ut retinendus esset, *sed ego ita egi ut non scinderem paenulam.*

[6] *Att.* XIII. 9, 2; *ib.* XIII. 11, 1 where Cic. says of Brutus 'cum ille me cotidie uidere uellet, ego ad illum ire non possem, priuabatur omni delectatione Tusculani.' There are many mentions in the letters of this period of private transactions between Cicero and Brutus. Cf. also XIII. 23, 1. Cic. had formed the intention of going to Arpinum, even before he left Astura; see *Att.* XII. 42, 3.

[7] *Att.* XIII. 16, 1.

not the *Academica* then the *De Finibus*[1]. Cicero had never been very intimate with Varro; their acquaintance seems to have been maintained through Atticus, who was at all times anxious to draw them more closely together. Nine years earlier he had pressed Cicero to find room in his works for some honourable employment of Varro's name[2]. The nature of the works on which Cicero was then engaged rendered it difficult for him to comply with the request[3]. Varro had promised on his side to dedicate to Cicero an important work. In answer to the later entreaty of Atticus, Cicero declared himself very much dissatisfied with Varro's failure to fulfil his promise. From this it is evident that Cicero knew nothing of the scope or magnitude of the *De lingua Latina*, a portion of which Varro afterwards dedicated to him. His complaint that Varro had been writing for two years without making any progress, shows how little familiarity there can have been between the two[4]. Cicero was minded to wait for Varro's promised gift and then to repay it by a richer present[5]. But, apart from these causes for grumbling, Cicero thought the new suggestion of Atticus a 'godsend'[6]. Since the *De Finibus* was already 'betrothed' to Brutus[7], he promised to transfer to Varro the *Academica*, allowing that Catulus and Lucullus, though of noble birth, had no claim to be considered learned[8]. So little learning did they possess that they could not even have dreamed of the doctrines they had been made in the first edition of the *Academica* to maintain[9]. For them another place was to be found, and the remark

[1] *Att.* XIII. 12, 3.

[2] IV. 16, 2.

[3] Cic. says (IV. 16, 2) that neither his oratorical works nor his *De re publica* were suited to the person of Varro, and gives a half promise to compose some work into which Varro might be naturally introduced. The promise, or suggestion was not carried out. In XIII. 12, 3 Cic. repeats his old excuses: 'scis me antea orationes aut aliquid id genus solitum scribere, ut Varronem nusquam possem intexere.' Cic. several times expresses a desire to introduce only deceased persons into his dialogues, so great was the trouble caused him by the eagerness of living personages to find a place in them. See XII. 12, 2. Among others, Dolabella had desired a προσφώνησις (XIII. 10, 2; 13, 2).

[4] *Att.* XIII. 12, 3 postea quam haec coepi φιλολογώτερα, iam mihi denuntiauerat magnam sane et grauem προσφώνησιν: biennium praeteriit, cum ille Καλλιππίδης assiduo cursu cubitum nullum processerit.

[5] XIII. 12, 3.

[6] XIII. 19, 4 ut tuas legi de Varrone, tamquam ἕρμαιον arripui; cf. too XIII. 16, 1.

[7] XIII. 12, 3. Cicero owed Brutus a dedication, having received from him a book entitled *De Virtute;* see *Fin.* I. 8; *Tusc.* V. 1.

[8] Plutarch *Luc.* 1. gives an exaggerated account of the learning of Lucullus, but he has merely adopted and improved upon the statements of Cicero in the introduction to the *Lucullus*.

[9] *Att.* XIII. 19, 5. Cf. XIII. 12, 3 illam Ἀκαδημικήν (σύνταξιν) in qua homines nobiles illi quidem, sed nullo modo philologi, nimis acute locuntur. So too XIII. 16, 1 illam Ἀκαδημικὴν σύνταξιν totam ad Varronem traduximus. Primo fuit Catuli Luculli Hortensi; deinde παρὰ τὸ πρέπον uidebatur, quod erat hominibus nota, non illa quidem ἀπαιδευσία, sed in eis rebus ἀτριψία. Cic. seems to have thought the noble birth of the interlocutors a great point; cf. XIII. 13, 1 totam

was made that the *Academica* would just suit Varro, who was a follower of Antiochus and the fittest person to expound the opinions of that philosopher[1]. It happened that continual rain fell during the first few days of Cicero's stay at Arpinum, so he employed his whole time in editing afresh the *Academica*, which he now divided into four books instead of two, making the interlocutors himself, Varro and Atticus[2]. The position occupied by Atticus in the dialogue was quite secondary, but he was so well pleased with it that Cicero determined to confer on him often in the future such minor parts[3]. A suggestion made by Atticus that Cotta should also be introduced was rejected as impracticable[4]. Although the work of re-editing was vigorously pushed on, Cicero had frequent doubts about the expediency of dedicating the work to Varro. He repeatedly throws upon Atticus the whole responsibility for the decision, and but for his friend's importunities he would probably again have changed his plans. Nearly every letter written to Atticus during the progress of the work contains entreaties that he would consider the matter over and over again before he finally decided[5]. As no reasons had been given for these solicitations, Atticus naturally grew impatient, and Cicero was obliged to assure him that there were reasons, which he would disclose when they met[6]. The true reasons did however appear in some later letters. In one Cicero said: 'I am in favour of Varro, and the more so because he wishes it, but you know he is

δεινὸς ἀνήρ, τάχα κεν καὶ ἀναίτιον αἰτιόῳτο.

So there often flits before me a vision of his face, as he grumbles, it may be, that my part in the treatise is more fully sustained than his; a charge which you will perceive to be untrue[7].' Cicero, then, feared Varro's temper and perhaps his knowledge and real critical fastidious-

Academiam ab hominibus nobilissimis abstuli; also *Acad.* II. 125 semper, ut scitis, studiosus nobilitatis fui.

[1] XIII. 12, 3; 16, 1; 19, 3.

[2] XIII. 19, 3. Schütz, by the dates he absurdly assigns to XIII. 12 and XIII. 13, causes Cic. to execute the second edition in a single day.

[3] XIII. 22, 1 te ἀσμεναίτατα intexui. Atticus had already been assigned an unimportant part in the *De Legibus*, and appears in the same way in *Fin.* V. (here we have a proof that the *Academica Posteriora* was finished before *Fin.* V. received its final form). The *Laelius* and *Cato maior* are dedicated to Atticus.

[4] XIII. 19, 3. Cotta would have had to speak against Varro, in defence of the New Academy; so Cicero would have been κωφὸν πρόσωπον. It is not easy to see why this should be; in the *Academica Priora* the Academic rôle was shared between two persons, Catulus and Cicero.

[5] XIII. 14, 2 illud etiam atque etiam consideres uelim, placeatne tibi mitti ad Varronem quod scripsimus...opinor igitur consideremus; etsi nomina iam facta sunt; sed uel induci uel mutari possunt. In XIII. 16, 2 a hint is thrown out that some other work would be more suitable to dedicate to Varro. Cf. also 18 and 19 § 5.

[6] XIII. 19 § 5; 22 § 1.

[7] *Att.* XIII. 25, 3.

ness[1]. Again and again Cicero professed to doubt whether Varro really desired to receive the dedication; again and again Atticus assured him that on that score there was nothing to fear. Still Cicero was not satisfied, and wished Atticus to state exactly the grounds he had for this confidence[2]. Atticus seems to have thought that Cicero's hesitation was caused by the possibility that people might accuse him of hunting after notoriety if he dedicated anything to Varro without being first challenged by a similar dedication from Varro. This idea Cicero denies[3]. In order to stimulate his friend, Atticus affirmed that Varro was jealous of some to whom Cicero had shown more favour. We find Cicero eagerly asking for more information on this point: was it Brutus of whom Varro was jealous[4]? It seems strange that Cicero should not have entered into correspondence with Varro himself. But the literary etiquette of the day seems to have required that the recipient of a dedication should be assumed to be ignorant of the donor's intentions till they were on the very point of being carried out. Thus although Cicero saw Brutus frequently while at Tusculum, he apparently did not speak to him about the *De Finibus*, but employed Atticus to ascertain his feeling about the dedication[5].

Cicero's own judgment concerning the completed second edition of the *Academica* is several times given in the letters. He tells us that it extended on the whole to greater length than the first edition, though much had been omitted, and adds 'unless human self-love deceives me, the books have been so finished that the Greeks themselves have nothing in the same department of literature to approach them... This edition will be more brilliant, more terse, and altogether better than the last[6].' Again: 'the Antiochean portion has all the keenness of Antiochus combined with any polish my style may possess[7].' Also: 'I have finished the work with I know not what success, but with a care which nothing could surpass[8].' In another passage he calls them 'sane argu-

[1] On matters of literary taste Cic. and Varro differed *toto caelo*; cf. *Att.* XII. 6, 1 with Boot's n.

[2] XIII. 18. Engstrand, p. 5 thinks one reason Cic. had for doubting about Varro was that the first edition had already become known. This idea receives some support from the anxiety Cicero expresses that the MS of the *De Finibus* should be kept secret, lest the gift he intended for Brutus should be stale (ἕωλα) before it was presented; see *Att.* XIII. 21 § 4; 22 § 3.

[3] XIII. 19, 3 in Varrone ista causa me non moueret, ne uiderer φιλένδοξος. In XIII. 24 nec tamen αἰδέομαι Τρῶας, the same notion of Atticus is referred to; cf. XIII. 13, 2.

[4] XIII. 13 § 1; XIII. 18.

[5] *Att.* XIII. 12, 3.

[6] XIII. 13, 1. The words *grandiores* and *breuiora* are not contradictory; the latter applies to the mode in which each separate point is put; the former to the compass of the whole work. On two different kinds of 'breuitas' see *De Or.* II. 326.

[7] XIII. 19, 5.

[8] XIII. 19, 3.

tulos libros[1].' The binding and adornment of the presentation copy for Varro received great attention, and the letter accompanying it was highly elaborated[2]. Yet after everything had been done and the book had been sent to Atticus at Rome, Cicero was still uneasy about the reception it would meet with from Varro. He wrote thus to Atticus: 'I tell you again and again that the presentation will be at your own risk. So if you begin to hesitate, let us desert to Brutus, who also is a follower of Antiochus. O Academy on the wing, as ever, flitting now hither, now thither[3]!' Atticus on his part 'shuddered' at the idea of taking the responsibility[4]. After the work had passed into his hands Cicero begged him to take all precautions to prevent it from getting into circulation until the two could meet, and decide its fate. The warning was necessary, because two persons, Balbus and Caerellia, had just managed to copy Cicero's MS of the *De Finibus*[5]. In a letter, written apparently a day or two later, Cicero again declared his intention of meeting Atticus at Rome, and of then sending the work to Varro if it should be deemed advisable to do so[6]. The meeting ultimately did not take place, and Cicero left the four books in Atticus' power, promising to approve any course that might be taken[7]. Atticus wrote to say that as soon as Varro came to Rome the books should be sent to him. 'By this time then,' says Cicero when he gets the letter, 'you have taken the fatal step; ah! if you only knew at what peril to yourself! Perhaps my letter stopped you, though you had not read it when you wrote. I long to hear how the matter stands[8].' Again, a little later: 'You have been bold enough, then, to give Varro the books? I await his judgment upon them, but when will he read them[9]?' Varro probably received the gift in the first fortnight of August, 45 B.C., when Cicero was already hard at work on the *Tusculan Disputations*[10]. A copy of the first edition

[1] XIII. 18, 1.

[2] XIII. 25, 3 impensam fecimus in macrocolla; *ib.* sed quaeso, epistula mea ad Varronem ualdene tibi placuit? Male mihi sit si umquam quidquam tam enitar. The letter will be found prefixed to the text of Acad. I. below. In XIII. 24 Cicero calls the books 'quattuor διφθέραι,' with reference to their superior binding.

[3] XIII. 25, 3.

[4] XIII. 25, 3. Cicero was in the habit of asking Atticus (who had a number of slaves employed in copying) to put his works into circulation. He compares the relation between Atticus and himself (in this respect) to that which existed between Hermodorus and Plato; see XIII. 21, 4 and cf. XV. 13, 1 and XVI. 3, 1.

[5] XIII. 21, 4 and 5.

[6] *Att.* XIII. 22, 3.

[7] XIII. 24, 1. Atticus had evidently begged for explicit directions (cf. 'quid ego *rescribam* de Varrone').

[8] XIII. 35 and 36 § 2.

[9] XIII. 44, 2. There cannot be the difference in time between XIII. 35 and XIII. 44 which Wesenberg makes by placing the former in July, the latter in September.

[10] XIII. 38, 1. The date '4th August, Arpinum' given to *Fam.* IX. 8 (the dedicatory epistle) by Wesenberg is certainly wrong. Cicero had left Arpinum before that date.

had already got into Varro's hands, as we learn from a letter in which Cicero begs Atticus to ask Varro to make some alterations in his copy of the *Academica*, at a time when the fate of the second edition was still undecided[1]. From this fact we may conclude that Cicero had given up all hope of suppressing the first edition. Indeed he never betrays in his letters to Atticus any anxiety that it should be suppressed. He does, it is true, console Atticus for the labour lost in copying the first edition[2], but he assumes that Atticus will prefer to have the 'splendidiora, breuiora, meliora[3].' Still, on every occasion which offered, the author sought to point out as his authorised edition the one in four books. He did so in a passage written immediately after the *Academica Posteriora* was completed[4]; and often subsequently, when he most markedly mentioned the number of the books as four[5]. That he wished the work to bear the title *Academica* is clear[6]. The expressions Ἀκαδημικὴ σύνταξις[7] and *Academia*[8] are merely descriptive, so also is the frequent appellation *Academici libri*[9]. The title *Academicae Quaestiones* found in many editions is a misnomer. It is an imitation of the title *Tusculanae Quaestiones*, and was supported by the false notion, current as early as the time of the elder Pliny, that Cicero had a villa near Puteoli called 'Academia' at which the book was written and from which it took its name, just as the later book took its name from the villa at Tusculum[10]. The *Academica* was, however, as we have

[1] XIII. 21, 3. Many scholars (among them Schütz and Brandis) wrongly thinking it impossible that Cic. should have allowed the first edition to have passed into Varro's hands, wish to alter *Varroni* into *Marioni* or some such name, which is supposed to be the name of one of Atticus' copyists. Engstrand's argument, however, that Varro was too intimate with Cic. *not* to ask for a copy, is mistaken. The slightness of the intercourse between Cicero and Varro is well shown in the introduction to the first book.

[2] XIII. 13, 1. Cf. Quint. *Inst. Or.* III. 6, 64.

[3] Brandis, *Rhein. Mus.* III. 544, is certainly wrong in saying that the new prologues (see above, p. 32) were added to the *Catulus* and *Lucullus* in order to make the copies taken by Atticus saleable.

[4] *Tusc.* II. 4.

[5] *Att.* XVI. 6, 4; *N. D.* I. 11; *Diu.* II. 1; *Tusc.* II. 4.

[6] *Off.* II. 8; *Tim.* I.; *Att.* XIII. 13 § 1; 19 § 5.

[7] XIII. 12 § 3; 16 § 1.

[8] XIII. 13, 1 totam Academiam.

[9] XVI. 6, 4; *Tusc.* II. 4; *N. D.* I. 11; *Diu.* II. 1. The titles given in our MSS are as follows: the *Acad. Pr.* are styled *Lucullus* only in the Cambridge, the two Leyden and the Erlangen MSS; in the 'codex Gudiani secundus' the title is *Marci tulii Ciceronis ad Hortensium liber;* in the Balliol MS *liber* III *Academicorum;* in Harl. 6327 *M Tulii Ciceronis de laude et defensione philosophiae liber unus ex quattuor Academicis ad Hortensium;* in a MS at Paris (7784) *Academicarum Quaestionum liber* IV. For the *Acad. Post.* we have *Academicarum Quaestionum liber* I (Harl. 3953); *Commentum super librum Achademicorum* ('codex Gedanensis,' which is original in the title, as in its readings); *liber* I merely (Paris 6331); *fragmentum de Academicis* (Harl. 5291); *fragmentum primi libri de Academicis* (Balliol MS); *Achademicorum liber* I (MS Bodl.); *fragmentorum de Academicis* (MS A); *fragmenta de Academicis* (Al_2). In the *editio Romana* of 1471 the heading is *pars libelli Ciceronis de philosophia.* On some of these titles see above, p. 31, footnote.

[10] Plin. *Nat. Hist.* XXXI. §§ 7, 8.

seen, entirely written at Astura and Arpinum. But even had it been otherwise the title *Academicae Quaestiones* could only mean 'particular problems discussed in the Academia,' a title entirely unsuited to a work which gives a complete exposition of the principles of a whole school. The title is equally unsuitable if, with some editors (Ernesti and others), we take it to mean 'problems connected with the Academic school[1].' But it is more than doubtful whether Cicero could ever have called his villa at Puteoli by the name 'Academia.' Pliny seems to have founded his statement on an epigram concerning the villa which he quotes, and which speaks of 'Academiae celebratam nomine villam.' Now it was the custom for the wealthy Romans of Cicero's day to give to certain shaded walks around their country houses the title *Academia* or *Lycium*. Cicero had both a *Lycium* and an *Academia* at Tusculum[2]. He may also have had an *Academia* in his grounds at Puteoli, though we have no evidence of the fact, or his successor in the villa (which no doubt soon became a show place for tourists) may have given the name to one of the walks or terraces.

As to the subsequent fate of the two editions, we can only gather scanty information from quotations. The second edition was far oftener referred to than the first. No fragments have been preserved which can with probability be referred to the lost portion of the earlier edition. Lactantius, Augustine, Nonius and Diomedes quote always the *Academica Posteriora*. The work is usually quoted under the title *Academica*, though Lactantius sometimes, and Augustine always used the name *libri Academici*. Quintilian knew both recensions[3], Plutarch only the earlier[4]. The quotations of Ammianus Marcellinus seem to be from the *Academica Priora*[5].

I have thought it advisable to set forth in plain terms the history of the genesis of the book, as gathered from Cicero's letters to Atticus. That it was not unnecessary to do so may be seen from the astounding theories which old scholars of great repute put forward concerning the two recensions[6], and from the blunders which are still occasionally made by unwary editors of Cicero's philosophical works[7].

[1] P. Faber made this remark, and it has been often repeated since. This title derives no support from the passage (*Att.* XIII. 19, 3) in which Cic. has treated in the four books 'omnem Academicam quaestionem.' Cf. *Diu.* II. 1 where it is said that they contain 'omnem Academicorum disciplinam.'

[2] *Att.* I. 4 § 3; 9 § 2; 10 § 3; 11 § 3; *Diu.* I. 8.

[3] *Inst. Or.* III. 6, 64.

[4] Plut. *Luc.* c. 42.

[5] Most of them are given in a useful pamphlet by H. Michael, entitled *De Ammiani Marcellini Studiis Ciceronianis* (Vratislauiae 1874). Some additional references will be found in my notes.

[6] A fair summary of these may be seen in the preface of Goerenz.

[7] For example Heine in the preface to

b. *The lost dialogue 'Catulus.'*

The whole of the characters in this dialogue and the *Lucullus* are among those genuine Optimates and adherents of the senatorial party whom Cicero so loves to honour. The Catulus from whom the lost dialogue was named was son of the illustrious colleague of Marius. With the political career of father and son we shall have little to do. I merely inquire what was their position with respect to the philosophy of the time, and the nature of their connexion with Cicero.

Catulus the younger need not detain us long. It is clear from the *Lucullus*[1] that he did little more in the dialogue than put forward opinions he had received from his father. Cicero would doubtless have preferred to introduce the elder man as speaking for himself, but in that case, as in the *De Oratore*, the author would have been compelled to exclude himself from the conversation[2]. The son, therefore, is merely the mouthpiece of the father, just as Lucullus, in the dialogue which bears his name, does nothing but render literally a speech of Antiochus, which he professes to have heard[3]. For the arrangement in the case of both a reason is to be found in their ἀτριψία with respect to philosophy[4]. This ἀτριψία did not amount to ἀπαιδευσία, or else Cicero could not have made Catulus the younger the advocate of philosophy in the *Hortensius*[5]. Though Cicero sometimes classes the father and son together as men of literary culture and perfect masters of Latin style, it is quite evident on a comparison of all the passages where the two are mentioned, that no very high value was placed on the learning of the son[6]. But however slight were the claims of Catulus the younger to be considered a philosopher, he was closely linked to Cicero by other ties. During all the most brilliant period of Cicero's life, Catulus was one of the foremost Optimates of Rome, and his character, life, and influence are often depicted in even extravagant language by the orator[7]. He is one of the pillars of the state[8], Cicero cries, and deserves to be classed with the ancient worthies of Rome[9]. When he opposes the Manilian law, and asks the people on whom they would rely if Pompey, with such gigantic power concentrated in his hands, were to die, the people answer with

his edition of the *De Officiis* (ed. 2, 1873) makes the first edition to consist of four books, the second of two; though a glance at the authorities he quotes would have set him right.

1 §§ 12, 18, 148.

2 Cf. *Att.* XIII. 19 § 4.

3 *Lucullus*, § 12.

4 *Ad Att.* XIII. 16 § 1.

5 Lactant. *Inst.* VI. 2.

6 Cf. esp. *De Off.* I. § 133 with *Brutus*, §§ 133, 134.

7 Esp. *Pro Lege Manilia*, § 51. In *Att.* I. 13, 2 Cicero, Catulus and Hortensius are treated as the three leaders of the senate.

8 *Brutus*, § 222.

9 *In Verrem*, II. 3 § 210.

one voice 'On you[1].' He alone was bold enough to rebuke the follies, on the one hand, of the mob, on the other, of the senate[2]. No storm of danger, no favouring breeze of fortune, could ever inspire in him either fear or hope, or cause him to swerve from his own course[3]. His influence, though he be dead, will ever live among his countrymen[4]. He was not only glorious in his life, but fortunate in his death[5].

Apart from Cicero's general agreement with Catulus in politics, there were special causes for his enthusiasm. Catulus was one of the *uiri consulares* who had given their unreserved approval to the measures taken for the suppression of the Catilinarian conspiracy, and was the first to confer on Cicero the greatest glory of his life, the title 'father of his country[6].' So closely did Cicero suppose himself to be allied to Catulus, that a friend tried to console him for the death of Tullia, by bidding him remember 'Catulus and the olden times[7].' The statement of Catulus, often referred to by Cicero, that Rome had never been so unfortunate as to have two bad consuls in the same year, except when Cinna held the office, was intended to point a contrast between the zeal of Cicero and the lukewarmness of his colleague Antonius[8]. Archias, who engaged to write a poem in honour of Cicero's consulship, lived in the house of the two Catuli[9].

We have seen that when Cicero found it too late to withdraw the first edition of the *Academica* from circulation, he affixed a prooemium to each book, Catulus being lauded in the first, Lucullus in the second. From the passages above quoted, and from our knowledge of Cicero's habit in such matters, we can have no difficulty in conjecturing at least a portion of the contents of the lost prooemium to the *Catulus*. The achievements of the elder Catulus were probably extolled, as well as those of his son. The philosophical knowledge of the elder man was made to cast its lustre on the younger. Cicero's glorious consulship was once more lauded, and great stress was laid upon the patronage it received from so famous a man as the younger Catulus, whose praises were sung in the fervid language which Cicero lavishes on the same theme elsewhere. Some allusion most likely was made to the connexion of Archias with the Catuli, and to the poem he had promised to write in Cicero's honour. Then the occasion of the dialogue, its sup-

[1] *Pro Lege Manilia*, § 59.
[2] *Pro Sestio*, § 122.
[3] *Pro Sestio*, § 101.
[4] *Philipp.* II. § 12.
[5] *Ad Att.* II. 24 § 4.
[6] *Pis.* § 6. *Pro Sestio*, § 121. *Philipp.* II. § 12.
[7] *Ad Fam.* IX. 15, § 3.
[8] Cf. *Post Reditum in Senatu*, § 9. *Pro Domo*, § 113.
[9] *Pro Archia*, §§ 6, 28. It is not certain that Archias ever fulfilled his engagement. See my edition of the speech *Pro Arch.* Introd. p. 11.

posed date, and the place where it was held, were indicated. The place was the Cumaean villa of Catulus[1]. The feigned date must fall between the year 60 B.C. in which Catulus died, and 63, the year of Cicero's consulship, which is alluded to in the *Lucullus*[2]. It is well known that in the arrangement of his dialogues Cicero took every precaution against anachronisms[3].

The prooemium ended, the dialogue commenced. Allusion was undoubtedly made to the *Hortensius*, in which the same speakers had been engaged; and after more compliments had been bandied about, most of which would fall to Cicero's share, a proposal was made to discuss the great difference between the dogmatic and the sceptic schools. Catulus offered to give his father's views, at the same time commending his father's knowledge of philosophy. Before we proceed to construct in outline the speech of Catulus from indications offered by the *Lucullus*, it is necessary to say something of the character and philosophical opinions of Catulus the elder.

In the many passages where Cicero speaks of him, he seldom omits to mention his *sapientia*, which implies a certain knowledge of philosophy. He was, says Cicero, the kindest, the most upright, the wisest, the purest of men[4]. He was a man of universal merit, of surpassing worth, a second Laelius[5]. It is easy to gather from the *De Oratore*, in which he appears as an interlocutor, a more detailed view of his accomplishments. Throughout the second and third books he is treated as the lettered man, par excellence, of the company[6]. Appeal is made to him when any question is started which touches on Greek literature and philosophy. We are especially told that even with Greeks his acquaintance with Greek, and his style of speaking it, won admiration[7]. He defends the Greeks from the attacks of Crassus[8]. He contemptuously contrasts the Latin historians with the Greek[9]. He depreciates the later Greek rhetorical teaching, while he bestows high commendation on the early sophists[10]. The systematic rhetoric of Aristotle and Theophrastus is most to his mind[11]. An account is given by him of the history of Greek speculation in Italy[12]. The undefiled purity of his Latin style made him seem to many the only true speaker of the language[13]. He

[1] Cf. *Ac.* II. § 9 with § 80.
[2] § 62.
[3] Cf. p. 47.
[4] *Pro Plancio*, § 12. *Pro Murena*, § 36. *Pro Rabirio perd.*, § 26. *Pro Cornelio* II. fragm. 5, ed. Müller.
[5] *T. D.* V. § 56. Cf. *De Or.* III. § 9. *N. D.* III. § 80.
[6] Cf. esp. III. § 173.
[7] *Ibid.* II. § 28.
[8] *Ibid.* II. §§ 13, 20, 21.
[9] *Ibid.* II. § 51.
[10] Cf. *ibid.* II. § 74 with III. § 127.
[11] Cf. II. § 152 with III. § 187.
[12] *Ibid.* II. § 154.
[13] *Brutus*, §§ 132, 133, 134, 259. *De Or.* III. § 29.

had written a history of his own deeds, in the style of Xenophon, which Cicero had imitated[1], and was well known as a wit and writer of epigrams[2].

Although so much is said of his general culture, it is only from the *Academica* that we learn definitely his philosophical opinions. In the *De Oratore*, when he speaks of the visit of Carneades to Rome[3], he does not declare himself a follower of that philosopher, nor does Crassus, in his long speech about Greek philosophy, connect Catulus with any particular teacher. The only Greek especially mentioned as a friend of his, is the poet Antipater of Sidon[4]. Still it might have been concluded, even from the *De Oratore*, that he was an adherent either of the Academic or of the Peripatetic school. Cicero repeatedly asserts that from no other schools can an orator spring, and the whole tone of the *De Oratore* shows that Catulus could have had no leaning towards the Stoics or Epicureans[5]. The probability is that he had never placed himself under the instruction of Greek teachers for any length of time, but had rather gained his information from books and especially from the writings of Clitomachus. If he had ever been in actual communication with any of the prominent Academics, Cicero would not have failed to tell us, as he does in the case of Antonius[6], and Crassus[7]. It is scarcely possible that any direct intercourse between Philo and Catulus can have taken place, although one passage in the *Lucullus* seems to imply it[8]. Still Philo had a brilliant reputation during the later years of Catulus, and no one at all conversant with Greek literature or society could fail to be well acquainted with his opinions[9]. No follower of Carneades and Clitomachus, such as Catulus undoubtedly was[10], could view with indifference the latest development of Academic doctrine. The famous books of Philo were probably not known to Catulus[11].

I now proceed to draw from the references in the *Lucullus* the chief features of the speech of Catulus the younger. It was probably introduced by a mention of Philo's books[12]. Some considerable portion of the speech must have been directed against the innovations made by Philo upon the genuine Carneadean doctrine. These the elder Catulus had repudiated with great warmth, even charging Philo with wilful mis-

[1] *Brutus*, § 132.
[2] *De Or.* II. § 244. *N. D.* I. § 79. Cf. Gellius, XIX. 9.
[3] *De Or.* II. § 155.
[4] *Ibid.* III. § 194.
[5] Cf. *De Or.* II. § 68 with III. §§ 182, 187.
[6] *De Or.* I. § 82 sq.; II. § 360.
[7] *Ibid.* I. § 45; II. § 365; III. §§ 68, 75.
[8] § 12, *commemoravit a patre suo dicta Philoni.*
[9] Cf. *De Or.* III. § 110.
[10] *Ac.* II. § 148.
[11] Cf. *Ac.* II. § 11; and see below, p. 59.
[12] *Ibid.* 11.

representation of the older Academics[1]. The most important part of the speech, however, must have consisted in a defence of Carneades and Arcesilas against the dogmatic schools[2]. Catulus evidently concerned himself more with the system of the later than with that of the earlier teacher. It is also exceedingly probable that he touched only very lightly on the negative Academic arguments, while he developed fully that positive teaching about the πιθανὸν which was so distinctive of Carneades. All the counter arguments of Lucullus which concern the destructive side of Academic teaching appear to be distinctly aimed at Cicero, who must have represented it in the discourse of the day before[3]. On the other hand, those parts of Lucullus' speech which deal with the constructive part of Academicism[4] seem to be intended for Catulus, to whom the maintenance of the genuine Carneadean distinction between ἄδηλα and ἀκατάληπτα would be a peculiarly congenial task. Thus the commendation bestowed by Lucullus on the way in which the *probabile* had been handled appertains to Catulus. The exposition of the sceptical criticism would naturally be reserved for the most brilliant orator of the party—Cicero himself. These conjectures have the advantage of establishing an intimate connexion between the prooemium, the speech of Catulus, and the succeeding speech of Hortensius. In the prooemium the innovations of Philo were mentioned; Catulus then showed that the only object aimed at by them, a satisfactory basis for ἐπιστήμη, was already attained by the Carneadean theory of the πιθανόν: whereupon Hortensius showed, after the principles of Antiochus, that such a basis was provided by the older philosophy, which both Carneades and Philo had wrongly abandoned. Thus Philo becomes the central point or pivot of the discussion. With this arrangement none of the indications in the *Lucullus* clash. Even the demand made by Hortensius upon Catulus[5] need only imply such a bare statement on the part of the latter of the negative Arcesilaean doctrines as would clear the ground for the Carneadean πιθανόν. One important opinion maintained by Catulus after Carneades, that the wise man would opine[6], *i.e.* would deliver himself of opinions, though he knew they rested on no sure and certain foundations (τὸν σοφὸν δοξάσειν), seems another indication of the generally constructive character of his exposition. Everything points to the conclusion that this part of the dialogue was mainly drawn by Cicero from the writings of Clitomachus.

[1] *Ibid.* §§ 12, 18; see also below, pp. 57, 58.

[2] *Ac.* II. § 12: *ista quae heri defensa sunt* compared with the words *ad Arcesilan Carneademque veniamus.*

[3] See below.

[4] *Ac.* II. §§ 33—36 inclusive; § 54.

[5] *Ac.* II. § 28.

[6] Cf. *Ac.* II. §§ 59, 67, 78, 112, 148, with my notes.

Catulus was followed by Hortensius, who in some way spoke in favour of Antiochean opinions, but to what extent is uncertain[1]. I think it extremely probable that he gave a résumé of the history of philosophy, corresponding to the speech of Varro in the beginning of the *Academica Posteriora*. One main reason in favour of this view is the difficulty of understanding to whom, if not to Hortensius, the substance of this speech could have been assigned in the first edition. In the *Academica Posteriora* it was necessary to make Varro speak first and not second as Hortensius did; this accounts for the disappearance in the second edition of a polemical argument advanced by Hortensius[2], which would be appropriate only in the mouth of one who was answering a speech already made. On the view I have taken, there would be little difficulty in the fact that Hortensius now advocates a dogmatic philosophy, though in the lost dialogue which bore his name he had argued against philosophy altogether[3], and denied that philosophy and wisdom were at all the same thing[4]. Such a historical résumé as I have supposed Hortensius to give would be within the reach of any cultivated man of the time, and would only be put forward to show that the New Academic revolt against the old Academico-Peripatetic school, as viewed by Antiochus, was unjustifiable. There is actual warrant for stating that the exposition given by Hortensius of Antiochus was merely superficial[5]. We are thus relieved from the necessity of forcing the meaning of the words *Hortensium nostrum commoveris*[6], from which Krische infers that the dialogue, entitled *Hortensius*, had ended in a conversion to philosophy of the orator from whom it was named. To any such conversion we have nowhere else any allusion.

The relation in which Hortensius stood to Cicero, also his character and attainments, are too well known to need mention here. He seems to have been as nearly innocent of any acquaintance with philosophy as it was possible at the time for an educated man to be. Cicero's materials for the speech of Hortensius were, doubtless, drawn from the works of Antiochus[7].

The speech of Hortensius was answered by Cicero himself. If my view of the preceding speech is correct, it follows that Cicero in his reply pursued the same course which he takes in his answer to Varro, part of which is preserved in the *Academica Posteriora*[8]. He justified the New Academy by showing that it was in essential harmony with the

[1] *Ibid.* II. § 10.
[2] *Ibid.* II. § 28.
[3] Cf. II. § 61 with the fragments of the *Hortensius;* also *T. D.* II. § 4; III. § 6; *D. F.* I. § 2.
[4] Lactant. III. 16.
[5] Cf. *Ac.* II. § 10.
[6] *Ib.* II. § 61.
[7] See below, p. 51.
[8] §§ 44—46.

Old, and also, in its views regarding the foundations of knowledge, with those ancient philosophers who preceded Plato. Lucullus, therefore, reproves him as a rebel in philosophy, who appeals to great and ancient names like a seditious tribune[1]. Unfair use had been made, according to Lucullus, of Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Democritus, Parmenides, Xenophanes, Plato, and Socrates[2]. But Cicero did not merely give a historical summary. He must have dealt with the theory of *καταληπτικὴ φαντασία* and *ἔννοιαι* (which though really Stoic had been adopted by Antiochus), since he found it necessary to 'manufacture' (*fabricari*) Latin terms to represent the Greek[3]. He probably also commented on the headlong rashness with which the dogmatists gave their assent to the truth of phenomena. To this a retort is made by Lucullus[4]. That Cicero's criticism of the dogmatic schools was, in this speech, incomplete and merely preliminary, may be seen by the fact that he found no occasion to Latinise such terms as *κατάληψις* (i.e. in the abstract, as opposed to the individual *καταληπτικὴ φαντασία*), *ἐνάργεια*, *ὁρμή*, *ἀποδείξις*, *δόγμα*, *οἰκεῖον*, *ἄδηλα*, *ἐποχή*, nearly all important terms in the Stoic, and to some extent in the Antiochean system, all of which Lucullus is obliged to translate for himself[5]. The more the matter is examined the more clearly does it appear that the main purpose of Cicero in this speech was to justify from the history of philosophy the position of the New Academy, and not to advance sceptical arguments against experience, which were reserved for his answer to Lucullus. In the later speech, he expressly tells us that such sceptical paradoxes as were put forward by him in the first day's discourse were really out of place, and were merely introduced in order to disarm Lucullus, who was to speak next[6]. Yet these arguments must have occupied some considerable space in Cicero's speech, although foreign to its main intention[7]. He probably gave a summary classification of the sensations, with the reasons for refusing to assent to the truth of each class[8]. The whole constitution and tenor of the elaborate speech of Cicero in the *Lucullus* proves that no general or minute demonstration of the impossibility of *ἐπιστήμη* in the dogmatic sense had been attempted in his statement of the day before. Cicero's argument in the *Catulus* was allowed by Lucullus to have considerably damaged the cause of Antiochus[9]. The three speeches of Catulus,

[1] § 13.
[2] Cf. II. § 14 with I. § 44, and II. §§ 55, 56.
[3] II. §§ 17, 18, 22.
[4] Cf. II. § 31 with I. § 45.
[5] II. §§ 17, 24, 26, 27, 29, 38, 54, 59.
[6] II. § 79.
[7] Cf. the words *tam multa* in II. § 79; also II. § 42 concidunt etiam minutius; ut enim de sensibus hesterno sermone, etc.
[8] See II. § 42.
[9] II. § 10.

Hortensius, and Cicero had gone over nearly the whole ground marked out for the discussion[1], but only cursorily, so that there was plenty of room for a more minute examination in the *Lucullus*.

One question remains: how far did Cicero defend Philo against the attack of Catulus? Krische (followed by Engstrand) believes that the argument of Catulus was answered point by point. In this opinion I cannot concur. Cicero never appears elsewhere as the defender of Philo's reactionary doctrines[2]. The expressions of Lucullus seem to imply that this part of his teaching had been dismissed by all the disputants[3]. It follows that when Cicero, in his letter of dedication to Varro, describes his own part as that of Philo (*partis mihi sumpsi Philonis*[4]), he merely attaches Philo's name to those general New Academic doctrines which had been so brilliantly supported by the pupil of Clitomachus in his earlier days. The two chief sources for Cicero's speech in the *Catulus* were, as we shall see, Philo himself and Clitomachus.

In that intermediate form of the *Academica*, where Cato and Brutus appeared in the place of Hortensius and Lucullus, there can be no doubt that Brutus occupied a more prominent position than Cato. Consequently Cato must have taken the comparatively inferior part of Hortensius, while Brutus took that of Lucullus. It may perhaps seem strange that a Stoic of the Stoics like Cato should be chosen to represent Antiochus, however much that philosopher may have borrowed from Zeno. The rôle given to Hortensius, however, was in my view such as any cultivated man might sustain who had not definitely committed himself to sceptical principles. So eminent an Antiochean as Brutus cannot have been reduced to the comparatively secondary position assigned to Hortensius in the *Academica Priora*. He would naturally occupy the place given to Varro in the second edition[5]. If this be true, Brutus would not speak at length in the first half of the work. Cato is not closely enough connected with the *Academica* to render it necessary to treat of him farther.

c. *The 'Lucullus.'*

The day after the discussion narrated in the *Catulus*, during which Lucullus had been merely a listener, the whole party left the Cumaean villa of Catulus early in the morning, and came to that of Hortensius

[1] Cf. II. § 10: *id quod quaerebatur paene explicatum est, ut tota fere quaestio tractata videatur.*

[2] For these see below, pp. 57, 58.

[3] II. § 12.

[4] *Ad Fam.* IX. 8.

[5] Cf. *ad Att.* XIII. 25, § 3: *Ad Brutum transeamus.*

at Bauli[1]. In the evening, if the wind favoured, Lucullus was to leave for his villa at Neapolis, Cicero for his at Pompeii[2]. Bauli was a little place on the gulf of Baiae, close to Cimmerium, round which many legends lingered[3]. The scenery in view was magnificent[4]. As the party were seated in the xystus with its polished floor and statues and shrubs, the waves rippled at their feet, and the sea away to the horizon glistened and quivered under the bright sun, and changed colour under the freshening breeze. Within sight lay the shore at Cumae and Puteoli, thirty stadia distant[5].

Cicero strove as usual to give vividness to the dialogue and to keep it perfectly free from anachronisms. Diodotus is spoken of as still living, although when the words were written he had been dead for some years[6]. The surprise of Hortensius, who is but a learner in philosophy, at the wisdom of Lucullus, is very dramatic[7]. The many political and private troubles which were pressing upon Cicero when he wrote the work are kept carefully out of sight. Still we can catch here and there traces of thoughts and plans which were actively employing the author's mind at Astura. His intention to visit Tusculum has left its mark on the last section of the book, while in the last but one the *De Finibus*, the *De Natura Deorum* and other works are shadowed forth[8]. In another passage the design of the *Tusculan Disputations*, which was carried out immediately after the publication of the *Academica* and *De Finibus*, is clearly to be seen[9].

Hortensius and Catulus now sink to a secondary position in the conversation, which is resumed by Lucullus. His speech is especially acknowledged by Cicero to be drawn from the works of Antiochus[10]. Nearly all that is known of the learning of Lucullus is told in Cicero's dialogue, and the passages already quoted from the letters. He seems at least to have dallied with culture, although his chief energy, as a private citizen, was directed to the care of his fishponds[11]. In his train

[1] This is not, as Krische supposes, the villa Cicero wished to buy after Hortensius' death. That lay at Puteoli: see *ad Att.* VII. 3, § 9. The villa of Lucullus at Bauli was afterwards inhabited by Tiberius Caesar; see Tac. *An.* VI. 50; Phaedrus II. 5, 7. The *uilla Ciceroniana* at Puteoli in which Hadrian was buried (Ael. *Spart. Hadr.* XXV. 7) was not the one that had belonged to Hortensius.

[2] II. § 9.

[3] Cf. II. § 61.

[4] II. § 80: *O praeclarum prospectum!*

[5] Cf. II. § 9 with § 128 (*signum illud*), also §§ 80, 81, 100, 105, 125.

[6] II. § 115. In *Fin.* II. 57 there is a touch of extraordinary delicacy, considering that the dialogue was written after Pompey's death and during Caesar's lifetime.

[7] II. § 63.

[8] II. §§ 147, 148.

[9] II. § 135.

[10] Cf. II. §§ 11, 12 with the words *quae erant contra* ἀκαταληψίαν *praeclare collecta ab Antiocho* in *ad Att.* XIII. 19, § 3.

[11] Varro, *De re Rust.* III. 17. For the private life of Lucullus Cicero felt a thorough contempt; he is alluded to in *Att.* I. 20, 3 piscinarii nostri; *ib.* II. 9, 1

when he went to Asia was the poet Archias, and during the whole of his residence in the East he sought to attach learned men to his person. At Alexandria he was found in the company of Antiochus, Aristus, Heraclitus Tyrius, Tetrilius Rogus and the Selii, all men of philosophic tastes[1]. He is several times mentioned by Pliny in the *Natural History* as the patron of Greek artists. Yet, as we have already seen, Cicero acknowledged in his letters to Atticus that Lucullus was no philosopher. He has to be propped up, like Catulus, by the authority of another person. All his arguments are explicitly stated to be derived from a discussion in which he had heard Antiochus engage. The speech of Lucullus was, as I have said, mainly a reply to that of Cicero in the *Catulus*. Any closer examination of its contents must be postponed till I come to annotate its actual text. The same may be said of Cicero's answer.

In the intermediate form of the *Academica*, the speech of Lucullus was no doubt transferred to Brutus, but as he has only such a slight connexion with the work, I do not think it necessary to do much more than call attention to the fact. I may, however, notice the close relationship in which Brutus stood to the other persons with whom we have had to deal. He was nephew of Cato, whose half-sister Servilia was wife of Lucullus[2]. Cato was tutor to Lucullus' son, with Cicero for a sort of adviser: while Hortensius had married a divorced wife of Cato. All of them were of the Senatorial party, and Cato and Brutus lived to be present, with Cicero, during the war between Pompey and Caesar. Brutus and Cicero were both friends of Antiochus and Aristus, whose pupil Brutus was[3].

d. *The Second Edition.*

When Cicero dedicated the *Academica* to Varro, very slight alterations were necessary in the scenery and other accessories of the piece. Cicero had a villa close to the Cumaean villa of Catulus and almost within sight of Hortensius' villa at Bauli[4]. Varro's villa, at which the scene was now laid, was close to the Lucrine lake[5]. With regard to the feigned date of the discourse, we may observe that at the very outset of

piscinarum Tritones; *ib.* I. 18, 6; I. 19, 6; *Leg.* II. 2; cf. also Hor. *Ep.* I. 6, 40; Vell. II. 33; Macrob. III. 15; Plin. *N. H.* IX. 170.

[1] II. § 11.

[2] *Paradoxa*, § 1. *D. F.* III. § 8. *Brutus*, § 119.

[3] *Ac.* I. § 12. *D. F.* V. § 8.

[4] Cf. II. § 80.

[5] Cf. *Fam.* IX. 8; Aug. *Adv. Acad.* III. § 35; also *Att.* XV. 13, 6, a passage which shews the letter to have been written from Cumae, not from Puteoli; as most editors suppose. Nonius, sub v. *exultare.*

the work it is shown to be not far distant from the actual time of composition[1]. Many allusions are made to recent events, such as the utter overthrow of the Pompeian party, the death of Tullia[2], and the publication of the *Hortensius*[3]. Between the date of Tullia's death and the writing of the *Academica*, it can be shown that Varro, Cicero and Atticus could not have met together at Cumae. Cicero therefore for once admits into his works an impossibility in fact. This impossibility would at once occur to Varro, and Cicero anticipates his wonder in the letter of dedication[4].

For the main facts of Varro's life the student must be referred to the ordinary sources of information. A short account of the points of contact between his life and that of Cicero, with a few words about his philosophical opinions, are all that is needed here. The first mention we have of Varro in any of Cicero's writings is in itself sufficient to show his character and the impossibility of anything like friendship between the two. Varro had done the orator some service in the trying time which came before the exile. In writing to Atticus Cicero had eulogised Varro; and in the letter to which I refer he begs Atticus to send Varro the eulogy to read, adding '*Mirabiliter moratus est, sicut nosti*, ἑλικτὰ καὶ οὐδέν[5].' All the references to Varro in the letters to Atticus are in the same strain. Cicero had to be pressed to write Varro a letter of thanks for supposed exertions in his behalf, during his exile[6]. Several passages show that Cicero refused to believe in Varro's zeal, as reported by Atticus[7]. On Cicero's return from exile, he and Varro remained in the same semi-friendly state. About the year 54 B.C., as we have already seen, Atticus in vain urged his friend to dedicate some work to the great polymath. After the fall of the Pompeian cause, when most of Cicero's friends were dead (*Att.* XVI. 11, 7), Cicero and Varro do seem to have been drawn a little closer together. Eight letters, written mostly in the year before the *Academica* was published, testify to this approximation[8]. Still they are all cold, forced and artificial; very different from the letters Cicero addressed to his real intimates, such for instance as Sulpicius, Caelius, Paetus, Plancus, and Trebatius. They all show a fear of giving offence to the harsh temper of Varro, and a humility in presence of his vast learning which is by no means natural to

[1] Cf. the word *nuper* in § 1.
[2] § 11.
[3] §§ 3 18.
[4] *Ad Fam.* IX. 8 § 1.
[5] *Ad Att.* II. 25 § 1. For the expression cf. *Att.* I. 5, 5 miro quodam modo affectus. The insertions in *Att.* II. 20, 1 (Varro satisfacit nobis) and II. 21, 6 were merely made in order that Atticus might report them to Varro; see II. 25, 1.
[6] *Ibid.* III. 8 § 3.
[7] *Ibid.* III. 15, § 3; 18 § 1.
[8] *Ad Fam.* IX. 1—8. They are the only letters from Cicero to Varro preserved in our collections.

Cicero. The negotiations between Atticus and Cicero with respect to the dedication of the second edition, as detailed already, prove sufficiently that this slight increase in cordiality did not lead to friendship[1].

The philosophical views of Varro can be gathered with tolerable accuracy from Augustine, who quotes considerably from the work of Varro *De Philosophia*[2]. Beyond doubt he was a follower of Antiochus and the so-called Old Academy. How, by an elaborate and pedantic process of exhaustion, he selected this school from among the 288 philosophies which he considered possible, may be read by the curious in Augustine. My notes on the *Academica Posteriora* will show that there is no reason for accusing Cicero of having mistaken Varro's philosophical views. This supposition owes its currency to K. O. Müller, who, from Stoic phrases in the *De lingua Latina*, concluded that Varro had passed over to the Stoics before that work was written. All that was Stoic in Varro came from Antiochus[3].

The exact specification of the changes in the arrangement of the subject-matter, necessitated by the dedication to Varro, will be more conveniently deferred till we come to the fragments of the second edition preserved by Nonius and others. Roughly speaking, the following were the contents of the four books. Book I.: the historico-philosophical exposition of Antiochus' views, formerly given by Hortensius, now by Varro; then the historical justification of the Philonian position, which Cicero had given in the first edition as an answer to Hortensius[4]. Book II.: an exposition by Cicero of Carneades' positive teaching, practically the same as that given by Catulus in ed. I.; to this was appended, probably, that foretaste of the negative arguments against dogmatism, which in ed. I. had formed part of the answer made by Cicero to Hortensius. Book III.: a speech of Varro in reply to Cicero, closely corresponding to that of Lucullus in ed. I. Book IV.: Cicero's answer, substantially the same as in ed. I. Atticus must have been almost a **κωφὸν πρόσωπον**[5].

I may here notice a fact which might puzzle the student. In some

[1] Above, pp. 37—42. For references to Varro in the year after the *Academica* was published, see *Att.* XV. 5, 3; XVI. 13, 3; XV. 13, 6. In XVI. 11, 3 Cicero thinks it necessary to assure Atticus that he is not angry with him for praising a work of Varro; so too in XVI. 11, 7.

[2] *De civ. Dei* XIX. cc. 1—3.

[3] See Madvig, *De Fin.* ed. 2, p. 824; also Krische, pp. 49, 50. Brückner, *Leben des Cicero*, I. p. 655, follows Müller. So Stahr, *Arist. bei d. Röm.* p. 50. I am sorry to see that Mr Cruttwell, in his excellent 'History of Roman Literature,' p. 152, gives renewed currency to this exploded error. In his satires Varro ridiculed the very *arcana* of the Stoic system. See Seneca, Ἀποκολοκύντωσις § 8, ed. Bücheler.

[4] Cf. Krische, p. 58.

[5] Each book had a prooemium: see *Att.* XVI. 6, 4.

old editions the *Lucullus* is marked throughout as *Academicorum liber IV.* This is an entire mistake, which arose from a wrong view of Nonius' quotations, which are always from the *second* edition, and can tell us nothing about the constitution of the *first.* One other thing is worth remark. Halm (as many before him had done) places the *Academica Priora* before the *Posteriora.* This seems to me an unnatural arrangement; the subject-matter of the second edition is certainly prior, logically, to that of the *Lucullus.*

§ 5. *On the Greek sources of the* 'Academica'.

It has been stated above (p. 24) that the philosophical works of Cicero were merely transcripts from the most approved Greek writings on the subjects with which they deal. There is but little difficulty in determining the Greek materials which were used in the construction of the *Academica.* The arguments in favour of dogmatism are frequently stated by Cicero to be wholly taken from his old teacher, Antiochus of Ascalon[1]. That Cicero did not rely on his own recollection of Antiochus' lectures, but transcribed the opinions from a book or books by the master, can be clearly proved, though the fact is nowhere definitely stated. The historical review of Greek philosophy down to the time of Arcesilas, which Cicero puts into Varro's mouth in the *Academica Posteriora*, bears in every line the stamp of direct and close translation. It is in fact a brief dogmatic statement of the peculiar views of Antiochus, given under cover of an historical retrospect. Tradition has not preserved to us the name of any work to which this portion of the *Academica* may be distinctly referred[2]. That it was a well-recognised and authoritative statement of Antiochus' system, is clear from the close verbal agreement of Varro's speech with other passages in Cicero professedly drawn from Antiochus, and also with the Antiochean fragments of Varro preserved by Augustine[3].

In the *Academica Priora* Lucullus reproduces the criticisms of Antiochus upon the scepticism of the New Academy. Cicero makes Lucullus say that he repeats the arguments of Antiochus from recollection of oral discussions in which that philosopher took part. But this state-

[1] See above, p. 4.

[2] It was probably not the *Sosus* (to be mentioned immediately), since that was polemical rather than expository, and developed only one particular thesis. Much the same may be said of the book which Antiochus addressed to Balbus, to prove that the difference between the Stoics and Peripatetics was merely one of terms (*N. D.* I. 16).

[3] For proofs of this agreement see my notes on the text of Varro's speech.

ment is only a literary device. No one can read the speech of Lucullus without perceiving that Cicero wrote it with a Greek work lying open before him, from which almost every sentence has been directly transferred. This book was in all probability the *Sosus*, a dialogue in which Antiochus attacked the views of his old teacher Philo[1]. The terms in which Cicero speaks of it show that it covered exactly the same ground as the discussions which Lucullus professes to report. The *Sosus* was probably divided into several books, one of them containing a purely personal attack upon Philo, which Cicero passed over in writing the *Academica*[2].

The sources of the sceptical arguments in the *Academica* are scarcely less clear. A work of Philo, twice mentioned, though not by any definite title[3], supplied Cicero with the historical justification of the New Academy which, in the first edition, he opposed to the speech of Hortensius, and in the second to that of Varro[4]. From the same work, in all probability, came the historical references placed at the outset of Cicero's speech in the *Lucullus*[5]. It is not quite so easy to trace to their origin the arguments by which Cicero showed the delusive nature of sense-knowledge. They were common-places of debate used by all philosophical sceptics from Pyrrho to Sextus. It is more probable that they were here borrowed from Clitomachus than from any other writer[6]. The 'four heads' of the sceptic argument, which Cicero in his later speech mentions in close connexion with the criticism directed in his earlier speech against the senses, are entirely in the style of Clitomachus[7]. The same book undoubtedly supplied Cicero with the more elaborate criticism on the bases of knowledge which he embodied in his second speech[8]. Tradition has, however, only handed down to us the titles of a few of the four hundred books which Clitomachus is said to have written, and no one of these titles suits the circumstances of the present case.

Cicero next gives two extracts relating to the constructive side of Carneades' philosophy, taken from two works of Clitomachus which he names[9]. The rest of his speech in the *Lucullus* is devoted to an exhibition of the hopeless discord which the history of philosophy presents.

[1] See *Ac.* II. 12 with my n.

[2] The phrase *compluris dies* in II. 12 indicates that in the *Sosus*, as in Cicero's own dialogues, a separate topic was assigned for each book. 'Ea pars quae contra Philonem erat' no doubt occupied a separate book.

[3] *Ac.* I. 13; II. 11.

[4] See above, p. 44.

[5] §§ 66—78.

[6] The phrase *inquit Carneades* in II. 93 seems to point to a work by Clitomachus the expositor of Carneades. So in § 98 Cicero professedly explains *tota Carneadi sententia* out of a work by Clitomachus.

[7] Cf. II. 83 with II. 99, 104.

[8] II. §§ 79—98.

[9] II. 98, 103.

I conjecture that Cicero here depended mainly on a work of Clitomachus mentioned by Diogenes Laertius, which probably contained a critical history of philosophy[1]. In the course of his remarks Cicero uses a small fragment of a lost dialogue by Aristotle[2]. The only allusions to other philosophers in the later part of Cicero's speech in the *Lucullus* are such as to confirm the supposition that it was almost wholly derived from Clitomachus[3].

Our analysis of the subject-matter of the *Academica* leads therefore to the following conclusion. It was composed of two long fragments of Antiochus taken from different works, two of Philo from the same work, four of Clitomachus from three or four different works. No attempt was made to recast or rearrange the subject-matter. It is to the last degree improbable that Cicero even condensed or made omissions to any considerable extent. He merely set the fragments in the framework of the dialogue. The local scenery, the illustrations from Roman history and the connecting links, constitute all that is due to his own invention. So far as philosophy is concerned, the passages which Cicero supplies contain nothing which was not notorious and well known to every man of culture in his day. In estimating, therefore, the philosophical value of the whole work, the reader must put Cicero's personality almost entirely out of sight, and look beyond him to Clitomachus, Philo and Antiochus. The only question personal to Cicero which can arise touches his fidelity as a translator. Few possess, few have ever possessed, the peculiar learning which would entitle them to pronounce an opinion on this subject. I have already stated the conclusions concerning it to which my studies have led me[4].

§ 6. *On the philosophical controversy contained in the* 'Academica'.

a. *The history of the controversy before Philo.*

There is no ancient philosophical work which ought to be of greater interest to modern students of philosophy, and particularly to English students, than the *Academica.* The problem it discusses is being debated as vigorously in the philosophical schools to-day as it was in the Ciceronian age. The question concerns the bases of human knowledge and the possibility of arriving at certitude. In order to a proper understanding of the *Academica*, it is necessary to apprehend in a general

[1] Diog. II. 92. The title is περὶ αἱρέσεων.

[2] See II. 119 with my nn.

[3] See II. 78.

[4] Above, pp. 26 sq.

way the mode in which the ancients stated the problem, and the lines on which they proceeded in search of its solution.

From the earliest appearance of the term ἐπιστήμη in Greek speculation, it carried with it the idea of fixity and indestructibility. To the Greek mind, knowledge was something which did not admit of degree. A great part of the work done by the predecessors of Plato had for its result the demonstration that knowledge in the Greek signification of the term could not be based solely on the information supplied by the senses. By their attacks on the trustworthiness of the perceptions of the senses, the Physicists and Eleates and Plato himself stored up results which formed in later times half the stock-in-trade of the Sceptics and New Academics. But all these earlier schools, and Aristotle after them, held that the intellect was capable of purging the impressions of sense from their impurities, and of arriving at certain and irrefragable truth.

On the other hand the critical efforts of the Sophists, the Megarians, the Eristics, and even the Cyrenaics[1], tended to prove that the intellect could supply no sounder or surer foundation for knowledge than the senses. It remained for Pyrrho of Elis to combine in one comprehensive and orderly scheme the somewhat confused criticism of the earlier and the later schools, and to boldly pronounce that no such thing as ἐπιστήμη, knowledge, is attainable by human faculties, but that we must act upon φαινόμενα, which give a confused and false picture of the realities lying behind them.

Nothing in the whole history of philosophy is more striking than the small vitality which the theories of knowledge constructed by Plato and Aristotle possessed in ancient times. Other parts of their systems continued to exert influence, but the sublime theory of ideas as conceived by Plato, and the elaborate fabric of human knowledge as reared by Aristotle, became practically obsolete within a generation or two of the death of their authors. After the time of Zeno nearly all who maintained that certitude was within human reach appealed to the theory which he advanced. From this time forward all the disputants in the debate tacitly assumed that, if knowledge is to be found anywhere, it can be found only in experience. Nothing at all like the modern idea of 'intuition' was recognised as a possible source of knowledge. Again, none of the disputants questioned the existence of a real world of things lying behind the phenomena of which we are conscious[2]. These

[1] See my n. on *Ac.* II. 79.

[2] Even the arguments of Sextus against the *Physici* question rather our knowledge of the real world than its existence. Only here and there in a few casual remarks of ancient writers is it hinted that the im-

two assumptions greatly limit the scope of the ancient discussion as compared with the modern. The problem was this: given a world of 'things in themselves' existing independently of human consciousness, given also the impressions of sense as the sole ultimate source of information concerning that world, to what extent can these impressions be trusted? The Epicureans boldly said that every impression of sense is true and trustworthy, and did not shrink from some of the most absurd consequences to which this principle led them, though they tried to escape from others by feeble quibbling[1]. Zeno, on the other hand, began by acknowledging that the impressions of sense must be divided into two classes, the true and the false, and proceeded to give a definition of a true impression. A true impression, he said, enables the healthy mind 'to seize on' the object, and to feel certain that the object has been rightly apprehended. This irresistible conviction is the sole test of truth. Knowledge, which is certain and admits of no degrees, must be built up on these 'irresistible impressions.' After the time of Zeno, the whole controversy concerning the possibility of certitude turned as on a pivot upon the Stoic definition of the individual 'irresistible impression' (*καταληπτικὴ φαντασία*). It was assumed that if the definition could be invalidated, the edifice of knowledge crumbled away from its base.

The sceptic school of Pyrrho practically died out with Timon of Phlius, and was only revived after Cicero's death[2]. But the mantle of Pyrrho really fell on Arcesilas, the founder of the New Academic school. He spent his life in combating the definition of the unit of knowledge given by the Stoics, and his scepticism was practically indistinguishable from that of Pyrrho. His position was modified by Carneades, whose negative criticism was as brilliant as that of Arcesilas, but who introduced positive teaching in the shape of what may be called a calculus of probabilities. While Arcesilas held that the moment we begin to examine any impression of sense, we shall find that the arguments for and against its trustworthiness exactly balance each other, Carneades thought that the scale would generally incline decisively in one direction or the other, so that although certitude is unattainable, various degrees of probability are within our reach.

pressions of sense may be without any external cause.

[1] See my n. on *Ac.* II. 79.

[2] Unless we accept the conclusion of Haas, *De philosophorum Scepticorum successionibus*, Würzburg 1875, p. 16, that Aenesidemus was contemporary with Antiochus of Ascalon. That some kind of titular succession was kept up from Timon to Aenesidemus seems to follow from Diog. Laert. IX. 68, 69 and 115, 116. The whole subject is discussed (with perhaps too much acuteness) by Haas.

Pyrrho and Arcesilas had maintained that all we can do is to act upon phenomena without attempting to determine their truth or falsehood. Carneades, equally holding that certainty is a chimera, contended that reason could lead up to sundry approximations to certainty, which were the proper bases for action.

The question whether action was possible without certainty was much talked of by the disputants, but the debate on this topic amounted in essence to nothing but assertion and denial. The dogmatists affirmed that if the sceptics were consistent they would be reduced to inaction of every description. The dogmatic position may be here stated in the words of Hume[1]. 'A Pyrrhonian cannot expect that his philosophy will have any constant influence, or if it had that its influence would be beneficial to society. On the contrary, he must acknowledge, if he will acknowledge anything, that all human life must perish, were his principles universally and steadily to prevail. All discourse, all action would immediately cease, and men remain in a total lethargy, till the necessities of nature, unsatisfied, put an end to their miserable existence. It is true so fatal an event is very little to be dreaded. Nature is always too strong for principle, and though a Pyrrhonian may throw himself and others into a momentary confusion by his profound reasonings, the first and most trivial event in life will put to flight all his doubts and scruples and leave him the same in every point of action and speculation with the philosophers of every other sect, or with those who never concerned themselves with any philosophical arguments or researches.'

The sceptics on the other hand maintained that there was no inconsistency in their acting and speaking like other men, provided it were understood that their speech or action was not to be taken as implying a belief in the correctness of impressions. They entrenched themselves in their impregnable position, which may also be described by quoting Hume[2]. 'By what argument can it be proved that the perceptions of the mind must be caused by external objects entirely different from them, though resembling them?... It is a question of fact whether the perceptions of the senses be produced by external objects resembling them. How shall this question be determined? By experience surely as all other questions of a like nature. But here experience is and must be entirely silent. The mind has never anything present to it but the perceptions and cannot possibly reach any experience of their connexion with objects. The supposition of such a connexion is therefore without any foundation in reasoning.'

[1] *Essays*, ed. Green and Grose II p. 131

[2] *Essays*, ed. Green and Grose II p. 125.

Hume and many other writers since have pronounced these sceptical arguments to be unanswerable. Modern philosophers have in fact been able to supply to the question 'why should we believe any impression of sense to give a correct picture of the object which causes it?' no better answer than that of the Stoics 'because in some cases our minds feel convinced of the correctness of the impression, in others not.'

b. *Philo and Antiochus.*

The opinions of these philosophers will only here be discussed so far as they concern the main problem of the *Academica*[1]. Both Philo and Antiochus began their teaching as ardent defenders of the pure doctrine of Carneades[2]. Both in their later days promoted, in different degrees, a reaction towards dogmatic doctrines. In the case of Antiochus this reaction was complete. So far as dialectic was concerned, he wholly attached himself to the Stoic school. In ethics and natural science he also accepted much from Zeno and Chrysippus, while declaring that these philosophers had borrowed their teaching from Plato and Aristotle and their immediate followers[3]. In Philo's case the nature of the reaction is exceedingly difficult to trace. All the information about it which we possess consists of a few hints in the *Academica* and two or three passages in other writers. Philo it is certain at all times maintained in its full force the whole polemic conducted by Carneades against the Stoic definition of the 'irresistible impression[4].' Yet he contended that things are in their own nature knowable[5]. But none of the sceptics or New Academics had ever asserted that our lack of sure knowledge is due to the nature of the objects of cognition. They referred it entirely to the defects in our faculties of perception. We want to be told, therefore, *how* Philo supposed it possible to arrive at a knowledge of things. Unfortunately no ancient authority has preserved for us any information on this point, and we are reduced to founding con-

[1] The most elaborate account of Philo of Larissa is to be found in C. F. Hermann's two papers 'de Philone Larissaeo,' Göttingen 1851 and 1855, but they are full of groundless fancies, as we shall have occasion to see; they are also often self-contradictory, and contain some positive blunders of serious importance. The best information about Antiochus is in Chappuis' pamphlet 'de Antiochi Ascalonitae vita et doctrina' (Paris 1854) which is in every way admirable.

[2] As to Antiochus, see *Ac.* II. 69.

[3] Full information on this subject will be found in my notes on *Ac.* I §§ 19—42.

[4] *Ac.* II. 18.

[5] Sext. *P. H.* I, 235. *ὅσον μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ στωικῷ κριτηρίῳ, τούτεστι τῇ καταληπτικῇ φαντασίᾳ, ἀκατάληπτα εἶναι τὰ πράγματα, ὅσον δὲ ἐπὶ τῇ φύσει τῶν πραγμάτων αὐτῶν καταληπτα.*

jectures on indirect evidence of a very shadowy kind. The theory of C. F. Hermann, that Philo returned to Plato's doctrine of the ἴδεαι, is destitute of all probability[1]. Zeller thinks that Philo merely restated with greater emphasis the Carneadean theory of probability[2]. This he concludes from a passage in the *Academica* which may refer to Philo especially, though that is far from certain[3]. It is moreover difficult to see why Philo should have been described as the founder or one of the founders of a *fourth* Academy (in succession to the Academies of Plato, Arcesilas and Carneades[4]) unless he gave utterance to some doctrine which was supposed to be novel. According to Cicero, when Antiochus first became acquainted with Philo's new views, he confidently appealed to a philosopher well acquainted with the history of the Academy, to say whether he had ever heard of such doctrines being preached by any professed adherent of the school[5]. From another passage of Cicero it appears that Philo, while he asserted that the Academic school had been perfectly consistent from first to last, from the time of Plato to his own[6], and while he treated the supposed contrast between Old and New Academy as a delusion, yet endeavoured to minimise the effect of the destructive criticism advanced by Arcesilas and Carneades, and so to show that the history of the New Academy had been generally misunderstood[7]. Hence he was openly charged with lying, not only by Antiochus, but by Catulus the elder. That the 'lie' of Philo, about the nature of which there has been much discussion, must have consisted in an attempt to put a new complexion on the sceptical teaching of Arcesilas and Carneades, must be clear to any one who attentively considers the passages in which the 'lie' is mentioned[8]. In all probability Philo argued that the solvent analysis which the New Academic leaders applied to the Stoic criterion of truth did not express their own views, but was merely a justifiable polemical expedient. He

[1] The sole ancient passage which can be stretched so as to favour this notion is Aug. *contr. Ac.* 3, 41 Philo coeperat ad Platonis auctoritatem Academiam legesque revocare; but the meaning of the passage is far from clear, and even if it meant what Hermann supposes it to mean, it must be remembered that the unsupported opinion of Augustine, who knew nothing of Philo but what he learned from Cicero, is worthless.

[2] *Phil. d. Griechen*, III. 1, p. 595, n. 1 (ed. 3).

[3] II. 34 where it is said that the Academics attempt to distinguish *perspicua* (ἐναργῆ) from *percepta* (κατάληπτα) and affirm that there is a kind of ἐναργὲς which may be called *true*, and is 'impressum in animo et mente.' Zeller thinks this goes beyond Carneades; I see no reason which compels us to suppose that it does. In II. 32 where Hermann supposes there is an especial reference to Philo, there is certainly nothing which is not Carneadean.

[4] Sext. *P. H.* I. 220. It is noticeable that Sextus there joins Charmadas with Philo.

[5] *Ac.* II. 11.

[6] *Ac.* I. 13.

[7] *Ac.* II. 12.

[8] *Ac.* II §§ 12, 18.

seems to have set up a contrast between the exoteric and the esoteric doctrines of the New Academy, though his opponents asked in vain what the latter were[1], and Clitomachus, the pupil and successor of Carneades, declared that he had never been able to discover the real opinion of his master concerning any topic whatever[2].

Philo then assigned his own positive teaching, whatever it was, to his predecessors in the school. Cicero nowhere in the *Academica* directly defends his accuracy on this point, but he does indirectly try to reestablish the impaired credit of his favourite master. Thus he repeatedly implies that the unfavourable judgment pronounced upon Philo was in great part caused by the failure of his critics to realise the constructive doctrines of Carneades[3].

The most probable conjecture about Philo's own opinion is, I think, this. He maintained that the impressions of sense give in the vast majority of instances a correct picture of the objects which cause them. We may therefore make confident assertions as to their truth, where we see no reason to suspect their falsehood. Only, while we may be sure that in the overwhelmingly larger number of instances our judgment will be right, yet in no one particular instance can we be absolutely certain that it is so. This conjecture accords with Philo's vindication of the seriousness of Carneades' assertion that the perfectly wise man will feel free to pronounce definite opinions though he knows he cannot absolutely prove them[4]. We may suppose that this view agreed roughly with the opinions of the Peripatetics at this time[5]. It would therefore seem a substantial concession to dogmatism[6].

One thing which closely concerns the *Academica*, but which is very difficult to determine, is the date at which Philo changed his opinions. The view of Brandis[7] that the two books which excited the wrath of Antiochus were written before Philo came to Rome, is exceedingly improbable. At the time when Cicero first heard his lectures, he almost certainly taught nothing but the doctrine of Carneades. Now Philo's

[1] *Ac.* II. 60.

[2] *Ac.* II. 139.

[3] A careful comparison of *Ac.* II §§ 35, 36 with §§ 98—106 will show this. It is difficult to get Lucullus and the others to see the full force of the Carneadean πιθανόν. They do not know the '*tota sententia Carneadi.*' There is a hint at Philo in the words with which Cic. introduces his quotation from Clitomachus: 'nec uero ita dicam ut quisquam id fingi suspicetur.' In § 102 there is a sort of counter charge against Antiochus of misrepresenting the Academy.

[4] *Ac.* II. 78.

[5] *Ac.* II. 112 with note.

[6] Philo seems not to have been alone among Academics in conceding something to the dogmatists. From *Ac.* II. 78 it would seem that Metrodorus of Stratonice was to some extent with him. The same may perhaps to some extent be affirmed of Charmadas, who is pointedly classed with Philo by Sext.

[7] *Rh. Mus.* III. 545 sq.

arrival in Rome cannot well be placed earlier than the end of the year 88 B.C.[1]. The elder Catulus, who is said to have reprehended Philo for his change of opinion[2], died a few months later during the proscription of Marius and Cinna. If the statement about Catulus is correct, an extraordinarily small space of time is left for Philo's change of opinion to have become known. Yet that the 'duo libri' in which Philo expressed his new views were composed at least as late as the summer of 87 seems clear. They came into the hands of Antiochus about the end of that year[3], and had been in circulation at Rome only a short time before he received them. It is possible that, in the public lectures which Cicero heard, Philo gave expression only to that brilliant negative criticism which he had inherited from Carneades, leaving reactionary doctrines for private conversation and his written books. One passage in the *Academica*[4] seems indeed to imply that the views expressed in the books were new even to men who must have listened to his oral teaching.

c. *The later Scepticism.*

We have seen that Pyrrho and Arcesilas were absolutely at one in the methods they pursued[5]. During all the vigorous and brilliant period of the New Academy the titular sceptical school was in abeyance[6], but the successive advances of the New Academic teachers towards dogmatism[7] called the ideas of Pyrrho into new life. Aenesidemus at the beginning of the first century of the Christian era was the founder of the renewed school of sceptics[8]. Its chief feature was the systematisation and reduction to order as well as the extension and development of all the scattered arguments which earlier sceptics had used against the dogmatists. At first ten heads, called 'methods' (τρόποι) were established, under which were ranged all the sceptical contentions. These methods were afterwards reduced to five, and even to two. The work

[1] The siege of Athens by Sulla did not begin till the spring of 87.

[2] *Acad.* II. §§ 11, 12.

[3] Cf. Plut. *Luc.* c. 2 with *Ac.* II. 11.

[4] II. 11.

[5] See my n. on *Ac.* I. 46 *paria momenta.* All attempts, whether made in ancient or in modern times, to sunder Pyrrho from Arcesilas have entirely failed. Sextus labours hard to draw a distinction in *P. H.* I. 190 sq.

[6] See above, p. 55, n. 2.

[7] For Zeller's wholly erroneous supposition that both Pyrrho and Arcesilas had a calculus of probability which Carneades did nothing but expand, see my n. on § 98.

[8] For a general account of the Greek sceptics the student is referred to Zeller, or to the excellent essay by Mr Norman Maccoll. The date here given for Aenesidemus is that adopted by Zeller; Haas (see above, p. 55, n. 2) places him 60 or 70 years earlier.

of the new sceptic school is summed up in the extant writings of Sextus Empiricus, who lived in the third century of our era[1]. As the later sceptics made full use of the literature of the New Academy, Sextus is of prime importance for the elucidation of the *Academica*. He was an admitted master of the sceptical philosophy, and his exposition of it is thorough and relentless. It will be of use to set side by side the comparatively loose assault made by Clitomachus upon the dogmatists, and the far more highly organised attack which we find in Sextus. For this purpose, we will first take the ten 'methods' of Aenesidemus, and show to what extent they have their counterparts in the *Academica*.

The first 'method[2]' shows that as animals are differently constituted the impressions which objects make on their senses must be different, and therefore the evidence of sense is contradictory. This is only just touched upon in the *Academica*[3]. Next comes the 'method' which is based on the differences of constitution found among human beings, in respect both of the bodily and of the intellectual powers[4]. Under this head falls that discordance of opinion among the dogmatists which has supplied so many weapons for the sceptic armoury in all ages. A large portion of the *Academica* is devoted to this subject[5], while a few arguments are also based on the physical diversities existing among men[6]. Thirdly, the sceptic urged that most objects make separate and even contradictory impressions on two or more of the senses; it is impossible to say whether the object is possessed of one quality only, which is differentiated by our senses, or whether it possesses just so many qualities as our senses perceive, or whether it has other qualities which we could not perceive without the addition of other senses[7]. In the *Academica* these arguments are only just hinted[8]. The fourth *τρόπος* is derived from the difference of impression which the same object makes on the senses under different bodily conditions, for example, in sickness and in health[9]. This point is urged at some length in the portion of the *Academica* which we possess, and probably had some space devoted to it in the part which has been lost[10]. The fifth 'method' carries the preceding contention a step farther and shows how the impressions

[1] Every student of the *Academica* should read at least the first book of the 'Principles of Pyrrhonism.' It has been translated into German with elucidations in Kirchmann's philosophical library, Berlin 1879.

[2] Sext. *P.H.* I. 40—78: *ὁ τρόπος ὁ παρὰ τὴν τῶν ζώων διαφορὰν* or *ἐξαλλαγήν*.

[3] II. 81.

[4] *P.H.* I. 79—89: *ὁ παρὰ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων διαφοράν*.

[5] I. 43—46; II. 118—147.

[6] II. 20, 81, 86; fragm. 11.

[7] *P.H.* I. 90—99: *ὁ παρὰ τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν αἰσθήσεων*.

[8] I. 42, where see my n.

[9] *P.H.* I. 100—117: *ὁ παρὰ τὰς περιστάσεις*.

[10] *Ac.* fragm. 9, 10; II. 46—53 (in parts); 81, 88—90.

produced by objects vary when the subject is placed under varying conditions of space[1]. This line of attack was so thoroughly hackneyed that Cicero did not expend much trouble in pursuing it[2]. Sixthly, the effect produced by variations in other external conditions besides those of position was considered. Each sensation is affected by and mixed up with other sensations, and these act and react upon one another[3]. This observation is not developed in the *Academica*, though it is involved in several passages[4]. In the seventh place, Sextus argues that different quantities of the same material substance will make very different impressions on the senses, and render it impossible to pronounce what the *real* qualities of the substance are[5]. This contention received only slight attention from Cicero[6]. The eighth sceptical method really sums up in a general form all the other nine. It shows that all judgment which follows on sensation is relative to or conditioned by either the peculiarities of the individual subject, or the external circumstances by which sensation is accompanied[7]. This principle in its general form is nowhere exactly stated in the *Academica*. Nor are the two succeeding τρόποι represented there. The ninth is based on the difference which it makes to our judgment whether an object is of rare or frequent occurrence[8]; the tenth relates to the great variety of habits and manners and social ideas prevailing among different nations[9].

These ten τρόποι were more or less common to the earlier sceptics and the New Academy, but in clearness and thoroughness Aenesidemus made a conspicuous advance, both upon Pyrrho and upon Carneades[10].

Of the five 'methods' adopted by the younger sceptics[11], one is identical with the eighth of the earlier scheme while another, based on the discord of human judgments[12], sums up most, if not all, of the re-

[1] *P.H.* I. 118—123: ὁ παρὰ τὰς θέσεις καὶ τὰ διαστήματα καὶ τοὺς τόπους.

[2] *Ac.* II. 19; 79—82; fragm. 3, 6, 10.

[3] *P.H.* I. 124—128: ὁ παρὰ τὰς ἐπιμιγάς.

[4] *Ac.* fragm. 3, 10; also II. 105.

[5] *P.H.* I. 129—134: ὁ παρὰ τὰς ποσότητας καὶ σκευασίας.

[6] *Ac.* II. 100; fragm. 7.

[7] *P.H.* I. 135—140: ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ πρός τι.

[8] *P.H.* I. 141—144: ὁ παρὰ τὰς συνεχεῖς ἢ σπανίους συγκυρήσεις.

[9] *P.H.* I. 145—163: ὁ παρὰ τὰς ἀγωγὰς καὶ τὰ ἔθη.

[10] Zeller, who concludes (III. 1, p. 486 n., ed. 3, or E. Tr. p. 494 n.) that the ten τρόποι, as they have come down to us, are not older than Aenesidemus, and implies that only a small portion of them appeared in any shape earlier, fails to notice how much of their substance exists among the remains of the New Academy preserved by Cicero and others. The argument of Zeller that *because* in *A.M.* 7, 345 the δέκα τρόποι are said to have been used by Aenesidemus, *therefore* the ἀρχαιότεροι σκεπτικοὶ to whom the same τρόποι are attributed in *P.H.* I. 36 must exclude A.'s predecessors, is illogical. I have no doubt that Sextus, as well as Diog. Laert. (IX. 79), meant to attribute the ten 'methods' to Pyrrho and Timon.

[11] They are attributed to the school of Agrippa of Alexandria, a pupil of Aenesidemus, by Diog. IX. 88.

[12] Sext. *P.H.* I. 164: ὁ εἰς ἄπειρον ἐμβάλλων.

maining nine. The other three later τρόποι are logical tricks, directed against the possibility of demonstration, no one of which is exactly given in the *Academica*. The first shows that proof is impossible, because to prove anything assumptions must be made, and these assumptions require proof, and so on ad infinitum. The second meets the claim of the dogmatist to have some unproved hypothesis admitted as a basis of proof, by pointing out that the sceptic can easily propose an unproved hypothesis destructive of that put forward on the other side[1]. The last 'method' is the 'method of alternation[2].' To distinguish a true from a false proof a criterion is needed, but to show the criterion true a proof is needed and so the argument oscillates to infinity between criterion and proof. These three 'tropes' were no doubt constructed out of ancient material. The first of the three can be definitely traced back to Timon[3], and involves (like the other two) a difficulty felt with the first dawn of logic.

The two 'tropes' which Sextus attributes to some later sceptics really constitute the horns of a dilemma, which showed that in every instance where knowledge was asserted, one of two among the five 'tropes' might be used, viz. that based on the diversity of judgments, and that which calls for proof upon proof to infinity[4].

The eight so-called τρόποι of Aenesidemus stand on quite a different footing from all the other schemes. They bear the stamp of original invention and have no counterparts in the speculation of earlier times. They were directed to the overthrow of the Stoic theory of causes.

§ 7. *On the text of the* 'Academica', *and various matters connected with its study.*

Every editor of Cicero's philosophical works must at present depend largely upon the evidence concerning MSS which is presented by Baiter and Halm in their continuation of Orelli's second edition of Cicero's works (Zürich, 1861). The recension given of the *Academica* is by K. Halm, who supplies *all* the readings of four MSS for the *Academica Posteriora*, and of three MSS for the *Academica Priora*, along with selected variants from other MSS and from the early printed editions.

a. The MSS of the *Academica Posteriora*. All the known MSS of this fragment are of dates later than the beginning of the xvth cent. Those on which my text is founded are as follows. The marks here assigned to them are those used in the critical notes.

1 ὁ ὑποθετικὸς τρόπος.
2 ὁ διάλληλος τρόπος.
3 Sext. *A.M.* III. 2.
4 Sext. *P.H.* I, 178.

1. A. In the possession of S. Allen, Esq., of Dublin[1], who inherited it from his father, H. Allen, Esq., well known to students of Cicero by his Latinised name 'Henricus Alanus.' This MS is a small quarto, written on parchment with great care; few mistakes in it can be ascribed to the copyist. In parts the ink is rubbed away, but the forms of the letters are so deeply impressed on the parchment that, with care, the readings can always be made out. The contents are—*Academica Posteriora*, *De legibus*, *De natura deorum*, *De divinitatione*, *De fato*, *Timaeus*, (*De mundo*), *Somnium Scipionis*. At the end comes *Academica I.* with this title, '*M. T. Ciceronis fragmentorum de Academicis.*' It concludes with the words *ex Epicureo Zenone* in § 46, and has no proper subscription, but merely the remark '*non repeperitur* (*sic*) *plus*.' The MS bears the book-plate of the well-known Conrad von Uffenbach, who probably brought it from Italy[2]. It afterwards became the property of Creuzer, who used it in preparing his editions of the *De legibus* and *De natura deorum*. The collation which Halm used was supplied to him by the owner ('Henricus Alanus') himself, and is very rarely inaccurate or incomplete. Only in a few instances have I been able to correct or supplement it.

2. Al_2. Also the property of Mr Allen. This MS has not been collated before so far as I know. It is a small folio, written in Italy on paper, and not older than the latter half of the XVth century. The MS (the writing of which is careless in many parts) contains only the *Tusculan Disputations*, and the first book of the *Academica Posteriora* down to *et cum* in § 28, where it breaks off. What remains is evidently only a portion of a much larger MS. Blank spaces are left where illuminated letters stood in the original from which it was copied. On the fly-leaf is written 'from the Rev. John Mitford's sale[3].'

3. Harl. 1. No. 3593 of the Harleian collection in the British Museum. Written in Italy, on paper, towards the end of the XVth century, with blank spaces for initial letters. The handwriting is small, and the orthography on the whole good. The MS contains only the *De finibus* and *Academica I.*

4. Harl. 2. No. 6327 in the Harleian collection. Written on paper; belongs to the very end of the XVth cent. or even to the beginning of the XVIth. Contains both the *Academica Priora* and *Posteriora*. A good many errors.

[1] Whom I heartily thank for the loan of this and No. 2.

[2] The *Catalogus Bibliothecae Uffenbachianae* (1720) gives no clue to its source. Mr S. Allen is unable to state how this and No. 2 came into his father's possession.

[3] Wherever A and Al_2 agree I denote the reading by Al. simply.

5. Harl. 3. No. 5291. Small folio, written in Italy about the middle of the xvth cent. on parchment. Contains the *De finibus* and *Academica I.*[1]

6. Burn. No. 165 in the Burneian collection at the British Museum. Written on parchment, in Italy; of about the same date as Harl. 3. Contains the *Tusculan Disputations*, the *De finibus* and *Academica I.*

7. E. In the Bodleian library; no. 2497. Written on paper, and has the inscription *istud volumen scriptum et compositum fuit opera Vespasiani librarii Florentini in civitate Florentie de anno* 1459. Contains the whole of Cicero's philosophical works excepting the *Lucullus*, and the recently discovered portions of the *De re publica.*

8. ψ. The well-known, beautifully written Balliol MS. Contains nearly the whole of Cicero's works (including the *Lucullus*). Written in Italy, on parchment.

9. U. In the library of Lincoln College, Oxford.

10. G. The '*codex Gedanensis*' of Halm.

11. P. A Paris MS; no. 6331, once known as *codex Puteanus;* written on parchment and containing the *De finibus*, and *Academica I*, with some works of Seneca, and a '*vita S. Albani.*'

12. V. In Paris. No. 7784; 'olim in aede S. Victoris, num. 90.'

In my critical notes I have given all the readings of these twelve MSS which are of any importance. The first eight I have collated myself. For the readings of U I have had to depend on the collation given by the Oxford editors of 1783, although I have found the information they give about E and ψ so untrustworthy that I can put little faith in their report of U. The readings of G P V I have taken from Halm[2].

Of these MSS no one, in my opinion, stands out as conspicuously better than the rest. Halm, and after him Baiter, and to a still greater degree C. F. W. Müller, have attributed much importance to the '*codex Gedanensis.*' I believe I have made it clear in my critical notes that this MS is largely interpolated and corrected by its copyist, who was undoubtedly a good scholar. It may be affirmed with confidence that all existing MSS of *Academica I* are ultimately derived from a single archetype. This archetype was, as I conjecture, not very much older than its descendants, and was probably Italian by origin. The following passages, where all known MSS agree, will be found to support these conclusions[3].

[1] Wherever the three Harleian MSS agree I denote the reading by Harl. simply.

[2] I have also examined a MS recently acquired by the library of the Univ. of Cambridge, but found that so far as the *Academica* is concerned it is *copied* from the Roman printed edition of 1471.

[3] I put here out of account the so-called *codices Elienses Davisii*, as to

§ 1 *cum eius uilla;* § 2 *et si quid;* ib. *in manibus que* or *quae;* § 5 *eadem ipse didicisti enim;* ib. *diffiniunt;* ib. *mallent...accipiunt* (a most remarkable agreement); § 6 *adhibenda enim geometria;* ib. break after *adducere;* ib. *apud nostros enim;* § 7 *non ut scis;* § 9 *plurimum quidem;* § 13 *ueterem iam;* § 14 *aqua assumptam* (or *absumptam*) *diu;* § 18 *uidetur quidem;* § 20 *absolutum* (there was here a lacuna in the archetype); § 22 *dum* (for *tum*—a noteworthy agreement); ib. *prima in natura* or *in pr. n.;* § 23 *artis* (for *partis*); § 28 *ultro in utroque* or *introque;* § 29 *hec necopinata;* § 32 *motionibus;* § 37 *et seruata;* § 40 *hoc uerbum quidem;* § 43 *et breuiter;* § 43 *duae* or *due* for *tuae* (like *dum* for *tum* in § 22); § 44 *ueluti amantes* (noteworthy); § 46 *exposui.*

It is evident from what has been stated that, although a good many MSS exist of *Acad. I* which have never been collated, or have been only partially collated, any future examination of MSS is not likely to contribute much to the study of this portion of the work.

As regards the text of the fragments of the *Academica Posteriora*, the most important of which are preserved by Nonius, I have made careful use of the edition of Nonius by Quicherat (Paris 1872).

b. The MSS of the *Lucullus.*

The following are the MSS referred to in my critical notes, where all the readings of any consequence are quoted.

1. V. A Vienna MS of the xth cent. In Endlicher's catalogue (1836) = No. LV. In the new catalogue (1856) = No. 189. This MS breaks off at the words *aut non* in § 104.

2. A. Leyden MS no. 84; XIth cent.

3. B. Another Leyden MS; XIIth cent.[1]

4. E. MS of Erlangen; no. 847. A paper MS, *dated* 1466, and containing a large number of Cicero's works[2]. Madvig made great use of this MS in editing the *De finibus.*

5. G. 'Codex Gudianus secundus,' now at Wolfenbüttel. A large parchment folio, of the XIVth cent., written in France. This '*ingens volumen*[3]' comprises a great portion of Cicero's writings.

6. U. The Lincoln College MS mentioned above.

7. ψ. The Balliol College MS mentioned above.

8. Harl. The MS described as Harl. 2 above.

9. Cant. The Cambridge MS marked Dd, 13, 2. As there are many points of interest about it I give a short description of it. It is of

which see below. For more particular information respecting the readings here quoted see my critical notes.

[1] I have followed Halm in denoting the *consensus* of ABV by C.

[2] See Halm *Zur Handschriftenkunde der Ciceronischen Schriften*, München 1850, p. 3.

[3] Halm, p. 7.

large folio size, containing *Cato maior*, *De natura deorum*, *De diuinatione*, *De fato*, *Lucullus*, *Pro Milone*, *Pro Plancio*, *Pro Caelio*, *Pro Sulla*, *Pro imp. Cn. Pomp.*, *Pro Marcello*, *Pro Ligario*, *Pro Deiotaro*, *In Pisonem*, *In Catilinam*, *Inuectiua in Sallustium*, *Inu. Sallustii in Ciceronem*, the *Philippics*, *De Officiis* and *Tusculan Disputations*. Mr Bradshaw tells me that from the writing and ornamentation he would have concluded that the MS was probably written in the north of Holland. At the end is this signature: '*per manus Theodorici Nycolai Werken de Abbenbroeck liber explicit anno domini* 1444.' The writer was therefore evidently a Hollander, but he probably wrote in England. There are many beautiful illuminations remaining, and many more have been cut out. Mr Bradshaw has shown me that the MS was the gift of Archbishop Rotherham to the Library, where it has remained for just upon four centuries.

On the margin are many notes ascribed to William of Malmesbury, nearly all written in the first person, in such a way as to show that this MS is to be traced back to one actually annotated by William himself. The notes consist not only of summaries of the arguments in the text, but of numerous parallel passages from Cicero himself, and quotations from or references to a great number of authors, among whom may be mentioned particularly Augustine, Lactantius, Orosius, Iustinus, Valerius Maximus, Florus, Pliny the elder, Lucan, Macrobius, Jerome, the *periochae* of Livy. These annotations really show very considerable reading and research. William seems to have been especially interested in gathering together fragments of lost works by Cicero, out of the ecclesiastical writers. The following extracts from notes appended to the *Lucullus* are of interest. After quoting from the outset of the *De diuinatione* a passage relating to the *four* books of the *Academica Posteriora*, and further from Augustine two passages concerning Varro, viz. the fragment numbered 36 in my edition, and part of 1 § 9, William says '*hic liber primus Achademicorum in Anglia non invenitur, sed nec secundus in quo Catulus pro Achademicis disputans introducitur, sicut ex multis quae in hiis libris proxime scriptis animadverti potest. Tertius vero et quartus liber Achademicorum hi duo sunt qui proprie Lucullus appellantur, quia in uno introducitur Lucullus contra Achademicos disputans, in altero Tullius ei pro Achademicis respondet.*' Although therefore William was not acquainted with the letters of Cicero which disclose the secret of the two editions, he had apprehended the divisions of the subject-matter better than many recent scholars. He goes on thus: '*dicit idem Cicero in principio secundi libri de divinatione se composuisse librum in quo introduxit Hortensium hortantem ad studium philosophiae. Dicit etiam ibidem se* VI *libros de re publica edidisse. Qui libri quia in Anglia non reperiun-*

tur ego Wilk'mus Malmesburgensis more meo hic apposui quitquid de materia et intentione eorum in beato Augustino invenire potui, simul et hic inventa occasione notandum puto ne quis me reprehendat quot libros gentilium lego et scribo. Qui enim hac intentione illos legit quia fastidit vel vilipendit divinas scripturas graviter et penaliter peccat, unde et beatus ieronimus se castigatum et caesum profitetur in libro ad Eustochium de divinitate servanda. Qui vero eos ideo legit ut si quid ornate et eloquenter dicunt ipse in suis scriptis addit (sic) [here something has evidently dropped out] *et sanctorum eius gloriam oportune transferat teneres* (sic) *apostoli regulam ut omnia probet quod bonum est teneat ab omni specie mala se abstineat nullo modo eum peccare de lectione gentilium librorum crediderim. Quod si michi non creditur, epistola eiusdem ieronimi ad oratorem magnum urbis romae legatur.*' Then follows the well-known passage from the third book of Augustine's Confessions, which tells how he attributed his conversion to the reading of Cicero's *Hortensius*. This is succeeded by the fragment of the *Hortensius* numbered 50 in C. F. W. Müller's edition, quoted from Augustine's *De trinitate*.

The orthography of the MS is in many respects good. The spelling of Greek names in particular is better than in most MSS.

Of these nine MSS, I have collated 7, 8, 9 myself. The readings of 6 are taken from the Oxford edition of 1783; those of the rest from Halm.

It has been supposed by many scholars that all existing MSS of the *De natura deorum*, *De diuinatione*, *Timaeus*, *De fato*, *Topica*, *Paradoxa*, *Lucullus* and *De legibus* are traceable to a single original. The evidence offered for this conclusion does not satisfy me, but it would be out of place to discuss it here. C. F. W. Müller has elaborately examined (*Neue Iahrbücher*, 1864, pp. 127 sq.; 261 sq.) the relation of the MSS above marked ABV to the archetype, but his conclusions are of little value for the study of the text of the *Academica*. Müller attributes importance to a MS of the xth cent. at Munich, which still (so far as I know) remains uncollated.

c. In addition to the readings of the MSS described above, I have often quoted those of the Roman printed edition of 1471 which represents, in the *Academica Posteriora*, a somewhat different recension of the text from that contained in our MSS. The readings of this edition are marked r. Further, I have given in all important cases the readings adopted by three recent editors, whose opinion on all matters connected with Ciceronian criticism is entitled to a respectful hearing. These are Halm (H in the critical notes), Baiter (B) who published in 1863 along with Kayser a complete text of Cicero, and C. F. W. Müller

(M), who is now engaged in editing Cicero for the Teubner series of texts. The net result of my judgment upon the evidence is a text which lies considerably nearer to the MSS than that of all three editors just mentioned. All of them, as I think my notes will show, have altered many passages unnecessarily. This is chiefly due to the fact that, good Latinists and critics as they are, they fail at many points from want of a special study of the ancient sources for the philosophic doctrines with which the *Academica* deals. It is not possible safely to construct a text for any one of Cicero's philosophical writings from a knowledge of Latin alone, and least of all for the *Academica*. If I have been able, as I think I have, to correct in a good many passages, on grounds of Latin criticism alone, the judgments of these three editors, the reason is that I have known the text of this book nearly by heart for many years, and have thus been enabled to bring to bear upon it at once anything germane to it which has come before me in the course of prolonged reading largely directed to this special end.

d. I now proceed to mention some other matters more or less closely connected with the textual criticism of the book.

1. In the library of the University of Cambridge there is a copy of the edition of Stephanus of 1538, 1539, which once belonged to P. Faber, and has annotations apparently in his handwriting[1]. Out of respect for Faber's name, I have gone carefully through them, but find nothing of any value in them. They as a rule either give the readings of Lambinus, or references to passages in Greek and Latin authors. Only in a few instances do these written annotations disagree with those printed by Faber, and they never add anything of importance.

2. The *codices Elienses* quoted by Davies have long been a puzzle to scholars. For most facts that are known concerning them I may refer to Prof. J. B. Mayor's introduction to his edition of the *De natura deorum*[2]. Davies speaks at different times of three *codices Elienses*. One of these seems to have been a real *codex*, containing the *Tusculan Disputations* only. The other two were not properly *codices* at all, but two sets of various readings professing (it appears) to be drawn from two MSS, and written in the margin of a copy of Stephanus' Cicero (1538—9). Of these MSS (if they really existed) only one contained the *Academica Posteriora*, while both contained the *Lucullus*. A careful examination

[1] The book seemingly came from Bishop Moore's library. Besides the principal hand, there are one or two others in the annotations, of a later date. All the notes to the *Academica* are in the principal hand. The chief doubt I have about the notes being in Faber's hand is that he considered his own handwriting to be very fine (see the pref. to his nn. on *Acad.*), while that of these notes is certainly not so.

[2] pp. lxvii. sq.

of the quotations made by Davies shows these collations to have been very imperfect. At least Davies often appeals to them on trivial matters while he says nothing about them when dealing with difficult passages. In his notes on *Acad. I* the *codex Eliensis* is quoted ten times only. In only two of these places has it readings peculiar to itself, viz. § 2 *ecquid* and § 24 *non auditis* for *inauditis*, both evidently conjectures, the first being right, the second wrong. In the notes to the *Lucullus* the two *codices* are indicated thirty-eight times, but in such a careless way that it is scarcely ever possible to draw distinctions between the two. Only in one place does he contrast two different readings of the same passage drawn from the two *codices* (§ 27 where El. 2 has *non satis*, El. 1 *satis*). In another note (on § 129) he quotes 'MS Eliensis' in the singular; all the other references are to 'omnes nostri' or to 'Eliens.' without distinction. In one passage only a reading is attributed to 'Eliens.' which is not found in any other MS, viz. *ferrentur* for *ferentur* in § 94, which, though adopted by Davies, is decidedly wrong.

Enough has been said to show that so far at least as the *Academica* is concerned, the *codices Elienses* are not worthy of serious attention.

e. Concerning the history of criticism as applied to the *Academica*[1]. Of the XVth century printed editions the only one of any use for the study of the text is the Roman edition of 1471. To two scholars of the succeeding century it was principally due that the Latin was purged of the grossest and most superficial errors that had crept into the MSS. The first of these was the Venetian, Paulus Manutius, whose edition (1540—1546) first laid the foundation of a sound text of Cicero's works. He was succeeded by D. Lambinus, who outshone all his predecessors in knowledge of Latin literature, and particularly of Cicero[2]. There were few weak points in the text on which he did not lay his finger. But he had two great faults. In the first place he was not content to try and find out what Cicero did write, but loved to introduce into the text countless small alterations which he thought improvements, but which were without evidence to support them. Also he destroyed in a great measure the value of his work by disingenuousness in attributing his own conjectures to MSS sources.

To Adrian Turnebus belongs the credit of being the first to advance the interpretation of the *Academica* by an appeal to the sources of the ancient philosophy. His commentary on *Acad. I* was published in Paris in 1553. That of P. Faber on both books appeared in 1611, and is remarkable for acute observations on the language of the work.

[1] For further descriptions of the editions here mentioned the student is referred to Orelli's '*Onomasticon*' Vol. I.

[2] His first edition appeared in 1566.

The next editor who did much to advance the criticism of the *Academica* was John Davies, President of Queens' College, Cambridge, as a Latin scholar surpassed in his own time by Bentley alone. His first edition appeared in 1725, his second in 1736; the latter has been reprinted by Rath (Halle, 1806). Davies successfully studied in other ancient works the philosophical doctrines discussed in the *Academica*. The value of his work, great in itself, was enhanced by reprints of the notes of Victorius, Muretus, Lambinus, Faber and Turnebus, and other scholars.

An edition by Wetzel (Brunswick, 1799) contains few notes, but they are generally sensible. That by Hülsemann (Magdeburg 1806) has a good deal of useful illustrative matter.

It is unfortunately necessary to mention the edition of Goerenz (Leipzig, 1810). The extraordinary vitality of this writer's works is a singular fact in literary history. Before 1826 Goerenz had a reputation for Latin scholarship which was perhaps not inferior to that of any man then living. In that year, however, a small work[1] was published by Madvig, then barely twenty-one years of age, which shattered for ever the pretensions of Goerenz to the title of scholar, in the eyes at least of all those who are qualified and who take pains enough to judge. Yet a year later Orelli could found his text of the *Academica* upon the '*praestantissima recensio*' of Goerenz, though he was well acquainted with Madvig's little book. Since then Madvig, in his editions of the *De finibus*, has most mercilessly displayed Goerenz as the drunken Helot of Latin scholarship. In spite of this, the professed guides of studious youth, occasionally in Germany, but more often in England, still to this day recommend the editions of Goerenz, even to the exclusion of all others.

The recension of Goerenz was the last which appeared, accompanied by explanatory notes, until my first edition of 1874.

Orelli's critical edition (Zürich, 1827) is still so useful, that it deserves a mention. It gives the readings of many of the earlier editions, and although these are not always accurately reported, the information is very acceptable, when access cannot be had to an extensive library. Orelli has also reprinted, among other things, the *Academica* of P. Valentia (mentioned below), and the work of Augustine, *Adversus Academicos*.

The most valuable translations are those of Boost (Mannheim, 1816) who was in many passages the first writer to see the true interpretation,

[1] *Emendationes in M. T. Ciceronis libros philosophicos*, the ripest work ever produced by a scholar so young, and quite worthy to rank beside the splendid achievements of Madvig's later life.

and Binder (Stuttgart, 1861). That of Castillon (see below) contains, in the notes, a great quantity of useful but ill-digested matter[1].

Of the works on ancient philosophy earlier than our own time, the *Academica* of Petrus Valentia (1596) is of far the greatest importance for the study of the Ciceronian *Academica*. This writer had acquired a knowledge of the post-Aristotelian philosophy which remained unsurpassed till recent days. His work was reprinted by Durand (London, 1740) and by Orelli (1827, see above). A diligent use of P. Valentia would have saved succeeding editors from innumerable errors. A work of the same class, though inferior in merit, is that of Castillon 'Livres Académiques de Cicéron' (Berlin, 1779) which is accompanied by a translation.

Of modern writers, Zeller surpasses in usefulness all others, although it must be admitted that his account of the post-Aristotelian philosophy is the weakest portion of his great work.

All the works mentioned above have been constantly consulted by me while writing the notes, and these alone require special notification or description[2].

§ 8. *On the Orthography of this edition.*

My one aim in this respect has been, by combining and studying the existing evidence of all kinds, to arrive as nearly as possible at the orthography which Cicero actually used. It would however have been impossible, without encumbering the notes, to give, except in a few instances, the reasons which have induced me to accept certain modes of spelling, and to reject others. It is common in this country to find all attempts at reforming Latin orthography opposed by the argument from convenience. I am convinced that the spelling which rests on the soundest scientific basis will in the end be found more convenient than any other. Latin orthography, so far as printed texts are concerned, is now in a state of absolute chaos. Something might indeed be said in favour of a consistent conventional spelling to be applied to the whole of Latin literature from first to last. But scholars never have agreed and never can agree on any conventional scheme, and were agreement

[1] The translation of Kirchmann (Berlin, 1874) contains references to modern philosophers (in the notes) which are often worth attention. But the value of Kirchmann's scholarship may be estimated from the fact that he regards all alterations introduced into the text since the time of Goerenz (!) as mere arbitrary attempts to secure greater fineness and clearness of style.

[2] For a general account of the aims and methods of this edition, see the Preface.

possible, the loss would be greater than the gain. A thousand important lessons in scholarship depend on the determination of the spelling used at particular epochs and by different authors. The subject is however too large to be pursued here. I would only point out one matter which seems to me of the highest importance. The study of Latin inscriptions gains in consequence every year. If the principle were always followed of representing as nearly as possible the orthography actually employed by each author, the student who passes from literature to inscriptions would have as little as possible to unlearn. At present he must get rid of a whole cargo of rubbish, which has not any antiquity to recommend it, since it is a burden for the most part cast upon scholarship by the random etymology of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

In determining matters of spelling even the best MSS are but indifferent guides. Cicero who, as Quintilian tells us[1], was most punctilious in his attention to orthography, would be aghast at Halm's text of the *Lucullus* produced by adherence to the Leyden and Vienna MSS[2]. The testimony of inscriptions, and of ancient writers who have touched on orthography, used as it has been used by Corssen, Fleckeisen, Brambach and others, is vastly more valuable. Yet the confirmatory evidence of our MSS is often of considerable importance. For example, the odious *quum*, to which many English scholars cling with such fondness, is of the rarest possible occurrence even in the most corrupt of MSS. A student might work at MSS for years without coming across a single instance. To take another example, the MSS of Cicero, rightly considered, give strong support to the conclusion which is arrived at on other grounds, that this author used *-i* only, not *-ii*, in the genitive singular of nouns whose nominatives end in *-ius* or *-ium*. In the ages when the scribes wrote the employment of *-ii* was universal, and the temptation to change the *-i* into *-ii* was therefore intensely strong. Yet some of our MSS preserve the original form in as many cases as one in five, a fact utterly incapable of explanation on the supposition that the form used by Cicero was that in *-ii*.

I have been at pains to point out here and there in my notes the true value of the conclusions to be drawn from MSS in matters of spelling, because it has rarely as yet been duly appreciated. It is perhaps hardly necessary to warn readers that my orthography does not pretend to be certain or final. It only represents the best results my studies have enabled me to attain.

[1] *Inst. Or.* I. 7, 34.

[2] The monstrous character of Halm's orthography has been well exposed by C. F. W. Müller, *Neue Jahrbücher*, 1864.

§ 9. *Analysis and Summary of subject-matter.*

a. *Academica Posteriora.*

§§ 1—14. Prooemium. Cic. Varro and Atticus meet at Cumae (1). Cic., after adroitly reminding Varro that the promised dedication of the *De lingua Latina* is too long delayed, turns the conversation towards philosophy, by asking Varro why he leaves this subject untouched (2, 3). Varro thinks philosophy written in Latin can serve no useful purpose, and points to the failures of the Roman Epicureans (4—6). He greatly believes in philosophy, but prefers to send his friends to Greece for it, while he devotes himself to subjects which the Greeks have not treated (7, 8). Cic. lauds this devotion, but demurs to the theory that philosophy written in Latin is useless. Latins may surely imitate Greek philosophers as well as Greek poets and orators. He gives reasons why he should himself make the attempt, and instancing the success of Brutus, again begs Varro to write on philosophy (9—12). Varro putting the request on one side charges Cic. with deserting the Old Academy for the New. Cic. defends himself, and appeals to Philo for the statement that the New Academy is in harmony with the Old. Varro refers to Antiochus as an authority on the other side. This leads to a proposal on the part of Cic. to discuss thoroughly the difference between Antiochus and Philo. Varro agrees, and promises an exposition of the principles of Antiochus (13, 14).

§§ 15—18. Part I of Varro's exposition: Antiochus' view of the history of Philosophy. Socrates rejected physics and made ethics supreme in philosophy (15). He had no fixed tenets; his one doctrine being that wisdom consists in a consciousness of ignorance. Moral exhortation was his task (16). Plato added to and enriched the teaching of his master; from him sprang two schools which abandoned the negative position of Socrates and adopted definite tenets, yet remained in essential agreement with one another—the Peripatetic and the Academic (17, 18).

§§ 19—23. Part II of Varro's exposition: Antiochus' *Ethics*. The threefold division of philosophy into ἠθική, φυσική, λογική. Goodness implies obedience to nature; happiness the acquisition of natural advantages. These are of three kinds, mental, bodily, and external. The bodily are described (19); then the mental, which fall into two classes, congenital and acquired, virtue being the chief of the acquired (20); then the external, which form with the bodily advantages a kind of exercise-ground for virtue (21). The ethical standard is then succinctly stated, in which virtue has chief part, and is capable in itself of producing happiness, though not the greatest happiness possible, which requires the possession of all three classes of advantages (22). With this ethical standard, it is possible to give an intelligent account of action and duty (23).

§§ 24—29. Part III of Varro's exposition: Antiochus' *Physics*. All that is consists of force and matter, which are never actually found apart, though they are thought of as separate. When force impresses form on the formless matter, it becomes a formed entity (ποιόν τι or *quale*)—(24). These formed entities are either *primary* or *secondary*. Air, fire, water, earth are primary; the two first having an active, the two last a passive function. Aristotle added a fifth primary substance (26). Underlying all formed entities is the formless matter; matter and space are infinitely subdivisible (27). Force or form acts on the formless matter and so produces the ordered universe,

outside which no matter exists. Reason permeates the universe and makes it eternal. This Reason has various names—Soul of the Universe, Mind, Wisdom, Providence, Fate, Fortune are only different titles for the same thing (28, 29).

§§ 30—32. Part IV of Varro's exposition: Antiochus' *Logic*. Although the old Academics and Peripatetics based knowledge on the senses, they did not place in the senses the criterion of truth, but in the mind, because it alone saw the permanently real and true (30). The senses they thought heavy and clogged and unable to gain knowledge of such things as were either too small to come into the domain of sense, or so changing and fleeting that no part of their being remained constant or even the same, seeing that all parts were in a continuous flux. Knowledge based *only* on sense was therefore mere opinion (31). Real knowledge only came through the reasonings of the mind; hence they *defined* everything about which they argued, and also used *etymology*, from which they drew proofs. In these two processes consisted their dialectic, to which they added persuasive rhetoric (32).

§§ 33—42. Part V of Varro's exposition: the departures from the old Academico-Peripatetic school. Aristotle crushed the *ἰδέαι* of Plato; Theophrastus weakened the power of virtue (33). Strato abandoned ethics for physics; Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo, Crates, Crantor faithfully kept the old tradition, to which Zeno and Arcesilas, pupils of Polemo, were both disloyal (34). Zeno maintained that nothing but virtue could influence happiness, and would allow the name *good* to nothing else (35). All other things he divided into three classes; some were in accordance with nature, some at discord with nature, and some were neutral. To the first class he assigned a positive value and called them *preferred;* to the second a negative value and called them *rejected;* to the third no value whatever—mere verbal alterations on the old scheme (36, 37). Though the terms *right action* and *sin* belong only to virtue and vice, he thought there was an appropriate action (*officium*) and an inappropriate, which concerned things *preferred* and things *rejected* (37). He made *all* virtue reside in the reason, and considered not the *practice* but the mere *possession* of virtue to be the important thing, although the possession could not but lead to the practice (38). All emotion he regarded as unnatural and immoral (38, 39). In physics he discarded the fifth element, and believed fire to be the universal substance, while he would not allow the existence of anything incorporeal (39). In dialectic, he analysed sensation into two parts, an impulse from without, and a succeeding judgment of the mind, in passing which the will was entirely free (40). Sensations (*uisa*) he divided into the true and the untrue; if the examination gone through by the mind proved irrefragably the truth of a sensation he called it *Knowledge*; if otherwise, *Ignorance* (41). *Perception*, thus defined, he regarded as morally neither right nor wrong, but as the sole ultimate basis of truth. Rashness in giving assent to phenomena, and all other defects in the application to them of the reason, he thought could not co-exist with virtue and perfect wisdom (42).

§§ 43—end: Cicero's historical justification of the New Academy. Arcesilas' philosophy was due to no mere passion for victory in argument, but to the obscurity of phenomena, which had led the ancients to despair of knowledge (44). He even abandoned the one tenet held by Socrates to be certain; and maintained that since arguments of equal strength could be urged in favour of the truth or falsehood of phenomena, the proper course to take was to suspend judgment entirely (45). His views were really in harmony with those of Plato, and were carried on by Carneades (46).

b. *Academica Priora.*

§§ 1—12. Prooemium. Lucullus, though an able and cultivated man, was absent from Rome on public service too long during his earlier years to attain to glory in the forum (1). He unexpectedly proved a great general. This was due to his untiring study and his marvellous memory (2). He had to wait long for the reward of his merits as a commander and civil administrator, and was allowed no triumph till just before my consulship. What I owed to him in those troublous times I cannot now tell (3). He was not merely a general; he was also a philosopher, having learned much from Antiochus and read much for himself (4). Those enemies of Greek culture who think a Roman noble ought not to know philosophy, must be referred to the examples of Cato and Africanus (5). Others think that famous men should not be introduced into dialogues of the kind. Are they then, when they meet, to be silent or to talk about trifles? I, in applying myself to philosophy, have neglected no public duty; nor do I think the fame of illustrious citizens diminished, but enriched, by a reputation for philosophical knowledge (6). Those who hold that the interlocutors in these dialogues had no such knowledge as is attributed to them only prove that they can make their envy reach beyond the grave. Some critics do not approve the particular philosophy which I follow—the Academic. This is natural; but they must know that Academicism puts no stop to inquiry (7). My school is free from the fetters of dogma; other schools are enslaved to authority (8). The dogmatists say they bow to the authority of the wise man. How can they find out the wise man without hearing all opinions? This subject was discussed by myself, Catulus, Lucullus, and Hortensius, the day after the discussion reported in the *Catulus* (9). Catulus called on Lucullus to defend the doctrines of Antiochus. This Lucullus believed himself able to do, although the doctrines had suffered in the discussion of the day before (10). He spoke thus: At Alexandria I heard discussions between Antiochus and Heraclitus Tyrius the pupil of Clitomachus and Philo. At that very time the books mentioned by Catulus yesterday came into the hands of Antiochus, who was so angry that he wrote a book against his old teacher (11, 12). I will now give the substance of the disputes between Heraclitus and Antiochus, omitting the remarks made by the latter against Philo (12).

§§ 13—18. Part I of Lucullus' exposition: false statements of the New Academics concerning the history of philosophy. Cicero seems to me to have acted like a seditious tribune, in appealing to famous old philosophers as supporters of scepticism (13). Those very philosophers, with the exception of Empedocles, appear to me, if anything, too dogmatic (14). Even if they were often in doubt, do you suppose that no advance has been made during so many centuries by the investigations of so many men of ability? Arcesilas was a rebel against a good philosophy, just as Ti. Gracchus was a rebel against a good government (15). Has nothing really been learned since the time of Arcesilas? His opinions have had scanty though brilliant support (16). Now many dogmatists think that no argument ought to be held with a sceptic, since argument can add nothing to the innate clearness of true sensations (17). Most however do allow of discussion with sceptics. Philo, in his innovations, was induced to state falsehoods, and incurred all the evils he wished to avoid; his rejection of Zeno's definition of the καταληπτικὴ φαντασία really led him back to that utter scepticism from which he was fleeing. We then must either maintain Zeno's definition or give in to the sceptics (18).

§§ 19—29. Part II of Lucullus' exposition: inaction of every kind, physical and

mental, is the logical outcome of scepticism. If the senses are healthy and unimpaired, they give perfectly true information about external things. Not that I maintain the truth of *every* sensation; Epicurus must see to that. Obstacles which impede the action of the senses must always be removed; in practice we always do remove them where we can (19). What power the cultivated senses of painters and musicians have! How keen is the sense of touch! (20). After the perceptions of sense come the equally clear perceptions of the mind, which are in a certain way perceptions of sense, since they come through sense; these rise in complexity till we arrive at definitions and ideas (21). If these ideas may possibly be false, then logic, memory, and all kinds of arts are at once rendered impossible (22). That true perception is possible, is seen from moral action. Who would act, if the things on which he takes action might prove to be false? (23). How can wisdom be wisdom if she has nothing certain to guide her? There must be some ground on which action can proceed (24). Credence must be given to the phenomena which impel us to action, otherwise action is impossible (25). The doctrines of the New Academy would put an end to all processes of reasoning. The fleeting and uncertain can never be discovered. Rational proof requires that something, once veiled, should be brought to light (26). Syllogisms are by scepticism rendered useless; philosophy too cannot exist unless her dogmas have a sure basis (27). Hence the Academics have been urged to allow their *dogma*, that perception is impossible, to be a certain perception of their minds. This, Carneades said, would be inconsistent, since the very dogma excludes the supposition that there can be *any* true perception (28). Antiochus declared that the Academics could not be held to be philosophers if they had not even confidence in their one dogma (29).

§§ 30—36. Part III of Lucullus' exposition: nature has formed men for the attainment of certitude, and no substitute which the sceptics offer is of any use. With respect to physical science, we might urge that nature has constructed man with great art. His mind is naturally formed for the attainment of knowledge (30). For this purpose the mind uses the senses, and so gradually arrives at virtue, which is the perfection of the reason. Those then who deny that any certainty can be attained through the senses, throw the whole of life into confusion (31). Some sceptics say 'we cannot help it.' Others distinguish between the absolute absence of certainty, and the denial of its absolute presence. Let us deal with these rather than with the former (32). Now they on the one hand profess to distinguish between true and false, and on the other hold that no absolutely certain method for distinguishing between true and false is possible (33). This is absurd; a thing cannot be known at all unless by such marks as can appertain to no other thing. How can a thing be said to be 'evidently white,' if the possibility remains that it may be really black? Again, how can a thing be 'evident' at all if it may be after all a mere phantom (34)? There is no definite mark, say the sceptics, by which a thing may be known. Their 'probability' then is mere random guess-work (35). Even if they only profess to decide after careful pondering of the circumstances, we reply that a decision which is still possibly false is useless (36).

§§ 37—40. Part IV of Lucullus' exposition (practically a repetition of Part II): certitude is implied in the very fact of action. The distinction of an animal is to act. You must either therefore deprive it of sensation, or allow it to assent to phenomena (37). Mind, memory, the arts and virtue itself, require a firm assent to be given to some phenomena; he therefore who does away with assent does away with all action in life (38, 39).

§§ 40—42. Part v of Lucullus' exposition: statement of the method pursued by the Academics. The Academics have a regular method. They first give a general definition of sensation, and then lay down the different classes of sensations. Then they put forward their two strong arguments; (1) *things* which produce *sensations* such as might have been produced in the same form by other *things*, cannot be partly capable of being perceived, partly not capable; (2) *sensations* must be assumed to be of the same form if our faculties do not enable us to distinguish between them. Then they proceed: Sensations are some of them true, others false; the false cannot of course be real *perceptions*, while the true are always of a form which the false *may* assume. Now sensations which are indistinguishable from false sensations cannot be in some cases perceptions, in others not. There is therefore no sensation which is also a perception (40). Two admissions, they say, are universally made, (1) false sensations cannot be perceptions, (2) sensations which are indistinguishable from false, cannot be in some cases perceptions, in others not. The following two assertions they strive to prove: (1) sensations are in some cases true, in others false, (2) every sensation which proceeds from a reality, has a form which it might have if it proceeded from no reality (41). To prove these propositions, they divide perceptions into those which are sensations, and those which are deduced from sensations; after which they show that credit cannot be given to either class (42). [The word 'perception' is used to mean 'a certainly known sensation.']

§§ 43—45. Part VI of Lucullus' exposition: preliminary criticism of the Academic method. The sceptics ought not to *define*, for (1) a definition cannot be a definition of two things, (2) if the definition is applicable only to one thing, that thing must be capable of being thoroughly known and distinguished from others (43). For the purposes of reasoning their *probabile* is not enough. Reasoning can only proceed upon *certain* premisses. Again to say that there are false sensations is to say that there are true ones; you acknowledge therefore a difference, then you contradict yourselves and say there is none (44). Let us discuss the matter farther. The innate clearness of *uisa*, aided by reason, can lead to knowledge (45).

§§ 46—53. Part VII of Lucullus' exposition. The Academics owe their popularity to the use of logical fallacies. The refusal of people to assent to the innate clearness of some phenomena (ἐνάργεια) is due to two causes: (1) they do not make a serious endeavour to see the light by which these phenomena are surrounded; (2) their faith is shaken by sceptic paradoxes (46). The sceptics argue thus: you allow that mere phantom-sensations are often seen in dreams, why then do you not allow what is easier, that two sensations caused by two really existing things may be mistaken the one for the other? (47). Further, they urge that a phantom-sensation produces very often the same effect as a real one. The dogmatists say they admit that mere phantom-sensations *do* command assent. Why, say the Academics, should the dogmatists not admit that these phantom-sensations command assent when they so closely resemble real ones as to be indistinguishable from them? (48). Antiochus attacked these arguments as *soritae*, and therefore faulty (49). The admission of a certain amount of similarity between true and false sensations does not logically lead to the impossibility of distinguishing between the true and the false (50). We contend that these phantom-sensations lack that self-evidence which we require before giving assent. When we have wakened from the dream, we make light of the sensations we had while in it (51). But, say our opponents, while they last our dreaming sensations are as vivid as our waking ones. This we deny (52). 'But,' say they, 'you allow that the wise man in madness withholds his assent.' This proves nothing, for he

will do so in many other circumstances in life. All this talk about dreamers, madmen and drunkards is unworthy our attention (53).

§§ 54—63. Part VIII of Lucullus' exposition. Final criticisms. The Academics fail to see that such doctrines do away with all probability even. Their talk about twins and seals is childish (54). They press into their service the old physical philosophers, though ordinarily none are so much ridiculed by them (55). Democritus may say that innumerable worlds exist in every particular similar to ours, but I appeal to more cultivated physicists, who maintain that each thing has its own peculiar marks (55, 56). The Servilii were distinguished from one another by their friends, and Delian breeders of fowls could tell from the appearance of an egg which hen had laid it (56, 57). We, however, do not much care whether we are able to distinguish eggs from one another or not. Another thing that they say is absurd, viz. that there may be distinction between individual sensations, but not between classes of sensations (58). Equally absurd are those 'probable and undisturbed' sensations they profess to follow. The doctrine that true and false sensations are indistinguishable logically leads to the unqualified ἐποχή of Arcesilas (59). What nonsense they talk about inquiring after the truth, and about the bad influence of authority! (60) Can you, Cicero, the panegyrist of philosophy, plunge us into more than Cimmerian darkness? (61) By holding that knowledge is impossible, you weaken the force of your famous declaration that you 'knew all about' Catiline. Thus ended Lucullus, amid the continued wonder of Hortensius (62, 63). Then Catulus said that he should not be surprised if the speech of Lucullus were to induce me to change my view (63).

§§ 64—71. Part I of Cicero's exposition. Preliminary criticisms of the position of Antiochus. Cic. much moved thus begins: The strength of Lucullus' argument has affected me much, yet I feel that it can be answered. First, however, I must speak something that concerns my character (64). I protest my entire sincerity in all that I say, and would confirm it by an oath, were that proper (65). I am a passionate inquirer after truth, and on that very account hold it disgraceful to assent to what is false. I do not deny that I make slips; but we must deal with the *sapiens*, whose characteristic it is never to err in giving his assent (66). Hear Arcesilas' argument: if the *sapiens* ever gives his assent, he will be obliged to *opine;* but he never will *opine*, therefore he never will give his assent. The Stoics and Antiochus deny the first of these statements, on the ground that it is possible to distinguish between true and false (67). Even if it be so the mere habit of assenting is full of peril. Still, our whole argument must tend to show that *perception* in the Stoic sense is impossible (68). However, a few words first with Antiochus. When he was converted, what proof had he of the doctrine he had so long denied? (69) Some think he wished to found a school called by his own name. It is more probable that he could no longer bear the opposition of all other schools to the Academy (70). His conversion gave a splendid opening for an *argumentum ad hominem* (71).

§§ 72—76. Part II of Cicero's exposition. Reply to Part I of that of Lucullus. You accuse me of appealing to ancient names like a revolutionist; yet Anaxagoras, Democritus, and Metrodorus, philosophers of the highest position, protest against the truth of sense-knowledge, and deny the possibility of knowledge, altogether (72, 73). Empedocles, Xenophanes, and Parmenides all declaim against sense-knowledge. You said that Socrates and Plato must not be classed with these. Why? Socrates said he knew nothing but his own ignorance, while Plato pursued the same theme in all his works (74). Now do you see that I do not merely name, but take

for my models famous men? Even Chrysippus stated many difficulties concerning the senses and general experience. You say he solved them; even if he did, which I do not believe, he admitted that it was not easy to escape being ensnared by them (75). The Cyrenaics too held that they knew nothing about things external to themselves (76).

§§ 76—78. Part III of Cicero's exposition. The issue between scepticism and dogmatism defined. The sincerity of Arcesilas may be seen thus (76). Zeno held strongly that the wise man ought to keep clear from *opinion*. Arcesilas agreed: but this without *knowledge* was impossible. *Knowledge* consists of *perceptions;* Arcesilas therefore demanded a definition of *perception*. This definition Arcesilas combated. This is the controversy which has lasted to our time. Do away with *opinion* and *perception*, and the ἐποχή of Arcesilas follows at once (77, 78).

§§ 79—90. Part IV of Cicero's exposition. The uncertainty of sense-knowledge demonstrated. You are wrong, Lucullus, in upholding your cause in spite of my arguments yesterday against the senses. You are thus acting like the Epicureans, who say that the inference only from the sensation can be false, not the sensation itself (79, 80). I wish the god of whom you spoke would ask me whether I wanted anything more than sound senses. He would have a bad time with me. For even granting that our vision is correct, how marvellously circumscribed it is! But, say you, *we* desire no more. No, I answer, you are like the mole, who desires not the light because he is blind. Yet I would not so much reproach the god because my vision is narrow, as because it deceives me (80, 81). If you want something greater than the bent oar, what can be greater than the sun? Still he seems to us a foot broad, and Epicurus thinks he may be a little broader or narrower than he seems. With all his enormous speed, too, he appears to us to stand still (82). The whole question lies in a nut-shell: of four propositions which prove my point only one is disputed, viz. that every true sensation has side by side with it a false one indistinguishable from it (83). A man who has mistaken P. for Q. Geminus could have no infallible mode of recognising Cotta. You say that no such indistinguishable resemblances *exist*. Never mind; they *seem* to exist and that is enough. One mistaken sensation will throw all the others into uncertainty (84). You say everything belongs to its own *genus;* this I will not contest. I am not concerned to show that two sensations *are* absolutely similar; it is enough that human faculties cannot distinguish between them. How about the impressions of signet-rings? (85) Can you find a ring-merchant to rival your chicken-rearer of Delos? But, you say, art aids the senses. So we cannot see or hear without art, which so few can have! What an idea this gives us of the art with which nature has constructed the senses! (86) But about physics I will speak afterwards. I am going now to advance against the senses arguments drawn from Chrysippus himself (87). You said that the sensations of dreamers, drunkards and madmen were feebler than those of the waking, the sober and the sane. The cases of Ennius and his Alcmaeon, of your own relative Tuditanus, of the Hercules of Euripides, disprove your point (88, 89). In their case at least 'mind and eyes agreed.' It is of no use to talk about the saner moments of such people; the question is, what was the nature of their sensations at the time they were affected? (90)

§§ 91—98. Part V of Cicero's exposition. Dialectic cannot lead up to certainty. Dialectic cannot lead to stable knowledge; its processes are not applicable to a large number of philosophical questions (91). You value the art, but please remember that it gave rise to fallacies like the *sorites*, which you say is faulty (92). If it is so, refute it. The plan of Chrysippus, to refrain from answering, will avail you

nothing (93). If you refrain because you *cannot* answer, your knowledge fails you; if you *can* answer and yet refrain, you are unfair (94). The art you admire really undoes itself, as Penelope did her web; witness the *mentiens* (95). You assent to arguments which are identical in form with the *mentiens*, and yet refuse to assent to it. Why so? (96) You demand that these sophisms should be made exceptions to the rules of Dialectic. You must go to a tribune for that exception. I just remind you that Epicurus would not allow the very first postulate of your Dialectic (97). In my opinion (and I learned Dialectic from Antiochus) the *mentiens* and the arguments identical with it in form must stand or fall together (98).

§§ 98—105. Part VI of Cicero's exposition. An explanation of the constructive side of Carneades' philosophy. In order to overthrow at once the case of Antiochus, I proceed to explain, after Clitomachus, the whole of Carneades' system (98). Carneades laid down two divisions of *uisa*, one into those capable of being perceived and those not so capable, the other into probable and improbable. Arguments aimed at the senses concern the first division only; the *sapiens* will follow probability, as in many instances the Stoic *sapiens* confessedly does (99, 100). The Academic *sapiens* is not made of stone; many things *seem* to him true; yet he always feels that there is a possibility of their being false. The Stoics themselves admit that the senses are often deceived. Put this admission together with the tenet of Epicurus, and perception becomes impossible (101). It is strange that our *probabile* does not seem sufficient to you. Hear the account given by Clitomachus (102). He condemns those who say that sensation is swept away by the Academy; nothing is swept away but its *necessary* certainty (103). There are two modes of withholding assent; withholding it absolutely and withholding it merely so far as to deny the *certainty* of phenomena. The latter mode leaves all that is required for ordinary life (104).

§§ 105—111. Part VII of Cicero's exposition. Probability is a sufficient ground for action. (Reply to II and IV of Lucullus' exposition.) You must see, Lucullus, by this time, that your defence of dogmatism is overthrown (105). You asked how memory was possible on my principles. Why, did not Siron remember the dogmas of Epicurus? If nothing can be remembered which is not absolutely true, then these will be true (106). Probability is quite sufficient basis for the arts. One strong point of yours is that nature compels us to *assent*. But Panaetius doubted even some of the Stoic dogmas, and you yourself refuse assent to the *sorites;* why then should not the Academic doubt about other things? (107) Your other strong point is that without assent action is impossible (108). But surely many actions of the dogmatist proceed upon mere probability. Nor do you gain by the use of the hackneyed argument of Antiochus (109). Where probability is, there the Academic has all the knowledge he wants (110). The argument of Antiochus that the Academics first admit that there are true and false *uisa* and then contradict themselves by denying that there is any difference between true and false, is absurd. We do not deny that the difference *exists;* we do deny that human faculties are capable of surely grasping the difference (111).

§§ 112—115. Part VIII of Cicero's exposition. If a man is to become a dogmatist, which set of opinions is he to adopt? If I had to deal with a Peripatetic, whose definitions are not so exacting, my course would be easier; I should not much oppose him even if he maintained that the wise man sometimes *opines* (112). The definitions of the real Old Academy are more reasonable than those of Antiochus. How, holding the opinions he does, can he profess to belong to the Old Academy? (113) I cannot tolerate your assumption that it is possible to keep an elaborate dog-

matic system like yours free from mistakes (114). You wish me to join your school. What am I to do then with my dear friend Diodotus, who thinks so poorly of Antiochus? Let us consider however what system not I, but the *sapiens* is to adopt (115).

§§ 116—128. Part IX of Cicero's exposition. The discord of philosophers on physical questions. Of the three parts of philosophy take Physics first. Would your *sapiens* swear to the truth of any geometrical result whatever? (116) Let us see which one of actual physical systems the *sapiens* we are seeking will select (117). He must choose *one* teacher from among the conflicting schools of Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Anaxagoras, Xenophanes, Leucippus, Democritus, Empedocles, Heraclitus, Melissus, Plato and Pythagoras. The remaining teachers, great men though they be, he must reject (118). Whatever system he selects he must know absolutely; if the Stoic, he must believe as strongly in the Stoic theology as he does in the sunlight. If he holds this, Aristotle will pronounce him mad; you, however, Lucullus, must defend the Stoics and spurn Aristotle from you, while you will not allow me even to doubt (119). How much better to be free, as I am, and not compelled to find an answer to all the riddles of the universe! (120) Nothing can exist, say you, apart from the deity. Strato, however, says he does not need the deity to construct the universe. His mode of construction again differs from that of Democritus. I see some good in Strato; yet I will not assent absolutely either to his system or to yours (121). All these matters lie far beyond our ken. We know nothing of the human body, which we can dissect; while we have not the advantage of being able to dissect the constitution of things, or of the earth to see whether she is firmly fixed or hovers in mid air (122). Xenophanes, Hicetas, Plato and Epicurus tell strange things of the heavenly bodies. How much better to side with Socrates and Aristo, who hold that nothing can be known about them! (123) Who knows the nature of mind? Numberless opinions clash, as do those of Dicaearchus, Plato and Xenocrates. Our *sapiens* will be unable to decide (124). If you say it is better to choose any system rather than none, I choose Democritus. You at once upbraid me for believing such monstrous falsehoods (125). The Stoics differ among themselves about physical subjects; why will they not allow me to differ from them? (126) Not that I deprecate the study of Physics; for moral good results from it (127). Our *sapiens* will be delighted if he attains to anything which seems to resemble truth. Before I proceed to Ethics, I note your weakness in placing all perceptions on the same level. You must be prepared to asseverate no less strongly that the sun is eighteen times as large as the earth, than that yon statue is six feet high. When you admit that all things can be perceived no more and no less clearly than the size of the sun, I am almost content (128).

§§ 129—141. Part X of Cicero's exposition. The discord of philosophers on ethical questions. What contention is there among philosophers about the ethical standard! I pass by many abandoned systems like that of Herillus; but consider the discrepancies between Xenophanes, Parmenides, Zeno of Elea, Euclides, Menedemus, Aristo, Pyrrho, Aristippus, Epicurus, Callipho, Hieronymus, Diodorus, Polemo, Antiochus, Carneades (129—131). If I desire to follow the Stoics, Antiochus will not allow me; while if I follow Polemo, the Stoics are irate (132). I must be careful not to assent to the unknown, which is a dogma common to both you, Lucullus, and myself (133). Zeno thinks virtue gives happiness. 'Yes,' says Antiochus, 'but not the greatest possible.' How am I to choose among such conflicting theories? (134) Nor can I accept those points in which Antiochus and Zeno agree. For instance,

they regard emotion as harmful, which the ancients thought natural and useful (135). How absurd are the Stoic paradoxes! (136) Albinus joking said to Carneades 'You do not think me a praetor, because I am not a *sapiens*.' 'That,' said Carneades, 'is Diogenes' view, not mine' (137). Chrysippus thinks only three ethical systems can with plausibility be defended (138). I gravitate then towards one of them, that of pleasure. Virtue calls me back, nor will she even allow me to join pleasure to herself (139). When I hear the respective pleadings of pleasure and virtue, I cannot avoid being moved by both, and so I find it impossible to choose (140, 141).

§§ 142—146. Part XI of Cicero's exposition. The discord of philosophers on logical questions. To pass to Dialectic, note how Protagoras, the Cyrenaics, Epicurus, and Plato disagree (142). Does Antiochus follow any of these? Why, he never even follows the true *uetus Academia*, and never stirs a step from Chrysippus. Dialecticians themselves cannot agree about the very elements of their art (143). Why then, Lucullus, do you rouse the mob against me like a seditious tribune by telling them I do away with the arts altogether? When you have got the crowd together, I will point out to them that according to Zeno all of them are slaves, exiles, and lunatics, and that you yourself, not being *sapiens*, know nothing whatever (144). This last point Zeno used to illustrate by action. Yet his whole school cannot point to any actual *sapiens* (145). Now as there is no knowledge, there can be no art. How would Zeuxis and Polycletus like this conclusion? They would prefer mine, to which our ancestors bear testimony (146).

§§ 147, 148. Conclusion. Next time we meet, we will talk of more important matters than the fallacious nature of the senses, and logical quibbles (147). Lucullus proposes that the interlocutors should certainly meet again. Catulus expresses his belief that the *sapiens* must *opine*, while Hortensius parts with a jest (148).

§ 10. *The dedicatory epistle to Varro* (*Ad Fam.* IX. 8).

Etsi munus flagitare, quamuis quis ostenderit[1], ne populus quidem solet nisi concitatus, tamen ego exspectatione promissi tui moueor, ut admoneam te, non ut flagitem. Misi autem ad te quattuor admonitores non nimis uerecundos; nosti enim profecto os illius adolescentioris Academiae. Ex ea igitur media excitatos misi, qui metuo ne te forte flagitent: ego autem mandaui, ut rogarent. Exspectabam omnino iam diu meque sustinebam, ne ad te prius ipse quid scriberem quam aliquid accepissem, ut possem te remunerari quam simillimo munere. Sed cum tu tardius faceres, id est, ut ego interpretor, diligentius, teneri non potui quin coniunctionem studiorum amorisque nostri quo possem litterarum genere declararem. Feci igitur sermonem inter nos habitum in Cumano, cum esset una Pomponius. Tibi dedi partes Antiochinas, quas a te probari intellexisse mihi uidebar: mihi sumpsi Philonis. Puto fore ut, cum legeris, mirere nos id locutos esse inter nos, quod numquam locuti sumus; sed nosti morem dialogorum. Post haec autem, mi Varro, quam plurima, si uidetur, et de nobis inter nos: sero fortasse, sed superiorum temporum fortuna rei publicae causam sustineat: haec ipsi praestare debemus. Atque utinam quietis temporibus atque aliquo si non bono, at saltem certo statu ciuitatis haec inter nos studia exercere possemus! Quamquam tum quidem uel aliae quaepiam rationes honestas nobis et curas et actiones darent: nunc autem quid est sine his cur uiuere uelimus? Mihi uero cum his ipsis uix, his autem detractis ne uix quidem. Sed haec coram et saepius. Migrationem et emptionem feliciter euenire uolo tuumque in ea re consilium probo. Cura ut ualeas.

[1] *ostendere* here is 'to promise', a rather rare meaning; cf. Att. 9, 13, 4.

M. TULLI CICERONIS

ACADEMICORUM POSTERIORUM

LIBER PRIMUS.

I. In Cumano nuper cum mecum Atticus noster esset, nun- 1
tiatum est nobis a M. Varrone uenisse eum Roma pridie uesperi et, nisi de uia fessus esset, continuo ad nos uenturum fuisse. Quod cum audissemus, nullam moram interponendam putauimus quin uideremus hominem nobiscum et studiis eisdem et uetustate

4 audissemus: codd. omnes; edd. nonnullae *audiuissemus*. 5 eisdem: Al. Burn. Harl.; etiam H; edd. nonnullae *iisdem*.

1. **cum mecum**: the *cum* in me*cum*, being so slightly separated from the conjunction, has an awkward sound; but parallels are very numerous in Cicero; see my n. on Balb. 1.

noster: here apparently for *meus*, in spite of the preceding *me;* cf. Fat. 2 cum essem in Puteolano Hirtiusque noster eisdem in locis; Fam. 2, 8, 3 cum Athenis fuissem multumque mecum Gallus noster Caninius; ib. 9, 2, 1 Caninius tuus et idem noster cum ad me uenisset. In ed. 1, I took Cic. to mean 'our common friend,' referring to Varro and himself, but this *proleptic* use of *noster* is hardly likely. The employment of *nos*, *noster*, for *ego*, *meus*, often causes ambiguity in Cic. Thus, in the present passage, the plurals *nos*, *nobiscum* and the plural verbs down to *reduximus* seem to refer to both Atticus and Cicero, but in § 2 percontantibus nobis, *nobis*=*me* again.

esset: 'was staying'; so in 2, 61.

nuntiatum: the spelling *nunciatum* is mistaken; see Corssen, Ausspr. 1^2, p. 51.

2. **a M. Varrone**: not '*by* M. Varro' (in which case *se* must have been written, not *eum*) but 'from M. Varro's house news came.'

3. **de uia fessus**: cf. Phil. 1, 12 cum de uia (al. e uia) languerem; Rep. 6, 10 me et de uia et qui ad multam noctem uigilassem, artior quam solebat somnus complexus est (so the MSS and recent edd.; older edd. *fessum de uia*). With *de uia* cf. *in uia*, 'on a journey,' Att. 3, 5; *in uiam se dare*, Fam. 14, 12.

4. **audissemus**: for the form see n. on 2, 77 definisse.

moram: 'obstacle', rather than 'delay'. The use of the word in reference to time is secondary and never very prominent in the best Latin.

5. **eisdem**: this spelling and in a less degree *isdem* have authority for the time of Cic., but *iisdem* is to be rejected. The word was almost certainly pronounced as a dissyllable, and the dat. abl. plur. of *is* (*eis*) as a monosyllable.

uetustate amicitiae: so in Fam. 4, 7, 1; but *uetustas* is often used alone without *amicitiae;* cf. Fam. 10, 10, 2

amicitiae coniunctum. Itaque confestim ad eum ire perreximus, paulumque cum ab eius uilla abessemus, ipsum ad nos uenientem uidimus: atque illum complexi, ut mos amicorum est, satis eum
2 longo interuallo ad suam uillam reduximus. Hic pauca primo, atque ea percontantibus nobis ecquid forte Roma noui, tum At-

2 ab eius: deest *ab* in codicibus omnibus; e coniectura Wesenbergii receperunt HBM. 3 satis eum: sic codd. omnes; *se uisentium* Dau. coniecit, H in textum recepit. *Satis tum* B, e coniectura Maduigii. M uerba *satis eum* obelisco notauit. 5 atque ea: uocem *ea* (ut uoluit Durandius) uncinis incluserunt BH, edd. Rom. Ven. 1494 secuti; obelisco notauit M; deest in Harl. 3. percontantibus: Al. Harl. Burn. G (ex Halmii silentio); *percuntantibus* ψ; *percunctantibus* PVE.

uetustate coniuncti; ib. 13, 32, 2; ib. 11, 16, 2; ib. 5, 15, 2; 11, 27, 2. Cf. also *uetustas amicorum*, Arch. 31; Q. Cic. pet. cons. 16; *u. necessitudinis*, Fam. 10, 3, 2.

2. **ab eius uilla**: Cic. probably did not allow the simple abl. without *ab* to follow on *abesse*, except in the case of city-names (as in Leg. 2, 2 Roma absis; Fam. 12, 15, 7 Laodicea afuisse, where some edd. insert the preposition). In three other passages (this and Fam. 5, 15, 4; and Fam. 4, 6, 2) all the MSS agree in omitting the preposition, but we cannot attribute much importance to their unanimity, when we reflect that there is a similar consensus of the MSS in favour of the construction *discrepare aliqua re* in Fin. 2, 100, and of other like constructions which no scholar would now think of defending. In Fam. 5, 15, 4 all the MSS read 'tu ea me abesse urbe miraris', except the Med. which has *tuae* for *tu ea*. Wesenberg reads *tu ab ea*, but *tu ex ea* would be a sounder correction; cf. Planc. 67; post red. in sen. 34. Wesenberg can hardly be right in retaining in Fam. 4, 6, 2 the reading *et domo absum et foro*, since there only do we find *domo, foro abesse*, elsewhere always *a domo, a foro*. On the other hand some passages have been wrongly suspected by editors who have misunderstood the perfectly well-attested dative construction with *abesse;* thus Leg. 1, 5 *historia abest litteris nostris;* Q. Cic. in Fam. 16, 8, 1 *diutius nobis afuturus est* (Wes. *a nobis*). In Off. 1, 43 abest officio has been long abandoned. The usage of the prose writers down to and including Livy agrees with that of Cic.

ipsum: see n. on 2, 84 si ipse erit.

3. **illum**: vivid and emphatic; 'our dear friend'.

complexi: the embrace is here introduced to convey the impression of close friendship between Cic. and Varro; a touch which would be impaired or destroyed by the reading *se uisentium* farther on. Just in the same spirit Horace says of the famous meeting on the Appian way (Sat. 1, 5, 43) 'o qui *complexus* et gaudia quanta fuerunt!' For the clause *ut mos amicorum est*, cf. De Or. 2, 13 qui cum inter se, *ut ipsorum usus ferebat*, amicissime consalutassent.

satis eum: the reading *se uisentium* is objectionable, causing, as it does, Cic. to *apologize* for the embrace, whereas he evidently intends to describe it as an ordinary courtesy between himself and Varro. On diplomatic grounds it is egregiously improbable that *se uisentium* should have been changed to *satis eum*. The position of *eum* as second word in the clause, separating *satis* from the word it qualifies, speaks for the text; cf. n. on 1, 25 quanto id magis; also Liu. 1, 10, 3 satis se impigre; 1, 48, 3 satis illum diu. It is impossible to make sense of the passage if *interuallo* be taken of *space* (as Goer.). Some edd. too misunderstand *satis*, which means not 'sufficiently', but only 'tolerably'; the phrase 'satis longum interuallum' = 'a tolerably long time' occurs elsewhere; see Fam. 5, 17, 1; Clu. 177; Arch. 6; also cf. Caes. B. C. 3, 69, 1 hac satis longa interiecta mora; ib. 3, 84, 1; Cic. Flac. 47 neque ita longo int.; Sen. ep. 46, 2 interuallo surgere ('after an int.'). The succession of pronouns *eum, eius, illum, eum* all referring to the same person, should be noticed; cf. n. on 2, 27 ea...ea and on 2, 29 haec...eis.

4. **suam uillam**: but above *eius* uilla, as usual. The use of *suus* here, though rather colloquial, is far from uncommon, particularly in oratio obliqua; see Draeger, Hist. synt. 1^2 §§ 28, 29; also Rie-

ticus 'omitte ista, quae nec percontari nec audire sine molestia possumus, quaeso, inquit, et quaere potius ecquid ipse noui. Silent enim diutius Musae Varronis quam solebant, nec tamen istum cessare, sed celare quae scribat existimo'. 'Minime uero' inquit

ecquid: *et si quid* MSS omn. noti, excepto U (?) et cod. Eliens. Dauisii. [De G tacet H.] Corr. Man. Lamb. tum Atticus: *tum* om. codd. omn. Hanc coniecturam primus in textum recepi; falso eam Goer. ascripsit Lambino, qui reapse coniecit *Atticus autem.* 6 percontari: Al. Harl. 1, 3, Burn. GE; *percuntari* ψ; *percunctari* PV Harl. 2. 7 quaere: MSS omn. *quare.* ecquid: *et quid* codd. plerique. 8 istum: *ipsum* E et edd. nonnullae.

mann, Études sur Tite-Live (Paris 1879) p. 95, where numerous exx. will be found. The difference between *eius* and *suus* here is just that between 'his' and 'his own'.

reduximus: see n. on § 9 deduxerunt.

pauca primo: sc. locuti sumus, an ellipse too common to need illustration. For the context cf. Fin. 1, 14 cum ad me in Cumanum salutandi causa uterque uenisset, *pauca primo* inter nos de litteris, deinde Torquatus...; ib. 3, 8 deinde *prima illa*, quae in congressu solemus; Fat. 2 cum ad me uenisset, *primo illa* quae erant cotidiana et quasi legitima nobis, de pace et de otio; quibus actis, 'quid ergo?' inquit; Tusc. 4, 49; Sall. hist. 1, 23 (ed. Dietsch) inde ortus sermo percontantibus utrimque 'satin salve?'

5. **atque ea**: καὶ ταῦτα: so idque below.

percontantibus: the spelling *percunctari* rests on the false assumption that the word originally meant 'per cuncta ire'; see Corssen, Ausspr. I^2 36.

ecquid forte: the reading *et si quid* has arisen from a common MSS corruption, *etquid* for *ecquid.* Though *si* in indirect questions is rare in Cic. and always implies an ellipse, it would not be impossible here; see Draeger II^1 § 553, to whose exx. add Att. 13, 9, 2.

Roma: most probably nominative, and subject of the same verb with *ipse* below (ecquid ipse novi); i.e. *agat* or *faciat.* So Plin. ep. 1, 3, 1 *quid agit* Comum? also Catull. 10, 5 huc ut uenimus incidere nobis Sermones uarii, in quibus *quid esset* Iam Bithynia, quo modo se haberet; where see Ellis' n. For the ellipse of a verb of movement or activity cf. n. on 2, 13 tum ad hos. Turnebus and others take *Roma* to be an ablative, and supply attulisset. If *Romae* be read cf. Suet. Ner. 48 ecquid *in urbe* noui de Nerone? Both these last methods have the disadvantage of introducing a change of construction in passing from *ecquid Roma noui* to *ecquid ipse noui.*

tum Atticus: if *tum* be not added, we are forced to assume a most awkward ellipse above, after *hic pauca primo,* (instead of the simple ellipse assumed in my n.) either of a nominativus pendens *locuti*, or of a clause such as *cum locuti essemus.* Cf. *deinde* in Fin. 1, 14 and *quibus actis* in Fat. 2 quoted in n. on *pauca primo* above. It was characteristic of Atticus to avoid politics; he similarly stops a political discussion in Brut. 157.

6. **quae percontari**: = de quibus p.; see n. on 2, 93 ultimum...respondere.

7. **inquit**: for the position cf. n. on § 14.

ecquid ipse noui: cf. De Or. 2, 13 quid uos tandem? Crassus, numquidnam, inquit, noui? Brut. 10 quos postquam salutaui, quid uos, inquam, Brute et Attice, noui? So Fam. 11, 27, 1.

silent Musae: cf. Brut. 19 iampridem conticuerunt tuae litterae; Off. 2, 3. It has been supposed that *Musae* alludes specially to Varro's many-sidedness; the expression, however, is quite general, like *mansuetiores Musae* in Fam. 1, 9, 23, and Plato's Ἰάδες καὶ Σικελαὶ Μοῦσαι in Sophist.; cf. also Fam. 16, 10, 2 tu Musis nostris para ut operas reddas.

8. **istum**: 'your friend'. *Ipsum* here would be decidedly out of place, as neither emphasis nor contrast is needed.

9. **cessare**: = nihil scribere, as in Fam. 16, 22, 1 ego hic cesso quia nihil ipse scribo; Att. 2, 7, 1 aliquid exstabit ne tibi plane cessasse uideamur. In the best Latin *cessare* is a verb of rest, not of motion; not 'to come to a standstill', but 'to be at a standstill'.

quae scribat: the subj. seems due to the class-notion, 'such things as he writes'.

ille, 'intemperantis enim arbitror esse scribere quod occultari uelit, sed habeo opus magnum in manibus, idque iam pridem: ad hunc enim ipsum—me autem dicebat—quaedam institui, quae
3 et sunt magna sane et limantur a me politius'. Et ego 'ista quidem', inquam, 'Varro, iam diu exspectans, non audeo tamen flagitare: audiui enim e Libone nostro, cuius nosti studium—

1 arbitror esse: *esse arbitror* Hieronymus in Rufinum I. col. 379. 2 uelit: *uelis* Hieron.; idem coniecit Walker. idque: sic (post Christii coniecturam) HBM; MSS *que* uel *quae*, nisi quod P *qui* praebet; U *quo*. 3 hunc enim

1. **intemperantis**: cf. Tusc. 1, 6 mandare quemquam litteris cogitationes suas, qui eas nec disponere nec illustrare possit, hominis est *intemperanter* abutentis et otio et litteris.

occultari: for the passive see n. on 2, 42 condemnari. *Occultare* is 'to conceal studiously', so is stronger than *celare* above.

2. **uelit**: the subject is easily supplied from *intemperantis* above. The indefinite subject is very often omitted by Cic., as in Lael. 59 ita amare oportere ut si aliquando *esset* osurus; De Or. 1, 30 uoluntates impellere quo uelit = quo quis uelit, where Sorof has a good many exx.; see others in Wopkens, Lect. Tull. p. 3 (ed. Hand). A similar usage is common in Greek. Scholars are often rash in emending passages like the present; thus in Lael. l. l. Cobet writes *esses*. [Cf. n. on 2, 79 inquit.]

opus magnum: used exactly as in 2, 121 opere magno, where see n. Not until the time of younger Pliny was the word *opus* freely used like our 'work' to denote a literary composition. [Plin. ep. 4, 3, 5; 4, 26, 3; 5, 5, 4; 7, 25, 1; also *opusculum* in 4, 13, 1; 4, 14, 10.] *Opus* is however commonly used of works of art. For our passage cf. Prop. 4, 3, 4 tantum operis. On the work in question here see Introd. p. 33.

in manibus: 'on hand'. For this later writers use *inter manus* (Plin. ep. 5, 5, 7) which in Cic. has quite another sense; see Verr. 5, 28. *In manibus* often has also the meaning 'close at hand'; cf. Lael. 96 with my n.

idque: καὶ τοῦτο: so Fam. 10, 14, 2 exspectabam tuas litteras idque cum multis; ib. 13, 16, 4 studiis deditum, idque a puero; Phil. 1, 34 audisti, eaque saepissime; ib. 2, 23; Leg. 2, 34 (et id); Brut. 244 tu quidem de faece hauris idque iamdudum Tusc. 2, 50; 4, 27; Fam. 10, 3, 3; Suet. Tib. 38; Gram. 24; Hor. Sat. 1, 4, 73; Plin. n. h. 33, 147 copia argenti furit uita, *idque iampridem*, etc.

3. **ad**: 'dedicated to'. The constr. is elliptic, in imitation of the title-page of the book: 'De lingua Latina ad M. Ciceronem'. Cf. Cat. m. 3 hunc librum *ad te* de senectute *misimus;* so Fin. 1, 8; Diu. 2, 3; Att. 8, 12, 6; Lael. 4 in Catone maiore, qui est *scriptus ad te* de senectute.

hunc enim ipsum: the reading *hunc eum ipsum* is vainly defended by Wopkens and Goer. on the strength of passages like Att. 2, 1, 11 me, illum ipsum uindicem aeris alieni. In that place, as in Flac. 52 huic illi legato; Att. 1, 18, 3 instat hic nunc ille annus egregius (Wes. om. *ille*); Tac. A. 14, 22 hunc illum numine deum destinari, the second demonstrative comes in as explanatory of the first in a special sense, 'the famous', 'the well known'. The common phrase *hoc illud est* is similar. Only by epexegesis of some sort can two demonstratives in the same construction refer to the same person.

me autem dicebat: a like parenthesis in Fin. 5, 7; Brut. 253; N. D. 2, 104, also 1, 17, where Schömann quotes Isocrates, Panath. c. 85 σὺ μὲν πεποίησαι τοὺς λόγους (ἐμὲ λέγων). Cf. also below, 2, §§ 13 and 17 and 61 me autem appellabat.

4. **magna sane**: 'extensive, I can assure you'. Cf. Phil. 2, 106 magna sane multitudo. Varro gives two reasons for not fulfilling his promise to Cic., (1) the size of the work, (2) the finish of the workmanship.

limantur: n. on 2, 66 elimatas.

politius: the comparative of *polite* also occurs in De Or. 1, 5.

et: 'whereupon'; like *atque* in § 1. Ac in this sense is far commoner, but could not stand here before the vowel; see n. on 2, 34.

nihil enim eius modi celare possumus—non te ea intermittere, sed accuratius tractare nec de manibus umquam deponere. Illud autem mihi ante hoc tempus numquam in mentem uenit a te requirere: sed nunc, postea quam sum ingressus res eas, quas tecum simul didici, mandare monumentis philosophiamque ueterem illam a Socrate ortam Latinis litteris illustrare, quaero quid sit cur, cum multa scribas, genus hoc praetermittas, praesertim

ipsum: sic G; *hunc eum ipsum* codd. ceteri. 5 tamen: om. G. 6 enim: *cum* PV (A *enim* habet, non *eum*); *enim eum* coni. Christ., commendauit H, receperunt BM. 11 tecum: om. G. 13 genus hoc: *hoc genus* G solus.

5. **diu exspectans**: see Introd. p. 33 n. 4.

6. **flagitare**: cf. closely Fam. 9, 8, 1 quoted on p. 83.

Libone: L. Scribonius Libo, father-in-law of Sextus Pompeius, and himself much mixed up with the troubles of the civil wars.

studium: sc. litterarum; so below § 8 in quibus est studium. Those edd. who take the word to imply Libo's personal devotion to Cic. or to Varro are certainly wrong.

7. **nihil enim**: *enim* gives the reason for *audiui*.

celare: sc. inter nos. Christ (whom Halm favours but does not follow) reads *enim eum* above, and understands the sense thus: cum tantum sit Libonis studium, nihil eum, si quid ego aut tu tractamus, celare possumus. But Varro would scarcely need to be informed about the extent of his own intimacy with Libo. Cic. merely means to tell Varro how he comes to know about the progress of the *magnum opus*. The passage contains a gentle hint that Varro might have been more communicative.

8. **illud**: explained by *quaero quid sit etc.* below; cf. n. on 2, 116 at illud ante. Observe that in this sentence Cic. practically admits (what his letters show) that he had again and again thought of pressing Varro about the dedication of the 'De lingua Latina'.

10. **ingressus...mandare**: n. on 2, 17.

11. **tecum simul**: these words have been objected to; but similar expressions are exceedingly common in all Latin from Plautus downwards. In Cic. cf. (si tanti est) Fam. 15, 4, 8; Att. 3, 8, 4; Arch. 28 and 30. *Mecum una etc.* also occur, and Plautus even has *mecum una simul* (Most. 1037 R). The words do not imply that Cic. and Varro studied *together* at Athens under Antiochus, which can hardly have been the case, since Varro was considerably older than Cic.; the words merely mean 'in common with you'.

mandare monumentis...litteris illustrare: common phrases, also mandare litteris; see e.g. below, 2, 2; Tusc. 1, 1; Diu. 2, 4; Fin. 1, §§ 1 and 11.

ueterem illam: cf. n. on § 13.

12. **a Socrate ortam**: Madv. on Fin. 5, 69 maintains that Cic. never used a simple ablative after *ortus;* and indeed all the apparent exceptions I have noticed are capable of explanation; e.g. in N. D. 3, 59 orta Nilo, if Nilus be the river, the abl. may be merely local, if the god, then *a* has probably dropped out after *orta;* so in Leg. 2, 3 hinc (al. hic) enim orti stirpe antiquissima sumus, *orti* must be taken with *hinc, stirpe antiquissima* being a qualitative abl. after *sumus.* Livy is the first prose writer who freely uses *ortus* with simple abl. The case is different with *natus*—a fact not clearly recognised even in the best recent grammars, e.g. Kühner, Vol. II § 80, 6 (ed. 1878); Roby § 1264; Kennedy § 160 c; Draeger I § 220. For the sense cf. Rep. 3, 5 hanc a Socrate aduenticiam doctrinam; also n. on § 18 idem fons erat.

13. **genus**: sc. litterarum or scriptorum. The defining genitive with *genus* is very frequently thus omitted; e.g. below, 2 §§ 20, 21; also in Att. 1, 8, 2; 16, 5, 2; Balb. 54; Tusc. 1, 103; 2, 5; 3, 57; 4, 48. In Att. 3, 7, 3; Fam. 2, 1, 1 hoc genus is used of literature as a whole opposed to other pursuits; cf. further *huic generi litterarum* in § 12; Tusc. 1, 3. For the order *genus hoc* not *hoc g.* cf. Tusc. 5, 94.

praetermittas: cf. however what is said in §§ 8, 9.

cum et ipse in eo excellas et id studium totaque ea res longe ceteris et studiis et artibus antecedat'.

4 II. Tum ille 'rem a me saepe deliberatam et multum agitatam requiris. Itaque non haesitans respondebo, sed ea dicam, quae mihi sunt in promptu, quod ista ipsa de re multum, ut dixi, et diu cogitaui. Nam cum philosophiam uiderem diligentissime Graecis litteris explicatam, existimaui, si qui de nostris eius studio tenerentur, si essent Graecis doctrinis eruditi,

1 res: *ars* E solus (codex Oxoniensis, non Erlangensis, ut Müllerus). 2 artibus: *rebus* coni. Bentl. antecedat: *antecellat* Lamb. codicibus sine dubio commenticiis obsecutus. 3 saepe: om. G. 4 sed ea...cogitaui: haec damnauit Goer.; quod ista...cogitaui Schuetzio spuria uidebantur. 5 dicam: *dico* V. 10 abhorrerent: *abhorrent* ψ (cf. adn. Orelli in ed. 1827). haec:

1. **in eo**: the preposition could not be omitted. In Tusc. 3, 11 edd. still read 'quo genere Athamantem furere dicimus', but undoubtedly *in* should be inserted between *quo* and *genere*.

id studium: = eius rei st. 'the *passion for* that pursuit'. *Res* is the pursuit itself. The readings *ars* for *res* and *artibus* for *rebus* are decidedly to be rejected, the variation from *res* to *artibus* being exactly in Cicero's style. For *res* cf. Lael. 4 cum mecum ageres ut de amicitia scriberem aliquid, digna mihi *res* ...uisa est; ib. 17.

totaque ea res: cf. § 7 totum illud studium.

2. **antecedat**: this verb hardly ever takes any case but the accusative in the prose writers, with the exception of Cicero. He too generally uses the accus. when *antecedere* means 'to precede' as regards space or time (though in Fat. 34 we find the dative), but the dative when the sense is 'to excel'. [So the Latin dramatists.] Cf. *anteire alicui*, Fin. 5, 93; *anteferre*, Tusc. 3, 49.

3. **tum ille**: see n. on § 14 mihi uero, ille.

4. **non haesitans**: the *non* goes very closely with the participle: so non dubitans in Diu. 1, 125; Fam. 5, 16, 4; haud dubitans in Mil. 68; see also n. on § 39 non corpus. For haesitans cf. n. on 2, 52.

sed ea dicam: Cic. has constructed this clause as though 'non haesitabo' had gone before; but this slight carelessness forms no reason for changing *sed* into *et*, as is done by Bake on Leg. 1, 13; nor for ejecting, with Goer., the words sed... promptu.

5. **in promptu**: so 2, 10 and often.

quod...cogitaui: Goer. (who makes merry over the gloss-hunters in a n. on the preceding section) strikes out this clause along with the preceding, as a 'miserum pannum'. Schütz echoes Goer. as usual (cf. Engstrand, p. 21 n. 'Goerenzius et Schützius, comes eius fidelis'). Yet there is no grammatical ground on which the words can be condemned. For multum et diu (also multum diuque; diu multumque) cf. e.g. Off. 1, 118; Cato m. 9; De Or. 1, 152; Orat. 1; Att. 4, 13, 2; Leg. agr. 2, 88; Liv. 22, 35, 3; 23, 26, 2; and 'saepe diuque' in Hor. ep. 1, 13, 1. Nothing is more Ciceronian than the repetition of clauses or whole sentences in slightly different forms. Thus in § 3 the words nec...deponere, in § 5 quae docti...suscipiatur labor, in § 18 quae quidem...differebant, might just as well be cast out. A scholar bent on excisions of this kind might appreciably reduce the bulk of Cicero's writings, and of ancient literature generally; as indeed some of Ritschl's pupils, who parody their master, bid fair to do.

The repetition we have here bears a good deal of similarity to the case (pretty common in Cic.) of a principal clause placed between two dependent clauses of which the second repeats the first; for this cf. Madvig on Fin. 1, 7. See a very similar repetition in N. D. 3, 4.

6. **philosophiam...explicatam**: see n. on § 7 erit illa explicanda; also cf. § 3 philosophiam Latinis litteris illustrare.

7. **si qui......tenerentur, si essent**: this is scarcely to be classed with the examples of double protasis (for which see n. on 2, 97) because in *si qui* the *si* has little or no conditional force, *si qui*

Graeca potius quam nostra lecturos: sin a Graecorum artibus et disciplinis abhorrerent, ne haec quidem curaturos, quae sine eruditione Graeca intellegi non possunt; itaque ea nolui scribere, quae nec indocti intellegere possent nec docti legere curarent. Vides autem—eadem enim ipse didicisti—non posse nos Amafini 5
aut Rabiri similis esse, qui nulla arte adhibita de rebus ante oculos positis uolgari sermone disputant, nihil definiunt, nihil partiuntur,

hoc G. 11 possunt: Al. Burn. EG; *possent* PV. 13 uides...didicisti: MSS *enim* post *didicisti* habent; corr. Dau. H (Christium secutus) edidit *uides autem ipse—didicisti enim eadem.* Amafini: amafinii Harl. 1 solus; amafanii cett., nisi quod *amaphanii* ψ habet, *amafranii* E, *amaffanii* Burn. *Amafini* lectionibus codicum ap. Tusc. 4, §§ 6, 7 et Fam. 15, 19, 2 confirmatur. 15 definiunt: *diffiniunt* codd. omnes; cf. §§ 17, 32.

being almost = *quicumque;* so often in Gk. εἴ τινες almost = οἵτινες. With our passage cf. Fam. 1, 9, 13 si accusandi sunt, si qui pertimuerunt; ibid. 13, 26, 3; Arch. 7; Cluent. 158; Off. 3, 30; Tusc. 2, 67; also § 11 below.

de nostris: for *de* (which Cic. in this as in some other uses interchanges with *ex*) see Draeger § 199, 10 and § 286, 2; for *nostris* = *Romanis* n. on § 18 nostra atque nostros.

9. **artibus et disciplinis**: so Arch. 5 Graecarum artium ac disciplinarum; the second word is here the wider of the two, covering theory as well as practice.

10. **quae...non possunt**: with the indicative, the bare fact is stated; with the reading *possent,* the fact would be regarded as part of Varro's thoughts at the time to which he refers.

11. **ea...quae possent**: the subjunctive is merely due to the class-notion; possent is not the apodosis to some unexpressed protasis such as 'si uellent' or 'si scriberem'. [Binder and Kirchmann translate wrongly.]

With these sections should be closely compared the prologue to Fin. 1; it will be seen that Cic. hints at Varro there (in § 2).

13. **eadem...didicisti**: the position of *enim* after *didicisti* in the MSS was intolerable; for though it is often said that *enim* can stand as fourth word in a clause, yet all the instances are far different from this, as Tusc. 1, 78 in his est enim; and similarly ib. 4, 83; Lael. 100; Off. 1, 67; Att. 13, 9, 2 si quid est enim; ib. 15, 13, 6 qua de re enim; Orat. 206 non ad unam enim rem. In all these passages *enim* succeeds three small words closely connected together. [The case is different with *igitur*, for which see n. on 2, 129.] Since in the later MSS *enim* is often denoted by the single letter *e.*, its transposition is easy. Halm's arrangement (uides autem ipse—didicisti enim eadem) departs from the MSS more widely than is necessary. For *eadem didicisti* cf. § 3 res eas quas tecum simul didici.

nos: = Academicos, no distinction being here drawn between Old and New. See n. on § 13.

Amafini...Rabiri: see Introd. p. 21; and for the constr. of *similes* n. on 2, 118.

14. **nulla arte**: explained by 'nullam artem nec dicendi nec disserendi' below.

rebus ante oculos positis: = facillimis.

15. **uolgari sermone**: 'the language of everyday life', a language destitute of technical terms. The context shews that the words cannot allude to the wide difference between the 'lingua rustica' and literary Latin. See Fin. 1, 8 and 15, also cf. Corn. ad Her. 4, 69 ne nuda inuentio uolgari sermone efferatur; De Or. 1, 12 uolgari genere orationis. Epicurus himself declared that the one virtue of composition was clearness, σαφήνεια (a virtue allowed him even by Cic. in Fin. 1, 15 and 2, 15), and was reproached by Aristophanes the grammarian for using ἰδιωτάτη (qy. ἰδιωτικῇ) λέξις (Diog. Laert. 10, 13), and the reproach became a commonplace charge against the whole school. See e.g. Brut. 131; Pis. 70. Yet Theon the ῥήτωρ blamed Epic. for an excessive attention to rhythm (Blass, die griechische Beredsamkeit p. 52). Mayor on N. D. 1, 85.

definiunt...concludunt: they disregard the logical rules taught in all the other

nihil apta interrogatione concludunt, nullam denique artem esse nec dicendi nec disserendi putant. Nos autem praeceptis dialecticorum et oratorum etiam, quoniam utramque uim uirtutem esse nostri putant, sic parentes, ut legibus, uerbis quoque nouis co-

1 interrogatione: *argumentatione* Bentl. 2 disserendi: *scribendi* G solus. dialecticorum: post hoc E habet *imbuti*. 3 oratorum: *rhetorum* coni. Pearce. etiam: *et* codd. fere omnes, exceptis PVG (ut est apud Halmium); om. Man. Lamb. uim uirtutem: *uim unam* coni. Man., edidit Lamb. et Bait. etiam; *utramque unam uirtutem* coni. H. Vid. tamen adnotationem meam. 4 quoque: *quamquam*

schools concerning ὁρισμός, διαίρεσις, ἀπόδειξις, for which see Trendelenburg on Arist. de an. p. 154 ed. 2. Cf. Fin. 1, 22 (the whole section) also ib. 2, 30 Epicurus, si definire, si diuidere didicisset; ib. 3, 40 scio quosdam qui quauis lingua philosophari possint, nullis enim partitionibus, nullis definitionibus utuntur; ib. 2, 27 Epicurus confuse loquitur (for this phrase see n. on 2, 47, below); Tusc. 2, 7 (the Epicureans profess) se neque distincte neque distribute neque eleganter neque ornate scribere. So Torquatus begins his speech in Fin. 1, 29 by combating the prejudice against Epic. on this score, to which Cic. retorts (ib. 2, 5) definitio qua tu imprudens utebare. In the same way Arist. Met. 1, 5 says of the Pythagoreans ὡρίζοντο ἐπιπολαίως. For definitio cf. n. on § 32.

1. **interrogatione concludunt**: this was understood by Faber, but many scholars have stumbled over it since. Even Bentley's knowledge did not here check his passion for change, and his emendation was far from happy. *Argumentatio* is an elaborate proof with many links (see Inu. 1, 74 sq.; Quint. 4, 2, 79 and 4, 2, 108), whereas the context shews clearly that here the syllogism is meant. *Interrogatione* has exactly the same meaning as *ratione*, and the use is exceedingly common; cf. e.g. Parad. 2 with Tusc. 2, 42 and see Madvig on Fin. 1, 39 rogatiuncula. In the Greek writers ἐρώτημα and ἀπόδειξις, ἐρωτᾶν and ἀποδεικνυσθαι are so constantly interchanged, that references are hardly needed; ἐρώτημα is an argument and ἐρωτᾶν to state an argument whether the argument be put as a series of questions, or categorically. Thus Galen. de Plac. Hipp. et Plat. II § 257 (ed. Müller) ἔνεστι δὲ καὶ συντομώτερον ἐρωτῆσαι, whereupon follows a syllogism in the ordinary form; so II 259, 260, 273; III 321, 586; so too Plut. Sto. Rep. 1034 F τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἐρωτήσας, where the argument has not a word of interrogation in it; also cf. Sextus Pyrrh. Hyp. 1, 189 σύνηθες δέ ἐστι καὶ πύσμασιν ἀντὶ ἀξιωμάτων χρῆσθαι καὶ ἀξιώμασιν ἀντὶ πυσμάτων. These usages begin to occur early; see Bonitz, Ind. Aristotelicus s. vv. ἐρωτᾶν, ἐρώτημα, ἐρώτησις.

nullam: 'worthless', as in the common phrase 'uita nulla est'.

2. **nec dicendi nec disserendi**: μήτε ῥητορικῆς μήτε διαλεκτικῆς: see n. on § 32. Notice the delicate use of chiasmus in passing to *dialecticorum et oratorum*.

3. **oratorum**: rhetorum might have been expected here, since the reference is to the *teachers* of oratory. So *rhetor* and *orator* are often contrasted, as in De Or. 3, 54; ib. 2, 10; ib. 3, 122; Plin. ep. 4, 11, 1. Yet the text is undoubtedly sound; cf. Orat. 113 disputandi ratio et loquendi dialecticorum sit, oratorum autem dicendi et orandi; ib. 61 orator...et Graece ab eloquendo ῥήτωρ et Latine 'eloquens' dictus est.

etiam: the occurrence of et...etiam in Cic. has often been questioned, but though rather rare is too well attested to be thrust aside; see Leg. 3, 4; Fin. 2, 74; Diu. 1, 132 (in N. D. 2, 130 *et* and *etiam* are in different clauses); Orat. 39; Brut. 98 and 284; Verr. 4, 104; Cael. 14; Rab. post. 32; Sest. 54; Fam. 15, 4, 13; Att. 2, 1, 3; Fam. 9, 25, 3; 12, 18, 1; 13, 7, 3; Att. 16, 16, 9. In the last four passages *et* and *etiam* are in juxtaposition, as in Varro r. r. 2, 4, 10. The *etiam* is never otiose, but has the sense of 'moreover' or 'even', or 'still', and very often refers rather to what follows than to what goes before. Cic. himself frequently prefers atque...etiam, as other writers of the best period nearly always do, to avoid the awkward repetition of *et*. Draeger § 313, 1 (whose list of exx. from Cic. is defective) says et...etiam is doubtful in Latin before Cic., unused by

gimur uti, quae docti, ut dixi, a Graecis petere malent, indocti ne a nobis quidem accipient, ut frustra omnis suscipiatur labor. Iam uero physica, si Epicurum, id est, si Democritum probarem,

codd., exceptis GV. 5 malent...accipient: *mallent...accipiunt* codd. (etiam U ?); corr. Dau. 6 ne a nobis quidem acc.: *a nobis ne acc. quidem* Orelli cum ed. Rom. Vid. adn. labor: haec uox est in Al. (errat Halm.), Oxx. Harl. Burn. ed. Rom.; abest a PVG (teste Halmio). 7 physica: *phylosophica* E (non *philosophica*, ut edit. Oxon.). id est: *idem* G, peruolgato errore; cf. § 32.

Caesar, Sallust and the Augustan poets, and only once used by Tacitus; he gives however three exx. from Varro, and seven from Livy. Similar expressions are iam...etiam (not uncommon); et... quoque (very rare; Plaut. Asin. 183 has et...quoque etiam); et...item (below, 2 § 12; Part. or. 121 and elsewhere); quoque etiam; cf. Munro on Lucr. 3, 208.

utramque: put for *utrorumque*, by a not uncommon idiom; cf. Liu. 35, 46, 7 utramque amicitiam (of the Romans and Macedonians); see also Munro on Lucr. 2, 433 tactus uterque=t. utriusque; to his exx. add Verg. Georg. 4, 37 utraque uis (i.e. frigoris et caloris); Aen. 4, 357 testor utrumque caput; Nep. Dio 1, 1 utrāque tyrannide Dionysiorum; Epam. 6, 2 utraque ciuitas (Thebanos et Argivos just before). [In Verr. 5, 129 Halm and Richter, as well as Neue II² 256 support the MSS reading *utrumque* as a contraction for *utrorumque*, but the supposed desire for euphony is a misconception, since Cic. uses *utrorumque* in Inu. 1, 57 and N. D. 2, 154 and probably elsewhere; moreover such contractions are found in very few words, even in poetry.]

uim uirtutem: the attack made on these words by later edd. is most strange. *Vis* is used in the common sense of 'faculty' (like δύναμις); cf. De Orat. 1, 142 uis ac facultas oratoris; so too ib. 1, 64; 2, 39 and 72; and uis dicendi, ib. 1, 89 and Quint. 3, 2, 4; also Plato, Philebus 57 E ἡ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμις, where see Stallbaum's n.; Diog. 5, 28. Any excellence, natural or acquired, may be called *uirtus* (ἀρετή); cf. particularly Brut. 65 omnes oratoriae uirtutes; De Or. 1, 48 dicendi uirtus; De opt. gen. 23. The following passage is almost enough in itself to protect the text, viz. De Or. 2, 120 oratoris uis illa diuina uirtusque. In all these places *uirtus* is used in a loose popular sense; but most of the Stoics held definitely that ἀρετή has three branches, ἠθική, λογική, φυσική; see Diog. 7, 92; [Plut.] Plac. Phil. 1, 1. They therefore gave the name ἀρετή to ῥητορική, which was a sub-division of λογική: cf. De Or. 3, 65. The theory that rhetoric is a *uirtus* is discussed by Quintilian, Inst. 2, c. 20 (whose language supplies abundant material for the defence of the text here), and was attacked by Plutarch in a lost tract entitled εἰ ἀρετὴ ἡ ῥητορική. See too Quint. 2, c. 15. [It is unnecessary to argue against the absurdity of those corrections which make Cic. pronounce logic and rhetoric to be identical.]

4. **sic...ut**: see n. on 2, 14 ut...sic. Vaucher's correction, ut legibus, sic uerbis may be left to the reader.

quoque: two things place the Academic at a disadvantage as compared with the Epicurean; (1) the need of attending to logical and rhetorical rules; (2) the necessity of using novel terms. The first requirement relates to form, the second to subject-matter, the *uolgaris sermo* being quite sufficient for such doctrines as the Epicureans had to expound. For the inadmissibility of *quamquam* here, see n. on 2, 74.

6. **ne a nobis quidem**: Orelli, after Ernesti, understanding this to mean 'not even from us', pronounced it 'arrogantius dictum', and read 'a nobis ne accipient quidem' after the ed. Rom. 1471. But, like οὐδέ, ne...quidem in nine cases out of ten means simply 'not...either' or 'neither'='auch nicht'. How rarely it marks a gradation in passing from one thing to another may be seen from an examination of the instances in the Academica, viz. Bk I §§ 4, 7, 8, 10, 31, 39, 45; Bk II §§ 28, 36, 42, 50, 52, 54, 55, 73, 79, 82, 85, 94, 96, 98, 109, 111, 113, 119, 124, 146 (ne nobis quidem). Cf. Arch. 2 ne nos quidem.

7. **iam**: for *iam* as particle of transition, see n. on 2, 86 iam illa praeclara.

id est: 'or rather'. For this corrective use cf. Att. 6, 9, 5 de Tulliola mea, id est de Dolabella; ib. 7, 7, 7 Cn. Pompeio, id est T. Pomponio; ib. 14, 2, 3

6 possem scribere ita plane, ut Amafinius. Quid est enim magnum, cum caussas rerum efficientium sustuleris, de corpusculorum—ita enim appellat atomos—concursione fortuita loqui? Nostra tu physica nosti, quae cum contineantur ex effectione et

1 possem: *possum* Al. 1, Harl. 2. Amafinius: *amafranius* E; *amafanius* cett. 2 rerum: *earum* Harl. 2. efficientium: sic codd. omn.; *efficientes* coni. Lamb., receperunt HBM, multique alii. 4 nostra tu physica: *nostram tu physicam* ψ; *nostra tu physicam* E; *n. t. phisicam* PV Al. 2, Harl. 2, 3; *philosophica* ed. rom. nosti: *noscis* Burn. cum: sic GPV; om. cett. contineantur: *contineatur* Harl. 2, E. 5 ea quam: *ea quae* G. etiam: *enim* codd.; corr. Man. Edidit

oti, id est Bruti; ib. 15, 17, 2 Seruiliae, id est Bruto; Tusc. 5, 39 cum Bruto, id est cum Aristotele; Phil. 2 §§ 50, 74; Florus 4, 2 (or 2, 13, 15 ed. Halm) senatus, id est Pompeius; Val. M. 8, 9, 1. This taunt aimed at Epic. is common in Cic., e.g. Fin. 1, 21 quae sequitur sunt tota Democriti; N. D. 1, 120 Democritus, cuius fontibus Epicurus hortulos suos irrigauit; Fin. 4, 13 Ep. in physicis Democriteum puto; N. D. 1, 73. For this charge see Zeller III 400 sq. ed. 3 (E. T. 482).

1. **magnum**: here=egregium, but in § 7 magnum est=difficile; cf. Plin. ep. 4, 3, 2 non minus difficile quam magnum. For the former sense cf. Fin. 4, 73; Tusc. 1, 111; 2, 15 (magna res est); 3, 52; 4, 37; De Fato 5 (quid autem magnum quod...); Off. 1, 55; Brut. 55 (permagnum); Hor. Sat. 1, 4, 10; ib. 1, 9, 52; ib. 1, 10, 20 (at magnum fecit quod...); Plin. pan. 13 and 16; also multum est (Verg. G. 2, 272); egregium est (Verg. Aen. 11, 705; Val. Max. 5, 1, 8). Of the Epicurean physics Cic. says in Fin. 1, 27 illa perdiscere ludus esset.

2. **caussas rerum efficientium**: the text is undoubtedly right; the genitive is explanatory or definitive ('epexegeticus siue appositionalis'). Cf. Topica 58 rerum efficientium quae causae appellantur; below, § 24 res duas...altera efficiens. The usage in Fin. 1, 18 caussam efficiendi, at which Madvig takes offence, is exactly similar; so Caec. 9 caussa alterius rei; Diu. in Caec. 59 iniuriae caussa; ib. caussam necessitudinis; Verr. 4, 113 caussam sceleris; Fin. 4. 25 finem summi boni; Liu. 6, 25, 9 suorum usuum caussas; 1, 13, 2 liberum progeniem; also some passages quoted in the index to Mayor's Iuvenal, s. v. 'genitive'. If *efficientis* (ποιητικὰς) be read it must be taken as governing *rerum;* cf. Fin. 2, 21; ib. 5. 81; Off. 3, 12; but in Fat. 33 *efficiens* governs the accusative.

sustuleris: this charge against the atomists, for neglecting one of the two sides of physics (as to which see nn. on § 24), is almost a commonplace; it is made by Arist. Met. 1, 4 against all the φυσικοί. Cf. De Fato 20, 21; Fin. 1, 18. It is very curious to read in connexion with our passage the following opinion of Varro, L. L. 6, 39 Democritus, Epicurus, item alii qui infinita principia dixerunt, quae unde sint non dicunt, sed cuius modi sint, tamen faciunt magnum, quod quae ex his constant in mundo, ostendunt.

3. **appellat**: sc. Amafinius, who avoided the technical term *atomus*. Cic. often uses *indiuidua* for *atomi*, as in 2, 55; also *corpora indiuidua* (De Fato 22); but he sometimes himself has *corpuscula* (N. D. 1, 66; 2, 94), and often uses *atomus* as a naturalised Latin word. Cf. Amm. Marc. 26, 1, 1 indiuidua illa corpuscula uolitantia per inane, ἀτόμους ut nos appellamus; Sen. N. Q. 5, 2, 1 *corpuscula*.

loqui: there is here (as often) a subtle sarcasm in the choice of this word; *dicere* can only be said of a stylist.

4. **nostra**: sc. Academicorum; the rendering 'meine Ansicht', given not only by Kirchmann but by Ritschl (see n. on § 9 elegans omni fere numero poema) is a mistake. For the (so-called) Academic scheme of physics see nn. on § 24.

cum: absent from most MSS; the word is often dropped out; cf. e.g. Fin. 2, 36; 2, 82; before *con-* the omission would be easy. [In Phil. 2, 18 *cum* should be inserted before *tecum ipse* not before *non*, as Halm suggests.]

effectione:=ui efficiente, δυνάμει ποιητικῇ. Effectio is here the equivalent of *res efficiens* above. The word is very rare, occurring (probably) only here and Fin. 3, 24 and 45, where it has the more natural sense of πρᾶξις, 'accomplishment'. Cic. sometimes translates δύναμις by the

ex materia ea, quam fingit et format effectio, adhibenda etiam geometria est, quam quibusnam quisquam enuntiare uerbis aut quem ad intellegendum poterit adducere? Ecce, haec ipsa de uita et moribus, et de expetendis fugiendisque rebus? Illi enim

Lamb., simulata codicum auctoritate, *adhibenda enim ea materiae est.* 6 quam: *quoniam* codd., sed in A dubia est scriptura inter *quam* et *quoniam*. Correxit Durand. quibusnam: *quibusdam* E. quisquam: *queam* Lamb. 7 adducere? Sic edd. fere omnes. Post uerbum *adducere* in omnibus quos ipse inspexi codicibus est aut punctum aut spatium inane relictum. ecce haec: uocem *ecce* addidi. 8 rebus: hic lacunae notam apposuit H; secutus est B. enim: hic om. M; post *pecudis* inseruit, G secutus.

substantive *efficientia*, as in N. D. 2, 95; De Fato 19.

5. **etiam**: most edd. since Manutius have seen that the words 'adhibenda...est' form the apodosis to the clause 'quae cum ...effectio'. Goer. alone defends the MSS reading *enim*.

6. **geometria**: no doubt Cic. in writing this was thinking principally of astronomy, partly however of the application of geometry to physics in the *Timaeus* of Plato. Some of the Peripatetics had followed in Plato's track (Fin. 5, 9); cf. too Sen. ep. 88, 24 with the context; Quint. 1, 10, 46; yet Zeller II 2, p. 407 ed. 3 truly says of all the ancient systems 'an eine durchgreifende Anwendung der Mathematik auf die Physik nicht gedacht wurde'. Epic. and his followers were proverbially ἀγεωμέτρητοι: see n. on 2, 82. Democritus on the other hand was a student of mathematics; see Diog. 9, 47. It is worth observing that Varro himself wrote on mathematics; see Ritschl's article quoted on § 8.

quam...adducere? This arrangement is wrongly attributed by Halm to Durand; P. Faber conjectured *quam iam*, and the note of interrogation at *adducere* was the accepted punctuation even before the time of Lambinus. Madvig (Em. p. 111) attempted to defend the MSS reading *quoniam* as a particle of transition, but the only parallel passage he could quote (Tusc. 3, 14) is irrelevant; moreover his defence involves us in the difficult reading *adducere haec ipsa* (without any stop), for which see below.

quam quibusnam quisquam: Schütz objected to these words as lacking euphony. His ears, however, were more fastidious than those of Cic.; cf. Fam. 9, 7, 2 quod quaeris quando qua quo; Tusc. 5, 46 quas quom quiuis quamuis; Fam. 12, 2, 2 qui quia quae. A very large list of similar passages might be given from Cic. and other authors too; e.g. Ennius ap. Corn. ad Her. 4, 18 quiquam quisquam quicquam quomquam quidque conueniat neget—a line which Ribbeck (I 73 ed. 2) not without reason supposes to belong to the satirical rather than to the tragic poems of Ennius.

quibusnam uerbis: the implied answer is 'not the terms contained in the *uolgaris sermo* which Amafinius uses'. With the form of the question cf. § 41 quonam enim modo καταληπτὸν diceres?

7. **quem...adducere?** i.e. 'not him whose mind is only capable of understanding the puerile Epicurean system'. The simplicity of the system accounts for its popularity; Tusc. 4, 7.

adducere? Ecce, haec: the few scholars who have read *adducere haec ipsa*, putting the note of interrogation at *rebus*, have entangled themselves in two inextricable difficulties, (1) the suddenness of the transition from physics to ethics, (2) the unparalleled ellipse of *pars philosophiae* or *scientia* or the like to agree with *haec ipsa*. All the MSS I have examined show signs of a slight gap after *adducere*, which no doubt existed in the archetype. I have supplied *ecce* which would readily fall out before *haec*, and is commonly used by Cic. as a particle of transition; see n. on 2, 134.

haec ipsa de uita et moribus: Cic. having attacked the Epicureans on the score of dialectic and physics now makes an inroad on their treatment of ethics, the remaining branch of philosophy. For this triple division, also for the phrases *de uita et moribus* etc. see nn. on § 19. The word *ipsa* merely emphasizes *haec*, so as to imply that the ethical division is of far greater importance than the other two; cf. *his ipsis* in §§ 8, 23; philosophia *ipsa* in § 20. Thus *haec ipsa* = 'this essential, this all-important branch'. For *expetendis* see n. on 1, 18.

simpliciter pecudis et hominis idem bonum esse censent: apud
7 nostros autem non ignoras quae sit et quanta subtilitas. Siue
enim Zenonem sequare, magnum est efficere ut quis intellegat
quid sit illud uerum et simplex bonum, quod non possit ab
honestate seiungi, quod bonum quale sit negat omnino Epicurus
sine uoluptatibus sensum mouentibus ne suspicari quidem. Si
uero Academiam ueterem persequamur, quam nos, ut scis, pro-

1 simpliciter: M ita interpunxit ut clausulam *simpliciter* concluderet; nescio an recte. Quod ad ellipsin uerbi *tractarunt* attinet, uid. adn. meam ad 2, 94. 2 autem: *enim* codd. omnes (de E errarunt editores Oxonienses); corr. Lamb. (non, ut HB praedicant, Guietus). ignoras: *ignaros* E. 3 sequare: *sequatur* G. 4 uerum: *unum* coni. Walker, perperam. 6 sine: *se sine* Lamb. BM. ne suspicari quidem: *nec suspicari* MSS omnes; corr. Durand.; *uel suspicari* Lamb. si uero: *siue* Turnebus, quem sunt multi secuti (non tamen HBM). 7 nos:

1. **simpliciter**: 'frankly', 'openly'; cf. Fam. 8, 6, 1; Phaedrus epil. 3 sed haec s., illa tacite irascitur; Suet. Aug. 71 s. et palam; Plin. ep. 1, 13, 2; 5, 2, 2; 5, 3, 1; Paneg. 84 simplicitas ueritas candor; Sen. ep. 7, 7 candido et simplici.

pecudis: see n. on 2, 139.

2. **subtilitas**: not 'subtlety', but 'minute accurate treatment'; 'refinement' expresses the word more nearly than anything else in English. [Boost rightly 'Feinheit'.]

3. **Zenonem**: the mention of Zeno is unexpected after *nostros = Academicos;* yet all that is implied is that he is worthy to rank with philosophers of the older schools, while Epic. is not; cf. Fam. 15, 4, 16 where Stoicism is treated as forming part of the 'uera et antiqua philosophia'. For the ethics of Zeno see nn. on §§ 35—37.

sequare...est; for the indicative in the apodosis see n. on 2, 140 si sequare... ruunt.

magnum: = difficile, as in *magnum opus* etc.; so De Or. 1, 19; Tusc. 1, 116; Phil. 8, 29; Verg. G. 3, 289; Plin. pan. 51 etc.; also n. on § 6 above.

4. **uerum et simplex bonum**: in § 35 simplex et solum et unum bonum. *Verum* has the sense of 'real', rather than that of 'true'.

5. **quod bonum**: here 'bonum' means 'good' generally; the transition from the special sense above (illud bonum) to the general sense here is somewhat awkward.

negat Epicurus: his words (in his book *περὶ τέλους*) are quoted by Diog. 10, 6 *οὐ γὰρ ἔχω τί νοήσω τἀγαθόν, ἀφαιρῶν μὲν τὰς διὰ χυλῶν ἡδονάς, ἀφαιρῶν δὲ τὰς δι' ἀφροδισίων καὶ τὰς δι' ἀκροαμάτων καὶ τὰς διὰ μορφῆς*: also (with slight differences) by Athenaeus VII, pp. 278 F, 280 A. XII p. 546 E. In Tusc. 3, 41 Cic. translates the passage literally, carrying his translation beyond the point at which Diog. and Ath. stop. This opinion of Epic. is referred to also in Tusc. 3, 47; N. D. 1, 111; Pis. 69; Fin. 2, 7 and 20 and 30. The statement must have been accompanied by many limitations, as indeed Cic. admits in Fin. 2, 7.

6. **ne suspicari quidem**: Madvig, in an exhaustive excursus to his ed. of Fin., has shown that nec = ne...quidem is foreign to the Latin of Cic.'s time. The substitution of nec...quidem or nec merely for ne...quidem is one of the commonest phenomena of the later Ciceronian MSS; cf. n. on 2, 11. As for Christ's suggestion that *sentire* has fallen out before nec... suspicari it is sufficient to remark that in all the other passages where Cic. quotes the words of Epic '*οὐκ ἔχω τί νοήσω*' in *oratio obliqua* he uses either *ne suspicari quidem* or *ne intellegere quidem*. In all those places the subject of the infinitive (*se*) is omitted as here; cf. also n. on § 18 exhibiturum.

si uero: this, following on *siue enim* above, is a departure from Cic.'s rule, which is to write (*where two suppositions are mentioned which exclude one another*) either siue...siue or si...sin, but not si... siue, nor siue...si, nor si...si. This and similar passages in Cic. are rightly explained as anacolutha by Madvig in an important excursus to his ed. of Fin. p. 785. He has not, however, remarked

bamus, quam erit illa acute explicanda nobis! quam argute, quam obscure etiam contra Stoicos disserendum! Totum igitur illud philosophiae studium mihi quidem ipse sumo et ad uitae constantiam quantum possum et ad delectationem animi, nec ullum arbitror, ut apud Platonem est, maius aut melius a dis datum munus homini. Sed meos amicos, in quibus est studium, 8
in Graeciam mitto, id est, ad Graecos ire iubeo, ut ea a fontibus

non codd. omn.; uetus est correctio. 8 erit: e codicibus reuocaui (G solus *erat* praebet); *erunt* HBM Ernestii coniecturam secuti. 11 quantum: *quantam* codd. omn. excepto G (si credendum est Halmii silentio). Iam pridem correctum est. 13 est: *id est* Durand. 14 id est...iubeo: suspicione Lambini comprobata, multi (etiam HBM) haec incluserunt. ea a fontibus; *ea e f.* M secundum Lambini coniecturam; *ex fontibus* coni. H.

that the combination *sin uero* is of very rare occurrence. Where more than two alternatives are stated either the form si ..sin...sin (as in Fam. 12, 2, 3) or si... si...sin (as in Fam. 4, 2, 2; 7, 14, 1; 14, 4, 4) may occur. In many places where MSS give si...si with two alternatives, si... sin should probably be read, as in Att. 10, 4, 6; Prou. Cons. 46; Phil. 1, 38. In other passages, where the contrast between the alternatives is not very sharp, si...si may be allowed to stand, as in Cato m. 71; De Or. 2, 137. [On this subject see C. F. W. Müller's excellent monograph on the use of *si* and *siue*; cf. also Munro on Lucr. 4, 783 and 5, 383.]

7. **Academiam ueterem**: the mention of the Stoics below shows that the school of Antiochus is meant. For the various meanings of the name 'uetus Academia' cf. Introd. p. 15.

persequamur: cf. n. on § 12.

nos: here = *ego.*

8. **erit...explicanda**: for the separation of these words see n. on § 17 erant... soliti. 'Explicare Academiam' is a simple enough phrase; at least as simple as 'Academiam persequi', or 'dicere contra Academiam' (= Academiae rationem) in 2, 63, or 'renouare Academiam' in § 14. If *erunt* be read (*illa* being taken as neuter plural) *erit* will have to be supplied with *disserendum*, which is harsh.

argute: 'smartly', 'pointedly' (cf. De Or. 2, 250; Brut. 322); very often joined with *acute* in Cic., as in Brut. 53; Cael. 19; cf. Hor. A. P. 364 iudicis argutum acumen. Some interpreters (as Kirchmann) have erred in thinking that the word must mean 'clearly' and so contradicts *obscure.* The subtleness and profundity of Antiochus' polemic against the Stoics were due to the slightness of the differences which separated him from them. See Introd. pp. 15—18.

9. **totum illud studium**: cf. § 3 tota illa res.

11. **constantiam**: see n. on 2, 23.

quantum: for the reading *quantam* see n. on 2, 4 ea memoria quam dixi.

nec ullum...homini: Plato, Tim. 47 B *φιλοσοφίας γένος, οὗ μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν οὔτ' ἦλθεν οὔθ' ἥξει ποτὲ τῷ θνητῷ γένει δωρηθὲν ἐκ θεῶν*: translated or imitated by Cic. Tim. § 52; Leg. 1, 58; Lael. 47; Cato m. 40; Tusc. 1, 64; Off. 2, 5; Fam. 15, 4, 16. In quoting from an author Cic. always uses 'apud aliquem' not 'in aliquo'.

The whole of §§ 6, 7 should be closely compared with the prooemium to Fin. Bk. III.

13. **est studium**: the correction *id est* is needless; see n. on studium in § 3.

14. **id est...iubeo**: many scholars have waged *ἄσπονδον πόλεμον* against the numerous clauses in Cic. introduced by *id est.* These may conveniently be divided into three classes, (1) those which *correct* a previous *statement* (of which exx. were given in n. on § 6); (2) those which contain an *inference* from a preceding assertion; (3) those which convey an *explanation* of a *word* or *phrase.* Exx. of class (2), where an argument is carried a step farther, are 2, 59 opinaturum, id est peccaturum; Fin. 1, 72 iucundius, id est melius; ib. 2, 92; Tusc. 3, 27 aegritudine, id est miseria; ib. 1, 75 (bis); Att. 8, 2, 2; ib. 9, 6, 2; Balb. 54, etc. The third class has fared worse at the hands of edd. than the other two. Those

potius hauriant quam riuolos consectentur. Quae autem nemo adhuc docuerat nec erat unde studiosi scire possent, ea, quantum potui—nihil enim magno opere meorum miror—feci ut essent nota nostris. A Graecis enim peti non poterant ac post L. Aeli nostri occasum ne a Latinis quidem. Et tamen in illis ueteribus

4 peti: *petere* A. 6 non interpretati: *ut* pro *non* habent Oxx. Al. 2; Harl. 1; Burn. De PVG tacetur. Fuitne *haud?* Poterat etiam *ut* ex *uel* prouenire

exx. which involve translation from one language into another, will be dealt with in n. on § 32. In another large section of exx. the clause with *id est* explains a word used in some metaphorical or otherwise unaccustomed sense, and very often the departure from custom is so slight that a modern would think no explanation necessary. In such passages as Lael. 97 in scaena, id est in contione the metaphor is strong; so too in Brut. 222 ex acie, id est a iudiciis, where recent edd. go astray; but in Att. 8, 1, 3 Cic. takes the trouble to explain *bonorum* in its common political sense, by the words 'lautorum et locupletium'; cf. Fin. 2, 90 tenuissimo uictu, id est contemptissimis escis et potionibus; ib. 3, 18 membrorum, id est partium corporis; Quint. 2, 18, 4 actu id est opere; Val. M. 7, 6, 5. With our passage cf. Brut. 172 sed domum redeamus, id est ad nostros reuertamur, where some recent edd. wrongly excise id ...reuertamur. In view of Cic.'s notorious tendency to excessive explanation and repetition the extremest caution is needed in dealing with these clauses, though no doubt there are glosses among them as in Brut. 120 eorum, id est ex uetere Academia philosophorum. Madvig most justly defends one such clause in Fin. 2, 6; and as to Paradoxa 4, where Cic. says of the Stoic paradoxes 'temptare uolui possentne proferri in lucem, id est in forum', Halm would scarcely have altered the passage had he remembered Fam. 15, 4, 16 nos philosophiam in forum...deduximus.

a fontibus: Lamb. suggests *e f.*; Hm. ut ex f.; but haurire is one of the many verbs with which Cic. uses the three prepositions *de, ex, ab*. See n. on 2, 11.

1. **riuolos**: if the allusion were to natural rivers the *riuolus* would be greater than the *fons*, but the reference is rather to the practice of irrigating land by runlets; cf. Tac. A. 1, 79 amnis Nar in riuos diductus; Verg. Ec. 3, 111. The contrast between *fons* (the *integer fons* of Lucr. 1, 927, parodied by Hor. sat. 2, 4, 94) and *riuos* or *riuolus* in these metaphorical senses is common; cf. N. D. 1, 120; De Or. 2, 117; ib. 3, 23; Top. 33; Rep. 2, 34; Liu. 4, 30, 8; Plin. ep. 3, 20, 12. So Hor. ep. 1, 3, 10 contrasts the *Pindaricus fons* with the *lacus* and *riui operti*; cf. De Or. 2, 162 seclusa acula (aquula)...uniuersum flumen. In Mur. 9 noli tam esse iniustus ut cum tui fontes uel inimicis tuis pateant, nostros etiam amicis putes clausos esse oportere, a writer in Philolog. Anz. VI 240 very plausibly proposes to insert *riuolos* after *nostros*. The very difficult passage of Verg. Aen. 8, 74 quo te cumque lacus...fonte tenet, should, I think, be read thus: qui te cumque lacus...fonsue tenet. [In Galen. de Plac. VI § 525 (ed. Müll.) is a curious passage, too long to quote, exposing the Stoic error of not seeing ὡς τὰ μείζω τῶν ἐλαττόνων ἀρχαί, καθάπερ ἡ πηγὴ τῶν ὀχετῶν: the error being due to a false use of the comparison between a ποταμὸς and its πηγή.]

consectentur: so 'riuolos consectari' in De Or. 2, 117. For *potius quam* (not *p. q. ut*) *consectentur* cf. n. on 2, 23.

2. **nec erat unde**: = nec erat quisquam a quo, as is shown by *a Graecis* below. For this use of *unde* see my n. on Cato m. 12.

3. **nihil...miror**: Cic. here no doubt introduces a personal trait of Varro.

meorum: the substantival use of the neuter adj. is generally avoided in the gen. and dat., because the termination leaves the gender ambiguous; where the use occurs there is generally some word close at hand (as *nihil* here) to indicate the gender. So *nostris, quae* below; cf. n. on § 27 omnibus.

4. **L. Aeli**: the great grammarian antiquary and man of letters, L. Aelius Stilo or Praeconinus, on whom see Teuffel's Hist. of Rom. Lit., and on his relations with Varro, cf. Baldi, die Gegner der griechischen Bildung in Rom II p. 22.

5. **nostri**: = Romani, opposed to

nostris, quae Menippum imitati, non interpretati, quadam hilaritate conspersimus, multa admixta ex intima philosophia, multa dicta sunt dialectice: quae cum facilius minus docti intellegerent, iucunditate quadam ad legendum inuitati, in lauda-

cum *uel interpretati* interpretatio esset. 8 quae: om. HB, post P. Fabrum. cum: scripsi pro *quo*, quod exhibent codd. et edd. B cum Kaysero uerba '*quo facilius ...intellegerent*' post u. '*conspersimus*' posuit. 9 inuitati: hic indicat lacunam M.

Graecis above: cf. my n. on Arch. 18 noster ille Ennius.

occasum: literally 'setting'; a rather poetical substitute for *mortem;* cf. Top. 32 senectutem occasum uitae; used of persons in Ennius, Ann. 164, 171, 292 (ed. Vahl.); Nep. Eum. 13, 3; Plin. ep. 3, 7, 13; Val. M. 3, 2, 7; Amm. Marc. 19, 1, 8. So *occidere* in Fam. 4, 3, 2; 5, 15, 2; Val. M. 5, 6, ext. 1; *decidere* in Hor. ep. 2, 1, 36.

6. **Menippum**: M. of Gadara, Cynic philosopher and satirist, lived about the middle of the second century B.C. For an account of him see Pauly, Realenc. s. v.; Diog. Laert. 6, 99 says that his books 'πολλοῦ καταγέλωτος γέμει': cf. also Diog. 6, 83, concerning Monimus, a Cynic, author of παίγνια σπουδῇ λεληθυίᾳ μεμιγμένα.

non interpretati: a saving clause for Varro's originality; cf. Off. 1, 6 sequemur Stoicos, non ut interpretes; ib. 2, 60 Panaetius, quem secutus sum, non interpretatus; Fin. 1, 6. For Varro's Menippean satires see Riese's edn. of the fragments; the popular account (vastly overdrawn) in Mommsen's history is well known. Krahner, De Varrone (Friedland. 1846,—a useful pamphlet) shows that Tertullian in Apol. c. 14 gave Varro the title 'Romanus Cynicus', while other late writers styled him 'Menippeus'. Professed imitations of the Menippean satires have been common in modern literature. [Krahner vainly attacks the text here.]

quadam hilaritate conspersimus: cf. De Or. 2, 221 Curiana defensio redundauit hilaritate quadam et ioco; with the whole context cf. Quint. 3, 1, 3.

7. **intima philosophia**: a glance at the fragments will show that they contain a large number of allusions to philosophy, chiefly ethical. Cf. De Or. 1, 87 haec esse penitus in media philosophia retrusa atque abdita (of ethical enquiries); also Orat. 11 ingressionem e media philosophia repetitam; Leg. 1, 17; Quint. 1, 4, 4. Krahner gives a very exaggerated account of Varro's works on their philosophical side. Anything of an ethical character, however commonplace, was described as being drawn *ex intima philosophia;* so Quint. 12, 1, 28 Quid? non in bellis quoque idem ille uir, quem instituimus, si sit ad proelium miles cohortandus, ex mediis sapientiae praeceptis orationem trahet? Whereupon follows a list of the topics such a speech would contain, all utterly commonplace. Cf. too Quint. 12, 2, 28; and Introd. p. 9 n. 6.

8. **quae cum...uoluimus**: with my readings, the passage implies that Varro had introduced philosophy into two classes of his writings; into the Menippean satires in such a manner as to suit the taste of the unlearned; into the 'antiquitates' so as to please philosophers. The retention of *quo* (*quae* being rejected) leads to the absurdity of making Varro say that he had put things dialectically *in order to* entice the vulgar.

minus docti: euphemistically put for *indocti;* cf. § 37 n. on *minoris.*

9. **inuitati**: Riese, after Casaubon and Ritschl, supposes a gap here, in which were mentioned Varro's 'libri logistorici', works that undoubtedly did contain philosophical statements. See below, n. on § 9 incohasti. It is impossible here minutely to describe each work of Varro to which Cic. makes allusion. Elaborate information is given in Ritschl's article 'die Schriftstellerei des M. T. Varro' in the Rh. Mus. for 1848, pp. 481 sq. (reprinted in his 'Opuscula') and in Riese's introduction to the Sat. Men.

laudationibus: sc. funebribus; λόγοις ἐπιταφίοις. One of V.'s is mentioned in Att. 13, 48, 2. [Krahner labours in vain to show that the word indicates a portion of the 'libri logistorici'.] As Ritschl remarks, the philosophy in these works must have consisted mainly of ethical commonplaces. In Seneca ep. 102, 15 is a curious passage on the difference between 'laus' and 'laudatio', which are indeed usually kept distinct, though Quint. frequently uses *laudes* for *laudationes,* as in 3, 4, 5.

tionibus, in his ipsis antiquitatum prooemiis philosophis scribere uoluimus, si modo consecuti sumus'.

9 III. Tum ego 'sunt', inquam, 'ista, Varro. Nam nos in nostra urbe peregrinantis errantisque tamquam hospites tui libri quasi domum deduxerunt, ut possemus aliquando qui et ubi essemus agnoscere. Tu aetatem patriae, tu discriptiones tem-

1 philosophis: ita scripsi; *philosophie* codd. plerique (*phylosophiae* E, *philosophiae* Harl. 1); *philosophice* Harl. 2, Man., alii; *philosophe* HB; *philologis* Seyffert. 4 peregrinantis errantis: sic EUψ Harl. 2. 5 deduxerunt: *reduxerunt* Augustin. ciu. d. 6, 2; sic Turneb., alii (etiam BM). 6 discriptiones: sic M.; *descriptiones* cett.

1. **his ipsis**: these words merely point out these prooemia as the most important of V.'s works from a philosophical point of view. See n. on § 6 haec ipsa, and cf. De Or. 1, 73 orationibus hisce ipsis (with the context).

antiquitatum: Varro's greatest work, in 41 books, divided into two portions 'antiquitates rerum humanarum' and 'a. rerum diuinarum'.

prooemiis: each section of the 'antiquitates' had an introductory book (Ritschl, p. 513), as had the 'De lingua Latina' and others of V.'s works (Ritschl p. 525). These prooemia, as Krahner shows, were mainly devoted to setting forth the philosophical principles which bore on the subjects treated.

philosophis scribere: 'to write for philosophers'. For the dat. cf. *scribere aliis* in Brut. 48 and 169 and 286; Fin. 1, 7 Consentinis et Siculis scribere; Plin. n. h. praef. § 6 humili uulgo scripta sunt; Plin. ep. 3, 18, 9 and 5, 8, 12; Quint. 3, 8, 51 Lysias in eis quae scribebat indoctis; so 3, 8, 70; 9, 4, 17; 11, 1, 38; 11, 2, 11; Cic. Sest. 32 ceteris supplicare (=pro ceteris) with Halm's n. in ed. mai.; Caes. B. C. 1, 8, 3 iracundiam suam rei publicae dimittere; Seneca, Contr. 4, 7 (cadere alicui); Quint. praef. § 26; Sen. ep. 24, 19. The readings hitherto given are indefensible; (1) *philosophice*, like *philosophicus*, does not occur till very late in Latin literature, nor is φιλοσοφικὸς used in Greek; (2) *philosophe* is a word invented by Halm, and not to be justified by the supposed, but utterly improbable use in Cic. of *philosophus* as an adjective; as to which see Kühner on Tusc. 5, 121; (3) *philologis* is entirely at variance with the context; (4) Goerenz's *philosophiae* (dat.) *scribere*='ad philosophiae studium commendandum et inuitandum' (sic), is, as Orelli too gently says, 'uix Latina'; (5) *philosophiam scribere* cannot have been written by Cic., who never writes *physicam dialecticam etc. scribere*, but always *physica* (neut. plur.) *etc.* as in § 6. My reading only requires the change of a single letter.

2. **si modo consecuti sumus**: so Rep. 2, 52; Leg. 2, 45; but in many passages Cic. inserts *id*, as in Sest. 5 si modo id consequi potero; Brut. 316; Tusc. 2, 8; De opt. gen. d. 9.

3. **sunt ista**: ἔστι ταῦτα. The insertion of *uera* in some edd. is a blunder; see Lael. 6; though sometimes an explanatory clause is added, as below § 13 and Rep. 1, 16 sunt ista, ut dicis; Att. 3, 9, 2 si ista sunt, quae speras. Cf. n. on 2, 10 si non fuerint. If alteration were needed, *sunt ista ita* would be more likely than *sunt ista uera;* see n. on § 11 si haec ita non sunt.

in nostra urbe peregrinantis: Cic. often compares people ignorant of the politics or institutions of their own country to μέτοικοι, as in De Or. 1, 249 ne in nostra patria peregrini atque aduenae esse uideamur; ib. 1, 218 and 2, 131; so Att. 4, 13, 2 Cic. begs Atticus to send him news from Rome 'ne istuc hospes ueniam'; cf. ib. 6, 3, 4 est enim quiddam aduenientem non esse peregrinum atque hospitem; add Mil. 33; Rab. perd. 28; Fin. 3, 40 mihi uideris Latine docere philosophiam, et ei quasi ciuitatem dare, quae quidem adhuc peregrinari Romae uidebatur.

5. **deduxerunt**: Durand's rule approved by Halm '*deducimus* honoris causa, sed errantes *reducimus* humanitatis' is a delusion; thus *reducere* is often used of escorting a senator back from the *curia* to his home ('honoris causa'), *deducere* denoting the escort away from home to the *curia*. See Val. M. 7, 5, 4; Sen. dial. 9, 11, 11; Cat. m. 63; and particularly Val. Max. 2, 1, 9; in both

porum, tu sacrorum iura, tu sacerdotum, tu domesticam, tu bellicam disciplinam, tu sedem regionum locorum, tu omnium diuinarum humanarumque rerum nomina genera officia caussas aperuisti, plurimumque idem poetis nostris omninoque Latinis et litteris luminis et uerbis attulisti, atque ipse uarium et elegans

7 sacerdotum: *sacerdotum munera* Lamb. bellicam: *publicam* August. 8 sedem: *sedium* Goer.; *situm* coni. M. regionum locorum: *regionum et locorum* Lamb. 10 plurimumque idem: *plurimum quidem* codd.; corr. Gruterus; *plurimumque* Lamb. alii. poetis: *a poetis* MSS, exc. G Al. 2 U (de quo errarunt fortasse edd. Oxon., ut profecto de E). 11 uerbis: *rebus* Man.

of the last-named passages the two words come together; also cf. above, § 1 reduximus; Brut. 86; Lael. 12 (where Halm's own text contradicts his rule). [Yet *deducere* is often used of the escort home; cf. Liu. 23, 23, 8 domum *de*duxerunt with ib. 4, 24, 7 domum est *re*ductus.] On the other hand Leg. 1, 41 in uiam deducere ('humanitatis causa'); Corn. ad Herenn. 4, 64 hospites domum deducere.

qui et ubi: *qui* refers to V.'s works on Roman history, *ubi* to those on topography. For the expression cf. Rep. 2, 6 qui et unde (followed by 'quis sit aut unde'); Diu. 2, 72 quae aues aut ubi; Plaut. Aul. 706 aut ubi sim aut qui sim nequeo inuestigare; Prop. 1, 5, 18 nec poteris qui sis aut ubi nosse miser; Liu. 5, 30, 3 quae aut unde. The form of expression was colloquial (Petron. § 124 ed. Büch.); Catullus (as a pupil points out) gives a peculiar turn to it in the 'Attis' 45 simul Attis uidit *sine quis* ubique foret. Cf. also Catull. 17, 22.

6. **aetatem patriae** etc.: most of these subjects were dealt with in the 'Antiquitates' (Aug. ciu. d. 6, 3), but on nearly all of them V. had written separate treatises; see Ritschl's list. It was V. who fixed the ordinarily received date for the foundation of Rome.

discriptiones temporum: 'chronological arrangements'. *Tempora* is commonly employed, like χρόνοι (Thuc. 5, 20 etc.) with the sense of 'dates'; e.g. in Phil. 2, 23. For the reading *dis*criptiones see n. on § 17.

7. **domesticam...bellicam**: a contrast like that in domi bellique; so in Brut. 49 and often. The German translators are inaccurate in rendering *bellicam* as though it referred to war solely.

8. **sedem regionum**: Müller's suggestion *situm* is needless; cf. Leg. agr. 1, 18 sedem urbis atque imperi; Aug. ciu. d. 4, 29 s. locorum; though *situs* is also common, as Vell. 2, 96, 3 s. regionum; so Plin. pan. 15. [In Qu. Fr. 2. 16, 4 quos tu situs, quas naturas rerum et locorum, *regionum* ought certainly to be substituted for *rerum*.] The reading *sedium* or *sedum* (destitute of MSS support) gives us an awkwardly long string of genitives dependent on *nomina etc.* In *regionum* Turnebus oddly finds an allusion to the regiones or administrative districts ordered by Augustus. For the omission of *et* between *regionum* and *locorum* see n. on § 16 varie copioseque.

diuinarum humanarumque rerum: the words curiously correspond with a common definition of philosophy; cf. Off. 2, 5 sapientia...rerum diuinarum et humanarum causarumque, quibus eae res continentur, scientia; so also Tusc. 5, 7; Fin. 2, 37; Sen. ep. 31, 8; ib. 88, 33; ib. 89, 5; ib. 104, 22; ib. 110, 8.

10. **poetis**: for V.'s works 'de poematis', 'de poetis', 'de originibus scenicis', etc. see Ritschl, l. l. p. 515.

et litteris luminis et uerbis: the collocation called by the old grammarians 'coniunctio'; see my n. on Lael. § 8 and cf. 2, 12 n. The em. *rebus* (resting on § 26 rerum...uerborum) is needless; *litteris* and *uerbis* are contrasted as 'literature' and 'language'. Bentley is of course mistaken in supposing a reference to the 'de lingua Latina'.

11. **elegans omni fere numero poema**: about these words there is an ἀνήνυτος μάχη, portions of which may be seen in Ritschl's paper above quoted, and in the introductions to the different editions of the fragments of the Menippean Satires. The idea that one poem is meant written in a variety of metres ('omni fere numero') is rightly ridiculed by Ritschl. [The phrase *impletas modis saturas* in Liu. 7, 2, 7 has no bearing on this question; see below, 2 § 22 n.] Ritschl

omni fere numero poema fecisti philosophiamque multis locis in-
10 cohasti, ad impellendum satis, ad edocendum parum. Caussam autem probabilem tu quidem adfers; aut enim Graeca legere malent qui erunt eruditi aut ne haec quidem qui illa nesciunt. Sed da mihi nunc: satisne probas? Immo uero et haec qui illa non poterunt et qui Graeca poterunt non contemnent sua. Quid enim caussae est cur poetas Latinos Graecis litteris eruditi legant, philosophos non legant? An quia delectat Ennius Pacuuius

1 incohasti: sic A Harl. Burn.; *incoasti* Al. 2, E; *inchoasti* ψ; de cett. siletur; edd. *inchoasti;* cf. § 20. 4 malent: *mallent* codd. plerique. haec: *hoc* EUGAr; cf. supra § 4. nesciunt: sic codd. exc. G, qui *nescient* habet; edd. fere *nescient;* cf. § 5 *malent...accipient.* 5 sed da mihi nunc: satisne probas? Sic codd. exc. G (qui lectionem manifesto ex correctione natam praebet '*sed ea mihi non sane probas*') et Al. 2 (*hoc* pro *nunc*); *sed da te mihi* coni. Man.; *sed eam mihi* Turn. Lamb. Halm. (qui nulla caussa pro *satisne* legit *non satis* Durand. secutus); *sed eam mihi non sane*

is, however, almost equally wrong himself in assuming (with all the other commentators) that the words must necessarily refer to some single poem. Varro wrote tragedies, lyric and elegiac poems, 'imagines', four books of satires (other than the Menippean); very many of these must have been written before the 'Academica'; is it not then inconceivable that Cic. should say 'you have not only written *about* poetry but have composed *a* poem'? Further, Ritschl's comments are faulty in detail. He most surprisingly understands 'nostra physica' in § 6 (see n. there) to mean '*mea* physica', and thinks Varro there and Cicero here may be alluding to a poem 'de rerum natura' attributed by Lactant. Inst. 2, c. 13; Vell. 2, 36, 2; Quint. 1, 4, 4, to *a* Varro, who after all may not be our Varro, but Varro Atacinus. But again if V. had already published so elaborate a work on philosophy, it is inexplicable that Cic. should have spoken of him throughout this prologue as having merely dabbled in philosophy. Finally, Ritschl seems to take *omni numero* in an impossible sense, that of *omnibus numeris absolutum* (so Forc. s. v. *numerus* and others). Even if *omni numero* could bear this meaning, the qualification *fere* would make the statement a 'damning with faint praise', of which Cic. is most unlikely to have been guilty towards Varro. The true interpretation has been overlooked from its very simplicity: Cic. says to V. 'in almost every metre you have composed a poem', i.e. 'there is hardly a metre in which you have not composed'. For the meaning of *elegans* see n. on 2, 146. [*Poema* may have the sense not of 'a poem' but of 'poetry' as in Orat. 67.]

1. **incohasti**: the spelling *inchoasti* is probably a mistake. The Ciceronian MSS certainly favour either *incohare* or *incoare*, as other MSS would most likely be found to do if their evidence were brought to a focus (cf. Wagner, Orth. Verg. 440). Editors seem often to introduce *inchoare* without warrant; thus in Catullus 35, 13 the reading of all MSS, *indotatam*, speaks strongly for *incohatam* (cf. *enudauit* for *incohauit* in all MSS of Leg. 1, 26); so in 35, 18 the Oxford MS has *incohata*. The indications to be gleaned from inscriptions and the ancient grammarians point the same way. *Incohare* is, literally, 'to sketch in outline'; the old word *cous* (the *h* is an example of improper aspiration) meant 'hollow', being in fact a form of *cauus* (*couos*) with the *u* dropped between the vowels; cf. *in-formare* and Gellius 2, 3, 3. Ritschl is no doubt right in thinking that the works referred to here are the 'libri logistorici'. Neither the 'de philosophia' nor the 'de forma philosophiae' had as yet been written. Hence much of Krahner's argument about the context is baseless.

2. **impellendum**: the word recalls *προτρέπεσθαι, προτρεπτικόν*, used of works introductory to philosophy. So Fin. 1, 2 mouere hominum studia (with reference to philosophy).

caussam: = excusationem, as often; e.g. Leg. 1, 11. The phrase 'caussa pro-

Attius, multi alii, qui non uerba, sed uim Graecorum expresserunt poetarum? Quanto magis philosophi delectabunt, si, ut illi Aeschylum Sophoclen Euripiden, sic hi Platonem imitentur, Aristotelen Theophrastum? Oratores quidem laudari uideo, si qui e nostris Hyperiden sint aut Demosthenen imitati. Ego 11
autem—dicam enim, ut res est—dum me ambitio, dum honores, dum caussae, dum rei publicae non solum cura, sed quaedam etiam procuratio multis officiis implicatum et constrictum tene-

probas BM ex suspicione Halmii. 6 non poterunt: *potuerunt* codd. exc. E. et qui Graeca poterunt: om. VEU; *potuerunt* Gψr. contemnent: *contemnant* codd. exc. E Burn. (*contempnant*), ψ (*contemnat*) W (*contemnant*); corr. Victorius. 8 philosophos non legant: om. Al. 2; *non* om. E. quia: om. edd. non nullae. 9 Attius: *Accius* uel *Actius* codd. 11 Aeschylum: *aeschinem*, uel *eschinem*, uel *heschinem* codd. imitentur: *mirentur* G. 12 Aristotelen: *Aristo* Harl. 1; Burn. 13 sint: *sunt* HB, nulla necessitate.

babilis' ('specious') occurs Off. 1, 101; Verr. 5, 173; Diu. Caec. 64; Tac. A. 6, 14; Suet. Ner. 32; Plin. ep. 7, 17, 5.

4. **ne haec quidem**: there is slight zeugma, since *legent* must be supplied from *legere malent*.

nesciunt: a little irregular after *erunt*, but such irregularities are too common in Cic. to render alteration necessary.

5. **sed da mihi nunc: satisne probas**: for *da*=*dic* it would be difficult to find a parallel in prose. *Da te mihi* 'place yourself in my hands' gives a sense too strong for the context; though *se dare alicui* is common enough in Cic. See critical n.

6. **non contemnent**: 'will not neglect'; *contemnere* (ὀλιγωρεῖσθαι) is never so strong as our 'despise'.

7. **legant...non legant**: Cic. very rarely ends a sentence or clause with *non;* in passages like the present when the verb is not repeated (2 § 80), *item* is substituted in the second place; see 2, 22. [*Non* sometimes stands by itself as an exclamation, repeating a negative in the sentence preceding; see Rosc. Am. 54; Verr. 1, 20.] The arguments used here occur also at the outset of Fin. bk. 1, and are applied to oratory in De opt. gen. d. 18.

8. **an quia**: 'or is this the reason, that...'.

9. **Attius**: the form of the name is difficult to settle, as the MSS everywhere vary between Attius, Accius, Actius. Cf. Ritschl, Parerga pp. 36 sq.

non uerba sed uim: since Cic. in Fin. 1, 4 and 1, 7 seems to imply that these poets were literal translators, it has been proposed to understand non...sed to mean non solum...sed etiam, which is impossible; see n. on 2, 73 non obscuros, sed tenebricosos. Madvig on Fin. 1, 4 thinks that the allusion there is only to *some* of the plays of these poets.

10. **philosophi...ut illi...sic hi**: see n. on 2, 14.

delectabunt...imitentur: for the irregular sequence see n. on 2, 140 si sequare, ruunt.

12. **laudari uideo**: Cic. of course here delicately flatters himself.

si qui...imitati: for the collocation see n. on § 17 erant...soliti. There were two Greek schools of rhetoric at this time in full reaction against the Asiatic style of eloquence, one at Rhodes, taking Hyperides for its model, the other at Athens, professing to imitate Demosthenes. Both these schools had great influence at Rome. See Blass, die griechische Beredsamkeit, ch. 3. Among the admirers of Hyperides were found the chief opponents of Cicero's style, against whom he defends himself in the Orator and De opt. gen. dic.; cf. also Brut. 67.

15. **cura...procuratio**: cf. Qu. fr. 3, 9, 3 rei publicae statu in quo etiam si nihil p r o c u r o, tamen nihil c u r a r e uix possum. *Procuratio* is replaced by *administratio* below. The noun *procurator* only acquired its political use in the time of the Empire.

16. **officiis implicatum**: similar phrases in Off. 2, 40; N. D. 1, 51 and 52.

implicatum et constrictum: the conjunction introduces the stronger word, as often (so with καί); cf. § 17 plenam ac

bat, haec inclusa habebam et, ne obsolescerent, renouabam, cum licebat, legendo. Nunc uero et fortunae grauissimo percussus uolnere et administratione rei publicae liberatus, doloris medicinam a philosophia peto et oti oblectationem hanc honestissimam iudico. Aut enim huic aetati hoc maxime aptum est aut eis rebus, si quas dignas laude gessimus, hoc in primis consentaneum aut etiam ad nostros ciuis erudiendos nihil utilius aut, si haec
12 ita non sunt, nihil aliud uideo quod agere possimus. Brutus

2 percussus: codd. exc. AE (*perculsus*). 5 aptum: *apertum* r, ut in § 5 *aperta* pro *apta*. eis: *his* codd., ut saepissime. 10 nihil ut: *ut nihil* G contra Ciceronis usum, nisi ubi *ita* est in clausula superiore. Vid. adn. meam ad 2 § 48. [*Mihi ut* Harl. 1, Burn.] eisdem: *isdem* Harl. 1, Al. 2; *hisdem* GPV, Harl. 2, ψ; *iisdem* Burn. E. Graeca desideres: *Graecia desideret* codd. exc. G

refertam; 2, 125 completa et conferta; 2, 127 exigua et minima with n.

tenebat: singular verb with several subjects, but the repetition of dum, and the occurrence of non...sed separating off *procuratio* from the other nouns, render the usage scarcely noticeable here. So below, § 43; 2 § 1.

1. **inclusa**: 'private'; so in Tusc. 1, 1 Cic. speaks of his philosophical studies as 'retenta animo' during his public life. The subject to which *haec* refers ('philosophiae studia') is left to be inferred from the context.

obsolescerent: obsolescere does not always coincide in meaning with our phrase 'to become obsolete', i.e. to die out of the public memory. The word primarily means 'to lose brightness' (apart from the idea of memory) and is often almost an equivalent of *sordere* (cf. Phil. 2, 105 in homine turpissimo obsolefiebant insignia dignitatis); it may therefore naturally be used of that which fades away from the remembrance of individuals.

2. **percussus uolnere**: the MSS are never agreed on the words *percussus* and *perculsus*, and most passages will admit of either. The word *uolnere* here seems to point to *percussus* ('smitten') which marks the suddenness of the blow, while *perculsus* ('overthrown') would describe it as crushing in its effects; cf. Att. 3, 12, 2 percussisti me de oratione prolata, cui uolneri medere, si quid potes; Fam. 9, 25, 3 repente percussus est atrocissimis litteris; so Att. 4, 8 b, 3; 5, 2, 2; 6, 9, 1 but ib. 3, 2 animo *perculso* et abiecto. The *uolnus* (which Goerenz finds so mysterious) is of course the death of Tullia; cf. Fam. 4, 6, 2 where the event is called a *graue uolnus;* N. D. 1, 9; De cons. fragm. 13 (ed. Müll.); Introd. p. 28.

3. **doloris...peto**: cf. Orat. 148.

4. **oti oblectationem**: cf. 2, 6; Fin. 1, 3.

5. **aut...aut...aut...aut**: the same elaborate apologies for devotion to philosophy are found in the exordia of nearly all Cic.'s philosophical works and show how low these studies stood in the public estimation. See Introd. p. 23.

eis rebus...consentaneum: this is an answer to some friends who maintained the opposite opinion: see 2, §§ 5, 6; Fin. 1, 1 personae et dignitatis esse negent.

6. **si quas**: slightly more modest than *quas;* the *si* has really very little conditional force. See my n. on Arch. 1 si quid est in me ingeni; and cf. Leg. 2, 58 eos, si qui; n. on § 4 si qui...si essent.

7. **ciuis erudiendos**: see Introd. p. 22; also 2, 6 ut plurimis prosimus.

si haec ita non sunt: a common form of expression; cf. e.g. Fam. 2, 3, 2 quod ita esse confido; Tusc. 5, 18 quod ni ita esset. So hoc ita dicere, for which see my n. on Arch. 2; Lael. 16 istuc ita necesse est; Tusc. 1, 30 haec ita sentimus; Verg. Aen. 10, 623 hoc ita ponere. Cf. Madvig on Fin. 2, 17.

8. **nihil aliud**: so Diu. 2, 6 nec nihil agere poteram, nec quid potius agerem reperiebam; Tusc. 2, 1 necesse mihi esse arbitror philosophari, nam quid possum, praesertim nihil agens, agere melius?

Brutus: M. Iunius Brutus, the murderer of Caesar, to whom Cic. addresses his 'De finibus', 'De natura deorum', 'Tusculan disputations' and 'Brutus'. The friendship between Cic. and Br. was far from close (see Introd. p. 32).

quidem noster, excellens omni genere laudis, sic philosophiam Latinis litteris persequitur, nihil ut eisdem de rebus Graeca desideres, et eandem quidem sententiam sequitur quam tu; nam Aristum Athenis audiuit aliquam diu, cuius tu fratrem Antiochum. Quam ob rem da, quaeso, te huic etiam generi litterarum'.

IV. Tum ille 'Istud quidem considerabo, nec uero sine te. **13**

(*graeca*) et Harl. 2 (*desideretur*). Corr. Aldus nepos; comprobarunt HBM; *a Graecis desideres* Lamb.; *a Graecia desideres* Turn.; *Graecia desideretur* coni. Dau.; *Graeca desiderentur* coni. H. 13 te: om. E. etiam: om. G; *iam* Al. 2. 15 istud: codd. exc. Gψ (*istuc*); Al. 2 (*isthuc*). sine te: *sine re* VEUψ Harl. 3.

Br. had addressed to Cic. a book entitled 'de uirtute' (see Fin. 1, 1; Tusc. 5, 1 and 30; Seneca cons. ad Helu. 9, 4, where there is a quotation from the book); we find mentioned also a work 'de officiis', quoted by Charisius p. 83 and Priscian p. 679; also by Seneca ep. 95, 45 under the title περὶ καθήκοντος: Diomedes p. 378 also names a book 'de patientia'. These writings are more moderately praised by Quintilian 10, 1, 123 egregius uero multoque in orationibus praestantior Brutus suffecit ponderi rerum; scias eum sentire quae dicit; cf. also Tac. dial. 21. Plutarch. Brut. 2 assigns him a wide acquaintance with philosophy: τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν φιλοσόφων οὐδενὸς ἀνήκοος ἦν οὐδὲ ἀλλότριος.

9. **laudis**: here, as often, that which deserves praise, 'merit'.

10. **persequitur**: so § 7 Academiam persequamur; Fin. 1, 12; Cato m. 16 and 55; Diu. 2, 17; Fam. 10, 7, 1; Planc. 56 etc.

nihil ut: for the position of ut in the clause see n. on 2, 48 nihil ut esset.

Graeca desideres: in favour of this reading cf. Tusc. 2, 6 quod si haec studia traducta erunt ad nostros, ne bibliothecis quidem Graecis egebimus; Diu. 2, 5 Romanis hominibus gloriosum, ut Graecis de philosophia litteris non egeant; Fin. 5, 75 tu, Piso, ita nosse ista uisus es, ut si tui nobis potestas saepius fieret, non multum Graecis supplicandum putarem; N. D. 1, 16 nihil est quod Pisonem desideres; Fin. 1, 8 dum modo de eisdem rebus ne Graecos quidem legendos putent. Formerly I read *Graecia desideret*, understanding the sense to be that even the Greek critics could find no fault with Brutus' philosophy. This interpretation is not affected by the remark of Halm's reviewer in Philologus XXIV, 483 that Brutus was not anxious to satisfy Greek requirements, but rather to render it unnecessary for Romans to use Greek philosophical literature. The main objection to *Graecia desideret* is that it fits in so awkwardly with *eisdem de rebus*. Whichever reading be taken, cf. Fin. 1, 8 (of Brutus) te ne Graecis quidem cedentem; Att. 1, 20, 6; Qu. fr. 2, 15 (16) 5; Leg. 1, 5. As to the rivalry between Latin and Greek writers cf. Phaedr. 2, epil. 9 quod si labori fauerit Latium meo | plures habebit quos opponat Graeciae; Sen. Contr. 1, praef. § 6 quidquid Romana facundia habet quod insolenti Graeciae opponat.

11. **eandem...tu**: cf. Att. 13, 25, 3 (of Brutus) est is quoque ('as well as Varro') Antiochius; so too Plut. Brut. c. 2; and Cic. Brut. 149 uestra, Brute, uetus Academia; ib. 332. Cicero too knew Ar.; see Brut. l. l.; Att. 5, 10, 5; Introd. p. 8.

eandem quidem: the repetition of quidem after *Brutus quidem* seems harsh, but *quidem* is repeated after a still smaller interval in Fin. 5, 80 and Cato m. 50, which are almost the only passages where two clauses absolutely contiguous contain *quidem*.

12. **Aristum**: brother of Antiochus (see 2, 12) and after his death *heres* of the *uetus Academia* (Brut. 332). For his connexion with Brutus, see Brut. l. l.; Fin. 5, 8; Tusc. 5, 21; Plut. Brut. 2, where Ar. is called the φίλος καὶ συμβιώτης of Brutus (the MSS of Plutarch give Ἀρίστωνα; if they are right, Plut. blundered; see n. on 2, 12 Aristone).

tu: ellipse of *audiuisti* to be supplied from *audiuit:* so § 25; 2 § 82 etc.

13. **quam ob rem**: this of course refers to the whole of the preceding argument, not merely to the last sentence.

da te: n. on § 10.

Sed de te ipso quid est, inquit, quod audio?' 'Quanam', inquam, 'de re?' 'Relictam a te ueterem illam', inquit, 'tractari autem nouam'. 'Quid ergo?' inquam. 'Antiocho id magis licuerit, nostro familiari, remigrare in domum ueterem e noua quam nobis in nouam e uetere? Certe enim recentissima quaeque sunt correcta et emendata maxime. Quamquam Antiochi magister

1 inquam, de re...ergo inquam: om. Burn. de: *ex* MSS al. 2 illam: *iam* codd.; corr. Maduig.; *Academiam* Bentl. HBM; om. *iam* Al. 2. 3 quid ergo? ita scripsi: *quid? ergo* edd. 4 nostro: *uestro* Burn. 5 recentissima: *rectissima* E Harl. 2. correcta: *correpta* Al. 2, Harl. Burn. Eψ. Cf. §§ 35, 43. 7 uir: om. E. negat: *negaret* codd.; corr. Dau.; *negarat* ed. Ascensiana, nescio an recte. 8 ex ipso: *ex te ipso* A Harl. 1; *et ex te ipso* Burn. 10 ea Philonis: ita scripsi; *Philonis* codd., exc. Al. 2 et V qui *Philonem* habent (sicut r et multae ex

1. **audio**: i.e. from Atticus, who was the chief means of communication between Cicero and Varro. The reading *ex* for *de* in some MSS. is no doubt due to a gloss by some scribe who mistook *de* to mean 'from', rather than 'concerning'. For the form of the question cf. Att. 12, 52, 2 sed quid est quod audio, Spintherem fecisse diuortium? So ib. 16, 7, 8.

2. **relictam...illam**: the meaning of this passage is discussed in the Introd. p. 15.

ueterem illam: the MSS reading *u. iam* is objectionable because *iam* is never placed so far from the beginning of a sentence. Madvig's *illam* requires a very small change; the Academy would at this point be so prominently before the mind of an ancient reader that the contrast of *uetus* and *noua* would be at once understood without the introduction of *Academia*. The contrast of *uetus* and *nouos* is constantly heightened by the addition of *ille* to *uetus*: so § 18 illam ueterem; § 46; Leg. 2, 23; Fin. 5, 7; Tusc. 5, 30; below, 2, 14 ueterum illorum; above § 8 illis ueteribus; cf. § 22 illa antiqua; Fin. 5, 8 istius ueteris. On the various meanings of *uetus Academia* see Introd. p. 15.

tractari: it is important to notice that this implies a reference to some *writing* of Cicero's, which can only be the 'Academica' itself; (cf. Introd. p. 15). The illusion of the dialogue is not here carefully preserved.

3. **quid ergo?** 'what then?' Like quid igitur? quid enim? and quid uero? this phrase in Cic. is always followed by a second question. The form *quid ergo est?* is almost equally common, but is not necessarily succeeded by an interrogative sentence. The punctuation I have adopted (with Faber) seems to suit *inquam* better than *quid? ergo*, the ordinary arrangement. For the succeeding words cf. Fam. 12, 16, 3 qui magis hoc Lucilio licuerit assumere libertatis quam nobis?

4. **remigrare**: re- here does not imply that Antiochus had originally professed to follow the *uetus Academia*; it has the sense not of 'again', but of 'back', 'in retrograde direction', and *migrare* not *remigrare* must be supplied with *in nouam*.

domum: 'school'. In this sense *familia* is far commoner; cf. however Fin. 1, 65 Epicurus una in domo, et ea quidem angusta, quam magnos tenuit amicorum greges, - where the commentators (including Madvig) most strangely take *domo* in its literal meaning, but feeling the absurdity of making Cic. say that Ep. kept flocks of friends in a tiny house, they extend the sense of the word *domo* so as to include the famous gardens! The meaning of the words 'una...angusta' evidently is 'within the limits of his own school alone, and that not widely extended, how many did he bind in friendship'. Domus has the same sense in Hor. O. 1, 29, 14 Socraticam domum; cf. too Sen. ep. 29, 11; ben. 5, 15, 3; N. Q. 7, 32, 3.

5. **certe enim** etc.: a singular sentiment in the mouth of so good a conservative as Cic.

correcta et emendata: so Tac. H. 1, 37. Cf. Cic. Leg. 3, 30 emendari et corrigi; Fin. 4, 21 correctio et emendatio; also 'corrector atque emendator' in Balb. 20; cf. Phil. 2, 43; Plin. pan. 6; further Plin. pan. 53 reformet et corrigat; Cic. Att. 1, 18, 2 corrigendae et sanandae ciuitatis.

6. **quamquam**: here elliptic 'yet there

Philo, magnus uir, ut tu existimas ipse, negat in libris, quod
coram etiam ex ipso audiebamus, duas Academias esse errorem-
que eorum, qui ita putarunt, coarguit'. 'Est', inquit, 'ut dicis:
sed ignorare te non arbitror, quae contra ea Philonis Antiochus
scripserit'. 'Immo uero et ista et totam ueterem Academiam, a 14
qua absum iam diu, renouari a te, nisi molestum est, uelim, et

ueteribus editionibus); *Philonia* coni. Maduig., edidit B; *Philonis sententiam* H; uocem '*Philonis*' inclusit M. 11 scripserit: sic codd. exc. V (*scripsit*); eum secuti sunt HB, quos optime refellit M. immo: *uno* Harl. 1, Burn. ista: *istam* APψ Al. 2, Harl. Burn. a qua absum iam diu: *aqua assumptam diu* codd. (*absumptam* PV); corr. Dau.; *a qua absum tam diu* Man. 12 renouari: *reuocari* (per incuriam) Goer.; simili incuria receperunt Orelli et Klotz. nisi: *mihi si* Burn.

is no need for this argument, since Philo says the Academy is really one'.

Antiochi...Philo: see Introd. p. 58.

7. **negat**: the MSS reading *negaret* was impossible, because Cic. never uses the subjunctive with *quamquam* unless in oratio obliqua (so below, § 30 q. oreretur) or when for some other reason the verb would be in the subjunctive, even if *quamquam* were absent, while evidently here a plain fact is stated. Tacitus employs the subjunctive construction freely, but its free use is rare in the earlier prose. One passage is quoted from Varro, but as it depends on the testimony of Gellius, it cannot be considered certain. There seems one pretty sure ex. in Livy 36, 34, 6, but none in Nepos, Caesar, Sallust, or Velleius. [Madvig is wrong in keeping *afferat* in Fin. 1, 55, where the indicative is necessary. In Tusc. 5, 85 the edd. all retain *sint*, though *sunt* is absolutely demanded by Cic.'s custom.]

10. **contra ea Philonis**: there are only two ways of taking the reading of the MSS (which omit *ea*); (1) to understand an ellipse of *libros* or *sententiam* after *Philonis;* (2) to take *Philonis Antiochus* together, supposing *auditor* to be understood. As regards (2), the preceding sentence contains the information that Antiochus was pupil of Philo, and it is most unlikely Cic. would repeat it. There is no need therefore to consider here whether the omission of *auditor* is possible; cf. however n. on 2, 16 *Arcesilae Lacydes*. Turning to alternative (1) the nearest parallel to the ellipse of *libros* is Att. 12, 23, 2 ex Apollodori, where *annali* has to be supplied from the same word two or three sentences back. But the elliptical style is so characteristic of the Letters that an example from a speech or philosophical book would be here ten times as valuable; yet none such can be found. Passages like Att. 13, 32, 2 Dicaearchi περὶ ψυχῆς utrosque, or Tusc. 5, 32 legi nuper tuum quartum de finibus, differ widely from ours. Nor can the ellipse of *sententiam* be justified by § 19 corporis (sc. bona); § 22; 2, 132 sin uera sunt Zenonis, and the like, since the difficulty lies here in the omission of the noun which the preposition *contra* ought to govern. The simplest emendation is the insertion of *ea*, which would readily drop out (thus in Liu. 7, 2, 4 Madvig restores *ea* after *parua*). For the personal genitive dependent on the neuter pronoun or adjective see Madv. on Fin. 4, 32; to his examples add Liu. 24, 45, 4 contra ea consulis; N. D. 3, 25 illa Zenonis; Tusc. 4, 51 hoc Stoicorum; ib. 5, 13 Stoicorum ista; ib. 5, 40 quid eius modi istorum est; Lael. 6 multa eius; Inu. 1, 22 si quid eorum; Nep. Timoth. 1, 2 multa huius. Similar usages are common in Greek; e.g. Plato, Theaet. 149 D. *Contra ea* alone is common in Liu. as 3, 57, 1; 4, 52, 6.

11. **ista**: the particular doctrines contained in the book mentioned. Plutarch, according to the catalogue of Lamprias, wrote a treatise περὶ τοῦ μίαν εἶναι τὴν ἀπὸ Πλάτωνος Ἀκαδημίαν.

12. **renouari**: the reading *reuocari* was a mere oversight of Goer. (who read *renouari* in his note); from him it passed to Orelli and so to Klotz. In itself *reuocari* would be admissible enough; cf. De Or. 2, 199 renouabam atque reuocabam; Tusc. 1, 1.

nisi molestum est: a common polite expression; cf. Tusc. 5, 82; Phil. 2, 41; N. D. 1, 17; De Fato 4 si tibi non est molestum; Catull. 55, 1 oramus, si forte

simul, adsidamus', inquam, 'si uidetur'. 'Sane istud quidem', inquit, 'sum enim admodum infirmus. Sed uideamus idemne Attico placeat fieri a me, quod te uelle uideo'. 'Mihi uero', ille, 'quid est enim quod malim quam ex Antiocho iam pridem audita recordari et simul uidere satisne ea commode dici possint Latine?' Quae cum essent dicta, in conspectu consedimus.

1 adsidamus: *assideamus* V. istud: sic MSS exc. G (*istuc*), cuius lectionem receperunt HBM, cum nimiam et hic et alibi uni illi codici tribuerent auctoritatem. 2 idemne: *ne idem* Al. 2; om. *idem* Harl. 2. 3 mihi uero: *m. u. inquit* Lamb. 6 essent dicta: *sint dicta* codd., exc. G (*essent*) et Harl. 1 (*sunt*) et Al. 2 (*ditta sint*). Edd. fere omn. uocem 'sint' delent. consedimus: *c. omnes* codd. edd. Vid. adn. meam. 7 id quod constat inter omnis: inclusit M, caussa nulla. 8 ab

non molestumst; Att. 13, 42, 1 si graue non est (so Hor. Sat. 2, 8, 4); also 'si uidetur', 'nisi iniquom postulo' (Fin. 4, 2), 'nisi alienum putas' etc.

1. **simul**: as though to cut V. off from the chance of refusal.

adsidamus: in most of his dialogues Cic. is careful to point out that the interlocutors are seated during the discussion; so Brut. 24 sedentes agamus; Fin. 3, 9 sed residamus, inquit, si placet; De Or. 1, 29; ib. 2, 367; ib. 3, 17; Leg. 1, 14; ib. 2, 1 sermoni demus operam sedentes; Lael. 2; De Fato 4; Rep. 1, 18; Tusc. 5, 11. The error of one MS here, *adsideamus* is common; so some have *adsideat* in Fin. 2, 59 and ib. 3, 9 *resideamus*.

inquam: the late position of this word in the sentence is noticeable; so in Fin. 3, 12, and below, § 43; above, § 2 inquit; cf. Madv. on Fin. 3, 20.

sane istud: 'that at all events'. So Leg. 2, 1 sane quidem, in answer to a similar request; there *nam* follows, as *enim* here. The combination *sane quidem* only occurs in brief clauses; hence in Leg. 2, 8 sane quidem hercule, et est ista recta docendi uia, it was a mistake on the part of Davies to cast out *et* and make one clause of the two.

3. **mihi uero ille**: the insertion of *inquit* is no more required here than in the common formulae 'tum ille' 'tum ego' (§§ 4, 9; Rep. 1, 15) 'hic ego' (Brut. 25). In such expressions the *uerbum dicendi* is inserted or omitted indifferently; cf. Fin. 4, 80 nos uero, inquit ille with Rep. 3, 44 minime uero, Laelius. For *uero* introducing an emphatic answer see § 35 mihi uero; § 41 nos uero; also § 25; Lael. 16; Nägelsbach, Stil. § 198, 2.

5. **uidere...Latine**: in Fin. 5, 96 Atticus says 'quae dici Latine posse non arbitrabar, ea dicta sunt a te, nec minus plane quam dicuntur a Graecis'. He therefore was one of those persons mentioned in N. D. 1, 8 'qui illa quae a Graecis accepissent Latine dici posse diffiderent'.

6. **quae...consedimus**: the edd. who, by omitting *essent* and leaving *omnes*, give this sentence in the form of a hexameter line, are certainly wrong. Cic. never quotes without naming the author unless the passage is perfectly well known. But the supposed verse is nowhere else found in extant literature, and is so absolutely destitute of point, that it could never have caught the popular ear. Nor can the verse have been unintentionally written by Cic.; see my n. on § 30. *Omnes* was no doubt added by some scribe who had a turn for rhythm.

For consedimus at the end of the sentence, cf. Diu. 2, 8 ea cum disseruisset ...adsedimus; ib. 2, 150 quae cum essent dicta, surreximus; De Or. 3, 18 cum placuisset...considitur; Brut. 24 cum placuisset...consedimus; also below, 2, 9 cum locuti essemus ... consedimus; De Fato 4; Aug. contr. Ac. 1, 25.

in conspectu: doubt has been expressed about the sense of these words; they simply mean 'in full view' (of one another). With this phrase the defining genitive (or possessive pronoun in agreement) is often left to be inferred from the context; in instances like the present Latin feels the want of an equivalent for ἀλλήλων. So *in conspectu* is often put alone for *in c. omnium* or *publico;* e.g. Liu. 1, 31, 2; cf. Attius 32 (Ribbeck) e conspectu.

7. **uidetur**: 'it is my belief'; the word expresses no more doubt or hesitation than δοκεῖ; the translation 'scheint'

Tum Varro ita exorsus est: 'Socrates mihi uidetur, id quod constat inter omnis, primus a rebus occultis et ab ipsa natura inuolutis, in quibus omnes ante eum philosophi occupati fuerunt, auocauisse philosophiam et ad uitam communem adduxisse, ut de uirtutibus et uitiis omninoque de bonis rebus et malis quaereret, caelestia autem uel procul esse a nostra cognitione cen- **15**

ipsa: om. *ab* cod. Ursini. 9 omnes: *omnibus* codd. exc. G (*omnes*); corr. Man. ante eum: om. V. fuerunt: *fuerant* coni. Ernesti; nimiam consectatus subtilitatem. 12 uel procul: *ut p.* Harl. 1, Burn.; *et p.* V. Cf. 2 § 116. cognitione: *regione* Al. 2; *cogitatione* Harl. 1. censeret: *censet* ψ; *censere* coni. Walker.

mir' (Kirchmann) is too weak. See n. on 2, 146.

8. **constat inter omnis**: ancient testimony is pretty unanimous concerning the detestation felt by Socrates for physical inquiries in general, and in particular for the mode in which they had been handled by the φυσικοί, whom he actually called fools and madmen. See Xen. Mem. 1, 1, 11—13; Arist. Met. 1, 6, 987 b, 1 Σωκράτους περὶ τὰ ἠθικὰ πραγματευομένου, περὶ τῆς ὅλως φύσεως οὐθέν: id. De part. an. 1, 1, 642 a, 28 ἐπὶ Σωκράτους τὸ ζητεῖν τὰ περὶ φύσεως ἔληξε: Diog. 2, 21 (on the authority of Demetrius of Byzantium, a Peripatetic philosopher of unknown date); Sext. A. M. 7, 8 quotes a fragment of the Σίλλοι of Timon the Sceptic (about 320—230 B.C.) to the same effect. Yet the ancients, as well as the moderns, were occasionally puzzled by Plato's attribution of physical speculations to Socrates. In Cic. Rep. 1, 16 the explanation is given that Plato ascribed to S. doctrines which he really learned from the Pythagoreans; so too August. ciu. d. 8, 4 (from Varro). Cf. Diog. 2, 45; Sext. A. M. 7, 10; Fin. 5, 87; Tusc. 5, 10; Acad. 2, 123; Varro ap. Aug. ciu. d. 8, 3. On Socrates' own mode of looking at Nature, see Zeller II 1, pp. 143 sq. ed. 3 (E. T. 141 sq.).

rebus occultis et...inuolutis: see n. on § 19.

ab ipsa natura: Ursinus ejected *ab*; wrongly, for the preposition is necessary with the passive verb when, as here, *natura* is strongly personified. So a natura inuolui, Tim. 1; institui, Fin. 3, 11; interdici, De Or. 1, 215; tribui, Off. 1, 11; Fam. 11, 21, 3; denegari, De Or. 2, 126; informari, Off. 1, 13; generari, Off. 1, 103; fieri, Fin. 5, 41; dari, Fin. 2, 34 and 45; ib. 4, 18; Tusc. 1, 100; ib. 4, 44; Off. 1, 118; Cato m. 39; Lael. 83; Leg. 1, 33; Tim. 45; De Or. 1, 132; cf. ab arte donari, De Or. 1, 114; also Quint. 3, 2, 1; 12, 2, 3; Plin. n. h. 4, 88; 5, 88. The simple ablative *natura* is used as a pure adverb = φύσει, with adjectives (as below 2, 11 n. lenissimus) and verbs, not only such verbs as esse, below § 22; inesse, Tusc. 1, 44; fieri, Fin. 3, 62; Brut. 276 (and often); ascisci, Fin. 3, 17; fluere, N. D. 1, 39; but even with tribui, Leg. 1, 16; Fin. 4, 17; Fam. 13, 12, 2; dari, Fin. 2, 33 (natura datum = 'a natural gift'); ib. 3, 66; 5, 2; De Or. 1, 31; inseri, Pro Sulla 83; generari, Fin. 5, 43. So both *fortuna* and *a f.* are found with *dari*; cf. Fam. 2, 3, 1 with Nep. Milt. 3, 3. [In Fin. 2, 49 natura uictus (left unchanged by edd.) can scarcely be right.]

9. **inuolutis**: 'veiled'; Cic. shows his sense of the metaphor by adding *quasi* in 2, 26, where see n.; also n. on *euoluere* in 2, 114.

10. **uitam communem**: not 'social life' but 'everyday life'; so Lael. 18 and 38; De Or. 1, 248; Diu. 2, 86; cf. De Or. 1, 221 communis consuetudo uitae.

11. **omnino**: this implies that *uirtutes* and *uitia* form a part only of ἀγαθά and κακά, and not the whole, as the Stoics said. Cf. Tusc. 5, 10 quoted below.

12. **caelestia**: οὐράνια or δαιμόνια in Xen. Mem. 1, 1, 4; 1, 1, 11—12; also 4, 7, 6. Cf. Tusc. 5, 10 Socrates primus philosophiam deuocauit e caelo et in urbibus conlocauit et in domus etiam introduxit, et coegit de uita et moribus rebusque bonis et malis quaerere; similarly Brut. 31; Seneca, ep. 71, 7.

procul esse: Socrates in Xen. Mem. 1, 1, 13 ταῦτα οὐ δυνατόν ἐστιν ἀνθρώποις εὑρεῖν: ib. 4, 7, 6 οὐχ εὑρετὰ ἀνθρώποις.

seret uel, si maxime cognita essent, nihil tamen ad bene uiuendum.
16 Hic in omnibus fere sermonibus, qui ab eis qui illum audierunt perscripti uarie copioseque sunt, ita disputat ut nihil adfirmet ipse, refellat alios, nihil se scire dicat nisi id ipsum, eoque praestare ceteris, quod illi quae nesciant scire se putent, ipse se nihil scire, id unum sciat, ob eamque rem se arbitrari ab Apolline

1 uel si: *ut si* Harl. 1, Burn. ad bene uiuendum: *ualere ad b. u.* H; *ad b. u. conferre* multi; *ad b. u. facere* Klotz. 3 uarie copioseque: sic G Al. Harl. 1, Burn.; *u. et copiose* U; ceteri *que* omittunt. disputat: *disputant* V Harl. 1. 7 omnis: *hominis* coni. Lamb.; *hominum* Dau. 8 sese: *se* H, quod habent G et Al. 2, et E. nesciat: *nesciebat* V. 9 eius: *enim* G. tamen:

1. **si maxime**: 'however fully'; cf. Rep. 1, 32 aut scire istarum rerum (i. e. physical phenomena) nihil, aut etiam si maxime sciemus, nec meliores ob eam scientiam nec beatiores esse possumus. So Epictetus fr. 175 ed. Dübner.

nihil tamen ad bene uiuendum: Diog. 2, 21 τὴν φυσικὴν θεωρίαν μηδὲν εἶναι πρὸς ἡμᾶς: cf. ib. 2, 45 (of Aristo Chius). If it were necessary to add any infinitive, either *attinere* (from the similar passage in Rep. 1, 15) or *pertinere* (cf. N. D. 2, 153) would have as much probability as Halm's *ualere*, for which cf. Fin. 3, 50 quae nihil ualerent ad beate misereque uiuendum. But there are so many exx. of ellipse with *nihil ad*, no more violent than that which our MSS give us here, that I make no change. In fact there is always an ellipse of a verb with *nihil ad*. These passages fall into two classes: (1) where *ad* has the meaning 'compared with', so that *nihil ad* exactly corresponds with our colloquial phrase 'nothing to...' (2) where *ad* means 'pertaining to', 'having reference to', as here. Examples of class (1) are De Or. 2, 25 uirum non illitteratum, sed nihil ad Persium; Leg. 1, 6 ecce autem successere huic Gellii, Clodius, Asellio; nihil ad Caelium; Deiot. 24 n. a. tuum equitatum; so *non ad* in Verr. 5, 25; cf. also Ter. Eun. 361 n. a. nostram hanc; Quint. 5, 14, 22. Class (2) is larger; the commonest instances are those where *nihil ad* is followed by the name of a person or personal pronoun; so Fin. 1, 39; De Or. 2, 139; Fam. 3, 13, 2; Att. 13, 42, 1; Sall. Iug. 24, 7; Plin. ep. 7, 17, 12. Other exx. are Diu. 2, 72 and 78 n. a. auspicia; Phil. 2, 56 n. a. rem; so Att. 12, 40, 2; De Or. 2, 5 and 3, 66 and Or. 117 n. a. hoc tempus; Tusc. 1, 70 n. a. id de quo agimus; De opt. gen. d. 15 n. a. eum oratorem, quem quaerimus; Rep. 6, 21 n. a. uestrum genus; Tac. A. 6, 14 n. a. serium; Quint. 5, 13, 10. There is nothing in our passage which marks it off from those just quoted. Cf. n. on 2, 94 quid ad illum; Diu. 1, 66 hoc minus ad rem; also the similar ellipses with οὐδὲν πρός.

2. **hic ... illum**: for the variation of the pronoun when repetition is necessary, see n. on 2, 29 haec...eis.

3. **perscripti**: cf. nn. on 2, 74. The word implies an assumption that the discourses ascribed to Socrates by his pupils were really delivered by him.

uarie copioseque: the *que* (omitted by some MSS) is necessary, since Cic. only omits the copula between *two* connected words (1) when the two words may be regarded as in some sense forming a pair, as in *manibus pedibus* and the like phrases; (2) in legal or official formulae such as *sarta tecta*. In De Or. 1, 240 and Verr. 3, 11 we have *uarie et copiose*, in De Or. 1, 59 copiose uarieque; Fam. 5, 13, 3 eleganter copioseque; Quint. 12, 2, 28 grauiter copioseque; Cic. Tusc. 2, 61 grauiter et copiose. For the omission of a copula in longer enumerations see n. on 2, 92 diues pauper. [In § 9 regionum locorum where Lamb. and others have inserted *et*, its omission is excused by the rapidity of the enumeration; cf. 2, 74. But in a matter like this our MSS are not trustworthy. Koch in Phil. Anz. V, 160, reviewing Wesenberg's edition of the Epist., gives the following exx. of omission of copula in an enumeration consisting of two words only—Fam. 3, 12, 1; ib. 4, 7, 6; ib. 7, 5, 1; ib. 12, 15, 6; ib. 13, 11, 3; Qu. Fr. 1, 4, 4.]

nihil adfirmet etc.: the attitude of Socrates towards the question whether definite and positive knowledge is attainable will be fully discussed in n. on 2, 74. It

omnium sapientissimum esse dictum, quod haec esset una omnis sapientia non arbitrari sese scire quod nesciat. Quae cum diceret constanter et in ea sententia permaneret, omnis eius oratio tamen in uirtute laudanda et in hominibus ad uirtutis studium cohortandis consumebatur, ut e Socraticorum libris, maximeque Platonis, intellegi potest. Platonis autem auctoritate, qui uarius et **17**

ita cum Grutero scripsi; *tam* codd. exc. AP (*tum*); *tantum* Dau., HBM; *cum in u. l.*, *tum* Lamb. 10 hominibus: sic G et Al. 2; *hominibus omnibus* ceteri, exc. V, in quo *omnibus* bis scriptum est, et Harl. 1 *omnibus hominibus*, quod edidit Lamb. 11 ut e: *ut et* G solus; *ut ex* H.

is singular that Varro, the follower of Antiochus, should be here made to dwell on Socrates' constant profession of ignorance. Antiochus himself maintained that the profession was purely ironical; see n. on 2, 74. In some things, however, Varro was more inclined to scepticism than his master Antiochus. See his utterances concerning theology in Aug. ciu. d. 7, 17.

4. **refellat**: the adversative asyndeton, so common in Cic.; e.g. 2, 39.

id ipsum: sc. nihil se scire. The whole of this passage is evidently based upon Plato's Apology; cf. particularly pp. 21—23.

6. **ab Apolline**: the question was put to the oracle by Chaerephon 'who is the wisest of the Greeks?' The answer was 'σοφὸς Σοφοκλῆς· σοφώτερος δ' Εὐριπίδης | ἀνδρῶν δὲ πάντων Σωκράτης σοφώτατος' (Diog. 2, 37; Schol. on Arist. Nub. 114). Socrates in Plato, Ap. 21 A, merely says the god declared *μηδένα ἐμοῦ σοφώτερον εἶναι*, but in Xen. Ap. § 14 *μηδένα εἶναι ἀνθρώπων ἐμοῦ μήτε ἐλευθεριώτερον μήτε δικαιότερον μήτε σωφρονέστερον*. The alteration *iudicatum* for *dictum* is unnecessary, though it is remarkable that the former word is four times used by Cic. in speaking of this answer of the oracle; viz. in Cat. m. 78; Lael. §§ 7, 9, 13; so too in Val. M. 3, 4, ext. 1.

7. **omnium sapientissimum**: so Tac. An. 6, 6 calls Socrates 'praestantissimus sapientiae'.

quod esset: after *disputat* above, *sit* might have been expected; the change of tense however is common after the historic present; see e.g. Brut. 46 ait...quod esset.

haec una: for *hoc unum*, by attraction to *sapientia*. Cf. n. on 2, 30.

8. **sese**: here quite indefinite, like our 'one'; cf. n. on § 19 adeptum esse.

9. **omnis oratio...consumebatur**: it is quite untrue to say that Socrates' sole aim in his discourses was the promotion of morality. His interest was in speculation, and he sometimes showed a startling disregard for the moral aspect of inquiry; as in his conversation with Theodota narrated in Xen. Mem. 3, 11, 1. For the expressions here cf. De Fato 2 omnis fere nostra in eis deliberationibus consumebatur oratio.

tamen: this reading seems right; *in spite* of Socrates' assertion that he had no knowledge, *yet* he exhorted men to pursue virtue; his uncertainty did not extend to morals. Goer., reading *tum*, ridicules those who do not know that *tum...et* is equivalent to *et...et*, and most absurdly appeals to such passages as 2, 43 (below). With equal infelicity, Hand Turs. 2, 537 supposes *tum...et* to be the same as *tum...tum*, while Stuerenburg on Arch. 31 construes *cum* (before *diceret*) followed by *tum* as 'so oft als...dann'; all these interpretations may be left to the reader.

11. **Platonis**: cf. Quint. 5, 7, 28 ex dialogis Socraticorum maximeque Platonis.

12. **uarius et multiplex**: these words often come together, as in Flac. 6; Cael. 14; Or. 12 (where *uarii sermones* are distinguished from *multiplices sermones*); Plin. ep. 1, 16, 1 ingenium uarium, flexibile, multiplex; Suet. Gram. 10 multiplex uariaque doctrina; Curt. 7, 4, 26 Bactrianae terrae uaria et multiplex natura; Quint. 2, 4, 20; ib. 4, pr. 6; 11, 1, 2; 11, 3, 163. Both *uarius* and *multiplex* (like ποικίλος or εὐτράπελος and πολύπλοκος) are used in bad as well as in good senses, in application to persons or character; cf. Nep. Paus. 1, 1 uarius in omni genere uitae; also contrast Leg. 1, 22 homo animal multiplex and Att. 6, 2, 2 multiplex pueri ingenium and Vell. 2, 105 uir multiplex uirtutibus, with Lael. 65 ingenium multiplex et tortuosum. In Tusc. 5, 11

multiplex et copiosus fuit, una et consentiens duobus uocabulis philosophiae forma instituta est, Academicorum et Peripateticorum, qui rebus congruentes nominibus differebant; nam cum Speusippum, sororis filium, Plato philosophiae quasi heredem reliquisset, duos autem praestantissimo studio atque doctrina, Xenocraten Calchedonium et Aristotelen Stagiriten, qui erant cum Aristotele Peripatetici dicti sunt, quia disputabant inambu-

1 una: om. Harl. 1, Burn. 2 instituta: *constituta* G. 3 differebant: *diffiniebant* E; cf. §§ 5, 32. 5 reliquisset: *instituisset uel reliquisset* E. duos: *duo* G (solus), eoque auctore HBM. praestantissimo: *praestantissimos* E et editores plerique (etiam HBM). 6 Calchedonium: sic BM et Klotz; *calcedonium* Al. Oxx. Burn. Harl. 2, 3: *calcedonicum* P Harl. 1; de GV siletur: *Chalcedonium* edd. multi. Stagiriten: *Stageritem* AψE Harl. 2, 3; *Strageritem* Al. 2; *Stageridem* Harl. 1, Burn.; *Stagiritam* Lamb. 7 inambulantes: omn.

Cic. speaks of Socrates' multiplex ratio dicendi rerumque uarietas.

1. **una et consentiens forma**: we here have one of the cardinal doctrines of Antiochus, often adopted by Cic. in his own person, as in Fin. 4, 5; Leg. 1, 38 and 55; De Or. 3, 67; cf. also below, 2, 136 Xenocrates...Aristoteles, hos enim quasi eosdem esse uoltis, and Fin. 5, 14 and 21. Five ancient philosophers are usually included in this supposed harmonious Academico-Peripatetic school, Aristotle, Theophrastus, Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo (cf. Fin. 4, 2). In the time of Polemo the harmony was broken by his pupils Arcesilas and Zeno; see § 34. This theory of Antiochus was based on the assumption that ethics are all-important, and that differences in dialectics and physics are not worth taking into account; this is clear from Off. 3, 20; Fin. 5, 21; Leg. 1, 55; Varro ap Aug. ciu. d. 19, 1; see also below, § 18. For the contradictions between § 17 and §§ 33, 34, see nn. on the latter passage.

uocabulis...nominibus: passages like this, and N.D. 1, §§ 83, 84 (where *uocabula* and *nomina* are interchanged) and ib. 1, 40 uocabula deorum show the futility of the distinction drawn by many grammarians, as by Varro, L. L. 8, 80 nominibus quae differunt a uocabulis, ideo quod sunt finita ac significant res proprias, ut Paris, Helena, cum uocabula sint infinita ac res communis designent, ut uir, mulier; cf. also 8, 45 where he distinguishes between *prouocabula* and *pronomina*; also ib. 53; Quint. 1, 4, 20. Cicero does not, however, go so far as Tacitus, who has such things as 'artifex talium uocabulo Locusta' (An. 12, 66).

4. **Speusippum**: see Zeller II 1 pp. 848 sq. ed. 3 (E. T. Plato and the Older Academy pp. 566 sq.).

quasi heredem: no doubt a translation of διάδοχον: cf. Brut. 332 uetus Academia atque eius heres Aristus. *Quasi* commonly marks a translation from the Greek as e.g. below §§ 20, 26, 29, 32 (bis), 40, 42. Similarly *quaedam* in § 20, and *quasi quidam* in § 21, where see n. Quasi also frequently modifies metaphors, as in 2, 26. The correction of Ciaconus *ex asse* for *quasi* with *secundos* for *duos* deserves mention for its quaintness.

5. **duos**: for the two forms of the acc. masc. *duos* and *duo* see Neue, Form. II^2 146. Most probably Cic. wrote *duos* not *duo*, though the latter form is found in our MSS, sometimes in those of the superior class, much oftener in those of the inferior class. The poets scarcely help us to determine the form usual in Cic.'s time. In Verg. the acc. masc. occurs twice, viz. Ecl. 5, 68 duos crateras (some edd. *duo*); Aen. 11, 285 duŏ (as most edd. read; some however *duos* scanned as one syllable). Hor. has only one ex., Sat. 1, 7, 15 duŏ. *Duos* is necessary in Ovid Met. 7, 800; 8, 709. Inscriptions near the time of Cic. always have *duos*; in the older inscr. the word only occurs in the combination *duouiros*. There can be hardly any doubt that after the time of Augustus *duos* was alone in ordinary use. [Halm's ed. of Velleius gives one ex. of *duo*, six of *duos*; Kiessling's ed. of Sen. Rh. has thirty-one times *duos*, never *duo*; Halm's of Valerius Maximus gives *duo* once against *duos* thirteen times.] The case with *ambo*, *ambos* is nearly the same.

praestantissimo: in support of the

lantes in Lycio, illi autem, qui Platonis instituto in Academia, quod est alterum gymnasium, coetus erant et sermones habère soliti, e loci uocabulo nomen habuerunt. Sed utrique Platonis ubertate completi certam quandam disciplinae formulam composuerunt et eam quidem plenam ac refertam, illam autem Socraticam dubitationem de omnibus rebus et nulla adfirmatione adhibita consuetudinem disserendi reliquerunt. Ita facta est, quod minime

codd. (etiam E), U excepto (*ambulantes*). 8 qui: *qui a* G; fortasse legendum est *quia*. 9 e loci: *ei loci* Harl. 1. 11 completi: *complecti* G (pr. man.) Harl. 1, Burn. formulam: *formam* Burn., fortasse recte; nam hoc *formulae* uerbum magis aptum est ad unum quoddam praeceptum (cf. Off. 3, §§ 19, 20) quam ad totam philosophiam. 12 refertam: *referctam* E. 13 dubitationem: *dubitantem* GH; dubitanter BM. 14 est quod: sic G; *est disserendi quod* cett., exc. Al. 2, qui omittit *est*.

reading cf. Brut. 125 uir praestantissimo ingenio et flagranti studio.

6. **Xenocraten**: Zeller II 1, pp. 862 sq. (E. T. pp. 581 sq.). The acc. of Greek names in *-ης* (with a few special exceptions, for which see n. on *Stagiriten* below) was probably written in *-en* not *-em*. See Neue, Form. 1^2 56.

Calchedonium: this, not *Chalcedonium*, is the right spelling. Prof. Gardner informs me that on their coins down to the latest times the people are invariably called Καλχαδόνιοι. Χαλχηδόνιοι is occasionally found in inscriptions (see Roscher in Curtius' Studien 1 b, 98) but Χαλκηδὼν only appears on one very late monument. In a Latin inscr. of L. Lucullus (Wilmanns, Ex. Inscr. no. 633) we find *Calchadona*, a form often given too by MSS and wrongly altered by edd., as by Dietsch in Sall. hist. 4, 61, 13; cf. Plin. n. h. 5, 150; 6, 3; 6, 217. The spelling Chalcedon was no doubt fostered by the resemblance to Chalcis.

Stagiriten: Lamb. and others *Stagiritam;* Cic. however does not thus Latinise Greek words in *-ης*, except in a few instances, such as *Persa*, *pirata*, which had come down from antiquity. See Madvig on Fin. 2, 94, and cf. Quint. 1, 5, 61. Although the Latins usually wrote the acc. of Greek names in *-ης* of the first declension with the termination *-en* not *-em*, yet an exception seems to have been sometimes made in favour of national names in *-της*, from their similarity to Latin accusatives like *Samnitem* etc.

qui erant cum Aristotele: evidently a translation of οἱ ἀμφὶ Ἀριστοτέλη.

8. **Lycio**: probably so spelt by Cic., not in the form *Lyceo*.

9. **coetus**: possibly a reference to the common meal which Plato is said to have instituted and enjoined on his disciples.

erant...soliti: Cic. often takes pains to separate by a considerable interval words which by grammatical construction are closely connected. So in § 7 erit...explicanda; § 10 si qui...imitati; 2, 4 sunt ...celebrata; 2, 86 esset...fabricata; Att. 5, 1, 3 quae fueramus ego et tu inter nos de sorore in Tusculano locuti; De Or. 2, 1; Tusc. 2, 9; Fam. 6, 1, 6; Sest. 3; Phil. 2, 51.

e loci uocabulo: cf. De Or. 3, 109 illi qui ex particula parua urbis et loci nomen habent et Peripatetici philosophi aut Academici nominantur.

10. **ubertate**: cf. Quintilian's 'illa Liuii lactea ubertas'. For the context cf. Off. 1, 2 nostra (i. e. Academica) non multum a Peripateticis dissidentia, quoniam utrique Socratici et Platonici uolumus esse; also Off. 2, 8, and Rep. 2, 52 where the 'sermo' contained in Plato's Republic is called 'Peripateticus.'

12. **plenam ac refertam**: so Sest. 23 plenam et confertam; see also n. on § 11 implicatum et constrictum.

13. **dubitationem**: Hm. *dubitantem*, but *dubitans consuetudo* may safely be pronounced an impossible phrase. The MSS variations here are of a sort commonly found; thus in Fin. 3, 1 they give *titillantem* for *titillationem*, where Madvig (probably wrongly) refuses to admit either word.

14. **facta est**: = perfecta est; cf. n. on *factus* in 2, 2.

Socrates probabat, ars quaedam philosophiae et rerum ordo et
18 descriptio disciplinae. Quae quidem erat primo duobus, ut dixi, nominibus una: nihil enim inter Peripateticos et illam ueterem Academiam differebat. Abundantia quadam ingeni praestabat, ut mihi quidem uidetur, Aristoteles, sed idem fons erat utrisque et eadem rerum expetendarum fugiendarumque partitio'.

5 quidem uidetur: *uidetur quidem* codd.; corr. Lamb.; om. *quidem* E. 6 utrisque: *utriusque* E. eadem: *earum* GVEUψ. fugiendarumque: om. PV. 7 ago: *ego* E. 8 sus: *sum* G¹E Harl. ut aiunt...Mineruam: om. A. 9 tu: *tum* V. 11 dicuntur: *leguntur et dicuntur* E. et

1. **ars**: it is impossible to keep the word *disserendi* which MSS insert before *ars*. Varro could never have meant to say that the Old Academy made philosophy entirely dialectical.

2. **descriptio**: the same in sense as *forma*, *formula* above; cf. § 23 forma atque descriptio. There is no need to read (with Müller) *discriptio*. This word, which is well attested by inscriptions and MSS, but even now has scarcely gained a footing in the lexica, is appropriate to such passages as § 9 above, where work is mentioned which requires the making of sections and subdivisions. Since Bücheler set the fashion, many editors have run to excess in changing *descriptio* into *discriptio*. For an example of this see Müller's critical n. on § 9. Cf. § 23 ex hac descriptione. For the context cf. 2, 15.

4. **abundantia ingeni**: cf. Pis. 62 tu ...abundantior consilio ingenio sapientia quam Crassus; Val. Max. 8, 7, ext. 2 Platon...ingenii diuina instructus abundantia; Iuv. 10, 128 exundans ingenii fons. For a similar comparison between Aristotle and the other pupils of Plato see De Or. 3, 67.

5. **mihi quidem uidetur**: the MSS give *uidetur quidem*, an unusual order of the words, for which see n. on § 40 hoc uerbum quidem.

idem fons: i.e. Socrates; cf. De Or. 1, 42 philosophorum greges ab illo fonte et capite Socrate; Vell. 1, 16, 4 philosophorum ingenia Socratico ore defluentia; Quint. 1, 10, 13 philosophis, quorum fons ipse Socrates; also for the expression Colum. 1, 1, 7 fontibus orti sapientiae; Fronto IV 3 (ed. Naber) M. Tullius caput atque fons Romanae facundiae; Plin. n. h. 17, 37 fons ingeniorum Homerus.

6. **rerum expetendarum fugiendarumque**: Cicero's constant translation of αἱρετῶν καὶ φευκτῶν. So above, 1, 6; cf. too Hor. sat. 1, 2, 75 fugienda petenda. The popular use of *expetendus* is early and common; e.g. in Ter. Phorm. 164, 202, 1024. The term αἱρετὸν was used by all the later Greek schools of that which is included in the τέλος or 'summum bonum'. For its earlier history see Grant on Arist. Eth. Nic. 10, 2, 1.

partitio: this word supports the reading *discriptio* (not *descriptio*) in Tusc. 5, 68 d. expetendarum fugiendarumque rerum. In maintaining the identity of the Platonic and Aristotelian Ethics, Antiochus left out of account the ideal theory with its Idea of the Good, which had in his time become obsolete practically, so that the similarity between the two systems seemed greater than it was.

7. **sed quid ago?** A not uncommon 'formula ipsum se corrigentis'; cf. Fam. 9, 10, 3.

qui...doceo: in many passages of Cic. the relative clause is treated as attributive merely, where it might fairly be expected to be considered as causal. So in 2, 22 quid quisquam meminit quod non *comprehendit* (where see my n.); 2, 135 Zenoni necessarium, cui praeter honestum nihil *est* in bonis. A large number of examples from Cic. are collected in Lieven 'die consecutio temporum des Cicero' (Riga 1872) p. 9; cf. also Madv. on Fin. 1, 43.

8. **sus Mineruam**: sc. docet. The proverb (given in De Or. 2, 233; Fam. 9, 18, 3) is of Greek origin; cf. Theocr. 5, 23 ὗς ποτ' Ἀθηναίαν ἔριν ἤρισεν; Plut. Praec. Pol. 7 (qu. by Binder). Brevity of expression is common in the quotation of proverbs: e.g. Att. 8, 5, 1 suo capiti, ut aiunt; cf. Draeger I² p. 198. *Vt aiunt* represents τὸ λεγόμενον: so commonly *ut dicitur*, and less often *quod aiunt* (Fam. 7, 25, 2; Ter. Ph. 506, 768); so *quod dicitur* (Lael. 67). Krahner de Varrone p. 3, quotes Festus p. 310, ed. Müller, to shew that the proverb 'sus Mineruam' was a favourite one with Varro.

V. 'Sed quid ago?' inquit, 'aut sumne sanus, qui haec uos doceo? Nam etsi non sus Mineruam, ut aiunt, tamen inepte quisquis Mineruam docet. Tum Atticus 'tu uero' inquit 'perge, Varro, ualde enim amo nostra atque nostros, meque ista delectant, cum Latine dicuntur et isto modo'. 'Quid me', inquam, 'putas, qui philosophiam iam professus sim populo nostro exhibiturum?' 'Pergamus igitur', inquit, 'quoniam placet'. Fuit ergo **19**

isto: *isto* E. 12 iam professus: *professus iam* G; *iam professum* V. sim: *sum* Gr. exhibiturum: *me exhibiturum* GHBM; *sim me* coni. Lamb. melius, si necesse fuisset conicere. 13 inquit: om. G.

inepte: sc. facit. For the ellipse see n. on 2, 94 superbe.

9. **Atticus ... inquit**: when *inquit* is preceded by its subject some words are regularly interposed. See Madvig on Fin. 2, 11, who says that the exceptions in Cic. are confined to five passages of the De Or. (the MSS of which are of late date) and Diu. 1, 8; he says too that there is only one instance in Livy.

10. **nostra**: = Latina. Atticus was one of those who objected in general to the attempt to represent Greek philosophy in Latin; see n. on § 14 uidere...Latine.

ista: = Antiochia.

11. **me putas**: sc. sentire or dicturum esse.

12. **professus sim**: cf. ἐπαγγέλλεσθαι.

exhibiturum: like the Greek ἐπιδείκνυσθαι. The ellipse of the subject (*me*) with the infinitive deserves notice. Almost every scholar allows that the pronominal subject is sometimes omitted by Cic., yet in dealing with particular passages, where the MSS do omit it, editors rarely withstand the temptation of inserting the pronoun. Madvig, in his Em. in Cic. libros philosophicos p. 111, defended the text of our passage, but in a note on Fin. 5, 31, while allowing such examples as that above, in § 7 negat ne suspicari quidem, and below, 2, 64 ut ei respondere posse diffiderem, he expresses a doubt about passages like the present, where the infinitive is of the composite class. Madvig however does not deny absolutely the soundness of such passages in Cic., because, as he says, the ellipse is certainly found in Caesar and Terence. It is also pretty common in Plautus and Livy (e.g. 3, 13, 3; 4, 2, 9; 4, 58, 7; 6, 17, 6; in 4, 2, 14 and 5, 55, 3 *eos* is omitted) and becomes usual in later Latin. But the existing MSS of Cic. give many instances which Madvig has not discussed; e.g. Orat. 38 Isocrates ea studiose consectatum fatetur (where recent edd. insert *se* before *ea*); Att. 14, 17, 3 Aquiliam nouercam non esse laturum, which Wesenberg retains, while Bait. inserts *se*: Sest. 15. [The last two examples are noteworthy as containing *esse*, which in such sentences is usually left out; see Madv. l. l.] The inconstancy of edd. in dealing with this matter is illustrated by Madvig's insertion of *se* in Fin. 2, 50, which if left unchanged would belong to a class of examples which Madvig himself allows, in his n. on Fin. 5, 31, to be numerous. Cf. my n. on 2, 128 considerare.

13. **fuit ergo...triplex**: no attentive reader of Plato can believe that he had present to his mind the division of philosophy into three parts, which is attributed to him here and very generally by ancient writers; cf. the note in Zeller, II, 1, p. 488 ed. 3 (E. T. p. 165), and particularly Diog. Laert. 3, 56. No doubt the assertion we have here came directly from Antiochus, who is also copied by Varro ap. Aug. ciu. d. 8, 4. In Fin. 5, 8 however, which is equally from Antiochus, the triple division seems carried no farther back than Xenocrates. Sextus A. M. 7, 16 attributes this classification to the Stoics and post-Aristotelian Peripatetics, 'ὧν δυνάμει μὲν Πλάτων ἐστὶν ἀρχηγός'. The division is not explicitly used by Aristotle, but there is a casual mention of something like it in Top. 1, 14 (qu. by Zeller), where it is said that some προτάσεις are φυσικαί, some ἠθικαί, some λογικαί. [Plato never uses the words φυσικὸς and ἠθικὸς at all, nor λογικὸς in this sense.] The triple division was undoubtedly first forced into prominence by the Stoics, who were enabled by it more sharply and decisively to subordinate to Ethics all else in philosophy. Cf. Sext. P. H. 2, 13 where it is attributed to οἱ Στωικοὶ καὶ ἄλλοι τινές. See also below, 2, 114 and 116; Quint.

iam accepta a Platone philosophandi ratio triplex: una de uita et moribus, altera de natura et rebus occultis, tertia de disserendo et quid uerum sit, quid falsum, quid rectum in oratione prauomue, quid consentiens, quid repugnans iudicando. Ac primam partem illam bene uiuendi a natura repetebant eique parendum esse dice-

1 philosophandi: *fandi* E Harl. 1 Burn. (ex *phandi* natum, ut est in Harl. 2). 3 uerum sit quid: ita scripsi; *uerum et quid* MSS omn., exc. G. (om. *et* ut corr. primus Man.). 4 consentiens: *consequens* Krische; *consentiens sit* Goer. repugnans: *repugnet* codd., corr. Man.; *repugnans esset* M. iudicando: *in dicendo*

12, 2, 10; Sen. ep. 88, 24 and 89, 9; Aug. ciu. d. 4, 2 and 11, 25.

1. **triplex**: but, below, § 21 *tripartita* ratio; the two words are often interchanged. In the succeeding words *una altera tertia* the phrase 'ratio triplex' is treated as plural = 'tres rationes.' Exactly so in Tusc. 5, 68 triplex animi fetus is followed by *unus alter tertius;* and in Lucr. 5, 93 triplex natura = tres naturae; see Munro there; Quint. 9, 2, 66. It is quite possible, however, that in our passage *pars* has fallen out after *una;* cf. Fin. 5, 9 est eius disciplinae forma triplex; una *pars* est etc.

de uita et moribus: = περὶ τῶν ἠθικῶν, the word ἠθικῶν being translated doubly, after a favourite fashion of Cic.; so too in Tusc. 5, 10; Rep. 1, 16; Brut. 31. But in Fin. 5, 9 we have 'uiuendi' merely, and ib. 5, 12 'de moribus' merely; so also below, § 39. For this latter translation cf. De Fato 1 eam partem philosophiae 'de moribus' appellare solemus; sed decet augentem linguam Latinam nominare 'moralem.' But Cic. did not again use the new word, which only reappears in Seneca (filius) and Quintilian, after whose time it becomes common. In ordinary Latin the combination of uita with mores in describing character is usual; cf. Mur. 74; Liu. praef. § 9; 40, 16, 2; Ov. Her. 17, 172 (qu. by White and Riddle s. v. *uita*). With the whole sentence cf. Tusc. 5, 68 triplex animi fetus: unus in cognitione rerum positus et in explicatione naturae, alter in discriptione expetendarum fugiendarumue rerum et in ratione uiuendi, tertius in iudicando quid cuique rei sit consequens, quid repugnans; also Aug. ciu. d. 2, 7 conati sunt ratiocinando uestigare quid in rerum natura latitaret, quid in moribus appetendum esset atque fugiendum, quid in ipsis ratiocinandi regulis certa conexione traheretur [so MSS; but the right reading is *traderetur*, for which cf. below, 2, 96 traditis] aut quid non esset consequens uel etiam repugnaret.

2. **de natura et rebus occultis**: = περὶ τῶν φυσικῶν: physical phenomena are frequently described by phrases like these; so above, § 15; below, 2, 30; Fin. 1, 64; ib. 3, 37 illa quae occulta nobis sunt (where Madvig misses the sense); ib. 4, 18; ib. 5, 10 rerum occultissimarum; ib. 5, 51 eorum quae naturae obscuritate occultantur; N. D. 1, 49; Timaeus c. 1; Brut. 44 reconditis abstrusisque rebus.

disserendo: for the various translations of λογική see n. on § 32. The words 'quid uerum sit quid falsum' apply to διαλεκτική or logic proper, 'quid rectum in oratione prauumue' to ῥητορική, 'quid consentiens, quid repugnans' to διαλεκτική again, so that the arrangement is awkward.

4. **consentiens**: Krische qu. in favour of consequens Tusc. 5, 68; Diu. 2, 150; Orator 115, to which may be added Tusc. 5, 21; Leg. 1, 45; Brut. 152; Off. 2, 18; Fin. 3, 26; Or. 16; Part. or. 7. Although I do not find that Cic. elsewhere uses *consentiens* in exactly this sense, yet I retain it, as the sense here is a very slight extension of the ordinary use of the word, and *consentaneus* is often employed in the same way, as below, 2, 22. In Greek ἀκολουθία and μάχη are thus contrasted (Epict. Ench. 52).

5. **bene uiuendi**: the gen. is definitive; cf. n. on § 6 caussas rerum efficientium. [It is possible that *partem* may be a mistake in our MSS for *artem;* there is the same confusion in Fin. 5, 16 and below §§ 23, 31.] The ethics of Antiochus, it is needless to say, are strongly tinged with Stoicism. His conception of nature as the foundation of morality is not to be traced in the systems of those old Academic philosophers whom he professed to follow, with the one exception (and that not altogether certain) of Polemo, for whom see n. on 2, 131. There was however undoubtedly a certain approximation to some of the Stoic principles not only in Polemo, but even in Theophrastus. For the latter see Ber-

bant, neque ulla alia in re nisi in natura quaerendum esse illud summum bonum quo omnia referrentur, constituebantque extremum esse rerum expetendarum et finem bonorum adeptum esse omnia e natura et animo et corpore et uita. Corporis

Harl. 2. primam: *primum* GEHBM; cf. tamen § 24 de natura, id enim sequebatur; § 30 tertia pars. 5 repetebant: *petebant* MSS et edd. Vid. adn. 9 omnia e natura: om. G; *omnia a natura* A (cui obsecuti sunt BM) Harl. 2, r. In Al. 2 *e* dubitanter scriptum est a librario.

nays, Theophrastos über Frömmigkeit, p. 101. The view of Antiochus is adopted by Cic. to the fullest extent, when speaking in his own person, in Fin. 2, 34. The ethical system of Antiochus is represented in Fin. bk. 5 and Aug. ciu. d. bk. 19 (cc. 1—3) from Varro. There can be no doubt that Plutarch also borrowed the ethical views of Antiochus. Cf. the examination of Plutarch's Ethics in Volkmann's *Plutarch*.

repetebant: this correction seems necessary to express Cic.'s evident meaning, that the ancients made nature the *starting-point*, or *foundation* of their ethical system. Cf. Leg. 1, 20 repetam stirpem iuris a natura; also ib. 1, 17. The sense given by *petebant* 'they begged (or sought) of nature' (cf. 1, 5 a Graecis petere; Off. 1, 133 a natura petere) seems inappropriate here.

6. **nisi in natura**: the preposition is repeated as here in Fin. 4, 22 in ullo nisi in sapiente (where however Madv. says the preposition was not in the archetypal MS); also ib. 2, 111; ib. 4, 47; but the second preposition is sometimes omitted, as in N. D. 1, 87; cf. too n. on alia rationem in § 39, below.

7. **summum bonum** ... **extremum** ... **finem**: for the variation in the titles cf. Fin. 3, 26 extremum ... ultimum ... summum...finem, all translating τέλος. Cf. n. on 2, 24 comprehensi...constituti.

referrentur: the tense, according to Latin idiom, is accommodated to that of *dicebant*, though the time of the action expressed by the second verb is not actually dependent on the time of the action expressed by the first. Cf. n. on 2, 65 quae dicerem. *Referre* is ἀναφέρειν in the Greek ethics; cf. e.g. Arist. Nic. Eth. 3, 5, 18 τὸ τέλος φύσει...κεῖται, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ πρὸς τοῦτ' ἀναφέροντες πράττουσι: n. on 2, 24 extremum...referentur.

8. **adeptum**: in agreement with an indefinite subject (τινὰ) to the infinitive, which is here, as often, omitted. So in § 16 sese is referred to a subject not expressed. Antiochus sometimes stated his *finis* rather differently; cf. n. on 2, 131.

9. **e natura**: = secundum naturam, κατὰ φύσιν, a Stoic expression of very frequent occurrence. For the use of *e* cf. the phrase *e re publica;* also Fin. 2, 34 and 4, 26 e uirtute uiuere; ib. 4, 35 ex uirtute agere.

animo...**corpore**...**uita**: ablatives of respect; 'as regards mind, etc.' We have here the τριλογία or τριὰς or τριγένεια τῶν ἀγαθῶν which is usually referred to the later Peripatetic system, as in Fin. 3, 43, with which cf. ib. 2, 68; also below, § 22; Sext. P. H. 3, 180 (φιλοσόφων τινὲς ὡς οἱ Περιπατητικοί). But this division of ἀγαθὰ existed in a loose shape long before it was crystallised in the formula which we have here. Cf. e. g. Plato, Legg. III 697 B πρῶτα τὰ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀγαθά, δεύτερα τὰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τρίτα τὰ περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ χρήματα: so too in Phaedrus 239 CDE advantages affecting the διάνοια, the σῶμα and κτῆσις are considered. The classification was attributed to Plato by Aristotle (see Diog. 3, 80) and is more or less presumed, also, throughout the Aristotelian Ethics; cf. esp. Eth. Nic. 1, 8, 2 where this classification is called a παλαιὰ δόξα καὶ ὁμολογουμένη ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων: also Stob. Eth. 84, 86. The last two divisions are often merged in one, as in Plat. Legg. 631 BC; Varro ap. Aug. ciu. d. 19, 3 (from Antiochus); cf. also Aug. ib. 8, 8; Fin. 5, 34—36; Leg. 1, 55.

uita: the ἐκτὸς ἀγαθὰ of Aristotle, called often 'externa bona' as in Tusc. 5, 76; Part. or. 74; De Or. 3, 115; Off. 3, 28 (incommoda externa); also 'res extrariae' in Inu. 2, 177 (in Weidner's text). For the use of *uita* to denote the ἐκτὸς ἀγαθὰ cf. § 21 uitae adiuncta; the usage is ultimately traceable to a misunderstanding of βίος τέλειος in Ar. Eth. Nic. 1, 7, 16, where, as the context shows, duration in time is alone indicated.

corporis: sc. bona; cf. § 22.

autem alia ponebant esse in toto, alia in partibus: ualetudinem uiris pulchritudinem in toto, in partibus autem sensus integros et praestantiam aliquam partium singularum, ut in pedibus celeritatem, uim in manibus, claritatem in uoce, in lingua etiam ex-
20 planatam uocum impressionem: animi autem, quae essent ad comprehendendam ingeniis uirtutem idonea, eaque ab eis in naturam et mores diuidebantur. Naturae celeritatem ad discen-

5 impressionem: *expressionem* Al. 2, Harl. 2 Uψ (sed ψ *impressionem* habet supra lineam). 6 ingeniis: om. HBM, susp. Manutii comprobantes; *ingenii* Lamb. cum r. eaque ab eis: om. E. eis: *his* codd. 7 et mores: *et in mores* coni. H, edid. B omnino nulla necessitate. 8 esset: *est* r; *esse* coni. Orelli, fauente

1. **ponebant esse**: n. on § 36.

in toto...in partibus: the same distinction in Fin. 5, 35; Stob. Eth. 256, 258 (where the text is rather disarranged), a passage professing to give the opinions of the Peripatetics.

ualetudinem uiris pulchritudinem: mentioned in the same connexion in Fin. 5, 18; Tusc. 4, 30 (where 'firmitas' is added); ib. 5, 30 (in 5, 22 uiris ualetudinem only); cf. also ib. 5, 45 ualetudine uiribus forma; Fin. 2, 114; ib. 3, 51; Sen. ep. 95, 58; Stob. 258 *ὑγίεια ἰσχὺς κάλλος*: further Plato, Phaed. 65 D *μεγέθους ὑγιείας ἰσχύος*: Phileb. 26 B *μεθ' ὑγιείας κάλλος καὶ ἰσχύν*; also Aristot. Top. III, 116 b, 18. Often *εὐεξία* is added to the *ἀγαθά* which concern the whole body; cf. Sext. A. M. 11, 142 *κάλλος ἰσχὺς εὐεξία*: also Arist. de part. an. 12, 673 b, 25 *εὐκρασία τοῦ σώματος*.

2. **sensus integros**: *εὐαισθησίαν* in Stob. l. l. and Sext. A. M. 11, 45; cf. Fin. 5, 18 sensus integros; Tusc. 5, 45 acerrimis integerrimisque sensibus; also in Fin. 3, 51 sensuum amissionem; ib. 5, 36 in sensibus est sua cuiusque uirtus; Sen. ep. 95, 58 sagacitas sensuum; in Epict. Diss. 1, 22, 12 *ἀρτιότης*.

3. **in pedibus celeritatem**: *ποδώκειαν* in Stob. l. l.; cf. Fin. 2, 114 uelocitas; Aug. ciu. d. 19, 3 bene currere; Plato, Leg. 631 C *ἰσχὺς εἴς τε δρόμον καὶ εἰς τὰς ἄλλας πάσας κινήσεις τῷ σώματι*.

4. **uim**: note the distinction drawn here between *uiris* and *uim*.

5. **impressionem**: the word implies the clear articulation of each particular sound (so Aristotle uses *διαρθροῦν* of utterance—see Bonitz, Ind. Ar. s. v.). Cf. De Or. 3, 185 si numerosum est in omnibus sonis atque uocibus quod habet quasdam *impressiones;* a passage which will show that it is unnecessary to read *expressionem* here. On the other hand Klotz's remark 'imprimit lingua uoces, non exprimit' is unfounded; cf. De Or. 3, 41; Off. 1, 133. In Off. 1, 133 it is said that the 'imitatio *presse* loquentium' will render the voice 'clara'; cf. also Plin. pan. 64 expressit explanauitque uerba; Cic. N. D. 2, 149 sonos uocis distinctos ac pressos; Quint. 1, 5, 33. [Cf. also n. on 2, 18 *im*pressum *ef*fictumque.]

quae...idonea: 'such as were suited to enable the mind to lay hold of virtue'. *Ingeniis*=*i. nostris* or *humanis* (De Or. 2, 356 *i. nostris*), so that the plural, as very often happens, becomes almost equivalent to an abstract noun, 'the mind'. Cf. 2, 127; Or. 48 nihil est feracius ingeniis; Leg. 1, 46; also the plural of *animus* a few lines below, and in §§ 40, 42, and in 2, §§ 58, 127; Lael. 23; Hor. Sat. 1, 8, 20; A. P. 377.

6. **in naturam et mores**: loosely put for 'in ea quae natura et ea quae moribus perfici solent'; cf. 2, 42 diuidunt (sc. proposita) in partis, primum in sensus = in ea quae ad sensus attinent; Quint. 1, 10, 35 cum sit geometria diuisa in numeros atque formas; Sen. ep. 89 §§ 16, 17. The division of mental faculties into those which are the gift of nature and those which are formed by habit passed into popular use after the time of Aristotle, who first explicitly separated the *διανοητικαὶ ἀρεταί* from the *ἠθικαὶ ἀρεταί* (Eth. Nic. 1, 13, 20; cf. Magn. Mor. 1, 5) and often contrasts *φυσικὴ ἀρετή* with *ἐθιστή*. Cf. Cic. De Or. 2, 343, and Fin. 5, 36 (which passage is strongly tinged with Stoicism); Stob. Eth. 246 *ἐκ τριῶν συμβεβηκέναι τὴν ἀρετὴν τελειοῦσθαι, φύσεως ἔθους λόγου*.

7. **celeritatem...memoriam**: *εὐμάθειαν, μνήμην* in Arist. Eth. Nic. 1, 13, 20 who adds *ἀγχίνοια σοφία φρόνησις*: cf. Fin. 5,

dum et memoriam dabant, quorum utrumque mentis esset proprium et ingeni. Morum autem putabant studia esse et quasi consuetudinem, quam partim exercitationis adsiduitate, partim ratione formabant, in quibus erat philosophia ipsa. In qua quod incohatum est neque absolutum progressio quaedam ad uirtutem appellatur, quod autem absolutum, id est uirtus, quasi perfectio

Halmio. 12 incohatum: sic A Harl. 2, 3; *incoatum* Al. 2, Harl. 1, Burn. E; *inchoatum* ψ; de ceteris tacetur; *inchoatum* edd. pleraeque; cf. supra § 9. absolutum: sic A Harl. 1, Burn. U (?); *perfectum* Harl. 2, 1; om. codd. cett. In codice archetypo lacuna fuit. ad uirtutem: *a uirtute* G; *ad uirtutis* Harl. 1. 13 id est uirtus quasi: *uirtus id est quasi* Christ., quod iniuria laudauit H, receperunt BM.

36 docilitas memoria. Aristotle was careful to state (Eth. Nic. 2, 1, 1) that even the διανοητικαὶ ἀρεταὶ were to a large extent dependent on practice and teaching; cf. too Eth. Eud. 6, 13, 1 where it is stated that natural untrained cleverness is merely δεινότης not φρόνησις.

8. **mentis...ingeni**: these words are constantly conjoined by Cic. as are *mens* and *animus*, *animus* and *ingenium*. In Fin. 5, 36 Cic. points out that *ingenium* implies chiefly the διανοητικαὶ ἀρεταί.

esset: for the mood cf. n. on § 41 ex qua exsisteret.

9. **morum...studia**: cf. Verg. G. 4, 5 mores et studia. In Fin. 5, 36 the ἠθικαὶ ἀρεταὶ are called 'uoluntariae', the διανοητικαὶ 'non uoluntariae' from a point of view nearer to the doctrine of Zeno than to that of Aristotle. The words in the text are a denial of the theory that virtue (in Plato's words) θείᾳ μοίρᾳ παραγίγνεται ἑκάστῳ. Cf. Part. or. 64 quonam pacto uirtus pariatur, naturane an ratione an usu; Hor. ep. 1, 18, 100 uirtutem doctrina paret naturane donet; Aug. ciu. d. 11, 25.

quasi consuetudinem: *quasi* shows as usual that a Greek term is being translated; see n. on § 17. The whole passage probably contains a reminiscence of Arist. Eth. Nic. 2, 1, 1 ἡ δὲ ἠθικὴ (ἀρετὴ) ἐξ ἔθους περιγίγνεται, ὅθεν καὶ τοὔνομα ἔσχηκε μικρὸν παρεκκλῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔθους, with which cf. Magna Mor. 1, 6, 1186 a, 2.

11. **ratione formabant**: cf. Stob. Eth. 244 (concerning the Peripatetics) τὸν δ' ἄνθρωπον τῷ λόγῳ πλαττόμενον ἐκ τοῦ ἐθισμοῦ. Krahner, de Varrone, p. 2, qu. Macrob. 3, 8, 9 Varro de moribus morem dicit esse in iudicio animi, quem sequi debeat consuetudo.

in quibus erat philosophia: *erat* seems =*uersabatur;* 'with which matters (*exercitatio* and *ratio*) philosophy was concerned', περὶ ἃ ἦν καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ φιλοσοφία. The succession *in quibus—in qua* is awkward. Observe the abandonment of the *oratio obliqua*.

12. **neque**: put for *et non*, a usage not very common in Cic.; see exx. in Draeger, Hist. Synt. II[1] p. 66.

progressio quaedam: quaedam merely marks the unfamiliarity of the translation of προκοπή: cf. n. on § 21 quasi quandam. The philosophic use of the phrases προκόπτειν, προκοπὴ seems to have been first introduced by Zeno the Stoic, after which they passed into common employment. The words are often coupled with εἰς ἀρετήν. For their Stoic use (hardly at all illustrated in Liddell and Scott) cf. Zeller, Stoics III 1, p. 270 ed. 3 or p. 276 of the E. Tr. Cicero renders προκοπὴ variously; by *progressio* as here in Off. 3, 14 and 17; Fin. 4, 17 and 67; Tusc. 4, 1; by *progressus* in N. D. 1, 15; Tusc. 4, 44; by *processus* in Brut. 232; but not by *profectus*, which is the commonest rendering in later writers, particularly Seneca. So προκόπτειν is translated by *progredi* and by *procedere*. [Clavel in his most unsatisfactory book 'de M. Cicerone Graecorum interprete', Paris 1868, gives under προκοπὴ only one reference, viz. to our passage, and under προκόπτειν none.]

13. **uirtus quasi perfectio naturae**: something like the definition of ἀρετὴ as the perfection of the natural constitution is implicitly involved in the whole of Aristotle's Ethics; cf. however esp. Phys. 7, 3, 246 a, 13 ἡ ἀρετὴ ἐστι τελείωσίς τις, ὅταν γὰρ λάβῃ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀρετήν, τότε λέγεται τέλειον ἕκαστον. But such a definition was mainly insisted on by the Stoics, from whom it passed to

naturae omniumque rerum, quas in animis ponunt, una res optima. Ergo haec animorum.
21 Vitae autem—id enim erat tertium—adiuncta esse dicebant, quae ad uirtutis usum ualerent. Nam uirtus animi bonis et corporis cernitur, et in quibusdam quae non tam naturae quam beatae uitae adiuncta sunt. Hominem esse censebant quasi partem quandam ciuitatis et uniuersi generis humani, eumque esse coniunctum cum hominibus humana

2 enim erat: *erat enim* A (*enim* per compendium scriptum fefellit Alanum, qui lectiones eius codicis Halmio contulit); *ergo erat* E; *enim* om. ψ. 4 nam: sic P; cett. *iam*, fortasse recte. animi...corporis: *in animi...in corporis* G (aperta coniectura) HBM; *praeterquam animi* Bentl. et in quibusdam: om. *et* codd. exc. G. 6 esse: *enim esse* G, correctione et manifesta et mala; ita HBM; *autem esse* coni. M, sed particulam nonnumquam omittebat Tullius. 7 homi-

Antiochus. They laid it down that the Good for each creature lies in the full development of its nature; man is preeminent in reason; hence Good for him is the perfection of his reason and this again is equivalent to ἀρετή. See Seneca, ep. 76, 10; Sext. P. H. 1, 72 ἀρετὴ=τελειότης τοῦ ἐνδιαθέτου λόγου (with which cf. Galen. de plac. Hipp. et Plat. 1, 5, qu. by Faber, ἀρετὴ=τελειότης τῆς ἑκάστου φύσεως); Cic. Leg. 1, 25 est uirtus nihil aliud nisi perfecta et ad summum perducta natura; Fin. 3, 33; ib. 2, 88; ib. 4, 35; Sen. ep. 66, 6—9; ib. 115, 3—6; Zeller, III 1, pp. 235—7, ed. 3 or Stoics, p. 214, E. Tr. The definition of *uirtus* or its equivalent (in the Stoic system) *sapientia* as 'ratio perfecta' or 'ratio recta' (ὀρθὸς λόγος) will be found below, 2, 30; Tusc. 4, 34; 5, 39; Fin. 4, 35 etc.

1. **rerum**: 'faculties'; cf. Leg. 1, 16 quantam uim optimarum *rerum* mens humana contineat.

una: merely intensifies the superlative *optima*. This assertion by Antiochus of the supremacy of virtue is reported by Varro in Aug. ciu. d. 19, 3 and by Cic. in Fin. 5 §§ 36, 38.

2. **ergo haec animorum**: brief summaries like this are common; so below, § 39 haec fere de moribus; 2, 134; Fin. 2, 113 ergo haec in animis; Off. 3, 17; ib. 1, 46; Rep. 1, 53; Cato m. 78; Suet. Iul. 25. Such summaries are often given by Aristotle, as in Eth. N. 1, 3, 8.

uitae adiuncta: no doubt *uitae* is dative and *adiuncta* merely the participle, though our MSS give in Leg. 2, 54 pietatis adiunctum, where *adiunctum* is noun, if the reading be right. For *uitae* cf. n. on § 19.

3. **uirtutis usum**: see n. on § 38.

4. **cernitur**: 'is displayed in connexion with'; lit. 'is seen by'; so Fin. 3, 28 beata uita honestate cernitur; cf. Off. 1, 66; De Or. 1, 219; Tusc. 5, 22. The insertion of *in* before *animi* and *corporis* is not necessary, though it is often found after *cernere*; e.g. Leg. 1, 52; Fin. 5, 67; Part. or. 78; De Or. 2, 342; Off. 3, 118; Top. 80. The general purport of the passage is that virtue is exhibited in the proper use of mental and bodily gifts, as well as of the external accompaniments of life.

5. **naturae...beatae uitae**: as regards Antiochus' views on the relation of the ἐκτὸς ἀγαθὰ to εὐδαιμονία see n. on 2, 134.

hominem esse etc.: the transition from Ethics to Politics is abruptly made. The idea of a universal brotherhood of the human race, of which there are no traces in the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle (if we except the utterance about slaves in Eth. N. 8, 11, 7), was first brought into notoriety by the Stoics, who developed herein an old idea of Socrates, which had been taken up to some extent by the Cynics (Tusc. 5, 108; Diog. Laert. 6, 63). For the Stoic teaching see Fin. 3, 62—67; Rep. 1, 19; and cf. Zeller, III 1, p. 298, ed. 3 or Stoics, pp. 308 sq., E. Tr. The ideas of Antiochus, which were mainly those of the Stoics, are reflected in Fin. 5, 66 and 67; Leg. 1, 61. As the Peripatetics from Theophrastus downwards (see Zeller, Aristotle, pp. 851, 855 ed. 3; Stob. Eth. 252) preached a humanitarianism closely resembling that of the Stoics, Antiochus

quadam societate. Ac de summo quidem atque naturali bono
sic agunt: cetera autem pertinere ad id putant aut adaugendum
aut tuendum, ut diuitias, ut opes, ut gloriam, ut gratiam. Ita
tripartita ab eis inducitur ratio bonorum. VI. Atque haec illa **22**
sunt tria genera, quae putant plerique Peripateticos dicere. Id
quidem non falso: est enim haec partitio illorum: illud impru-
denter, si alios esse Academicos, qui tum appellarentur, alios

nibus: *omnibus* (post Ernestium) B. humana: *communi* Gronovius et BM; *mundana* Bentl. 8 atque naturali: *ac n.* Al. 2, Lamb. 9 adaugendum: sic G (teste Halmio); *ad agendum* cett. 10 tuendum: *tenendum* EG (ut HBM); *ad tenendum* cett.; corr. Lamb. 13 imprudenter; *prudenter* G[1]. 14 tum: *dum* codd. omnes (etiam Eψ); uerba 'qui dum appellarentur' suspecta sunt Halmio et Muellero. appellarentur: *appellantur* G solus; *appellabantur* B.

had some excuse for ascribing it to his imagined Old Academic School.

6. **quasi partem quandam**: the addition of *quasi...quandam* is strange here, as the Greek term translated can only be *μέρος*, and the translation *pars* of this requires no softening; cf. Fin. 3, 64 unumquemque nostrum mundi esse partem. The combination *quasi quidam* often occurs with translations, see e.g. §§ 24, 29, 40; 2 § 26; 2, 45; also to modify metaphors, in many writers.

7. **humana societate**: 'fellowship of human kindness'. Cf. Rep. 2, 48 quis enim hunc hominem rite dixerit, qui sibi cum suis ciuibus, qui denique cum omni hominum genere nullam humanitatis societatem uelit? The phrase *humana societas* then (used by Varro in Aug. 19, 3) is here no mere synonym (as it is in Off. 1, 50; Leg. 1, 27 and elsewhere) for the much commoner *hominum societas* and *societas humani generis*, but indicates the *civilising effect* of social union. The correction *mundana* based on Tusc. 5, 108, where Socrates calls himself 'mundanus', is not required, nor is it in itself defensible, since there is in the context here no mention of the *κόσμος* as the universal city to which all men belong (thus described in Rep. 1, 19 'mundus hic totus, quod domicilium quamque patriam di nobis communem secum dederunt'; cf. Fin. 3, 64).

8. **summo atque naturali bono**: the phrase 'summum bonum' (for which Hor. sat. 2, 6, 76 has 'summum boni') is employed is a more limited sense than usual. Strictly speaking, the *τέλειον ἀγαθὸν* must be incapable of increase; here however, it includes only the *animi* and *corporis bona* which are regarded as natural and opposed to the *ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά*, which are looked on as in a sense unnatural and adventicious. Below (in § 22) the 'animi bona' are set against the 'corporis bona' and the 'externa' combined. Antiochus allowed little importance to the *ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά*: see n. on 2, 134. Naturale bonum = *φυσικὸν ἀγαθόν*, as in Leg. 1, 31.

9. **pertinere**: most likely a translation of *συμβάλλεσθαι*, as in Fin. 3, 54.

10. **tuendum**: al. tenendum, but the constant recurrence of *φυλάττεσθαι*, *φυλακτικὸν* in the later Greek philosophy makes *tuendum* more probable. The two words differ but slightly; cf. Off. 2, 23 ad opes tuendas ac tenendas.

opes: of course has a much wider sense than *diuitias*, including every source of power.

11. **tripartita**: see n. on § 19.

12. **Peripateticos**: n. on § 19; cf. also Fin. 3, 43 cum tria genera bonorum sint, quae sententia est Peripateticorum.

13. **illud**: explained by the words si... arbitrantur; cf. n. on 2, 116 at illud ante.

14. **qui tum appellarentur**: the subjunctive is surprising, as the clause has all the appearance of being merely descriptive, like 'qui quidem nunc sunt' and the like clauses. Cf. Nep. Dat. 4, 2 regiones uexabat et quae regi portarentur abripiebat; Plin. pan. 62 oderat quos amaremus. In our passage, we must suppose that the clause was intended by Cic. to be either restrictive (Draeger § 488) or to be subordinated (improperly and unnecessarily) to *arbitrantur*. In the latter case cf. Roby Gr.

Peripateticos arbitrantur. Communis haec ratio et utrisque hic bonorum finis uidebatur, adipisci quae essent prima natura quaeque ipsa per sese expetenda, aut omnia aut maxima; ea sunt autem maxima, quae in ipso animo atque in ipsa uirtute uersantur. Itaque omnis illa antiqua philosophia sensit in una
23 uirtute esse positam beatam uitam, nec tamen beatissimam, nisi adiungerentur et corporis et cetera, quae supra dicta sunt, ad uirtutis usum idonea. Ex hac descriptione agendi quoque

2 uidebatur: *uidetur* G; *uideatur* cett. prima natura: *in prima n.* PV Al. 2, Harl. 3, Oxx. 1; *prima in n.* AG Harl. 1, 2, Burn.; corr. Dau.; *pr. naturae* coni. Bremi. 4 animo: *domino* E. 7 et corporis: *etiam c.* P Lamb. 8 descriptione: *discr.* M, perperam, hic et ll. 12, 15. 11 contemptio: *contentio* VE Al. 2, Burn. 12 magnorumque: *magnorum* GP; cf. supra, § 16. 13 earum rerum: aliquid

§§ 1742, 1746. [Very possibly *ita* has fallen out between *qui* and *tum*.]

2. **uidebatur**: both Goer. and Orelli stumble at this, not perceiving that the word has (as it very often has) the strong sense of the Greek ἐδόκει 'it was their dogma'. Cf. § 15 n. and n. on 2, 146 uideri.

adipisci...maxima: the discussion of this statement concerning the τέλος is reserved for the notes on 2, 131.

adipisci: cf. adeptum esse in § 19.

natura: the ablative is conditioned by *essent*.

4. **ipso animo**: see n. on § 6 haec ipsa, and cf. offici ipsius below.

5. **sensit**: here equivalent to *censuit* in the corresponding passage in 2, 131. So often, as in Fin. 2, 6 (where see Madvig); 3, 34; 5, 23; Att. 7, 6, 2; Tusc. 1, 39; 5, 82. In N. D. 1, 27 *sensit* and *censuit* come in consecutive sentences with exactly the same meaning. Cf. Georges on Velleius, p. 64.

6. **nec tamen beatissimam**: so in 2, 131 where see n.

7. **corporis**: sc. bona, as in § 19.

8. **uirtutis usum**: above, § 21; below, § 38 n.

descriptione: see above, n. on § 17.

agendi...initium: ἀρχὴ τῆς ἐν τῷ βίῳ πράξεως καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ καθήκοντος (cf. Stob. Eth. 250). The Greek πράττειν, πρᾶξις, are generally rendered by *agere aliquid*, or *agendum* connected with *aliquid*, not by *agere*, *agendum* alone. Cf. 2, 24 and 37; Off. 3, 102; Fam. 4, 6, 3; Liu. 1, 21, 1. Where the absolute use is found there is generally a contrast, as in 2, 22 faciendo...agendo. Cf. however De Or. 3, 118 quae referuntur ad agendum aut in offici discriptione uersantur; Fin. 4, 46. The whole passage is covertly directed against the New Academics, whose scepticism, according to the dogmatists, cut away the ground from action and duty; see Introd. p. 56. With the words agendi...reperiebatur cf. Fin. 4, 46 unde offici, unde agendi principium nascatur non reperietis.

9. **reperiebatur**: for the change from *sensit* cf. Tusc. 1, 72 ita enim censebat itaque disseruit; ib. 1, 4; ib. 1, 86; Fin. 4, 26.

11. **uoluptatum contemptio**: = σωφροσύνη. Contemptio has not the strong sense of our 'despising'; it simply means 'holding in light esteem', ὀλιγωρία not καταφρόνησις. Cf. § 10 n.

12. **laborum dolorumque susceptio**: = ἀνδρεία, or fortitudo; cf. Off. 3, 117 fortitudo quae est laborum dolorumque contemptio (a passage sufficient to do away with Halm's doubts about the text here); Fin. 1, 49 eadem fortitudinis ratio reperietur; nam neque laborum perfunctio neque perpessio dolorum per se ipsa allicit. On the ancient doctrines of self-sacrifice see Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, p. 108 ed. 1.

multorum magnorumque: some MSS omit *que*; but the copula can only be left out when *multus* and *magnus* are succeeded by a third adjective. See my n. on Laelius § 30 and to the examples quoted there add Or. § 6 multi oratores magni et clari; Diu. 1, 35 multa grauia et uera; Liu. 26, 39, 3 multis fortibus factis (without *et*). In Sest. 139 multis audacibus *et* improbis should almost cer-

aliquid in uita et offici ipsius initium reperiebatur, quod erat in conseruatione earum rerum, quas natura praescriberet. Hinc gignebatur fuga desidiae uoluptatumque contemptio, ex quo laborum dolorumque susceptio multorum magnorumque recti honestique causa et earum rerum, quae erant congruentes cum descriptione naturae, unde et amicitia exsistebat et iustitia atque aequitas: eaeque uoluptatibus et multis uitae commodis anteponebantur. Haec quidem fuit apud eos mo-

H censet excidisse, aut hic aut post *praescr. naturae*, uelut *appetitus* uel *appetitio*, quod scripsit B. 14 descriptione: *praescriptione* G, quod ex correctione ortum esse quouis pignore contenderim; scripserunt tamen HBM. 15 eaeque: *haeque* (uel *heque*) codd. exc. G (*ea aeque*), E Al. 2 (*haecque*); corr. H; *haec* uel *hae* edd. pleraeque uetustiores; *ea quae* Gruter. multis: *cunctis* Dau.

tainly be read. Cf. n. on § 16 uarie copioseque.

recti honestique: simply a double translation of τοῦ καλοῦ, an expression which is properly Stoic. Cf. § 36 n.

13. **erant congruentes**: there is some difference between this phrase and *congruebant*, since the present participle, when used as an adjective, denotes generally (though not always) some recurring tendency in the subject to which it is attached. Hence it is commonly used in rendering into Latin the Greek adjectives in -κὸς, as below, § 24 efficiens = ποιητικὸς, where see n.

14. **descriptione naturae**: 'the plan marked out by nature'. Praescriptione naturae (Halm) could only mean some particular injunction of nature, as in 2, 140; whereas here is meant that outline sketch of existence drawn by nature for men to fill in and complete, which both Stoics and later Peripatetics placed at the outset of their moral systems. The Stoic view of it is given in Fin. III (cf. esp. § 16 with Madvig's notes); the Peripatetic view in Fin. IV and particularly in Stobaeus, Eth. 244—262. The ethical *groundwork* of Stoicism and of the later Peripateticism was almost the same, and there is no reason to suppose (as Madvig does) that the approximation of the two systems at this point is to be traced to Antiochus; it was certainly far older. The 'descriptio naturae' we have here is therefore the πρώτη σύστασις τῆς φύσεως of the Greek texts, the 'prima constitutio naturae' of Fin. 4, 15 and Sen. ep. 121, 14, the 'status' of Fin. 3, 16. Both schools make the instinct of self-preservation the starting-point of action; with the words above, 'in conseruatione earum rerum quas natura praescriberet', cf. Fin. 3, 16 animal commendari ad se conseruandum et ad suum statum eaque quae sunt conseruantia eius status diligenda. As the later Academics never formulated any ethical system for adoption, Antiochus naturally followed the Stoics and Peripatetics in a matter with regard to which they were so thoroughly at one.

unde etc.: nature impels men to society, φιλάλληλον γὰρ εἶναι καὶ κοινωνικὸν ζῷον τὸν ἄνθρωπον (Stob. Eth. 252). Hence the expression 'naturalis societas' in Off. 1, 50.

exsistebat: 'sprang'; in good Latin *exsistere* always means 'to *come into* existence', not 'to *be in* existence' like our word 'exist'.

iustitia atque aequitas: δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἐπιείκεια. The *atque* here would certainly have been *ac* but for the succeeding vowel; see n. on 2, 34.

15. **multis uitae commodis**: 'the possession of a large number of the advantages of life'. Binder's translation 'die zahlreichen Bequemlichkeiten des Lebens' is more accurate than Kirchmann's 'vielen Annehmlichkeiten des Lebens'. The latter would imply that *some* 'commoda uitae' *were* preferred to justice and equity. The 'commoda uitae' are here the 'uitae adiuncta' of § 21, i.e. the ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά; the *expression* 'uitae commoda' was in common use; see Tusc. 1, 87; N. D. 1, 23; Lucr. 3, 2. [Wopkens, Lect. Tull. p. 15 ed. Hand refuted the proposal to read *cunctis* for *multis*.]

rum institutio et eius partis, quam primam posui, forma atque descriptio.

24 De natura autem—id enim sequebatur—ita dicebant, ut eam diuiderent in res duas, ut altera esset efficiens, altera autem quasi huic se praebens, ex eaque efficeretur aliquid. In eo, quod

1 partis: *artis* codd.; corr. Walker; cf. § 31 et adn. ad § 19. 3 dicebant: *docebant* G. 5 ex eaque: sic M, ut ipse olim conieceram; *eaque* codd.; *ea qua* Man. B.; *ex qua* Turn. Lamb.; *ea quae* Gruter. H. 6 materiam: *tantum modo m.* G, quod

1. **primam posui**: in § 19. The later philosophers attached considerable importance to the order in which the three parts of philosophy were arranged. For the Stoics, see Zeller, III 1, p. 61 ed. 3 or Stoics, p. 67, E. Tr. with the footnotes.

forma: cf. n. on § 33.

3. **de natura**: *περὶ φύσεως*. The views of Antiochus concerning physics were partly founded on the *Timaeus* of Plato, but comprised large importations from Aristotle and the Stoics, as will be seen from the references in the notes which follow. Essentially the same systematisation of physics is adopted by Plutarch as belonging to the Academy; see Volkmann, II, p. 9.

4. **res duas**: 'two spheres'.

efficiens...praebens: = *ποιητική, παθητική*. The adjectival present participle is regularly used to translate the Greek adjectives in *-κός*: thus *efficiens* or *conficiens* is the regular rendering of *ποιητικὸς* (see e.g. Fin. 2, 21 and 5, 81), *conseruans* of *φυλακτικός* (Fin. 3, 16); see other exx. in Nägelsb. Stil. § 72, c. Many of the adjectives in *-iuus*, such as *effectiuus*, *conseruatiuus*, only came into use at a late date, but some, as *demonstratiuus* = *ἐπιδεικτικὸς*, occur in Cicero's earliest works (e.g. Inu. 1, 7). The philosophical contrast between active and passive was first formulated by Plato in Theaet. 156 A, 157 A by the expressions *τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν ἔχον δύναμιν τὸ δὲ πάσχειν, τὸ ποιοῦν, τὸ πάσχον* [the philosophic uses of which terms are left entirely without illustration by Liddell and Scott]. The contrast was applied by Plato to physical phenomena in the *Timaeus*, where the universe is constructed by a union of the forms (*εἴδη* or less definitely *τὸ ὅθεν* in 50 D) with the so-called Platonic *ὕλη*, described as *τὸ δεχόμενον* (Tim. 50 D), *τὸ πανδεχές, ἐκμαγεῖον*, and as the *μήτηρ* of phenomena, the forms being the *πατήρ*. [For further information as to this *ὕλη* see n. on 2, 118.] Aristotle analysed all material existences into a formal and a material part, but he did not, like Plato, suppose that the forms had ever had a separate existence in time, or that the two had been brought into union by a *δημιουργός*. [For the details of Aristotle's physical system the student must go to Zeller; a clear summary is given by Schwegler, in his 'History of Philosophy'.] The Stoics while making many innovations on the Aristotelian physics, and particularly insisting that all things which exist are (with insignificant exceptions) material, yet distinguished two kinds of matter, one of which they described as *τὸ ποιοῦν*, the other as *τὸ πάσχον*; cf. Diog. Laert. 7, 134; Zeller, Stoics, III 1, p. 130 ed. 3 or p. 134 E. Tr. —With efficiens...praebens (*quasi* simply marks the hesitation with which this translation of an unfamiliar Greek term is given), cf. *facere* and *pati* in Cic. Tim. 18, *facere* and *fungi* in Lucr. 1, 440.

5. **ex eaque**: the correction is certain; cf. Diu. 2, 89 ex eoque, where one of the best MSS drops out *ex*. Cic. rarely attaches *que* to the preposition; see Kühner on Tusc. 3, 27 and cf. § 38 in angustumque.

aliquid: 'a something', a *τί*, equivalent to *corpus* below; cf. § 39 quod efficeret aliquid. So in Aristotle *τί* or *τόδε τι* often denotes that which is compounded of form and matter, a phenomenal object, as contrasted with its two factors; cf. Metaph. 6, 8, 1033 a 27 and 31. Plato on the other hand (49 E, 50 A) will not allow the words *τόδε* and *τοῦτο* to be used of the phenomenal object, because they imply a certain permanence of existence which it does not possess.

in eo quod efficeret etc.: id quod efficit is not different from, but equivalent to uis (*δύναμις*), and id quod efficitur to materia (*ὕλη*). See my translation. So

efficeret, uim esse censebant, in eo autem, quod efficeretur, materiam quandam: in utroque tamen utrumque: neque enim materiam ipsam cohaerere potuisse, si nulla ui contineretur, neque uim sine aliqua materia. Nihil est enim quod non alicubi esse cogatur. Sed quod ex utroque, id iam corpus et quasi quali-

laudat H. 9 uim sine: *uim esse sine* B auctore Christio. nihil...cogatur: suspecta Lambino. 10 ex: om. E. utroque id iam: *iam* obelisco notauit M, qui coniecit *utraque constaret id* corpus etc.; *etiam* pro *id iam* r.

Quintilian contrasts *materia effecta* (in another sense) with *m. incohata*.

6. **materiam quandam**: the translation of the Greek ὕλη, as a technical term, by *materia* was unfamiliar, hence the addition of *quandam*. Even the rhetorical sense of ὕλη, 'subject-matter', was commonly rendered by *silua*, as in De Or. 2, 65; 3, 93; 3, 103. Cf. De Or. 3, 118 silua subiecta (=ὑποκειμένη ὕλη) with Fin. 3, 61 subiecta quasi materia; Off. 1, 16 quasi materia subiecta; on the other hand see Inu. 1, 7; 1, 34. We have in the present passage what is probably the earliest use of *materia* to render the physical sense of ὕλη. [The word does not seem to occur at all before Cicero's time in any but the literal sense of 'building material'. In his works the meaning 'occasion' = ἀφορμή, of matters outside science and literature, is common.]

7. **in utroque tamen utrumque**: *utroque* here represents τὸ σύνολον or ἡ σύνολος οὐσία of Aristotle (see Bonitz, Ind. Arist. s. vv.), i.e. the concrete object (cf. n. on 2, 60); while *utrumque* denotes the ingredients, the formal and material elements of which the object is composed; the words mean therefore 'each of these factors however exists in the concrete object'; i.e. only in it, not outside it; the two factors are only separable by an act of the mind. The views of Aristotle and the Stoics agreed pretty closely on this point, but they were at variance with the doctrine of Plato. [These words have received many wrong interpretations which it is unnecessary to discuss.]

8. **cohaerere**: used here in a peculiar sense 'to form an organic whole'; cf. below, 28 cohaerente natura; and the passages there quoted.

9. **sine aliqua**: see n. on 2, 35.

nihil...cogatur: there is no doubt that these words are ultimately traceable to the following sentence in Plato's Timaeus 52 B φάμεν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναί που τὸ ὂν ἅπαν ἔν τινι τόπῳ. It would seem that Antiochus adopted that view of the Platonic ὕλη which identified it with Space (see n. on 2, 118). An indirect indication of this is to be found in a statement of Diog. Laert. Prooem. 21 concerning Potamo of Alexandria, a philosopher of the age of Augustus, who is known to have borrowed much from Antiochus: ἀρχάς τε τῶν ὅλων τήν τε ὕλην καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν, ποιησίν τε καὶ τόπον. [Cf. Chappuis, Antioch. pp. 72—76.] It is probable that Antiochus followed the Stoics in declaring all existence to be material, but Plato (whose words in the *Timaeus* must not be closely pressed) recognised the existence of much which was unconnected with space and time, particularly the ἰδέαι, according to the statement of Aristotle in Phys. 3, 4, 203 a 8. The same is true of Aristotle; cf. especially Met. 1, 8, 988 b 24 φυσικοὶ...τῶν σωμάτων τὰ στοιχεῖα τιθέασι μόνον, τῶν δ' ἀσωμάτων οὔ, ὄντων καὶ ἀσωμάτων. The doctrine of Antiochus was therefore far from being what it professed to be, a representation of the views of Plato and Aristotle and their immediate pupils. Ant. seems to have disbelieved in the existence of void; see n. on § 27. With the expressions in our text cf. Lucr. 1, 426 tum porro locus ac spatium quod inane uocamus si nullum foret, haud usquam sita corpora possint esse; also De Or. 2, 358 corpus intellegi sine loco non potest; Arist. Met. 10, 10, 1067 a 28 πᾶν σῶμα αἰσθητὸν ἐν τόπῳ: Phys. 3, 5, 205 b 31 (the same words); Sext. A. M. 10, 20; P. H. 3, 121.

10. **quod ex utroque**: sc. effectum est, a rather strange ellipse.

iam: = ἤδη, 'at once'.

corpus: here matter organized and formed, *materia* being left to denote unformed matter. Plato, Tim. 28 B and 31 B uses σῶμα exactly as Cic. does *cor-*

tatem quandam nominabant: dabitis enim profecto, ut in rebus inusitatis, quod Graeci ipsi faciunt, a quibus haec iam diu tractantur, utamur uerbis interdum inauditis'.

25 VII. 'Nos uero', inquit Atticus, 'quin etiam Graecis licebit utare, cum uoles, si te Latina forte deficient'. 'Bene sane facis, sed enitar ut Latine loquar, nisi in huiusce modi uerbis, ut philosophiam aut rhetoricam aut physicam aut dialecticam appellem, quibus, ut aliis multis, consuetudo iam utitur pro Latinis. Quali-

1 dabitis: *habetis* EU Burn. (*hētis*, quod in margine habet Al. 2); *habenis* Harl. 1. 4 nos...uoles: om. E. 5 utare: *uitare* V. bene sane: *b. satis* Al. 2. 6 enitar: *en. inquit* Durand.; sed cf. § 33. 7 aut rhetoricam: *ut* rU; pro *rhetoricam* male *ethicam* coni. Huelsemann., scripsit Goer. rhetoricam... physicam...dialecticam: sic codd. excepto U (si fides est edd. Oxx.), et A (qui *rhetoricam* habet, sed supra *a* scriptum est *e*, tum *physicem...dialecticem*) et Harl. 2

pus; by Aristotle σῶμα is employed to denote everything existent.

quasi quandam: these two words show the hesitation with which Cic. put forward *qualitas* as a translation of ποιότης. For these terms see next n. and for quasi quidam cf. n. on § 21, above and Kühner on Tusc. 2, 11.

qualitatem: both here and in § 26 Cic. has used the substantive *qualitas* (ποιότης) where he ought to have employed the adjective *quale* (ποιόν). Strictly speaking, the objects which have been formed by the union of force with matter are ποιά, i.e. have definite qualities; to such objects Plato in Tim. 49 D applies the word τοιοῦτο and they are rightly called *qualia* in § 28. The term ποιότης ought, if correctly used, to apply only to the force which gives definiteness to the indefinite matter. In the preface to his edition of the 'De finibus' p. 65 n. Madvig severely condemns Cic. for his confusion of the ποιότητες with the ποιά. But the two terms were frequently interchanged in Greek, without any trouble being caused thereby, except to hypercritical persons like Plutarch, who (Κοιν. ἐνν. 1085 F) complained that the Stoics, after asserting that ὕλη is the substratum for the ποιότητες, declare ποιότητες to be οὐσιαι καὶ σώματα. Madvig demands more steadiness in the use of terms than is to be found anywhere in the ancient philosophy. Aristotle's laxity in this respect is notorious and Plato frequently uses terms in different senses (as Suidas s. v. φαῦλος complains). [Arist. names one of his categories τὸ ποιὸν and ποιότης indifferently.] For further information about ποιότης see nn. on § 26.

2. **Graeci ipsi**: cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. 2, 7, 11 πειρατέον δὲ ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αὐτοὺς ὀνοματοποιεῖν σαφηνείας ἕνεκεν καὶ τοῦ εὐπαρακολουθήτου; Fin. 3, 3, where the necessity for creating a terminology is insisted on as one of the chief difficulties in writing upon philosophy in Latin.

4. **nos uero**: sc. dabimus, to be supplied from *dabimus* above. As to Atticus, see above, n. on § 14 uidere...Latine. O. Iahn, in his ed. of Cic. Orator, p. 7, thinks that in this § the imitators of the Alexandrine literature, who objected to translations from the Greek (De opt. gen. d. 18), are attacked.

5. **si...deficient**: cf. Fin. 3, 15.

bene facis: a polite expression of thanks, commonly found in comedy and in colloquial talk; e.g. Fin. 3, 16; Hor. Sat. 1, 4, 17 di bene fecerunt ('thank heaven!'); Plin. ep. 8, 4, 1; 9, 5, 1; 9, 24, 1. With the word 'optume' the verb is omitted, as in Tusc. 1, 119; Diu. 1, 47; Brut. 52; on this point cf. n. on 2, 94. The force of the expression here was missed by Lambinus who proposed *mecum agis* for *facis* and by Wopkens, who defended the text (Lect. Tull. p. 16) by many irrelevant quotations.

6. **enitar ut Latine loquar**: cf. Tusc. 1, 15 dicam si potero Latine, scis enim me Graece loqui in Latino sermone non plus solere quam in Graeco Latine; Off. 1, 111 sermone eo debemus uti qui notus est nobis, ne ut quidam Graeca uerba inculcantes iure optimo rideamur;

tates igitur appellaui, quas *ποιότητας* Graeci uocant, quod ipsum apud Graecos non est uolgi uerbum, sed philosophorum, atque id in multis. Dialecticorum uero uerba nulla sunt publica, suis utuntur, et id quidem commune omnium fere est artium; aut enim noua sunt rerum nouarum facienda nomina aut ex aliis transferenda. Quod si Graeci faciunt, qui in his rebus tot iam saecula uersantur, quanto id magis nobis concedendum est, qui

(*physicen...dialecticen*). appellem: *appellam* A. 9 *ποιότητας*: lacunam habet E; is igitur codex a quo descriptus est E, uerbum *ποιότητας* habuit Graecis, non Latinis litteris scriptum; *poeotetas* A; *phetetas* Al. 2; *poeothetas* P Harl. Burn. *poethetas* Vr; *poecthetas* ψ; *poiotecas* G. uocant: *appellant* G solus; quam lectionem nulla proposita causa recepit M; cf. § 30. 11 uero: om. V. 15 saecula: *secla* APVψ; *secula* Al. 2, Burn. E. magis nobis: *nobis magis* HBM cum codice G solo; *uobis magis* Burn. concedendum: *edendum* Harl. 1, Burn.

where Dr Holden aptly quotes Iuvenal 6, 187.

ut...appellem: the clause is epexegetic of *huius modi uerbis*. For 'appellare philosophiam' = 'to employ the *word* philosophy' (a usage I do not find illustrated in the dictionaries) cf. 'nomen appellare' put for 'aliquem (aliquid) nomine appellare' in Cic. Tim. 33 (where however recent edd. read *nomine*) and Inu. 2, 78; also Plato Phileb. 25 C *θερμότερον ἐφθεγγόμεθά τι* 'we used the expression *θ. τι*'; also Cic. N. D. 1, 44 Epicurus ipse *πρόληψιν* appellauit, i.e. used the word *πρόληψις*: Brut. 133 suauitate appellandarum litterarum; Plin. n. h. 5, 45.

7. **rhetoricam**: it has been proposed to read *ethicam* or *ethicen* here, so that the three chief divisions of philosophy may be mentioned. But Cic. is merely giving specimens of Greek terms naturalised in Latin, quite apart from any bearing their meanings may have (cf. the precisely similar passage in Fin. 3, 5), and moreover the noun *ethica* is unknown in Latin, while *ethice* occurs two or three times in Quintilian only. Some MSS give here *rhetoricen* etc., but the context shows that Cic. gave the words the Latin inflexions. [Quintilian always has *rhetorice.*] The fem. noun *physica* seems peculiar to Cic., who has it in only a few passages, as Fin. 3, 72 and 73; the form *physice* given by the dictionaries was never in use. *Dialectica* is common in Cic.; for it Quint. has always *dialectice.* Instead of the fem. nouns, Cic. often employs the neuter plurals *physica, -orum* (Fin. 1, 17 and Orat. 119) and *dialectica* (common) but seemingly not *rhetorica*, which he applies only to *books* on rhetoric.

8. **consuetudo...utitur**: Cic. goes considerable lengths in the personification of *consuetudo*; e.g. Fin. 2, 48 c. loquitur; Orat. 157 a consuetudine impetratum est.

qualitates: the word, used only once by Cic. in his subsequent works (N. D. 2, 94) took firm root in Latin. Martianus Capella 510 forgets that Cic. invented the word.

10. **non est uolgi uerbum**: *ποιότης* was first used by Plato in Theaet. 182 A where he apologises for it as *ἀλλόκοτόν τι ὄνομα*. Cf. Fin. 3, 4 dialectici et physici uerbis utuntur eis quae ipsi Graeciae nota non sint.

id in multis: sc. *fit* or *faciunt*.

11. **suis utuntur**: Fin. 3, 4 musici more locuntur suo.

13. **facienda...transferenda**: so in De Or. 3, 149 uerba ea quae transferuntur are contrasted with 'ea quae nouamus et facimus ipsi'; cf. ib. 154. *Transferre* is *μεταφέρειν* in its technical rhetorical sense, common in Greek from Isocrates onwards. For *facere nomen* = *n. imponere*, a number of exx. are given in Georges-Mühlmann, Thesaurus d. Klass. Latinität, s. v. *facere*.

15. **saecula**: better than *secula*; see Corssen, Ausspr. I[2] 325, 377.

quanto id magis: it is Cicero's custom to separate multo tanto quanto etc. from the comparatives to which they belong, by some small word or words like *id* here; e.g. Fin. 3, 5 (a passage dealing with the same subject as ours) quanto id

26 haec nunc primum tractare conamur?' 'Tu uero', inquam, 'Varro, bene etiam meriturus mihi uideris de tuis ciuibus, si eos non modo copia rerum auxeris, ut effecisti, sed etiam uerborum'. 'Audebimus ergo', inquit, 'nouis uerbis uti te auctore, si necesse erit. Earum igitur qualitatum sunt aliae principes, aliae ex his ortae. Principes sunt unius modi et simplices, ex his autem ortae uariae sunt et quasi multiformes. Itaque aer quoque—utimur

1 tu: *tum* V. 2 meriturus: *meritus* GE; *moriturus* Harl. 1, Burn. 3 ut effecisti: *ut fecisti* Al. 2, ut scripsit Lamb.; *ut et fecisti* coni. Bentl. (debuit *etiam*); *uti fecisti* (*utei*) BM cum Klotzio. 5 erit: *est* AEUψ Harl. Burn., fortasse recte; sic etiam Lamb. (non, ut ait Halm. *fuerit*, quod est in r). ex his: (bis); sic codd.; *ex iis* HBM cum r. 7 aer quoque: *aer hoc quoque* GHBM. 8 enim: *iam* H et de eius coniectura BM. prima: *primae* (ut est in Burn.) HB

nobis magis concedendum est qui ea nunc primum audemus attingere; N. D. 2, 35 multo etiam magis; so Sest. 52 multo alia maiora; in N. D. 3, 45 however *etiam multo magis* and in Brut. 8 multo magis alia. Cf. n. on 2, 83 quam in paruo; also above § 1 satis eum longo. [Livy's usage is much the same, e.g. 6, 5, 3 multo eum infestiorem.]

qui...conamur: see n. on § 18 qui haec uos doceo; also on 2, 22.

3. **copia rerum**: a reference to the works enumerated in § 9.

5. **igitur**: resumptive or analeptic, picking up the interrupted thread of the exposition. So in § 35; 2, 18 and often; cf. n. on *sed* in § 41.

qualitatum: for *qualium;* see n. on § 24, above.

principes...ex his ortae: the ordinary terms in Greek are ἁπλᾶ σώματα (usually applied to the four elements; cf. *simplices* below) and σύνθετα, commonly used after Plato's time, particularly by Aristotle (see Bonitz, ind. s. v.) and the Stoics. But the terms used by Antiochus and here translated were probably πρῶτα (cf. *prima* below) or πρότερα and δεύτερα or ὕστερα, which Aristotle sometimes uses.

6. **unius modi**: probably a rendering of the Platonic word μονοειδής; Aristotle appears to use the term only once, in Magna Mor. 1, 25, 1192 a, 12 where it is a synonym of ἁπλοῦς and contrasted with πολυειδής. Cf. n. on § 30. *Quasi* below shows that *multiformes* is a rendering of πολυειδεῖς, a word both Platonic and Aristotelian; πολυειδής is contrasted with ἁπλοῦς in Plat. Phaedr. 238 A, with μονοειδής in Rep. 612 A. Cf. also Plato Tim. 35 A ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἐχούσης οὐσίας rendered by Cic. Tim. 21 'materia quae est semper unius modi'.

7. **aer**: the word was strange in the time of Ennius; cf. Ann. 149 (Vahl.) uento quem perhibent Graium genus aera lingua; it was not naturalised much before Cicero's time. The original Latin equivalents were *spiritus*, *caelum*, *anima*. With our passage cf. N. D. 2, 91 aer, Graecum illud quidem sed perceptum iam tamen usu a nostris; tritum est enim pro Latino; where Schömann quotes Lucr. 4, 132, and two passages of Pliny, n. h. 2, § 10 and 2, § 102 which show that Pliny did not know that the Latins borrowed the word.

8. **prima**: the alteration *primae* (sc. *qualitates*) is needless; but for the proximity of *formae*, Cic. would probably have written *orta*.

9. **formae**: = genera, εἴδη. The word is applied to the four elements themselves in N. D. 1, 19. The words *forma*, *genus*, *species* are often defined so as to be distinct in meaning, for example in Top. 30, but in practice they are very much interchanged.

earum rerum...terra: this and similar paraphrases are rendered necessary by the want of a single word in Latin corresponding to φυτόν: cf. Madv. on Fin. 4, 13; to his exx. add Fin. 5, 26; 5, 33; 5, 39; 5, 40; Off. 1, 22; N. D. 2, 130. The nearest representative of φυτὸν is *stirps;* cf. Leg. 1, 1; N. D. 2, 36 and 130; Fin. 5, 40. In poetry and late prose *sata* and *arbusta* are used.

10. **initia...elementa**: initia is evidently a translation of ἀρχαί, elementa

enim pro Latino—et ignis et aqua et terra prima sunt: ex his autem ortae animantium formae earumque rerum, quae gignuntur e terra. Ergo illa initia et, ut e Graeco uertam, elementa dicuntur, e quibus aer et ignis mouendi uim habent et efficiendi, reliquae partes accipiendi et quasi patiendi, aquam dico et terram. Quintum genus, e quo essent astra mentesque, singulare eorumque quattuor, quae supra dixi, dissimile Aristoteles quod-

cum Walkero, probante Dau. et ignis: sic Gψ; om. *et* cett. (de A fallitur H). 10 et ut: om. *et* Man. (sic etiam E). 12 reliquae: *reliqua* coni. H, scripserunt BM. 13 singulare: *singulares* G Al. Oxx. Burn. Harl. 2. Fuitne *singulare esse?* 14 dissimile: *dissimiles* Harl. 1, 2, Burn. quoddam: sic codd. (etiam A) exc. V (*quodammodo*); *quiddam* Lamb. al.

of *στοιχεῖα*, which two terms Cic. seems to have thought to be interchangeable. *Στοιχεῖον* is regularly applied to the four elements from Aristotle onward. Empedocles, to whom the four elements were the ultimate factors of material objects, might call them *ἀρχαί*, but to Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics they were not ultimate factors, so that in these systems *ἀρχαί* were, strictly speaking, distinct from *στοιχεῖα*, and we often find the terms contrasted. To both Aristotle and the Stoics, Matter and Form or Force were the real *ἀρχαί*. [While the Stoics allow the *τέτταρα στοιχεῖα* to arise *immediately* out of the *ἀρχαί*, Aristotle interposes another stage, the *ἐναντιότητες*, for which see below.] Yet even Aristotle was far from consistent in his use of the terms *στοιχεῖον*, *ἀρχή*: see Bonitz on Metaph. 4, cc. 1 and 3; Zeller, as above, II 2 p. 442, ed. 3. Consult too Stob. Phys. 310, 312; Ps.-Plut. Plac. I 2; also Plut. Κοιν. ἐνν. 1085 B (in which passage the two terms are identified); Diog. Laert. 7, 134 and 136.

11. **mouendi...efficiendi...accipiendi...patiendi:** Antiochus here followed the Stoics. According to Aristotle, out of the combination of Form or Force with Matter spring first the two fundamental *ἐναντιότητες*, i. e. *τὸ θερμὸν* and *τὸ ψυχρόν*, *τὸ ὑγρὸν* and *τὸ ξηρόν*. Of these four things the former pair are said to have active functions, the latter passive; now as the four elements spring from the four possible combinations of these four things taken two together, each of the four elements contains within it both an active and a passive principle. But the Stoics only assigned *one* of the properties to each element; i. e. heat to fire, cold to air (cf. N. D. 2, 26), moisture to water, dryness to earth. Hence, as they followed Aristotle in regarding heat and cold as active, moisture and dryness as passive, the doctrine in the text was a necessary consequence. See, for Aristotle, Zeller, II 2, p. 441 ed. 3; Schwegler, Hist. Phil.; Ritter and Preller § 338; for the Stoics, Zeller, III 1, pp. 130, 182 ed. 3 or Stoics pp. 155, 187, E. Tr., also R. and P. §§ 411, 412.

12. **reliquae partes**: it has been proposed by Halm to take *partes* as accusative in the same construction as *uim*, and having the sense of 'rôle'. The following passage is almost decisive against this interpretation, viz. Tusc. 1, 40 eam (sc. terram) naturam esse quattuor omnia gignentium corporum, ut, quasi partita habeant inter se ac diuisa momenta, terrena et umida...in terram et mare ferantur, r e l i q u a e d u a e p a r t e s, una ignea, altera animalis...in caelestem locum subuolent.

accipiendi: so *δέχεσθαι* passim in the *Timaeus*.

patiendi: cf. N. D. 3, 29 patibilis natura.

13. **quintum genus**: = quinta natura in § 39, where see n. A fifth element is said to have been first added to the other four by Philolaus, from whom it passed to Speusippus, Xenocrates and Aristotle. Plato does not adopt the fifth element in the *Timaeus*, though it is sometimes attributed to him by late authorities.

e quo essent: this clause seems to give the *reason* for the use of the word *singulare;* otherwise *esse* might have been expected; cf. however n. on § 41 ex qua exsisteret.

27 dam esse rebatur. Sed subiectam putant omnibus sine ulla specie atque carentem omni illa qualitate—faciamus enim tractando usitatius hoc uerbum et tritius—materiam quandam, ex qua omnia expressa atque effecta sint, quae tota omnia accipere possit omnibusque modis mutari atque ex omni parte, eoque

1 putant: codd. *putat*, exc. G (*putabant*); uetus est correctio. 3 tritius: *contritius* G solus, cum librarius usum huius uerbi, ut ita dicam, ecclesiasticum alieno tempore meminisset; quam lectionem recepisse Muellerum mirari satis non queo. ex qua: *e qua* GHBM. 4 effecta: sic codd. (etiam Eψ) exc. Al. 2 (*affetta*) et U (?); *efficta* post Turn. plerique editores (etiam HBM). sint: sic codd. (etiam ψ) excepto Harl. 1 (*sunt*). tota omnia: codd., exc. A (*omnia tota*); obelisco notauit

1. **rebatur**: see n. on 2, 88 reri.

subiectam: ὑποκειμένην.

omnibus: unusual for *omnibus rebus*; see n. on Lael. 23 and cf. below, § 46; also 2 § 60 and n. on § 8 meorum.

sine ulla...qualitate: an inevitably cumbrous translation of ἄμορφον καὶ ἀειδῆ: cf. Arist. De Cael. 3, 8, 306 b, 17, also Plut. Κοιν. ἐνν. 1085 B; Plat. Tim. 50 D ἄμορφον πασῶν τῶν ἰδεῶν. For *sine ulla* see n. on 2, 35; for attributive phrases like *sine ulla specie* Nägelsbach, Stil. § 75, 2.

3. **tritius**: cf. N. D. 2, 91 (quoted above, n. on *aer*); N. D. 1, 95 durum, sed usu mollienda nobis uerba sunt Quint. 1, 5, 72; n. on 2, 18 triuimus.

quandam: above, nn. on §§ 20, 21.

ex qua...sint: the sense seems '*such that* from it have been formed and produced'. The correction *efficta* (for which cf. 2, 18 and 77) is mistaken in view of § 24 efficeret, efficeretur, where see nn. The difference however between *effingere* and *efficere* is but slight; see N. D. 1, 65 effingis atque efficis, and cf. Aug. ciu. d. 13, 24.

4. **quae tota**: cf. § 28 materiam ipsam totam; N. D. 3, 92 qu. on § 28; also *quae tota* in Fin. 2, 48; Lael. 97; Fat. 13. *Tota* is in agreement with *quae* and not with *omnia*, as has been strangely supposed by Binder and others. Many scholars, among them Bentley and Davies, seeing this to be impossible (such things as *toto omni* in Tim. 43 are quite different) have proposed improbable corrections of the text. *Tota* corresponds with the words κατὰ πᾶν ἑαυτοῦ in Plato, Tim. 51 A τῷ τὰ τῶν πάντων ἀεί τε ὄντων κατὰ πᾶν ἑαυτοῦ πολλάκις ἀφομοιώματα καλῶς μέλλοντι δέχεσθαι: cf. also Sext. A. M. 10, 312 δι' ὅλων τρεπτή, of the Stoic ἄποιος ὕλη: so Philosophumena x. 6; Sen. dial. 8, 5, 6 materia continua et per totum mutabilis; Diog. 8, 25. For *omnia* cf. also 2, 118; Tim. 50 B δέχεται γὰρ ἀεὶ τὰ πάντα: ib. 51 A εἶδος πανδεχές: also Okellus as reported in Stob. Phys. 424 ὕλα τὸ πανδεχές, which expression Aristotle twice quotes from Plato's *Timaeus*.

5. **eoque**: here = atque adeo, a somewhat rare usage in Latin before Velleius.

6. **interire non in nihilum**: cf. Arist. Met. 1, 3, 983 b 8 ἐξ οὗ γίγνεται τὰ ὄντα πρώτου, καὶ εἰς ὃ φθείρεται τελευταῖον, τῆς μὲν οὐσίας ὑπομενούσης, τοῖς δὲ πάθεσι μεταβαλλούσης, τοῦτο στοιχεῖον καὶ ταύτην ἀρχήν φασιν εἶναι τῶν ὄντων· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὔτε γίγνεσθαι οὐθὲν οἴονται οὔτε ἀπόλλυσθαι, ὡς τῆς τοιαύτης φύσεως ἀεὶ σωζομένης. The word *interire*, which should imply the vanishing out of existence, is so modified by the next words as to be seen to mean mere dissolution into constituent parts. For *interire in suas partis* cf. Velleius 2, 123, 3 in sua resolutus initia (of the death of Augustus). The words *non in nihilum* etc. would seem to have been inserted with special reference to the Epicureans; thus Lucretius repeatedly asserts that nothing but the atom can prevent things from vanishing into utter nothingness; cf. 1, 216; 1, 746—757 where see Munro's notes. M. thinks that in our passage there may be a reference to the actual words of the poet.

infinite secari ac diuidi: Lucr. 1, 746 finem non esse secandis corporibus; N. D. 3, 29 secari ac diuidi, where the whole context strongly recalls the passage of Lucretius above quoted.

8. **minimum**: = absolute least, for which sense see Munro on Lucr. 1, 602. The possibility of τομὴ εἰς ἄπειρον was denied not only by Leucippus, Democri-

etiam interire non in nihilum, sed in suas partis, quae infinite secari ac diuidi possint, cum sit nihil omnino in rerum natura minimum quod diuidi nequeat: quae autem moueantur, omnia interuallis moueri, quae interualla item infinite diuidi possint. Et cum ita moueatur illa uis, quam qualitatem esse diximus, et **28**

H; *formas omnis* e coni. Dauisii B; *tot formas* Bentl.; *una omnia* M. Vid. adn. 5 possit: A Harl. 1, Burn.; *possint* GPVE Al. 2, Harl. 2. mutari: *mutare* codd., nam Goerenzio confirmanti se in tribus codicibus inuenisse *mutari*, non credo. eoque: codd., exc. A (*eo*); *eaque* post Dau. H; *atque* M; *eamque* Christ. 6 interire: *omnia int.* Lamb. 10 et cum: hic desinit MS Al. 2.

tus and Epicurus, but in a sense by Plato, who founded all material existence on certain least possible or indivisible triangles (Zeller, II 1, p. 677 ed. 3, E. Tr. p. 375). From this, as Zeller remarks, it was but a short step to Atomism in some shape or other. Xenocrates denied *πᾶν μέγεθος διαιρετὸν εἶναι καὶ μέρος ἔχειν, εἶναι γάρ τινας ἀτόμους γραμμάς*, according to Simplic. Phys. fol. 30 a, qu. by Ritter and Preller § 300. Aristotle, Met. 1, 9, 992 a, 22 says, of Plato, *πολλάκις ἐτίθει ἀτόμους γραμμάς*, but the doctrine is not found in Plato's extant works. Heraclides Ponticus too believed in a sort of atom, which he called *ὄγκος* (Zeller, II 1, p. 886, or E. Tr. p. 607), while Eudoxus went back to the *ὁμοιομέρειαι* of Anaxagoras. Chrysippus merely drew a distinction between *τομὴ ἄπειρος* and *ἀκατάληκτος*, denying the former and affirming the latter (Diog. 7, 150). After Aristotle the infinite divisibility of matter became and till modern times remained an orthodox doctrine. Aristotle's arguments will be found summarised in a n. by Zeller, II 2, p. 396, ed. 3. The Stoics, particularly Chrysippus, followed Aristotle very closely; see Stob. Phys. 344 and Diog. L. 7, 150. Cicero commonly scouts the atom as an absurdity; so in Fin. 1, 20 ne illud quidem physici credere esse minimum; N. D. 1, 65. It was generally supposed that mathematicians had absolutely disproved the possibility of a limit being set to the subdivision of matter; cf. esp. Galen De Plac. Hipp. et Plat. 7, p. 663, ed. Müller. On the other hand hear Hume, Essays II, p. 128, ed. Green and Grose, 'no priestly dogmas invented on purpose to tame and subdue the rebellious reason of mankind ever shocked common sense more than the doctrine of the infinite divisibility of extension, with their consequences, as they are pompously displayed by all geometricians and metaphysicians'.

9. **interuallis moueri**: those interpreters (Kirchmann and others) who have understood *interuallis* to refer to time, are indubitably mistaken. The reference most certainly is to the refutation given by Aristotle and his successors of the leading argument advanced by the atomists to prove the existence of void; viz. that without it motion would be impossible. The answer was that motion takes place by one thing yielding up its place to another (Arist. Phys. 4, cc. 7, 8; cf. Zeller, II 2, p. 398 sq.). *Interuallis* here therefore means 'by the creation of room'. Lucretius combats the Aristotelian argument in 1, 370 sq. Antiochus seems to have followed Aristotle in altogether denying the possibility of Void (cf. De Fat. 24). Strato allowed its possibility within, while denying its existence without the universe (Stob. Phys. 380); the Stoics did the exact opposite, affirming its existence without and denying it within (Zeller, III 1, p. 181 ed. 3 or Stoics, p. 186, E. Tr.). For the different notions attached by the ancient thinkers to the terms *τόπος χώρα κενὸν* the student must go to Zeller. [As to some of the ancient problems connected with motion and void, see N. D. 1, 65; Sen. N. Q. 2, 7, 2; Sext. A. M. 10, §§ 83, 85, 131, 132.]

quae interualla...possint: according to Aristotle space and time as much as matter are potentially divisible to infinity. Such too was the doctrine of the Stoics; Zeller, as above.

10. **et cum ita moueatur etc.**: we have here expressed rather the Stoic than the Aristotelian idea of force, which made it physically inseparable from matter. The Stoics actually realised to themselves their *ποιότητες* as air-currents;

cum sic ultro citroque uersetur, et materiam ipsam totam penitus commutari putant et illa effici, quae appellant qualia, e quibus in omni natura cohaerente et continuata cum omnibus suis partibus effectum esse mundum, extra quem nulla pars materiae sit nullumque corpus, partis autem esse mundi omnia, quae insint

1 sic: *sit* GE. ultro citroque: *ultro in utroque* codd. (etiam A, de quo errat H), exc. GV (*ultro introque*); uetus correctio. et materiam: *mat. iam* G;

see Zeller, III 1, p. 145 or p. 134 of the E. Tr.

et cum...et cum: cf. §§ 38, 39 cumque ...cumque...cumque...cumque.

ita...sic: these words refer to the process as described in § 24.

1. **ultro citroque uersetur**: cf. N. D. 2, 84 naturis his ex quibus omnia constant sursus deorsus, ultro citro commeantibus; ib. 1, 27 animum esse per naturam rerum omnem intentum et commeantem; Plin. n. h. 2, 104 ultro citro commeante natura. The phrases *ultro citroque*, *ultro et citro* are very common in Cic. (who however does not use *ultro citro* except in balanced clauses such as we have in N. D. 2, 84 quoted above); see e.g. Verr. 5, 170; Sext. Rosc. 60; Off. 1, 17. [Ultro citroque should be read in Val. Max. 9, 8, ext. 1 for *ultra citraque*, for which expression there is no authority.]

materiam...commutari: cf. N. D, 3, 92 materiam rerum ex qua et in qua omnia sint, totam esse flexibilem et commutabilem.

2. **qualia**: here no doubt the four elements are meant, for they, according to the Stoics, were the first product of the union of Matter with Force.

3. **in omni natura**: 'by operations extending over the whole of the substance'. Here *natura* = οὐσία = ὕλη. [For the renderings of οὐσία cf. n. on 2, 77.] Most edd. since Davies cast out *in*, without any need; cf. Fin. 4, 36 in tota eius (sc. hominis) natura quaerere quid sit effectum (where Madvig rightly construes *in tota eius natura* with *effectum*, not with *quaerere*); N. D. 2, 35 in omni natura necesse est absolui aliquid; ib. 2, 28 in omni natura fusum; ib. 2, 80 quae inessent in omni mundo; also below, 2, 75 in consuetudine probari. For the expression 'omnis natura' cf. Leg. 1, 21; N. D. 2, 57. [In Leg. 1, 18 *insita in natura* the preposition, ejected by Madvig and Halm, should be retained.]

cohaerente: cf. N. D. 2, 155 mundi cohaerentia. Cohaerere often means 'to form an organised whole'; so above in § 24; cf. too N. D. 2, 82 nos cum dicimus natura constare administrarique mundum, non ita dicimus ut glebam aut fragmentum lapidis aut aliquid eius modi nulla cohaerendi natura, sed ut arborem, ut animal; see Schömann's n. there, also N. D. 2, 115 and Tusc. 3, 61 with Kühner's n.; Sen. N. Q. 2, 2, 4.

continuata cum suis partibus: these expressions come ultimately from the Stoics, who insisted far more than any other philosophers on the unity pervading the physical world. Cf. N. D. 2, 19 rerum consentiens conspirans continuata cognatio; also ib. 2, 119; ib. 3, 28 sq.; Diu. 2, 33; Leg. fragm. 1 (Bait. and Halm); Zeller, III 1, p. 146 sq. or Stoics, p. 137 E. Tr.; Stob. Phys. 496. In N. D. 2, 84 it is stated that the unity of the κόσμος is secured by the harmonious alternation of the four elements.

partibus: since the world was to the Stoics (as to Plato) ζῷον they often speak of its divisions as *membra*. In Plut. Κοιν. ἐνν. 1079 there is an obscure Stoic opinion ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκ πλειόνων μορίων ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἢ ὁ δάκτυλος, οὐδὲ ὁ κόσμος ἢ ὁ ἄνθρωπος. In N. D. 1, 100 an enumeration of the *mundi membra* is given. The 'partes mundi' are mentioned in N. D. II, 19, 22, 25, 28, 30, 32, 37, 75, 86, 87, 115, 116 all from Stoic sources; cf. also Fin. 1, 19; Sen. N. Q. 2, 3, 1 and 2, 4, 2; Varro ap. Aug. 7, 5.

4. **extra quem...sit**: probably a hint at the Epicureans, who declared that boundless quantities of unorganised atoms existed.

6. **natura sentiente**: i.e. the Stoic divinity who holds all together; so N. D. 2, 85 aut nihil est quod sentiente natura regatur, aut mundum regi confitendum est; ib. 2, 75 omnis res subiectas esse naturae sentienti; ib. 2, 22 mundi partes sentientes sunt; Diu. 1, 118 uis quaedam sentiens. Cf. Diog. 7, 139 θεὸν αἰσθητικῶς ὥσπερ κεχωρηκέναι διὰ τῶν

in eo, quae natura sentiente teneantur, in qua ratio perfecta insit, quae sit eadem sempiterna: nihil enim ualentius esse a quo intereat: quam uim animum esse dicunt mundi eandemque esse **29** mentem sapientiamque perfectam, quem deum appellant, omni-

etiam mat. H. 2 et illa: *et ita* U. 3 in omni: om. *in* (post Dau.) Goer. HBM. cohaerente: *cohercente* MSS exc. GV Harl. 2 U (?). 4 effectum: *unum effectum* GHBM. 5 partis: sic AEU Harl. 1, 3.

ἐν ἀέρι καὶ διὰ τῶν ζῴων ἁπάντων καὶ φυτῶν: also 7, 143 where it is said that the κόσμος, being a ζῷον, has οὐσίαν ἔμψυχον αἰσθητικήν. See too n. on 2, 119 animalis intellegentia. [Augustine borrows from Cic. the phrase *natura sentiens* in Ciu. d. 12, 1.]

teneantur: put here for *contineantur* or *sustineantur*, as in N. D. 2, 83 terra natura tenetur ac uiget (continetur a line or two above); ib. 2, 31; Diu. 1, 64; Leg. 1, 23; with which passages cf. N. D. 1, 39.

ratio perfecta: thoroughly Stoic; see N. D. 2, 34; ib. 3, 22; Zeller, III 1, 143 or Stoics, p. 139, E. Tr.; also below. With regard to *insit* it may be noted that while the Stoics believed that God and the Universe are coextensive and identical, they sometimes spoke of God as being contained *within* the Universe; an inevitable inconsistency with which Aristotle is also charged in N. D. 1, 33: cf. ib. 2, 34.

7. **sempiterna**: Aristotle was the first to hold this view to the fullest extent; cf. n. on 2, 119. Most of the Stoics (not however Panaetius—see Stob. Phys. 414) believed that the present order of the world would one day be swept away by fire (ἐκπύρωσις) or flood; see Zeller, III 1, 153 ed. 3 or Stoics, pp. 155 sq. But this destruction was merely an absorption of the parts of the universe into the being of the World-God, who is eternal and beyond reach of harm (Diog. 7, 134 and 138 and 147) and reconstructs the world out of his own substance.

nihil ualentius: an argument often urged; cf. N. D. 2, 31 quid potest esse mundo ualentius? Sen. N. Q. 6, 4, 1 quid sit terra ualentius? See also Boethus qu. by Zeller, Stoics, p. 159, E. Tr.

a quo intereat: here *interire* replaces the passive of *perdere* which is excessively rare in good Latin, except in the participle; for the constr. cf. 2, 105 a sole collucet; also ἀναστῆναι, ἐκπίπτειν ὑπό τινος.

8. **animum mundi**: there is no need to read *animam*, as Cic. frequently translates ψυχή by animus; e.g. Tim. 42 omnis animus uniuersae naturae (in Plato ἡ τοῦ παντὸς ψυχή). The Stoics called their World-God, according to his different aspects, God, Soul, Mind, Reason, Nature, Zeus, Universal Law, Providence, Wisdom, Fate, Fortune, Universal Substance, Fire, Ether, All-pervading Air-Current etc. See Zeller, Stoics, cc. 6, 7 passim. The whole of this section is so undilutedly Stoic that one can only marvel how Antiochus contrived to harmonize it with the teaching of the earlier Platonists and Aristotelians. He no doubt relied chiefly on the *Timaeus* of Plato, where the theory of a Soul of the Universe was first clearly propounded, though something resembling it is often attributed to earlier thinkers; see Brandis, Entwickelung d. Griech. Phil. p. 49 n. With this whole § cf. N. D. 1, 39 (taken from Philodemus) Chrysippus ait uim diuinam in ratione esse positam et in uniuersae naturae animo atque mente; ipsumque mundum deum dicit esse, et eius animi fusionem uniuersam (where Cic. is not translating Philod. but representing the Stoic expression κρᾶσις δι' ὅλων); tum eius ipsius principatum, qui in mente et ratione uersetur, communemque rerum naturam uniuersitatemque omnia continentem; tum fatalem uim (MSS *umbram*) et necessitatem rerum futurarum; ignem praeterea et aethera; Sen. ben. 4, c. 7; Diog. 7, 135. See also n. on 2, 126. [Varro in his 'Antiquitates', no doubt borrowing from Antiochus, declared 'deum esse animam motu ac ratione mundum gubernantem'; see Aug. ciu. d. 4, 31; cf. also ib. 7, cc. 5, 6.]

9. **mentem**: cf. N. D. 2, 58 mens mundi.

sapientiam: in N. D. 2, 36 it is maintained by the Stoic that the *mundus* is *sapiens;* the utterance is severely criticised in N. D. 3, 23.

quem: not *quam;* so *eandem* above; see n. on 2, 30 ipse sensus est.

deum: as is remarked in N. D. 1, 30,

umque rerum, quae sunt ei subiectae, quasi prudentiam quandam, procurantem caelestia maxime, deinde in terris ea, quae pertinent ad homines: quam interdum eandem necessitatem appellant, quia nihil aliter possit atque ab ea constitutum sit, inter quasi fatalem et immutabilem continuationem ordinis sempiterni: non numquam quidem eandem fortunam, quod efficiat

1 sunt: *sint* M; at non opus; hic enim Varro indicat se quoque sentire ea quae Antiochus disputasset. 2 pertinent: *pertineant* GPHBM. 4 sit inter: sic codd. (etiam Eψ) exc. V (*interdum*, quod etiam P habet in margine, idemque coni. Lamb.) et U (?); *item* (quod etiam P in marg.) Bentl.; *ire* coni. Dau.; *euenire* Turn.

Plato had already made the κόσμος a god. See Mayor's nn. there. Cf. too what Diog. 8, 25 and 27 says of Pythagoras.

1. **sunt...pertinent**: these indicatives, after the subjunctives in the preceding section, seem to imply a more unhesitating acceptance by the speaker of these particular doctrines than of the rest.

subiectae: below, n. on § 31.

quasi...quandam: see n. on § 21 quasi partem quandam.

prudentiam: the Stoic πρόνοια, for which see Zeller, Stoics, c. 7 E. Tr. Cic. renders the word both by *prudentia* and by *prouidentia* in the same passage, N. D. 2, 58; so too, ib. 2, 77—80; ib. 1, 18 by *prouidentia*. Cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. 10, 8, 13 εἰ τις ἐπιμέλεια τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ὑπὸ θεῶν γίγνεται, ὥσπερ δοκεῖ.

2. **procurantem**: the word strictly implies the action of a person who conducts affairs under authority from another (see n. on § 11); it is however often applied to the divine government of the world.

3. **homines**: see n. on 2, 120 nostra causa.

necessitatem: the idea of ἀνάγκη is widely spread in Greek literature and philosophy. Fate was very generally supposed to be something above and controlling Zeus and the gods; sometimes however, Zeus and Fate are identified, as in Eur. Tro. 886 Ζεὺς εἴτ' ἀνάγκη φύσεος. The notion of Fate which we have here is distinctively Stoic; i.e. that of the interdependent chain of events, each event being determined and conditioned by its predecessors; see Zeller, III 1, 157 sq. or E. Tr. pp. 160 sq. The term generally used by the Stoics was εἱμαρμένη, and it is an illustration of the peculiar use they made of etymology when we find it defined as εἱρμὸς αἰτιῶν (Plutarch) or αἰτία τῶν ὄντων εἰρομένη (Diog. 7, 149). In Fat. 41 (partly confirmed by Plac. Phil. 1, 27) it is said that Chrysippus rejected *necessitas* = ἀνάγκην and accepted *fatum* = εἱμαρμένην, but in the Stoic texts ἀνάγκη is sometimes used indifferently for εἱμαρμένη and both are given as names for the Stoic God in a quotation from Chrysippus by Philodemus,—the passage represented in N. D. 1, 39. The following passages give the Stoic definition of destiny; viz. Diu. 1, 125 ordinem seriemque caussarum, cum caussa caussae nexa rem ex se gignat; ib. 1, 127 conligationem caussarum omnium; N. D. 1, 55 illa fatalis necessitas, quam εἱμαρμένην dicitis, ut quidquid accidat, id ex aeterna ueritate caussarumque continuatione fluxisse dicatis; Fat. 20 caussarum seriem sempiternam; ib. fragm. 2 conexio rerum per aeternitatem se inuicem tenens; Top. 59 ex hoc genere caussarum ex aeternitate pendentium fatum a Stoicis nectitur; Plac. Phil. 1, 27 συμπλοκὴν αἰτιῶν τεταγμένην...εἱρμὸν αἰτιῶν, τάξιν καὶ ἐπισύνδεσιν ἀπαράβατον: cf. also the quotations in Zeller, Stoics, E. Tr. p. 161 n. and the following passages of Seneca, viz. Ep. 16, 6; ib. 19, 6; ib. 77, 12; ib. 88, 15; ib. 101, 7; N. Q. 1, 1, 4; ib. 2, 32, 1; ib. 2, 36, 1; Dial. 1, 5, 7; ib. 12, 8, 3. The Stoic conception of Fate often appears in the non-philosophic portion of the later Latin literature; e.g. Liu. 25, 6, 6 immobilis rerum humanarum ordo; Tac. An. 6, 22, 4 nexum naturalium causarum; Curt. 5, 11, 10 equidem aeterna constitutione (? continuatione) crediderim nexuque causarum latentium et multo ante destinatarum suum quemque ordinem immutabili lege percurrere; Lucan. 1, 70 inuida fatorum series; Aug. ciu. d. 5, 9. In Plato, ἀνάγκη is an utterly irrational and irregular force, very like Chance as popularly conceived, and entirely unlike the *necessitas* described here as 'old Academic'; cf.

multa improuisa ac necopinata nobis propter obscuritatem ignorationemque caussarum.

VIII. Tertia deinde philosophiae pars, quae erat in ra- **30**
tione et in disserendo, sic tractabatur ab utrisque. Quamquam oriretur a sensibus, tamen non esse iudicium ueritatis in

BM; coniecit H, nec tamen recepit, *interuenire.* 6 non numquam quidem: *quidem* om. GHBM. 7 ac necop.: MSS *hec nec.; et n.* HBM; *ac* coni. H. 11 oriretur: codd. omn.; *oreretur* HB non necessario; cf. Neue, Form. II² 418; *iudicium oriretur* Lamb. non: om. G. esse: *est* E.

Plat. Tim. 47, 48, Grote's Plato III, pp. 248—259. Aristotle is styled by Cicero a fatalist in Fat. 39; and although he spoke of *τὸ αὐτόματον* and *τύχη* as *causes*, yet he did not mean that they were irregular or disorderly causes, but rather that in them were exhibited the orderly action of an unintelligent, as opposed to an intelligent principle; cf. Heath in Journal of Philology 7, 97 sq. Aristotle's views of *τύχη* and *τὸ αὐτόματον* are given in Phys. II cc. 4—6; of *ἀνάγκη* ib. cc. 8, 9.

4. **quia ... constitutum sit**: cf. the hymn of Cleanthes, v. 16 *οὐδέ τι γίγνεται ἔργον ἐπὶ χθονὶ σοῦ δίχα δαῖμον.*

possit: sc. fieri; see n. on 2, 121.

inter: this use of the word, to introduce a consideration accounting for, or confirming a previous statement, is rare in Cic., and not used by Caesar or Nepos, though several exx. occur in Sallust and the usage becomes pretty common in later prose; see Nägelsbach, Stil. § 124, 6.

5. **quasi...continuationem**: quasi as usual points to a translation from the Greek = *κατηναγκασμένην τινα καὶ ἀπαράβατον συμπλοκήν.*

6. **fortunam**: the Stoics defined *τύχη* as *αἰτία ἄδηλος ἀνθρωπίνῳ λογισμῷ*; see Plac. Phil. I, 29 and Stob. Phys. 218 where the same view is attributed to Anaxagoras, and cf. Arist. Phys. 2, 5, 196 b 5 *εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἷς δοκεῖ εἶναι αἰτία μὲν ἡ τύχη, ἄδηλος δὲ ἀνθρωπίνῃ διανοίᾳ ὡς θεῖόν τι οὖσα καὶ δαιμονιώτερον.* The idea has been a thousand times expressed in literature; cf. Pope's line 'all Chance, Direction which thou canst not see'; Chamfort 'le hasard est un sobriquet de la Providence', thus pirated by Gautier 'le hasard est un pseudonyme de la Providence' (see Fournier, 'l'esprit des autres', Paris 1879). A character in 'Wilhelm Meister' curiously regards Chance as the imperfect instrument to which Fate entrusts the execution of its decrees. [This idea too is ancient, cf. Macrob. sat. 5, 16, 8 philosophi qui eam (fortunam) nominant nihil sua ui posse sed decreti siue prouidentiae ministram esse uoluerunt.] Servius on Aen. 8, 334 objects to the identification by Virgil of Fate with Fortune; for Livy see Weissenborn, Einl. p. 19; cf. also Seneca, Ben. 4, 8, 3 nunc naturam uoca fatum fortunam, omnia eiusdem dei nomina sunt uarie utentis potestate sua; Cic. Top. 63 cum enim nihil sine caussa fiat, hoc ipsum est fortunae euentus, obscura caussa quae latenter efficitur; Aug. ciu. d. 5, 9 nos eas causas quae dicuntur fortuitae, unde etiam fortuna nomen accepit, non esse dicimus nullas sed latentes; Sen. ep. 117, 19.

7. **necopinata**: for this Cic. often has *inopinata*, as in Tusc. 3, 55; 3, 76; 4, 37; 5, 81. The occurrence of *nec*opinata immediately after *ac* is curious, but the *ac* rendered it impossible to use *inopinata;* see n. on 2, 34. Necopinata is here no doubt a translation of *παράδοξα*, as inopinata is in Sen. ep. 81, 11.

ignorationem caussarum: the same words in Diu. 2, 49; cf. Aug. cont. Ac. 1, 1.

9. **erat**: 'was, as we said': the Platonic *ἦν*.

ratione...disserendo: a double rendering of *λογική*: cf. Fin. 4, 18 cupiditas rationis explicandae disserendique. There is not the least need to read *oratione*, with Turnebus and others.

11. **oriretur**: the MSS of Cic. generally vary between the forms *oriretur* and *oreretur;* see Neue, Form. II² 418. The subjunctive is of course purely due to the *oratio obliqua*, since Cic. does not, like the later prose writers, make a subjunctive depend directly on *quamquam*; see above, n. on § 13. The subject of the verb is *iudicium* not *ueritas.*

iudicium: the regular translation of *κριτήριον* = 'standard', 'test', found in all Greek philosophical literature after Plato (Theaet. 178 B). Aristotle only has

sensibus. Mentem uolebant rerum esse iudicem: solam cen-
sebant idoneam cui crederetur, quia sola cerneret id, quod semper
esset simplex et unius modi et tale quale esset. Hanc illi ἰδέαν
appellant, iam a Platone ita nominatam, nos recte speciem
31 possumus dicere. Sensus autem omnis hebetes et tardos esse
arbitrabantur, nec percipere ullo modo res eas, quae subiectae

1 uolebant: *uolentem* V. rerum esse: *esse rerum* (cum Gr) HB. Vid. adn. 3 ἰδέαν: *ideam* AGPrU et Harl 3; *idem* E; *idem ideam* Vψ. 4 appellant: *appellabant* AV Harl. 1, Burn. iam...nominatam: incl. M sine caussa. nominatam: *appellatam* r; cf. supra § 25. 5 omnis: sic AEUψ Harl. 1, Burn. esse: om. G. 6 arbitrabantur: *arbitrantur* U. percipere: *percipi* Christ. "quod perceptio sit mentis, non sensuum"; falso ille quidem, cum perceptio et mentis sit et sensuum; cf. §§ 40, 41, et 2 §§ 30, 31. *Percipi* scripsit

the word once, Met. x 6, 1063 a 3; he usually expresses the same idea by κανὼν or (like Protagoras) μέτρον; cf. Eth. Nic. 3, 4, 5; also De An. 1, 5, 411 a 6, where the κανὼν is called κριτὴς τοῦ εὐθέος καὶ τοῦ καμπύλου: Heraclitus fr. 32 (ed. Bywater) εἰ πάντα τὰ ὄντα καπνὸς γένοιτο, ῥῖνες ἂν διαγνοῖεν: Xen. Mem. 1, 4, 5 γλῶττα is the γνώμων τῶν διὰ στόματος ἡδονῶν. [Cf. norma in § 42. In Fin. 5, 27 κριτήριον is rendered by *terminatio*.]

1. **mentem...iudicem**: cf. Tusc. 1, 46 where 'animus' is said to be 'solus iudex' of all sensations; also n. on 2, 30 ipse sensus. The doctrine in the text is of course true of Plato and also of Aristotle, to whom truth lies in ἐπιστήμη, which is apprehended by νοῦς through τὰ καθόλου: cf. esp. Anal. Post. 1, c. 33 (88 b 36) λέγω νοῦν ἀρχὴν ἐπιστήμης. Both the Epicureans (see n. on 2, 79) and the Stoics (below, § 41) attributed much value to the senses as guides to truth.

rerum esse: Halm's reading *esse rerum* gives a perfect iambic line, with a long pause before it and after it, so that there is no possibility of avoiding it in reading. I venture to assert that no real parallel to this can be found in the works of Cicero. He strongly condemns such verses in Orat. 194 sq.; De Or. 3, 174 and 182 sq., and his practice is in accordance with this condemnation. Editors are fond of pointing out complete lines, but they are always such as Cic. describes himself in Or. 189, lines which would not be observed if the passages were read naturally, with due regard to the pauses. To this class belong De Or. 1, 193 and 3, 20, pointed out by Sorof on De Or. 3, 175; add Cato m. 47. Occasionally hexameter endings are found, for which see n. on 2, 117. In Cato m. § 2 Madvig and others introduce an iambic line in defiance of MSS authority; see my n. there. Cf. Quint. 9, 4, 76 sq.

3. **simplex ..esset**: all the expressions here are copied from Plato's descriptions of the ἰδέαι: cf. especially Phaedo 78 D ἕκαστον, ὃ ἔστι, μονοειδὲς ὂν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ, ὡσαύτως καὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχει καὶ οὐδέποτε οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς ἀλλοίωσιν οὐδεμίαν ἐνδέχεται: Symp. 211 B αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ μεθ' αὑτοῦ μονοειδὲς ἀεὶ ὄν: Tim. 35 A οὐσίας ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἐχούσης, which Cic. Tim. 21 translates by 'materia quae est unius modi'; Tim. 28 A τὸ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχον, rendered in Tim. 4 by 'ea species quae semper est eadem'; Tusc. 1, 58 id solum esse quod semper tale sit quale sit, quam ἰδέαν appellat ille, nos speciem; Quint. 11, 3, 44 μονοειδές, quasi quidam unus aspectus. *Unius modi* is an old Latin phrase; cf. Ter. Haut. 205. [See n. on 2, 129 Euclides.]

hanc illi ἰδέαν: *hanc* is put for *hoc* by attraction; see n. on 2, 30. *Illi* of course denotes the supposed harmonious school comprising the early Peripatetics and Platonists, yet in § 33 emphasis is laid on the fact that Aristotle destroyed the theory of ἰδέαι. See my n. there.

4. **speciem**: the ordinary rendering of ἰδέα: cf. Tusc. 1, 58 quoted above. Tim. §§ 22, 35; Orat. 9; Top. 30. Sometimes Cic. has *forma* (as Or. 10); *exemplar* is common in Seneca.

5. **sensus omnis etc.**: in this passage all sense-perception is said to be tainted by uncertainty; in 2, §§ 12—64 (which professes to be taken from Antiochus) sense-perceptions are divided into a fallible and an infallible class, the latter class serving

sensibus uiderentur, quae essent aut ita paruae, ut sub sensum
cadere non possent, aut ita mobiles et concitatae, ut nihil um-
quam unum esset aut constans, ne idem quidem, quia continenter
laberentur et fluerent omnia. Itaque hanc omnem partem rerum
opinabilem appellabant. Scientiam autem nusquam esse cen- 32
sebant nisi in animi notionibus atque rationibus: qua de caussa

B. res eas: *r. ullas* GHBM. 7 quae essent aut: *quod autem ita essent* G; *q. aut. i.e.* HBM. 9 esset aut: sic scripsi; *esset* codd.; *esset et* HBM; sed *et* inter *nihil* et *ne...quidem* positum mihi non placet. ne idem: *eidem* codd. omn.; corr. Man. quia: om. ψ. 10 partem: *artem* Nonius; cf. § 23. 12 notionibus: *motionibus* codd.; corr. Lamb., codicis cuiusdam auctoritatem se sequi professus. Sic supra (v. 5) cod. Burn. *nobiles* habet pro *mobiles*.

as the basis for knowledge; cf. particularly § 19 sensibus, quorum ita clara et certa indicia sunt etc. As they stand, the two passages are difficult to reconcile. It may be that in the words we have before us, Cic. has substituted his own recollections of Plato and some others of the ancients for the account actually given by Antiochus; or it may be that *sensus omnis* means sense alone, without the action of thought.

6. **percipere**: = καταλαμβάνεσθαι: see n. on § 41. Christ's reading *percipi* 'quod perceptio sit mentis non sensuum' is a needless corruption of the text; if objects can be said 'sensibus percipi' or 'comprehendi' as in § 41, also 2, 21; 2, 101; 2, 119; then the senses may very well be said to perceive the objects.

quae subiectae sensibus uiderentur: 'which were commonly thought to fall within the province of the senses'. For 'subiectae sensibus' cf. 2, 74 sub eos (sc. sensus) subiecta; Diu. 2, 12; also τὰ ὑποκείμενα ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι in Sext. P. H. 1, 47 and often.

7. **aut ita paruae, etc.**: two difficulties in the way of the senses are here mentioned, one lying in themselves, and caused by the limitations which their construction imposes, the other caused by the inconstant nature of the external objects.

sub sensum cadere: so in Sext. P. H. 1, 46 and A. M. 8, 9 τὰ ὑποπίπτοντα τῇ αἰσθήσει and often; also in Epict. etc.

8. **aut ita mobiles**: these words recall those parts of Plato (particularly in the 'Theaetetus' and 'Sophistes') where the Heraclitean doctrine of Flux is stated; cf. too Phaedo 90 B—E.

nihil unum: these two words taken together form the subject of *esset*: 'no single object'.

9. **constans**: ἑστηκός, frequent in Plat. Theaet. and Sophist.

ne idem quidem: 'no, nor even the same'. It is repeatedly argued in the two dialogues of Plato just referred to, that things do not retain their identity from moment to moment; even the word ἐμὲ is said to be an absurdity, since it implies a permanent subject; the correct expression would be τοὺς ἐμέ.

continenter: συνεχῶς: cf. Simplicius (qu. by Grote, Plato 1 p. 37) ἐν μεταβολῇ γὰρ συνεχεῖ τὰ ὄντα, of Heraclitus; Sext. P. H. 3, 54 συνεχὴς ῥεῦσις.

10. **laberentur et fluerent**: cf. N.D. 1, 39 ea quae natura fluerent atque manarent, ut et aquam et terram et aera; Or. 10 has rerum formas appellat ἰδέας, easque gigni negat et ait semper esse ac ratione et intellegentia contineri; cetera nasci occidere fluere labi nec diutius esse uno et eodem statu; also the phrases ῥοή, πάντα ῥεῖ, οἷον ῥεύματα κινεῖσθαι τὰ πάντα, etc. are scattered thickly over the Theaet. and other ancient texts which touch on the doctrines of Heraclitus.

11. **opinabilem**: = δοξαστήν. In Tim. 3 Cic. renders δοξαστὸν by *opinabile*. Plato often contrasts δοξαστὸς with νοητός: so too Aristotle has δοξαστὸς and ἐπιστητὸς in Analyt. Post. 1, 33, 88 b 30 (qu. in R. and P. § 317 b). Xenocrates (ap. Sext. A. M. 7, 147) maintained that there were three οὐσίαι, the αἰσθητή, the νοητὴ and the δοξαστή.

nusquam nisi: cf. § 19 neque ulla alia in re nisi.

12. **animi notionibus**: the reading *motionibus* would mean 'emotions' and

definitiones rerum probabant, et has ad omnia, de quibus disceptabatur, adhibebant. Verborum etiam explicatio probabatur, id est, qua de caussa quaeque essent ita nominata, quam ἐτυμο-

1 definitiones: *diffinitiones* AEψ Burn.; cf. supra, §§ 5, 17. ad: om. A. 2 probabatur: *probatur* AEUψ Harl. 1, Burn. 3 nominata: *nomina* E. 4 argumentis: *arg. quibusdam* GHBM. quasi rerum notis ducibus: sic codd. omn., si eos praetereas qui, ut praedicarunt Man. Lamb., uocem *ducibus* omittunt; *nodis* pro *notis* Bentl.; *rerum notis quasi ducibus* Dau. BM; *notationibus* pro *notis*

would thus make nonsense; cf. *commotiones* in Tusc. 5, 42 and *permotio* below, 2, 135. 'Animi notio' is one of the ordinary translations of ἔννοια, for which see n. on 2, 30. Cic. here seems to imply that there was practically little difference between Plato's ἰδέαι and Aristotle's ἔννοιαι τῶν καθόλου. All the schools after Zeno's time appear to have been so influenced by the Stoic dialectic as to have lost the true views about these portions of the Aristotelian and Platonic systems.

1. **definitiones rerum**: here intended to be pointedly contrasted with 'definitiones nominum'. Aristotle in Anal. Post. 2, 7 (qu. in R. and P. § 318 a) points out the difference between the 'definitio rei' and the 'definitio nominis'; the former marks out the species comprised under a genus of actually existent objects, the latter merely explains the use of terms, which may apply to objects without existence altogether, τραγέλαφος for example. In most cases, however, the two processes, 'definitio rei' and 'd. nominis' coincide; cf. De Or. 2, 108 d. uerbi, quid sit ars. For the Aristotelian theory of definition cf. R. and P. § 323; also Grote's 'Aristotle', the passages referred to in the index s. v. 'definition'. In writing the words we have before us, Cic. (or rather Antiochus) probably had mainly in view (cf. Rep. 1, 38) the Platonic dialogues, in nearly all of which definition is prominent; see esp. Grote's articles on the 'Sophistes' and 'Politicus'. The Stoics laid great stress on definition; see Zeller, footnote on p. 70 of the E. Tr.

2. **uerborum explicatio**: quite different from the 'definitio nominis' referred to in the preceding note; here 'derivation' is meant, which does not necessitate 'definition'.

3. **id est**: these words introduce an explanation of the phrase 'uerborum explicatio', which is used as a translation of ἐτυμολογία. As is the case with the other uses of *id est* (see nn. on §§ 6, 8) so in this use, where an explanation is given either of a Greek word, or of some unfamiliar expression used to render a Greek word, many of the clauses introduced by the phrase are unjustly cast out by modern editors on the suspicion that they are glosses. With our passage cf. 2, 93; Tusc. 3, 65, in both of which passages the Greek phrase comes *after* the Latin explanation, and has often been wrongly ejected. In dealing with those passages where the Latin explanation *follows* the Greek phrase, it should be remembered that Cic. very seldom (excepting in his Letters) introduces a Greek word without a comment on its meaning, unless the word has been thoroughly naturalised. Hence in N. D. 2, 73 πρόνοιαν id est prouidentiam, Halm is wrong in casting out the last three words; cf. ib. 1, 20 φυσιολογίαν, id est naturae rationem (where see Mayor's n.); also Att. 13, 38, 2; below, 2, 59. The Greek will be found introduced *after* the Latin rendering (but without *id est*) in 11, 17, 24, 26, 27, 29, 38, 54.

quaeque: 'each *set* of objects'. Only in this way is *quisque* used by Cic. in the plural, and then only in the neuter; see my n. on Lael. § 34.

ita: = ita ut sunt nominata.

ἐτυμολογίαν etc.: what we have here comes almost entirely from Stoic sources, though the Stoics themselves borrowed much from Plato's Cratylus and from the Heraclitean school there represented. The word ἐτυμολογία, like ἔτυμος and its other derivatives, is foreign to classical Greek prose; the first of them to appear is ἐτύμως in the 'De Mundo' ascribed to Aristotle but not really his, being steeped in Stoicism. 'Ετυμολογία is not very common in the remains of the older Stoics, who use rather ὀνομάτων ὀρθότης (Diog. L. 7, 83; Galen, De Plac. II, p. 214 ed. Müller), the phrase used in the 'Cratylus' 422 B etc.; the books on the subject mentioned by Diog. are generally entitled not

λογίαν appellabant: post argumentis et quasi rerum notis ducibus utebantur ad probandum et ad concludendum id, quod explanari uolebant: in quo tradebatur omnis dialecticae dis-

H. 6 in quo: scripsi cum Manutio (uid. adn.); *in qua* MSS; *ita* Maduig.; *denique* M, quam uocem Cicero initio clausulae ponere non solet; Halmio uerba 'in qua' spuria uisa sunt, et coni. *itaque*, nec tamen scripsit. dialecticae: *dialectica* A Harl. Oxx. r.

'*περὶ ἐτυμολογίας*' but '*περὶ τῶν ἐτυμολογικῶν*'. Though Zeno and Cleanthes gave the impulse to the pursuit of etymology (N. D. 3, 63) it was first thoroughly systematised by Chrysippus, after whose time it became distinctive of the Stoic school. It should be observed that Cic. proposed in Top. 35 *ueriloquium* as a rendering of *ἐτυμολογία* but rejected it in favour of *notatio;* Quintil. 1, 6, 28 mentions *originatio* as a translation offered by some, among whom we may probably reckon Varro; in his extant writings however he uses as Latin the Greek term. Cf. Sen. 95, 65 causarum inquisitionem etymologiam. Caussa is much used in connexion with etymology; cf. e.g. Liu. 1, 13, 8.

4. **post**: used like *postea* in § 42 for *tum* or *deinde* in enumerations; = 'next in order'. The adverbial use of *post* for *postea* is comparatively rare in early prose, except in expressions like *multis annis post* etc.

argumentis ... rerum notis: both these expressions are renderings of *σύμβολον*, which is represented by *nota* in Top. 35 as in Quint. 1, 6, 28; cf. too ib. 8, 6, 69 signis quasi quibusdam; ib. 10, 7, 6. *Quasi* simply marks, as usual, an unfamiliar translation from the Greek (see n. on § 17); the proposal of Dav. and others to place the word before *ducibus* is therefore thoroughly mistaken; *dux* is used most freely by Cic. in metaphorical applications and requires no qualification; (in N. D. 1, 40 quasi dux uitae, the *quasi* applies to the whole expression, not to dux alone). Halm's em. *notationibus* for *notis ducibus* betrays ignorance of the fact that *notatio* is used as a rendering of *ἐτυμολογία*, the science, and not to denote a particular derivation; see Top. 35. Bentley's *nodis* for *notis* must be perverse, as he cannot have been unaware of the common phrase 'rerum notae' (Fin. 5, 74 nomina et *tamquam* rerum notas); his em. receives no support from N. D. 3, 62 enodatio nominum, which is quite different.

5. **ad probandum**: etymology as a method of proof was adopted by Aristotle (see Bonitz, Ind. Ar. s. v. 'etymologica') and formulated in some of his rhetorical treatises, though not in any that we now possess. Plato too incidentally (apart from the 'Cratylus') draws arguments from derivations; Antiochus therefore had a colorable pretext for ascribing the practice to the Old Academics and Peripatetics (cf. Top. 10 and 35; De Or. 2, 165). But the practice was first persistently carried out by the Stoics, and particularly by Chrysippus. (Cf. Sext. A. M. 7, 9 where it is stated that dialectic has three branches, treating respectively of *ὅροι, διαιρέσεις, ἐτυμολογία.*) Specimens will be found in N. D. II, III and many are scattered about in Galen, De Plac. Hipp. et Plat., in which treatise Galen is careful to shew that etymology will tell in favour of the most contradictory arguments. Many of the works falsely attributed to Aristotle betray a Stoic origin by the extravagant use they make of derivations; cf. Bonitz, s. v. 'etymologica'.

6. **explanari**: for the *passive* infinitive see n. on 2, 42 quam obscurari uolunt.

in quo: this phrase (= *in qua re* with reference to the sentences or clauses immediately preceding) is very commonly used by Cic. (e.g. Att. 6, 1, 25; 6, 4, 1; 7, 17, 2; 7, 23, 1; 10, 12, 5, or 10, 12 b, 2 Wes.; Balb. 21; Sest. 2; II Phil. 6, 23, 49; Orat. 3) even where a feminine noun precedes, with which the relative, instead of being used substantially, might have been made to agree; so Att. 3, 23, 1 promulgationem ... in quo. The usage is very common in Varro; see Müller on L. L. 5, 108. We have *in qua* connecting clauses or sentences in §§ 20, 40 and 2, 59.

dialecticae: the Stoic *διαλεκτική* (which comprised all modes of proof, etymology included—cf. Fin. 1, 63 uerborum uis) was one of the two subdivisions of *λογική*, the other being *ῥητορική* (cf. Zeller,

ciplina, id est, orationis ratione conclusae. Huic quasi ex altera parte oratoria uis dicendi adhibebatur, explicatrix orationis per-
33 petuae ad persuadendum accommodatae. Haec erat illis prima forma a Platone tradita, cuius quas acceperim immutationes, si uoltis, exponam'. 'Nos uero uolumus', inquam, 'ut pro Attico etiam respondeam'. 'Et recte', inquit, 'respondes: praeclare enim explicatur Peripateticorum et Academiae ueteris auctoritas.

1 id est: *id* Harl. 1, Burn.; *idem* A. conclusae: *conclusa* A Harl. Burn. Oxx. 2 oratoria: incl. H. 3 prima forma: ita scripsi; *prima* MSS (G tamen praebet *prima erat illis prima*); *forma* BM, Madvigio praeeunte (Em. 1, p. 118); *disciplina* Klotz. (ut coniecerat Dau., omisso uerbo *illis*); *primum a Pl. tr. disciplina* Krische; *forma erat illis primum* H (qui coni. etiam *haec erat ratio illis primum*). 4 immutationes: H cum Dau.; *dissupationes* B, et eum secutus M; *disputationes* codd., quod ortum est ex errore librariorum *imputationes* uel *putationes* scribentium.

Stoics, p. 69, E. Tr.). Cic. nearly always renders ῥητορική by *dicendum*, as in § 5; διαλεκτική sometimes by *disserendum* (§ 5), sometimes by *intellegendum* (De Or. 3, 73), and sometimes he uses *dialectica* (as below, 2, 91). The word λογική (which was not, any more than ἠθική or φυσική, in use as a substantive before the time of Zeno) is represented in Fat. 1 by 'ratio disserendi', in Fin. 1, 22 by 'pars philosophiae quae est quaerendi ac disserendi'.

1. **orationis ratione conclusae**: 'speech cast into a logical shape'. For *ratione conclusae* cf. n. on 2, 26 argumenti conclusio.

quasi ex altera parte: cf. Orat. 114 Aristoteles principio artis rhetoricae dicit illam artem quasi ex altera parte respondere dialecticae; Arist. Rhet. 1, 1 ἡ ῥητορική ἀντίστροφός ἐστι τῇ διαλεκτικῇ. In Cope's n. on the latter passage the word ἀντίστροφος is elaborately explained. In De Or. 2, 279 quasi contrarium is probably also a rendering of ἀντίστροφον.

2. **oratoria uis dicendi**: cf. the 'oratorum uis' in § 5, and for the words Brut. 261 oratoria ornamenta dicendi. The construction is merely a variation upon Cicero's favourite double genitive, *oratoria* being put for *oratoris* or *oratorum*; 'uis dicendi' is taken as one notion, and qualified by the adjective. Cf. n. on 2, 128 omnium rerum una est definitio comprehendendi.

perpetuae: i.e. not broken up into short arguments such as Logic alone would require.

3. **persuadendum**: nearly all the ancients defined the end of rhetoric to be πειθώ or τὸ πιθανόν: see the summary of definitions in Cope, Introd. to Arist. Rhet. pp. 27—36.

prima forma: cf. Rep. 2, 51 prima sit haec forma et species et origo tyranni. For *forma* Madvig compares § 17 formulam; also § 23 and Fin. 4, 19; 5, 9; Tusc. 3, 38; Fin. 2, 48; Off. 1, 15 and 103. The MSS reading *prima* only was insupportable, though Goerenz, whose power of *supplying* is boundless, supplies *pars* here.

4. **acceperim**: cf. § 44 accepimus; also 2, 5.

immutationes: the MSS reading makes no sense, though Madvig's reason for rejecting it, viz. that 'disputationes philosophiae' would not be Latin, may be doubted; cf. n. on 2, 5, below. Davies' em. (approved by Madv. Em. 119) is rendered almost certain by § 37 commutauerat, § 40 mutauit, § 42 commutatio and Leg. 1, 38 rebus non commutatis immutauerunt uocabula (of the Stoics): Baiter's conj. *dissupationes* is ingenious, but requires support, which it does not receive from the one passage he quotes, De Or. 3, 207; nor have I observed in Cic. any metaphorical use of *dissupare*, *dissupatio* nearly so bold as this.

5. **nos uero**: n. on § 14 mihi uero. For the context cf. Brut. 122 nobis uero, inquit Atticus, et uehementer quidem (placet), ut pro Bruto etiam respondeam; Lael. 32 tu uero perge, pro hoc enim respondeo...Recte tu quidem (sc. respondes); De Or. 2, 27 ego pro utroque respondeo; also ib. 2, 362 and 3, 188;

IX. Aristoteles primus species, quas paulo ante dixi, labefactauit, quas mirifice Plato erat amplexatus, ut in eis quiddam diuinum esse diceret. Theophrastus autem, uir et oratione suauis et ita moratus, ut prae se probitatem quandam et ingenuitatem ferat, uehementius etiam fregit quodam modo auctoritatem ueteris disciplinae: spoliauit enim uirtutem suo decore imbecillamque reddidit, quod negauit in ea sola positum esse beate uiuere. Nam **34**

8 Aristoteles: uocem *igitur* unus codex G praebet, cui obsecuti sunt HBM. Cf. tamen § 21 hominem esse, ubi G solus praebet *hominem enim*, et § 25 bene sane facis, ubi G solus *inquit* exhibet, utrumque simili de causa a correctore inculcatum. 9 amplexatus: *amplexus* E. 11 moratus: *moderatus* multae edd. prae se probitatem qu.: *pr. qu. prae se* GHBM. ferat: *ferret* Harl. 1 (ut coni. Ernesti et edidit B).

Rep. 1, 34 feceris, ut etiam pro his dicam, nobis gratum.

6. **et recte**: so at the beginning of a sentence in Brut. 255 and Rep. 3, 44. Cf. *et merito* at the beginning of an elegy of Propertius (1, 17); so too Lucr. 1, 107; Ov. Met. 9, 585. The usage is practically the same whether the *et* introduces an emphatic repetition of a verb from a speech by a preceding speaker, or of a verb previously used by the speaker himself, as in Verr. 5, 121 errabas et uehementer errabas, and similar passages.

inquit: Atticus of course is the subject. Goer. supposes Varro's speech to begin here. To the objection that V. (who says in § 8 nihil meorum magno opere miror) would not eulogise himself quite so unblushingly, Goer. feebly answers that the eulogy is meant for Antiochus, whom V. is copying.

7. **auctoritas**: =sententia, 'opinion' as in the phrase 'senatus auctoritas'.

8. **Aristoteles**: the resumption by Varro of his exposition is abrupt. In Fin. 1, 28 two speeches (as given in some good MSS) by different persons follow similarly on each other without anything to indicate the break; so in Brut. 204 Lachmann and others wrongly insert *inquam*. After the preceding argument to prove that the early Academics and Peripatetics formed one harmonious school (cf. esp. §§ 17, 18) it is startling to find Aristotle, Theophrastus and Strato treated as disturbers of the harmony. The words used in §§ 33, 34 would, if pressed, exclude the philosophers named from all connexion with the supposed old school. Cicero cannot have given here quite in full the exposition of Antiochus, who no doubt minimised the differences between Plato on the one hand and on the other Aristotle and Theophrastus.

species...labefactauit: the principal passages in which Arist. attacks the theory of ἰδέαι are Eth. Nic. 1, c. 6 and Met. 1, c. 9. See Zeller, II 2, pp. 293 sq. ed. 3. Antiochus no doubt considered dialectical differences unimportant; cf. the strong statement borrowed from him by Varro in Aug. c. d. 19, 1 nulla est caussa philosophandi nisi finis boni.

9. **diuinum**: as to the difficult question whether in Plato's system God is identical with or separate from the ἰδέαι or the ἰδέα of the Good, compare Zeller II 1, pp. 594 sq., ed. 3 (E. Tr. 'Plato' 282 sq.); R. and P. § 264 d.

10. **suauis**: cf. De Or. 1, 49 Theophrastus...Carneades...in dicendo suaues; Brut. 121 quis Theophrasto dulcior? Also the well-known story of Aristotle's judgment on his death-bed 'ἡδίων ὁ Λέσβιος' (Gellius 13, 5). The tradition that Th. was originally called Τύρταμος and was renamed Theophrastus by Aristotle on account of his charming style, is very doubtful; cf. Orat. 62 diuinitate loquendi nomen inuenit; Quint. 10, 1, 83 loquendi nitor ille diuinus; Sen. N. Q. 6, 13, 1 Theophrastum non ut Graecis uisum est diuini, tamen et dulcis eloquii uirum et nitidi sine labore.

14. **negauit...uiuere**: yet above, § 22 we read 'omnis illa antiqua philosophia sensit in una uirtute esse positam beatam uitam, nec tamen beatissimam'. As to the ethical views of Theophrastus see n. on 2, 134.

beate uiuere: this, or *beata uita*,

Strato, eius auditor, quamquam fuit acri ingenio, tamen ab ea disciplina omnino semouendus est, qui cum maxime necessariam partem philosophiae, quae posita est in uirtute et moribus, reliquisset totumque se ad inuestigationem naturae contulisset, in ea ipsa plurimum dissedit a suis. Speusippus autem et Xenocrates, qui primi Platonis rationem auctoritatemque susceperant, et post eos Polemo et Crates unaque Crantor, in Academia congregati, diligenter ea, quae a superioribus acceperant, tuebantur.
35 Iam Polemonem audiuerant adsidue Zeno et Arcesilas; sed

1 Strato: *Stratus* ψ. 2 cum: om. E. 3 reliquisset: *reliquis sed* E. 5 dissedit: GPEψ Harl. 1, 3, Burn.; *discedit* AV Harl. 2; *dissentit* r. 7 eos: codd. (etiam A); *hos* edd. non nullae. 8 ea quae: *eis quae* APV Harl. 2, 3. tuebantur: *utebantur* codd. exc. G. 10 cum: om. A. dissereret: *definiret* Bentl. 11 moueretur: *partiretur* Bentl.; lectio codicum iniuria suspecta est Halmio

regularly represents εὐδαιμονία in Cic., who in N. D. 1, 95 proposed the new words *beatitas* and *beatitudo* but did not again use them.

nam: elliptic, as often; here 'I need hardly mention Strato, for etc'. See exx. in N. D. 1 27, 28, 63; Diu. II 3, 65, 67, 68; also Draeger, Hist. Synt. § 348, 4.

1. **auditor**: ἀκουστής, discipulus; see Mayor on Iuv. 1, 1; below, 2, 121.

3. **uirtute et moribus**: ἠθικοῖς: see n. on § 19.

reliquisset: the statement, if taken literally, is untrue. Diogenes 5, 58, 59 preserves the titles of at least six ethical works by Strato, and Stob. 2, 80 quotes his definition of the ἀγαθόν.

5. **plurimum dissedit**: for the physics of Strato see n. on 2, 121.

7. **Polemo**: n. on 2, 131.

congregati: 'gathered in one fold'; here almost a deponent participle; cf. Fin. 5, 42 se congregare, and for the application of the word to schools of philosophy cf. the similar uses of *grex*, as Lael. 69 in nostro, ut ita dicam, grege; Fin. 1, 65 amicorum greges; De Or. 1, 42 philosophorum greges; Hor. ep. 1, 4, 16 Epicuri de grege; Sat. 2, 3, 44 Chrysippi porticus et grex.

8. **diligenter ... tuebantur**: a statement certainly untrue as it stands; and scarcely true even if limited to ethics. Diog. 4, 1 says of Speusippus ἔμεινεν ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν Πλάτωνι δογμάτων, but Numenius ap. Eus. Pr. Eu. 14, 5, 1 attacks Sp. along with Xenocrates and Polemo for deserting their master, contrasting the devotion of the Epicureans to their founder; cf. esp. πολλαχῇ παραλύοντες, τὰ δὲ στρέβλουντες, οὐκ ἐνέμειναν τῇ πρώτῃ διαδοχῇ (these are words of Numenius, not of Eusebius himself as stated by Zeller, II 1, 847 n. ed. 3; E. Tr. 565 n.) also διίσταντο προαιρέσει ἢ ἀγνοίᾳ, τὰ δέ δή τινι αἰτίᾳ ἄλλῃ οὐκ ἀφιλοτίμῳ ἴσως.

9. **iam**: 'to proceed'.

Polemonem...Arcesilas: Diog. 7, 1 mentions as teachers of Zeno (besides Polemo) Crates, Stilpo and Xenocrates (so Num. ap. Eus. 14, 5, 11); among the masters of Arcesilas he does not mention Polemo. Cf. Zeller, III 1, p. 491, ed. 3, or Stoics, p. 500 E. Tr., who remarks that Arcesilas and Zeno can hardly have been pupils of Polemo at the same time. Cf. Numenius ap. Eus. 14, 5, 11 Πολέμωνος δὲ ἐγένοντο γνώριμοι Ἀρκεσίλαος καὶ Ζήνων...συμφοιτῶντες παρὰ Πολέμωνι ἐφιλοτιμήθησαν ἀλλήλοις. Antiochus regularly charged Zeno with introducing mere verbal changes. Varro, Eumenides XIII (ed. Riese) following Ant., treats Zeno as the first heretic—'ubi dicatur primus Zenon nouam haeresim nouo paxillo suspendisse'. On the other hand Diog. 4, 28 (of Arcesilas) πρῶτος τὸν λόγον ἐκίνησε τὸν ὑπὸ Πλάτωνος παραδεδομένον.

10. **anteiret aetate**: the date of Zeno's birth is very uncertain; Zeller places it about 350 B.C.; that of Arcesilas is usually put about 315 B.C.

11. **peracute moueretur**: sc. ingenio. There is not the slightest ground for suspecting the text. In the act of

Zeno cum Arcesilan anteiret aetate ualdeque subtiliter dissereret et peracute moueretur, corrigere conatus est disciplinam. Eam quoque, si uidetur, correctionem explicabo, sicut solebat Antiochus'. 'Mihi uero', inquam, 'uidetur, quod uides idem significare Pomponium'.

X. 'Zeno igitur nullo modo is erat, qui, ut Theophrastus, neruos uirtutis inciderit, sed contra, qui omnia quae ad beatam uitam pertinerent in una uirtute poneret nec quicquam aliud numeraret in bonis, idque appellaret honestum, quod esset sim-

et Baitero. 12 correctionem: *correptionem* ψ Harl. 3; cf. § 13. 15 igitur: om. E. 16 inciderit: *incidit* Burn.; *incideret* post Lamb. B. omnia quae: *omn. quaeque* codd.; corr. Man. 18 in bonis: *e bonis* Harl. 1. idque: *id quod* EU. simplex...bonum: *bonum* post *simpl.* habet ψ.

thought the mind is constantly said 'moueri' or 'agitari' (see n. on 2, 34) and the very expression '*acute* moueri' occurs in Fam. 15, 21, 4.

corrigere: ἐπανορθοῦσθαι, 'reform'; n. on § 13.

15. **igitur**: resumptive here; see n. on § 26.

is erat qui inciderit: Rep. 1, 7 is fueram qui non dubitauerim; Diu. 2, 43 eum te esse qui putes; Off. 3, 12 si is esset Panaetius qui diceret; ib. 2, 7 non sumus ei quorum uagetur animus; also below, 2, 66.

erat...inciderit...poneret: the perfect *inciderit* seems to me necessary here, the sense being 'he was not the man *ever at any time* to have cut the sinews of virtue, but just the man *constantly* to teach that virtue contained all that is necessary to happiness'. Such changes of tense are common enough in categorical statements containing indicatives, and there can be no reason for suspecting them when the syntax requires subjunctives. Our MSS gives us many exx. very few of which are left untouched by editors. The following are quoted by Lieven, p. 11 (his remarks on the whole matter are excellent): Rosc. Am. 127; Sull. 32; Rep. 2, 11; Fam. 10, 31, 3; Verr. 2, 113; Phil. 14, 16; pro Quint. 51; see also Lieven, p. 45. Add Fin. 3, 33; Liu. 5, 45, 4 habuerint...facerent. [Many of these passages have been needlessly altered by edd.]

16. **neruos**: for the metaphor cf. Phil. 12, 8 legionum neruos his consiliis incidemus; in Tog. cand. fragm. 28 ed. Müller Hispaniensi pugiunculo neruos incidere ciuium Romanorum; Tusc. 2, 27 poetae omnis neruos uirtutis elidunt; ib. 3, 83 stirpis aegritudinis elidere. So Plato Rep. 411 B ἐκτέμνειν ὥσπερ νεῦρα ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς: Demosth. has ἐκνευρίζειν. Cf. also Amm. Marc. 28, 1, 46 in succidendis familiarum nobilium neruis.

sed contra: so De Or. 3, 93; Liu. 45, 18, 2.

omnia quae: the MSS reading *quaeque* was defended by Turnebus as = *quaecumque*; so Goer. who says 'negari omnino nequit hac ui saepius pronomen illud reperiri'; as usual, he gives no exx. in support of this sweeping statement, and is castigated by Madvig in Exc. VI to his ed. of 'De finibus', where it is shewn that the usage does not occur in prose till after Livy.

omnia quae...pertinerent: πάντα τὰ τελικὰ ἀγαθά: pertinens is Cicero's regular rendering of τελικός. See Fin. 3, 55, with which cf. Diog. 7, 96 and Fin. III 41, 43, 50 etc.

17. **in una uirtute**: for general information about Zeno's system the reader must have recourse to the historians of ancient philosophy; only such points as have a special bearing on our subject can receive illustration here.

18. **in bonis**: 'in the category of Good'. The plural is used although in the Stoic system the category only contains one thing, virtue. So often; e.g. Fin. 3, 22 ultimum in bonis; ib. 30, 34; ib. 36 nihil aliud in bonorum numero nisi honestum; ib. 42, 44, 49, 58. Yet the Stoics sometimes subdivide the notion of ἀγαθόν as they do that of its equivalent, *uirtus;* see Zeller, III 1, pp. 212, 246 ed. 3 or Stoics, p. 217 E.T.

36 plex quoddam et solum et unum bonum. Cetera autem etsi nec bona nec mala essent, tamen alia secundum naturam dicebat, alia naturae esse contraria. His ipsis alia interiecta et media numerabat. Quae autem secundum naturam essent, ea sumenda

1 quoddam: *quodamio* V; cf. § 26 ubi V pro *quoddam* habet *quodammodo.* 3 his ipsis ... numerabat: "Christ post vv. *quae minoris* transponenda esse censet; mihi potius adiecticia uidentur, quippe etiam de Latinitate suspecta." Ita Halm., vide tamen adn. meam. Verba *his ipsis ... ea sumenda* om. V. 5 aestimatione:

honestum: the usual translation of the Stoic τὸ καλόν. Sometimes Cic. has *honestas*, as in § 7 and 2, 140; sometimes *rectum* (above § 23; Fin. 3, 14); rarely *pulchrum*, which is a common rendering in other authors; e.g. Hor. ep. 1, 2, 3.

simplex etc.: cf. § 7, § 30 n., also 2, 129, the note on Euclides.

1. **cetera**: before going to the ἀδιάφορα Cic. ought to have specified that the only *malum* is vice; but this is taken for granted.

nec bona nec mala: a rendering of ἀδιάφορα, which Cic. translates in Fin. 3, 53 by *indifferentia*, without using the word again; and it does not reappear before the time of Seneca the younger, when it became common. The Stoics protested that such things as wealth poverty, honour dishonour, life death, were neither good nor bad, and could not affect happiness; yet they maintained that some of these things ought to be sought after, some avoided. Cic. marks his sense of the inconsistency by making Cato in Fin. 3, 50 talk of the *differentia rerum* (sc. *indifferentium*). On this subject see Zeller, III 1, pp. 214 sq. ed. 3 or Stoics, pp. 218 sq., E. Tr.

2. **secundum naturam...naturae contraria**: = κατὰ φύσιν...παρὰ φύσιν. A clear distinction must be made between τὰ κατὰ φύσιν which are identical with the προηγμένα mentioned below, and τὰ πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν, for which see n. on 2, 131. As to the idea of conformity with nature, see Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, p. 62.

3. **his ipsis**: many writers (Halm, Christ, Vaucher and others) have objected to these words, for very insufficient reasons. The three subdivisions of the class of ἀδιάφορα, viz. the προηγμένα, ἀποπροηγμένα and καθάπαξ ἀδιάφορα are mentioned twice over in the words from *cetera* to *momenti:* then in the words from *sed* to *quae minoris* the first two subdivisions are mentioned once more, the third being dropped. For the dative *his ipsis* dependent on *interiecta* cf. Opt. gen. d. 2 alios eis interiectos et tamquam medios; Liu. 21, 30, 11 campum interiacentem Tiberi ac moenibus; Tim. § 14 ea quibus esset interpositum; Quint. 11, 3, 18 his ipsis media interiacent multa.

4. **sumenda**: Cicero's standing translation of ληπτά, another name for the προηγμένα. *Sumendum* must be carefully distinguished from *expetendum*, which translates αἱρετόν: see n. on § 18. For *sumendum* and its opposite, Cic. in Fin. 1, 31 uses *appetendum* and *aspernandum;* cf. *reicienda* in Fin. 5, 78; ib. 4, 46 sumenda legenda optanda.

5. **aestimatione**: aest. = ἀξία: see below, and cf. Catul. 12, 12.

contraria: put for 'ea quae contra naturam erant'; so Fin. 3, 58 neque in bonis neque in contrariis; cf. Leg. 1, 45 consequentia et contraria (for c. et repugnantia); De Or. 2, 330 caute an contra; Plin. ep. 8, 7, 1 tu magister, ego contra. In our passage Cic. feels the want of a word to express ἀπαξία; Madv. on Fin. 3, 50 coins *non-aestimatio;* cf. Fin. 3, 20 inaestimabile = τὸ ἀπαξίαν ἔχον whereas in 3, 50 Cic. says 'alia aestimabilia, alia contra'.

6. **neutra**: the absolutely indifferent circumstances (καθάπαξ ἀδιάφορα) of which the stock example is 'τὸ ἀρτίας ἔχειν τὰς ἐπὶ τῆς κεφαλῆς τρίχας ἢ περιττάς', given in Diog. 7, 104; Stob. 148. For the use of the word *neutra* cf. Tusc. 4, 28 bona, mala, neutra; Fin. 3, 50 alia aestimabilia, alia contra, alia neutrum.

mediis: a translation of ἀδιαφόροις, used κατ' ἐξοχὴν = καθάπαξ ἀδιαφόροις. Madvig on Fin. 3, 50 remarks that the Stoics applied the adjective μέσος to *actions*, rather than to *objects* or circumstances; a statement generally true, but subject to many exceptions. With our passage cf. Fin. 3, 39 and 53; also below, 2, 130;

et quadam aestimatione dignanda docebat, contraque contraria, neutra autem in mediis relinquebat, in quibus ponebat nihil omnino esse momenti. Sed quae essent sumenda, ex eis alia **37**
pluris esse aestimanda, alia minoris. Quae pluris, ea praeposita

extimatione GE ψ Harl. 3; *estimatione* A. dignanda: *digna* coni. Rath.; *eligenda* Ernesti. docebat: *dicebat* Lamb.; cf. § 24. 7 esse momenti: *esse* incl. B, Ernestium et Huelsemann. secutus. sumenda: *media* coni. Dau. 8 aestimanda: *extimanda* G; *existimanda* Harl. 1, Burn.: *estimanda* A; cf. § 36.

A. Gellius 12, 5, 7 uoluptas et dolor...in mediis relicta, et neque in bonis neque in malis iudicata.

ponebat esse: cf. Ter. Phorm. 630 uerum pono esse uictum eum; above, § 19; Att. 1, 20, 1 duco esse; Madv. on Fin. 5, 73. The inf. is however often omitted, as in 2, 2. So *dico* and *dico esse* (Fin. 2, 49); *iudico* and *iudico esse* etc.

7. **momenti**: cf. *momenta* in 2, 130.

quae essent sumenda...quae minoris: this passage contains two main difficulties; (1) in place of *sumenda* = ληπτὰ = *προηγμένα*, some phrase corresponding to the term ἀδιάφορα should have been used; (2) minor aestimatio = ἐλάττων ἀξία is treated as equivalent to πολλὴ ἀπαξία. We may at once dismiss the insinuation of Madvig (on Fin. 3, 50) that these difficulties arise from ignorance of Stoicism on the part of Cic. or his authorities or both. Cicero, by a large number of other references to the Stoic doctrine of ἀδιάφορα, has proved that he thoroughly understood it. With regard to the former of the two difficulties he may fairly be charged with careless writing; for he has first mentioned the *προηγμένα alone*, and then has gone on to speak as though he had previously indicated *both προηγμένα and ἀποπροηγμένα*. The carelessness is of a kind which he often allowed himself to commit. We have a striking parallel in Fin. 3, 52 quae secundum locum obtinent, *προηγμένα*, id est producta nominentur, quae uel ita appellemus, uel promota et remota. If this language be closely pressed the *ἀποπροηγμένα* are made a subdivision of the *προηγμένα*, though no sensible reader could suppose Cic. to have had any such arrangement in his mind. So if his words in Fin. 5, 90 are to be taken literally, the *sumenda* are there made to include both *producta* and *reducta* (as in our passage); in Fin. 3, 16 *appeterent* includes *fugerent*. In Fin. 2, 86 *beate uiuere* is mentioned, then its opposite is introduced with the utmost abruptness; in Fin. 2, 88 *frui dolore* must be construed together, and ib. 73 *pudor modestia pudicitia* are said *coerceri*, the writer's thoughts having drifted on rapidly to the vices which are the opposites of these virtues. A similar error is in Fin. 3, 61 prima illa naturae, siue secunda siue contraria; since strictly *pr. nat. only* correspond to *secunda*; cf. too ib. 4, 47.

With regard to the second difficulty, Cic. is no doubt careless in treating ἀπαξία as a lesser degree of ἀξία, the difference between the two being one of kind and not of degree, since ἀξία is positive and ἀπαξία negative value. But that Cic. (or rather Antiochus) followed the Stoic writers themselves in this inaccuracy is clear from Stobaeus Eth. 144 *τῶν ἀδιαφόρων τὰ μὲν πλείω ἀξίαν ἔχειν, τὰ δ' ἐλάττω* and from Sextus, who after defining (in A. M. 11, 62—64) *ἀποπροηγμένα* to be *τὰ ἱκανὴν ἀπαξίαν ἔχοντα*, again speaks of them (P. H. 3, 191) as *τὰ μὴ ἱκανὴν ἔχοντα ἀξίαν*. [The word *magno* in Fin. 5, 90 involves the same error.] By a similar inconsistency, the Stoics declared duty (*κατόρθωμα*) to differ in kind from appropriate action (*καθῆκον*) and then defined *κατόρθωμα* to be *καθῆκον τέλειον*, as though the two differed only in degree. It should be observed that Cicero's *minoris* conveys a much stronger negative idea than Stobaeus' *ἐλάττων*: the comparative *minus* is often as strong a negative as *non*; cf. § 8 n. [Neither the violent textual remedies that have been proposed, nor the device of Goerenz, who distorts the Stoic tenets to suit our passage, need be discussed.]

quae pluris...quae minoris: observe the *chiasmus*.

8. **praeposita...reiecta**: the most common rendering of *προηγμένα...ἀποπροηγμένα*: so in Fin. 3, 15. In other passages alternative renderings are proposed, as *promota, producta, praecipua, commoda, eligenda* on the one hand, and *remota,*

appellabat, reiecta autem quae minoris. Atque ut haec non tam rebus quam uocabulis commutauerat, sic inter recte factum atque peccatum, officium et contra officium media locabat quaedam, recte facta sola in bonis actionibus ponens, praue, id est peccata, in malis; officia autem seruata praetermissaque media putabat,
38 ut dixi. Cumque superiores non omnem uirtutem in ratione

2 commutauerat: *communicauerat* E. 3 quaedam: om. Walk.; *quidem* coni. Dau. 4 ponens: *pones* V. praue: *praua* A Burn. Harl. 2. 5 seruata: *reiectanea, reicienda, incommoda*, on the other; cf. Fin. 3, 52; ib. 4, 72; ib. 5, 78 and 90; Tusc. 5, 47; N.D. 1, 16. Cic. is followed by Senec. ep. 74, 17; in Gellius 12, 5, 7 productiones et relationes suis quaeque momentis distinctae diuisaeque sunt quae προηγμένα et ἀποπροηγμένα ipsi uocant, surely *reiectiones* should be read for *relationes*.

2. **rebus...uocabulis**: for the expression cf. § 17 rebus...nominibus. Varro here gives a very loudly and constantly expressed opinion of Antiochus, who, when stealing the clothes of the Stoics, convinced himself that they had never properly belonged to the Stoics at all. Cic. often adopts similar language when speaking in his own person. Cf. Fin. IV passim, but esp. §§ 72, 73; ib. 3, 5 Zeno non tam rerum inuentor fuit quam uerborum; ib. 5, 74 atque ut reliqui fures earum rerum, quas ceperunt signa commutant, sic illi (Stoici), ut sententiis nostris pro suis uterentur nomina tamquam rerum notas mutauerunt; Tusc. 5, 34 Zeno ignobilis uerborum opifex; Leg. 1, 38; Rep. 3, 12 Chrysippo qui omnia uerborum momentis non rerum ponderibus examinet. Cf. Introd. p. 17. Diog. 7, 25 has a story about Polemo accusing Zeno of stealing Academic doctrines. Cf. 2 § 15, below.

recte factum...peccatum: so Cic. usually translates the Stoic κατόρθωμα (virtuous action) and ἁμαρτήμα (sin); sometimes *rectum* stands for *recte factum* (Fin. 4, 15). Cf. Plin. ep. 8, 2, 2 peccata... laudes; succeeding Latin writers usually follow Cicero. In Sen. Rh. contr. 9, 24 13 ἁμάρτημα is rendered by 'non recte factum'. For the Stoic doctrine on this subject see Zeller, Stoics, E.T. pp. 238—248, 268—272; R. and P. §§ 419—424.

3. **officium...contra officium**: the phrases almost exclusively used by Cic. to render τὸ καθῆκον, παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον. [The Stoics always used παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον for the opposite of τὸ καθῆκον; so nearly always παρὰ τὸ καλὸν for the opposite of τὸ καλόν, αἰσχρὸν being of rare occurrence in this sense.] Atticus found fault with this rendering when the 'De Officiis' appeared; see Att. 16, 14, 3 and cf. ib. 16, 11, 4. For the expression *contra officium* cf. n. on § 39 *non corpus*.

media: this does not allude to any doctrine that the καθήκοντα, as distinguished from the κατορθώματα, have no moral character, are neither good nor bad, but rather implies that the road from vice to virtue, from folly to wisdom, lies through the καθήκοντα: so Stob. Eth. 142 speaks of τὰ μεταξὺ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας: cf. Diog. 6, 105, and 7, 165; Sext. A. M. XI, 64. To the strict Stoics an action must be either entirely virtuous or entirely vicious; wholly vicious if done by the fool, wholly virtuous if done by the wise man. In this sense Diogenes says (7, 127) μηδὲν μέσον εἶναι ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας: so too Stob. Eth. 116 ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας οὐδὲν εἶναι μεταξύ. Hence Diog. (l. l.) lays stress on the fact that the Peripatetics (not the Stoics) consider προκοπή (see n. on § 20 progressio) to be a middle state between virtue and vice, having no definite moral character. In the eyes of the strict Stoic, even though a man be within a hair's breadth of possessing complete virtue, his every act is as immoral as it is possible for any act to be (see Fin. 3, 48). When therefore the Stoics call καθήκοντα and their opposites by the name μέσαι πράξεις (as they constantly do), the word μέσαι must not be taken to import that these actions are not sinful; cf. Stob. 158 where παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον is identified with ἁμάρτημα.

4. **bonis actionibus**: καλαῖς πράξεσι. For the expression 'recte facta sola in bonis actionibus ponens' see n. on § 35 nec quicquam aliud numeraret in bonis.

5. **seruata praetermissaque**: instead of *que* a disjunctive particle might have been expected; 'whether maintained or neglected'; or at least *et...et*. As to

esse dicerent, sed quasdam uirtutes natura aut more perfectas, hic omnis in ratione ponebat, cumque illi ea genera uirtutum, quae supra dixi, seiungi posse arbitrarentur, hic nec id ullo modo fieri posse disserebat nec uirtutis usum modo, ut superiores, sed ipsum habitum per se esse praeclarum, nec tamen uirtutem

et seru. codd.; corr. Lamb. 7 dicerent: *diceret* PE. natura: *quasi natura* G. 8 omnis: sic APEU Harl. 1. uirtutum: *uirtutis* E. 9 hic...disserebat: om. A Oxx. Harl. 1 r.

the inadmissibility of the MSS reading *et* before *seruata* see n. on § 43 breuiter minimeque.

6. **cumque**: the quadruple repetition is inelegant; cf. § 28 et cum...et cum.

7. **natura aut more**: in § 20 the *διανοητικαὶ ἀρεταὶ* were said to owe their developement to nature, and the *ἠθικαὶ ἀρεταὶ* theirs to practice; here we seem to have the true Aristotelian view given, that the intellectual virtues, as well as the moral, required practice. See n. on § 20.

8. **omnis in ratione**: both Plato and Aristotle divided the mind of man into a rational and governing part, and an emotional and governable part (in Plato still further subdivided). For Plato see Zeller, II 1, pp. 713 sq. ed. 3 (E. Tr. pp. 419 sq.); as to Aristotle, II, 2 pp. 587 sq. ed. 3. Zeno, however, made the mind of man, or *ἡγεμονικὸν*, to be entirely Reason (Zeller, III 1, 199 ed. 3 or Stoics p. 203 sq.). When the Reason was in a healthy state, there was virtue, when it became disordered there was vice or false emotion, which is a form of vice. The battle between the virtuous and vicious inclinations in the soul did not resemble a struggle between two separate powers, as in the systems of Plato and Aristotle, but rather a civil war. [This is well illustrated in Plutarch's tract 'de uirtute morali' an analysis of which is given by Volkmann II 94.] In the strict Stoic creed, *ἀρετὴ* has no subdivisions; see Zeller, III 1, p. 242 sq. ed. 3 or p. 247 E. Tr., and cf. Galen, De Plac. v § 468 ed. Müller.

9. **seiungi**: cf. Eth. Eud. 6, 13, 6 *χωρίζονται ἀλλήλων αἱ ἀρεταὶ* (a passage in which a close approach is made to the Stoic view).

10. **usum...habitum**: so *χρῆσις* and *κτῆσις* are often contrasted, as in Ar. Eth. Nic. 1, 8, 9; cf. *χρῆσθαι* and *κεκτῆσθαι* in Rhet. 1, 5.

usum: throughout the Aristotelian ethics great stress is laid on practice; cf. esp. Eth. Nic. 1, 8, 9 *ὥσπερ Ὀλυμπίασιν οὐχ οἱ κάλλιστοι καὶ ἰσχυρότατοι στεφανοῦνται, ἀλλ' οἱ ἀγωνιζόμενοι, τούτων γάρ τινες νικῶσιν, οὕτω καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ καλῶν κἀγαθῶν οἱ πράττοντες ὀρθῶς ἐπήβολοι γίγνονται*: Fin. 2, 19 Aristoteles uirtutis usum cum uitae perfectae prosperitate coniunxit; Off. 1, 19 uirtutis laus omnis in actione consistit; N. D. 1, 110 uirtus actuosa; Rep. 1, 2 nec habere uirtutem satis est quasi artem aliquam, nisi utare; etsi ars quidem, cum ea non utare, scientia tamen ipsa teneri potest, uirtus in usu sui tota posita est; Sen. ep. 109, 2 uirtutum agitatione sapienti opus est; ib. 117, 16 sapientiam, si sine usu detur, accipiendam non esse. In the Platonic ethics action is characteristic of the lower or popular virtue; reflexion and contemplation belong to the higher or philosophic virtue; cf. Phaedo 82 A *οἱ τὴν δημοτικὴν καὶ πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπιτετηδευκότες, ἣν δὴ καλοῦσι σωφροσύνην καὶ δικαιοσύνην, ἐξ ἔθους καὶ μελέτης γεγονυῖαν, ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας καὶ νοῦ.*

ut superiores: n. on 2, 124 ut Xenocrates.

11. **ipsum habitum**: 'the mere state or condition of virtue'. So *uirtutis habitus* in Fin. 3, 48; *rationis habitus* ib. 4, 37; cf. Inu. 2, 30. *Habitus* is probably used here to render *διάθεσις*, not, as is usually the case, *ἕξις*, since to the Stoics virtue was not a *ἕξις* but a *διάθεσις*, the difference being that according to them the *διάθεσις* is incapable of increase or decrease, while *ἕξις* admits of degree. See Simplicius Cat. 61 β sq. qu. by Zeller III 1, p. 246 n. ed. 3 or Stoics p. 249 n. (E. Tr.), also cf. Stob. Eth. 98, 104; Diog. 7, 89. The last-named writer sometimes uses *ἕξις* loosely, as in 7, 93. For the Aristotelian view of the terms *ἕξις* and *διάθεσις* see Met. 4, cc. 19, 20. [In ed. 1 I took *habitus* in the sense of 'possession', supposing it to be a translation of *ἕξις* used as in Plat. Theaet.

cuiquam adesse quin ea semper uteretur. Cumque perturbationem animi illi ex homine non tollerent, naturaque et condolescere et concupiscere et extimescere et efferri laetitia dicerent, sed ea contraherent in angustumque deducerent, hic omnibus
39 his quasi morbis uoluit carere sapientem. Cumque eas perturbationes antiqui naturalis esse dicerent et rationis expertis aliaque in parte animi cupiditatem, alia rationem collocarent, ne his

1 perturbationem: *perturbationes* HB post Walkerum. 4 ea: *eas* HB cum Walkero. 6 antiqui: *antiqui qui* E. 7 alia: *in alia* (cum Lambino) HBM.

167 A πονηρᾶς ψυχῆς ἕξις, and not in the later Aristotelian sense. This view is abandoned because *habitus* thus used would be without parallel. In Tusc. 2, 43 διαθέσεις is rendered by 'animi affectiones'.]

nec...uteretur: cf. Stob. Eth. 198 δύο γένη τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἶναι, τὸ μὲν τῶν σπουδαίων, τὸ δὲ τῶν φαύλων, καὶ τὸ μὲν τῶν σπουδαίων διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου χρῆσθαι ταῖς ἀρεταῖς, τὸ δὲ τῶν φαύλων ταῖς κακίαις: Diog. 7, 128 ἀρέσκει δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ διὰ παντὸς χρῆσθαι τῇ ἀρετῇ. To the same effect is the assertion 'πάντα κατορθοῦν τὸν ἀστεῖον' (Plut. Aud. Poet. 7) and 'πάντα ποιεῖν τὸν σοφὸν κατὰ πάσας τὰς ἀρετὰς' (Stob. 116; Sen. Dial. 8, 1, 4).

1. **perturbationem**: here used in the abstract = emotion in general. There is no need to read *perturbationes*, since the change to *ea* (from the general to the particular) has many parallels, as Tusc. III 23, 24; IV 59, 60, and 65; V 43, where however the *particular* sense of the word occurs in the plural. *Perturbatio* often elsewhere has the general sense, e.g. in Tusc. IV 8, 11, 24, 57, 82. See Wesenberg on Tusc. 4, 65 and cf. n. on 2, 22 quam.

2. **natura...condolescere etc.**: this is the Peripatetic view of the emotions, for which see n. on 2, 135 naturalem modum.

condolescere etc.: we here have the Stoic division of πάθη (irrational emotions) into four classes, λύπη ἐπιθυμία φόβος ἡδονή: see Diog. 7, 110; Stob. 166, 168; Zeller III 1, 230 ed. 3 or E. Tr. p. 233. In Tusc. 4, 11 and elsewhere these terms are rendered by *aegritudo*, *libido*, *metus*, *laetitia gestiens* or *nimia*. The Stoic classification appears in Verg. Aen. 6, 733 (qu. as an imitation of the Stoics by Aug. c. d. 14, 3) hinc metuunt cupiuntque, dolent gaudentque; Hor. ep. 1, 6, 12 gaudeat an doleat, cupiat metuatne, quid ad rem? Cf. Plato qu. below, n. on *carere sapientem*.

3. **efferri**: Cic. always uses this verb (not *ferri*) with *laetitia*, as in Tusc. III 23; IV 12, 14, 37, 39, 66, 68. The Stoic definition of ἡδονή was ἄλογος ἔπαρσις (Diog. 7, 114).

4. **in angustumque**: n. on § 24 ex eaque. For *angustum* used as noun cf. n. on 2, 83 quam in paruo.

5. **quasi morbis**: morbus is proposed as a translation of πάθος in Fin. 3, 35, but rejected in favour of *perturbatio*; objections are raised to *morbus* also in Tusc. 3, 7 and 4, 10, though it is adopted ib. 4, 23; also Fin. 1, 59 and by Hor. s. 2, 3, 80 and ep. 1, 1, 35 and by Seneca ep. 75, 10; ben. 7, 16, 6. The rendering *perturbatio* is generally adopted by Cic. and is often described as peculiarly his, e.g. by Aug. c. d. 9, 4 and 14, 5. Other representations of πάθος are 'animi affectio' in Tusc. 3, 10; 'turbati animi motus' in Off. 2, 18; 'animi uitium' in Hor. s. 2, 3, 307; 'animi affectus' in Sen. ep. 75 and 85; sometimes too 'permotio' and often simply 'motus'. The literal rendering *passio* was first used by the ecclesiastical writers; cf. Aug. c. d. 9, 4; also Macrob. Somn. 1, 8, 11; 2, 15, 17. The Stoics sometimes drew a distinction between mere emotion and mental disease (see next n.), but did not use it consistently; see Zeller III 1, 233 ed. 3 or E. T. p. 235 n. 2; and cf. Tusc. 4, 23; Sen. ep. 75, 10—12.

carere sapientem: cf. the following passage of Plato, where a very close approximation is made to the Stoic position, viz. Phaedo 83 B ἡ τοῦ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλοσόφου ψυχὴ ἀπέχεται τῶν ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ λυπῶν καὶ φόβων, but the saving clause καθ' ὅσον δύναται is added. For the freedom of the Stoic wise man from the πάθη, see

quidem adsentiebatur. Nam et perturbationes uoluntarias esse putabat opinionisque iudicio suscipi et omnium perturbationum arbitrabatur matrem esse immoderatam quamdam intemperantiam. Haec fere de moribus.

XI. De naturis autem sic sentiebat, primum, ut in quattuor initiis rerum illis quintam hanc naturam, ex qua superiores

10 arb. matrem esse: *matrem esse arb.* HBM ex GP. 12 in quattuor: codd. omn.; *in* omiserunt multi editores, etiam HBM. *In* ex *IV* corruptum putat M; *uti* pro *ut in* scr. B.

Zeller, III 1, 235 ed. 3 or Stoics, pp. 237, 238. Cf. Ar. Eth. Nic. 2, 3, 5 ὁρίζονται τὰς ἀρετὰς ἀπαθείας τινὰς καὶ ἠρεμίας (probably a reference to Democritus); Fin. 1, 59 where opinions closely resembling those of the Stoics are put in the mouth of an Epicurean. It must not be supposed that all the Stoics imagined their σοφὸς as absolutely impassive; some of them allowed him certain rational emotions (εὐπάθειαι); χαρὰ corresponding to ἡδονή, εὐλάβεια to φόβος, βούλησις to ἐπιθυμία: the σοφὸς was however destitute of any feeling at all resembling λύπη, the fourth πάθος. Cf. Tusc. 4, 12; Diog. 7, 115; Stob. 94.

6. **antiqui**: cf. *superiores* in § 38.

aliaque in parte: Plato, Tim. 69 C—E; Rep. 436, 441; Ar. De An. 2, 3 etc.; cf. Tusc. 1, 20.

7. **alia rationem**: for the omission of *in* before alia cf. Off. 1, 107 in formis aliis dignitatem inesse, aliis uenustatem; ib. 1, 112 alia in caussa M. Cato fuit, alia ceteri, where see Holden's n.; also cf. my n. on § 19, above.

his: =*his rebus*, not *antiquis*. For *ne...quidem* see n. on § 5.

8. **uoluntarias**: Tusc. 4, 14 eas (perturbationes) definiunt pressius ut intellegatur non modo quam uitiosae, sed etiam quam in nostra sint potestate; ib. 4, 65 omnis uoluntarias; Sen. ep. 85, 11 si das aliquid iuris tristitiae, timori, cupiditati ceterisque motibus prauis, non erunt in nostra potestate. Yet the Stoics accepted the Socratic maxim that Virtue is Knowledge, and Vice is Ignorance; the reconciliation of this maxim with the statement in the text may be seen in Zeller, III 1, 235 sq. or E. Tr. pp. 232, 240, 241.

9. **opinionis iudicio**: so in Tusc. 4, 14 iudicio et opinione; ib. 4, 65 omnis perturbationes iudicio susceptas; ib. 3, 61; ib. 3, 24 (perturbationum) caussa omnis in opinione; Fin. 3, 35 omnia ea sunt opiniones ac iudicia leuitatis; the word *opinio* or *opinatio* is used in the definitions of emotions throughout Tusc. IV. *Iudicium* is here a rendering of κρίσις, used by Chrysippus and all the Stoics after him; cf. Diog. 7, 111 δοκεῖ δ' αὐτοῖς τὰ πάθη κρίσεις εἶναι, καθὰ φησὶ Χρύσιππος: Plut. uirt. mor. c. 3 πάθος... ἐκ διημαρτημένης κρίσεως: Sext. P. H. 3, 276 τὸ μὴ γίγνεσθαι ἐν φαύλαις κρίσεσιν: Sen. de ira 2, 4, 2 motus qui iudicio nascitur, iudicio tollitur. *Opinio* is a translation of δόξα: see n. on § 42. For the whole passage Zeller III 1, pp. 226—235 ed. 3 or E. Tr. ch. X. § B should be closely compared; see also nn. on 2, 38 and 39.

perturbationum......intemperantiam: cf. Tusc. 4, 22 omnium perturbationum fontem esse dicunt intemperantiam, quae est a tota mente et a recta ratione defectio. *Intemperantia* is here probably the representative of ἀκολασία, the opposite of σωφροσύνη.

10. **matrem**: cf. De Or. 2, 171 luxuries auaritiae mater; Rep. 3, 23 iustitiae imbecillitas mater est; ib. 5, 3 pax Numae mater huic urbi iuris et religionis fuit; Brut. 322 philosophiam matrem omnium bene factorum beneque dictorum.

11. **haec fere de moribus**: n. on § 20 ergo haec animorum.

12. **naturis**:=οὐσίαις, here used as equivalent to στοιχείοις or ἀρχαῖς, as in N.D. 2, 84 naturis his ex quibus omnia constant; ib. 1, 29; 2, 144; ib. 3, 34; Tusc. 1, 66.

in quattuor: here *in* does not mean strict *inclusion*, but only *accompaniment;* the sense is 'when dealing with the four elements'.

13. **quintam naturam**: called in § 26 quintum genus; cf. Leg. 1, 22 generibus atque naturis.

ex qua...rebantur: according to § 26 Plato must be excluded from those who assumed a fifth element. Yet there is

sensus et mentem effici rebantur, non adhiberet. Statuebat enim ignem esse ipsam naturam, quae quidque gigneret, etiam mentem atque sensus. Discrepabat etiam ab isdem quod nullo modo arbitrabatur quicquam effici posse ab ea, quae expers esset corporis, cuius generis Xenocrates et superiores etiam animum esse dixerant, nec uero aut quod efficeret aliquid aut quod efficeretur

2 ipsam: *ipsam eam* HB, auctore Christio; at non opus; cf. Madu. ad Fin. 2, 93 et adn. meam ad 2 § 84. quidque: *quicquid* Er.; Madu. (Orelli ed. 2, vol. 4, p. 854) coni. *quoique*, cum putaret hic *quidque* dici perperam pro *omnia* et persuasit Baitero; Müll. autem rectius est interpretatus 'quae in singulis rebus quae gignerentur, ea esset natura quae gignerentur, ea esset natura quae gigneret', collato

some reason for supposing that in his later teaching (though not in his extant dialogues) he asserted the existence of αἰθὴρ as a separate elemental substance; see Zeller, II 1, p. 809 n. ed 3 (E. T. p. 521). The theory was originally Pythagorean (Zeller I p. 377 ed. 4) and as such recommended itself to Xenocrates and Speusippus. The πέμπτον σῶμα was made the subject of elaborate argument by Aristotle (though not invented by him, as Cic. erroneously says in Tusc. 1, 41); see Zeller, II 2, p. 434 sq. ed. 3, Grote, Aristotle II 391 sq.

1. **sensus et mentem**: in § 26 and also in Tusc. I 22, 41, 65; Fin. 4, 12 Cic. declares that Aristotle derived mind from the fifth element. This assertion has exposed him to the undeserved contempt of many modern critics (among them Madvig in his n. on Fin. 4, 12) who have not troubled themselves to examine carefully the utterances of Aristotle himself on the subject. These are very various and contradictory. It seems clear that Aristotle, though he called his πέμπτον σῶμα or πέμπτη οὐσία by such names as ἀγένητον, ἄφθαρτον, ἀναυξὲς, ἀναλλοίωτον, yet intended it to be distinctly a *material* substance. On the other hand he often asserted the soul to be immaterial, as in De An. I 5; cf. Zeller II 2, p. 482 sq. ed. 3. Yet the powers of the soul in his system have their existence so bound up with that of things which *are* material, that it is barely possible, when reading certain passages, to avoid attributing a material character to it also. Thus Zeller himself admits (p. 483) that Aristotle's words make it hard not to identify with the αἰθὴρ or fifth element his *animal warmth*, with which ψυχὴ is inextricably connected. Even in the case of pure intellect (νοῦς) modern scholars have been found to maintain, after careful examination, that Aristotle intended αἰθὴρ to be its substratum—the very doctrine which Cic. is accused of having blundered into through sheer ignorance and carelessness. (See Zeller 569 n.) Trendelenburg (in his ed. of the 'De Anima' pp. 146, 147) complains that Ar. so closely linked his νοῦς with the lower ψυχὴ that the two can with difficulty be disentangled; and we have seen how easy Ar. had made it to confound this lower ψυχὴ with a material substance. The later Peripatetics certainly maintained that the ψυχὴ came from αἰθήρ: see Stob. Phys. 870. So did the Stoics; only they considered αἰθὴρ to be not essentially different from πῦρ. In Tusc. 1, 66 Cic. even derives the gods from the fifth substance, which Aristotle had called θεῖον and τὸ τῶν ἄστρων στοιχεῖον, while designating the stars as δαίμονες: see Zeller, 423, 437, 439. [Cf. Pacuuius (Ribbeck 93) mater est terra: ea parit corpus: aeter animam adiugat.]

rebantur: see n. on 2, 88 reri.

ignem esse ipsam naturam: so Diog. 7, 156 δοκεῖ δὲ αὐτοῖς τὴν φύσιν εἶναι πῦρ. To the Stoics, all the aspects of the universe are in one way or another manifestations of Fire, which is one of the names given to the universal God; see Zeller, Stoics, p. 141, and cf. Diog. 7, 136, 137, and Stob. Phys. 312, 314, where it is said that πῦρ is κατ' ἐξοχὴν στοιχεῖον, and is the first thing generated from the ἄποιος ὕλη: from it then comes air, from air water, from water earth. Fire is λογικὸν and gives rise to the ἡγεμονικὸν in man, which comprises within it all powers of sensation and thought. Cf. Zeller, III 1, 196 sq. or E. T. pp. 153, 187. The connexion of these doctrines with Heraclitus is obvious; for this see

posse esse non corpus. Plurima autem in illa tertia philosophiae **40**
parte mutauit. In qua primum de sensibus ipsis quaedam dixit noua, quos iunctos esse censuit e quadam quasi impulsione oblata extrinsecus, quam ille *φαντασίαν*, nos uisum appellemus licet, et teneamus hoc quidem uerbum, erit enim utendum in

Fin. 1, 18 quae uis sit quae quidque efficiat. etiam: ita scripsi; codd. edd. *et*; om. Madu. apud Orelli, ed. 2, uol. 4, p. 854. 7 autem: *etiam* GHBM. 9 iunctos: *uinctos* PVE; *cunctos* ψ (ut coni. Ernesti, scripsit Huelsemann.); *punctos* coni. Dau. e quadam: *e* om. E. 10 appellemus: P corr. ex *appellamus*, quod habent cett. 11 hoc quidem uerbum: sic ex Halmii coniectura scripsi; *hoc uerb. quidem*, codd.; uocem *quidem* obelisco notat M; B ut H.

n. on 2, 118 Heraclitus ignem.

2. **etiam**: this correction seems necessary; the only way to understand *et* would be to suppose an ellipse = et in his quae gignuntur. In no case can *et...atque* stand for *et...et;* and Cic. probably did not use *et* for *etiam*, though the usage is found in some writers of his time (e.g. Nep. Milt. 3, 4).

4. **effici**: nn. on §§ 24, 28.

ab ea: sc. natura. The words *ea... corporis* are a periphrasis necessitated by the lack of a word like *incorporeus* or *incorporalis;* the latter was first used by Seneca and Quintilian, the former not till a much later time. Cf. N. D. 1, 30.

5. **Xenocrates**: 2, 124 n.

superiores etiam: either Cic. is here thinking of Plato only, or he does not realise that the *πέμπτον σῶμα* of Aristotle, however fine and subtle, is still corporeal.

6. **nec uero...corpus**: for the uncompromising materialism of the Stoics see Zeller, III 1, 117 sq. or E. Tr. 120 sq.; Sext. A. M. 8, 262 *τὸ γὰρ ἀσώματον κατ' αὐτοὺς (τοὺς Στωικοὺς) οὔτε ποιεῖν τι πέφυκεν οὔτε πάσχειν*: so ib. 404; 9, 255. The necessity of a physical analogy between the perceiving mind and the things perceived was often asserted by the old *φυσικοί*: cf. Arist. de gen. et corr. 1, 7 (of Democritus) *οὐ γὰρ ἐγχωρεῖν τὰ ἕτερα καὶ διαφέροντα πάσχειν ὑπ' ἀλλήλων*: Sext. A. M. 7, 116 *παλαιά τις ἄνωθεν παρὰ τοῖς φυσικοῖς κυλίεται δόξα περὶ τοῦ τὰ ὅμοια τῶν ὁμοίων εἶναι γνωριστικά.* Theophrastus discussed the question '*ἀσωμάτῳ ὑπὸ σώματος τί τὸ πάθος*' (Zeller, II 2, p. 849). On the other hand Anaxagoras laid down the principle '*τὸ ὅμοιον ἀπαθὲς ἀπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου*' (R. and P. § 58). There is of course no ultimate difference in the Stoic scheme between Matter and Force; see Zeller, III 1, 131 ed. 3 or Stoics, pp. 134, 135. [Cf. Lucr. 1, 443 at facere et fungi sine corpore nulla potest res.]

7. **non corpus**: again a substitute for *incorporeum* or *incorporale;* here the *non* goes closely with the succeeding word and forms a compound with it. So in Lucr. 1, 1075 non medium, where Munro's n. gives exx., to which add Fin. 2, 18 hoc non-dolere; cf. also § 37 contra-officium, 2, 47 non confuse; 2, 50 non honestis; and n. on 1, 4 non haesitans.

9. **iunctos**: I entirely agree with Madvig (Exc. 1 to his ed. of 'De finibus') and Schuppe, 'de anacoluthis Ciceronianis' p. 9, that we have here an anacoluthon. Cic. meant to say 'iunctos e quadam impulsione et ex assensione animorum', but having to explain *φαντασία* was obliged to break off and resume at *sed ad haec.* The explanation of a Greek term causes a very similar anacoluthon in Off. 1, 153. The notion that *iunctos = aptos* (R. and P. § 398 *a*) is untenable; in this sense (if emendation were needed) *uinctos* might be read, the interchange of *uinctus* and *iunctus* being very common in MSS; cf. Tim. 27 ex eadem uinctus. For the construction *iunctus ex* see Madv. on Fin. 2, 44.

quadam quasi impulsione: cf. Fat. 42 adsensio non possit fieri nisi commota uiso. For *quadam quasi* cf. n. on § 21. The order *quadam quasi* for *quasi quadam* is unusual; cf. Tusc. 1, 27.

oblata extrinsecus: n. on 2, 48 intestinum et oblatum.

10. **φαντασίαν**: the word was both Platonic and Aristotelian.

nos...licet: for the turn of expression cf. Fin. 3, 21; 4, 74; Quint. 6, 2, 29; Draeger 1^2 p. 218.

11. **hoc quidem uerbum**: *quidem* usually follows close on the pronoun; hence the correction here and in § 18

reliquo sermone saepius; sed ad haec, quae uisa sunt et quasi accepta sensibus, adsensionem adiungit animorum, quam esse

41 uolt in nobis positam et uoluntariam. Visis non omnibus adiungebat fidem, sed eis solum, quae propriam quandam haberent declarationem earum rerum, quae uiderentur: id autem uisum, cum ipsum per se cerneretur, comprehendibile—feretis haec?' 'Nos uero', inquit. 'Quonam enim modo καταληπτὸν diceres?'—'Sed, cum acceptum iam et approbatum esset, comprehensionem

4 haberent: *habebant* G. 5 uiderentur: *uidentur* G. 6 comprehendibile: sic APψ; *comprendibile* GHM; *comprehendibilem* E; *comprehensibile* V Harl. 2 U; *conprensibile* Harl. 1; *comprensibile* Burn.; *conprehendibile* B. haec: *hoc* cum Dauisio HBM; sed *haec* valet 'talia qualia hoc est'. 7 inquit: *inquam* post Man.

mihi quidem uidetur; see Madv. on Fin. 4, 43; also ib. 3, 28; Ac. 2, 101; Madv. Opusc. I 406; II 315. In our passage the irregularity might perhaps be excused by the fact that *teneamus* comes before its object.

1. **quasi accepta**: here *accepta* is used to denote the mere experiencing of an impression, quite apart from any conclusion as to its truth or falsehood. The word *acceptum* in § 41 has a different sense; it implies that the impression has been considered and adopted as accurate; so 2, 29 accipi.

2. **adsensionem**: συγκατάθεσιν, for which see n. on 2, 37.

animorum: n. on § 20.

3. **in nobis positam et uoluntariam**: as to the relation of the will to sensation, see n. on 2, 37 ea quae est in nostra potestate sita adsensio.

uisis non omnibus: a hint at Epicurus: see n. on 2, 79. Observe *omnibus adiungebat*, but above *ad haec adiungit*.

4. **propriam**: 'peculiar to itself', the force of this expression will be explained in n. on 2, 34 proprium.

5. **declarationem**: 'clear evidence concerning those objects from which the impressions come'. Ἐνάργεια is the characteristic of those impressions called καταλήψεις or καταληπτικαὶ φαντασίαι. This subject is reserved for the nn. on 2, 17.

6. **ipsum per se**: 'by its own inherent characteristics'.

cerneretur: = discerneretur a falso uiso.

comprehendibile: it is almost certain that this form of the word was used by Cic., not *comprehensibilis*, which first occurs in Seneca the younger; Pliny the younger and Quintilian have *incomprehensibilis*. Nearly all the adjectives in *-bilis* are formed by joining the suffix to the stem of the verb; of the few in which the suffix is added to the stem of the passive participle, one only (*flexibilis*) occurs in Latin so early as Cicero's time. The words *patibilis* (N. D. 3, 29), *impetibilis* (Fin. 2, 57) were also invented by Cic. The note of Goerenz on the forms *incomprehendibile*, *incomprehensibile* is worth reading as a philological curiosity.

feretis: for the omission of the interrogative *nĕ* cf. Draeger § 156 and below, 2, 69.

7. **nos uero**: above, n. on § 35.

inquit: sc. Atticus; cf. n. on § 33; Atticus answers also in §§ 14, 25.

καταληπτόν: this should mean, strictly, the *object* which causes the impression; the impression itself should be κατάληψις not καταληπτόν; but, as we shall see in the 'Lucullus', words denoting the object and words denoting the impression are readily interchanged.

diceres: Draeger § 148; Roby §§ 1536—1546.

8. **sed**: resumptive after a break, as above, § 40; below, 2, 30. A good ex. will be found in Att. 3, 23, 2; cf. too Draeger § 333, 5; also n. on *igitur* in § 26 and *sed tamen* in 2, 17.

comprehensionem: strictly, this ought to denote the process of perception in the abstract, not the individual perception. In Greek however κατάληψις and καταληπτικὴ φαντασία are constantly interchanged. Cf. n. on *scientiam* below.

9. **manu**: see 2, 145 with n.

10. **cum eo uerbo etc.**: cf. N. D. 1, 44 sunt rebus nouis noua ponenda nomina, ut Epicurus ipse πρόληψιν appel-

appellabat, similem eis rebus, quae manu prehenderentur: ex quo etiam nomen hoc duxerat, cum eo uerbo antea nemo tali in re usus esset, plurimisque idem nouis verbis—noua enim dicebat—usus est. Quod autem erat sensu comprehensum, id ipsum sensum appellabat, et si ita erat comprehensum, ut conuelli ratione non posset, scientiam: sin aliter, inscientiam nominabat: ex qua exsisteret etiam opinio, quae esset imbecilla et cum falso

HBM; *inquit Atticus* coni. Goer., ad sensum recte; sed non opus est correctione. modo: *alio modo* GHBM. καταληπτόν: *captaleton* A Harl. 2; *catalempton* P; *captalempton* ψV; *captalepton* Harl. 1, Burn.; *cathalepton* E. 10 duxerat cum: *duxerat at* (*ac* G) *cum* MSS; corr. Man. in re: *iure* AVEψ Harl. Burn. 15 exsisteret: *exstiterat* G; *existerat* P.

lauit, quam antea nemo eo uerbo nominarat. The word *καταλαμβάνειν* or *καταλαμβάνεσθαι* is not uncommon in Greek before Zeno's time with the sense 'to mentally apprehend'. The real sense of *κατάληψις* is often missed. Thus Zeller, throughout his account of the Stoics, assumes that the word is used because certain impressions *seize on* the mind of the percipient, and irresistibly compel him to believe in their truth. But in the process of perception the mind is by the Stoics regarded as active, not passive, and *κατάληψις* is rather the process by which the mind *seizes on* the nature of external things.

11. **noua...dicebat**: an admission not often made by Cic. who usually contends, like Antiochus, that Zeno merely gave new names to old doctrines; see §§ 35, 43; above, however, § 40 quaedam dixit noua.

12. **sensu...sensum**: here we have the two meanings of *αἴσθησις*, as applied to (1) the organs of sense, (2) the impressions received by them. In the Greek sources the words *φαντασία* and *αἴσθησις* are often interchanged. Cf. Sen. ep. 124, 6 aliquid manifestum sensuque comprehensum.

13. **ita...posset**: in the belief of Zeno and the earlier Stoics every perception of sense which brought with it, at the moment of perceiving it, an irresistible conviction of its accuracy, was sure to prove incapable of being upset by subsequent examination or reasoning. Later Stoics admitted, however, that the irresistible conviction might accompany an inaccurate impression; hence every impression must be tested by reasoning before acceptance. Cf. Sext. A. M. 7, 253 *οἱ ἀρχαιότεροι τῶν Στωικῶν κριτήριόν φασιν εἶναι τῆς ἀληθείας τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν· οἱ δὲ νεώτεροι προσετίθεσαν καὶ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχουσαν ἔνστημα*: Epict. Diss. 3, 12, 15 *ἀνεξέταστον φαντασίαν μὴ παραδέχεσθαι*; also below, 2 § 45. This, as Zeller remarks (III 1, p. 84 ed. 3 or E. Tr. p. 88), was a most important change of view. For *conuelli* cf. Diu. 1, 117 haec si tenemus, quae mihi quidem non uidentur posse conuelli.

14. **scientiam**: *ἐπιστήμη* is usually defined as *σύστημα ἐκ καταληψέων συγγεγυμνασμένων* (Sext. P. H. 3, 188); see n. on 2 § 22. But the constituent parts of this *ἐπιστήμη* were themselves called *ἐπιστῆμαι*, so that *ἐπιστήμη* and *κατάληψις* or *καταληπτικὴ φαντασία* become convertible terms. Cf. Stob. Eth. 128 *εἶναι δὲ τὴν ἐπιστήμην κατάληψιν ἀσφαλῆ καὶ ἀμετάπτωτον ὑπὸ λόγου· ἑτέραν δὲ ἐπιστήμην σύστημα ἐξ ἐπιστημῶν τοιούτων*: Sext. A. M. 7, 151 *ἐπιστήμην εἶναι τὴν ἀσφαλῆ καὶ βεβαίαν καὶ ἀμετάθετον ὑπὸ λόγου κατάληψιν*: Diog. 7, 47 *ἐπιστήμην φασὶν ἢ κατάληψιν ἀσφαλῆ ἢ ἕξιν ἐν φαντασιῶν προσδέξει ἀμετάπτωτον ὑπὸ λόγου* (with the last words cf. the sequel of Stob. Eth. 128 quoted above; also a definition of *ἐπιστήμη* quoted by Arist. Top. 5, 2, 130 b, 16 = *ὑπόληψις ἀμετάπειστος ὑπὸ λόγου*). In Fin. 3, 17 Cic. translates *ἐπιστῆμαι* = *καταλήψεις* by *rerum cognitiones*: in his n. there Madvig falls into some serious errors. Cf. also n. on 2, 31 cognitionem.

inscientiam: *ἄγνοιαν*, which word the Stoics generally used as the opposite of *ἐπιστήμη*.

15. **exsisteret**: the infinitive *exsistere* might have been expected here, as to all

42 incognitoque communis. Sed inter scientiam et inscientiam comprehensionem illam, quam dixi, collocabat, eamque neque in rectis neque in prauis numerabat, sed soli credendum esse dicebat. E quo sensibus etiam fidem tribuebat, quod, ut supra dixi, comprehensio facta sensibus et uera esse illi et fidelis uidebatur, non quod omnia, quae essent in re, comprehenderet, sed quia nihil quod cadere in eam posset relinqueret quodque natura quasi normam scientiae et principium sui dedisset, unde

1 incognitoque: *ignotoque* G. 3 soli: suspectum Halmio; *solum ei* Christ. 7 quodque: *quodque eam* Faber; Harl. 1 habet *naturam* pro *natura*. Fortasse legendum est *natura eam*. 10 inueniendam: *muniendam* G, cum librarius lectionem ad uerbum *uiae* accommodaret. 11 reperiuntur: *aperirentur* coni. Dau.

appearance *ex qua* is merely connective. But in relative clauses in *oratio obliqua* Cic. allows himself a certain latitude of choice between infinitive and subjunctive; so above in § 20 quorum utrumque mentis esset proprium; § 26 e quo essent; § 27; § 28 extra quem sit; Fin. 4, 16 aiunt artis requisitas quae naturam adiuuarent, in quibus ea numeretur; N. D. 1, 106 hoc idem fieri in deo, cuius crebra facie pellantur animi; Lael. §§ 45, 88; Off. 3, 49 classem clam incendi posse, quo facto frangi Lacedaemoniorum opes necesse esset. Add Caes. B. C. 1, 67, 4; Tac. Ann. 1, 9; Sen. Rh. contr. 2, 1, 21. In all these passages it would be very harsh to make the relative clause in any way subordinate. In many of them the infinitive may be restored by slight corrections such as the omission of a final *t*, which is very often wrongly added in MSS; see Madv. Em. Liu. 631, 752, ed. 2. The whole subject of mood in relative clauses in *oratio obliqua* requires more thorough treatment than it has hitherto received in Grammars. [Cf. Mayor on N. D. 1, 12.]

opinio...imbecilla: for δόξα cf. n. on § 39; also on *opinationem* below.

1. **inter scientiam etc.**: this does not mean that *κατάληψις* was something which had not the characteristics either of knowledge or of ignorance, but merely that it is the appointed path by which the transition from ignorance to knowledge must be made. Cf. Sext. A. M. 7, 151 *ἐπιστήμην καὶ δόξαν καὶ τὴν ἐν μεθορίᾳ τούτων τεταγμένην κατάληψιν*: ib. *κατάληψιν δὲ τὴν μεταξὺ τούτων (ἐπιστήμης καὶ δόξης)*: also ib. 153.

2. **neque in rectis neque in prauis**: the *κατάληψις* is common to the wise man and the fool (Sext. A. M. 7, 152) and therefore has no moral character. Cf. Sen. ep. 113, 18 assensio in uirtute non est ('does not come under the head of virtue'). Perfect virtue, however, brings with it unfailing *κατάληψις*, since the wise man never makes a mistake.

6. **non quod...relinqueret**: this is best explained in the words of Sext. P. H. 1, 94 *φαίνεται τὸ μῆλον λεῖον εὐῶδες γλυκὺ ξανθόν· ἄδηλον οὖν πότερόν ποτε ταύτας μόνας ὄντως ἔχει τὰς ποιότητας, ἢ μονόποιον μέν ἐστιν, παρὰ δὲ τὴν διάφορον κατασκευὴν τῶν αἰσθητηρίων διάφορον φαίνεται, ἢ καὶ πλείονας μὲν τῶν φαινομένων ἔχει ποιότητας, ἡμῖν δ' οὐχ ὑποπίπτουσί τινες αὐτῶν*: ib. 97 *καὶ ἡμᾶς οὖν ἐνδέχεται τὰς πέντε μόνας αἰσθήσεις ἔχοντας μόνον ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι, ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὸ μῆλον ποιοτήτων, ὧν ἐσμὲν ἀντιληπτικοί· ὑποκεῖσθαι δὲ ἄλλας οἷόν τέ ἐστι ποιότητας, ὑποπιπτούσας ἑτέροις αἰσθητηρίοις, ὧν ἡμεῖς οὐ μετεσχήκαμεν.* The contention of the Stoics was that although our senses do not necessarily reveal to us the whole nature of an external object, yet all that they do reveal to us is true. The language of Sextus has innumerable parallels in the writings of modern philosophers: cf. Mill on Hamilton p. 10 ed. 3 'the impressions these realities (i. e. external objects) make upon us we may know, and these are all that we can know respecting them. In some future state of existence it is conceivable that we may know more, and more may be known by intelligences superior to us. Yet even this can only be true in the same sense in which a person with the use of his eyes knows more than is known

postea notiones rerum in animis imprimerentur, e quibus non principia solum, sed latiores quaedam ad rationem inueniendam uiae reperiuntur. Errorem autem et temeritatem et ignorantiam et opinationem et suspicionem et uno nomine omnia, quae essent aliena firmae et constantis adsensionis, a virtute sapientiaque remouebat. Atque in his fere commutatio constitit omnis dissensioque Zenonis a superioribus'.

scr. HBM; *aperiuntur* Man.; *reperirentur* Gruter. Quod ad indicatiuum attinet, uid. supra, ad § 29. ignorantiam: *ignorationem* Burn.; uid. adn. 13 constantis: *conflantis* E. 14 constitit: unice uerum, cum ualeat 'substitit, non ultra progressa est' (Madu. Em. 1, p. 120); *consistit* multae edd.

to one born blind, or in which we should know more than we do if we were endowed with two or three additional senses'. Also Berkeley 'On the principles of Human Knowledge' § 77 'but, say you, there may be some...substance or substratum of some other qualities, as incomprehensible to us as colours are to a man born blind, because we have not a sense adapted to them'.

7. **cadere in eam**: cf. § 31 sub sensum cadere, with n.

posset relinqueret: Cic. generally avoids the concurrence of two verbs in different constructions, especially of ὁμοιοτέλευτα; cf. however Fin. 3, 62 apparet nos a natura ipsa ut eos quos genuerimus amemus impelli; so Val. Max. 5, 4, 3; Liu. 6, 3, 4.

8. **quasi normam**: norma is here probably a rendering of γνώμων or κανών; cf. n. on § 30 iudicium; also fragm. 8.

principium sui: sc. cognoscendae.

9. **notiones rerum**: ἔννοιαι, for which see n. on 2, 30 notitiae rerum.

imprimerentur: n. on 2, 18 impressum effictumque.

10. **principia...latiores uiae**: for the progress of the mind from disconnected sensations to ordered knowledge see 2 §§ 21, 30 with nn.

inueniendam...reperiuntur: this close juxtaposition of words of similar meaning is illustrated by Wopkens, Lect. Tull. p. 24.

11. **reperiuntur**: edd. object to the change from *oratio obliqua* to *or. recta*, which however has repeatedly taken place in Varro's speech and is excessively common (see Madv. on Fin. 1, 30 and 3, 50) also to the phrase *reperire uiam*, which however occurs in Verg. Aen. 9, 195 and seems a very natural phrase; cf. N. D. 1, 107 r. exitum; Caes. B. G. 6, 37, 4 r. aditum.

errorem: n. on 2, 66 errore leuitate.

temeritatem: here the 'temeritas credendi' of Tac. An. 4, 67, 5 readiness to believe on insufficient evidence. See n. on 2 § 66.

ignorantiam: the only place in Cicero's writings where the word occurs. Having regard to the character of our MSS, it seems exceedingly likely that *ignorationem* (which with contractions would closely resemble *ignorantiam*) was the original reading. *Ignorantia* occurs in Sall. hist. 3, 61, 25 ed. Dietsch; Nep. Ages. 8, 5; Pelop. 1, 1; Caes. B. C. 3, 68, 2 elsewhere only in poets and late prose. So Cic. employed *iactatio* but not *iactantia*, which is so common in Tacitus; though he sometimes has the double form, as in the case of *tolerantia* and *toleratio*. Probably *haesitantiam* which now stands as ἅπαξ εἰρημένον in Phil. 3, 16 is a corruption of the common *haesitationem*.

12. **opinationem**: οἴησιν or δόξαν, which is defined by Sext. A. M. 7, 152 as ἀσθενῆ καὶ ψευδῆ συγκατάθεσιν, with which cf. § 41 opinio...imbecilla; Tusc. 4, 15 opinationem imbecillam adsensionem; also below, 2, 52 imbecillius adsentiuntur. So in Cic. Tim. 28 opiniones adsensionesque firmae ueraeque, a rendering of Plat. Tim. 37 B δόξαι καὶ πίστεις βέβαιοι καὶ ἀληθεῖς.

13. **aliena...adsensionis**: for the constructions of *alienus* in Cic. see n. on 2, 25.

uirtute sapientia: the terms ἀρετή and σοφία are often equivalent in the Stoic system.

14. **remouebat**: cf. 2, 6 remouimus. For the context cf. Diog. 7, 23 ἔλεγε δὲ Ζήνων μηδὲν εἶναι τῆς οἰήσεως ἀλλοτριώτερον πρὸς κατάληψιν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν.

atque in his fere etc.: for this summary cf. n. on § 20 ergo haec animorum;

43 XII. Quae cum dixisset, 'breuiter sane minimeque obscure exposita est', inquam, 'a te, Varro, et ueteris Academiae ratio et Stoicorum: uerum esse autem arbitror, ut Antiocho, nostro familiari, placebat, correctionem ueteris Academiae potius quam aliquam nouam disciplinam putandam'. Tunc Varro, 'tuae sunt nunc partes', inquit, 'qui ab antiquorum ratione desciscis et ea, quae ab Arcesila nouata sunt, probas, docere quod et qua de caussa discidium factum sit, ut uideamus satisne ista sit iusta
44 defectio'. Tum ego: 'cum Zenone', inquam, 'ut accepimus, Ar-

1 breuiter: *et breuiter* codd.; corr. Lamb. 3 uerum: incl. Orelli et B; *horum* coni. Goer. scr. M. autem: incl. HB. Sed uid. adn. meam. ut Antiocho: *at ab Ant.* APVψ Harl. 1, 3, Burn.; *at et* A Harl. 2; *ut ab* r; *ut* om. G[1]: *at* G[2]. 4 correctionem: *correptionem* Harl. 1; cf. supra, §§ 13, 35, 43. 5 tuae; *duae* uel *due* codd. omn. 6 desciscis: *nunc d.* GV Harl. Burn.; *desistis*

also De Or. 3, 205; ib. 1, 145; Caes. B. C. 3, 55, 3 in his rebus fere erat Fufius occupatus. The summary is often introduced by *atque*, as in Lael. 76.

1. **breuiter...minimeque**: here, as in § 37 et seruata praetermissaque, the MSS insert *et*. *Et...que* where only two things are mentioned, is, in general, a combination foreign to Cicero's prose, though where the enumeration consists of three or more members, it may occur (see n. on 2, 9 Catulus et Lucullus nosque). Only when a considerable interval intervenes between the *et* and the *que*, so that there is almost room for anacoluthon, do these conjunctions correspond, and even then they connect clauses rather than separate words; so in Tusc. 1, 4; ib. 3, 5; Fin. 5, 64 where Madv. has an elaborate note. Examples like Fin. 2, 100 scripsit enim et multis saepe uerbis et breuiter aperteque, are of course not to the point. After Livy *et...que* is not uncommon; cf. 4, 2, 3 id et singulis uniuersisque. [For breuiter see n. on 2, 108 breui.]

2. **exposita est...et...et**: singular verb with double subject, as in § 11.

3. **uerum esse autem etc.**: 'and I believe this view to be the true one, viz. that it (the Stoic system) should be looked on as a reform' etc. There is not the least reason for casting out either *uerum* or *autem;* the words from *correctionem* to *putandam* form an explanation of *uerum*. (So Faber.) Cf. Orat. 67 uideo uisum esse non nullis...putandum; and for the omission of *esse* 2, 15 ait...putandam; 2, 74 aiebas...remouendum. The edd. seem to have thought that *esse* was wanted to go with *putandam*, but its omission in such cases after verbs of speaking and thinking is quite regular. [In Tusc. 1, 20 Xenocrates animi figuram et quasi corpus negauit esse uerum numerum dixit esse, read 'negauit; esse uerum dixit, numerum esse'. *Verum* is foisted on the text in some MSS of Fin. 1, 39.]

5. **tunc**: rarely found before consonants in prose earlier than Livy; see Munro on Lucr. 1, 130.

tuae sunt...partes: the same expression in Sen. Rh. contr. 8, 6; Phaedr. 3, epil. 24.

6. **qui...desciscis**: the antecedent to the relative is not expressed, but involved in *tuae*. The usage is common in Latin (as in Greek). A good collection of exx. will be found in Kühner's Gram. II § 193, 7 (Hannover 1879). For *desciscis* see § 13 n. and Introd. p. 16, n. 2.

7. **quod et qua de caussa**: cf. Sall. Cat. 47, 1 interrogatus quid aut qua de caussa consili habuisset.

9. **Zenone ... Arcesilas**: for the polemic of A. against Zeno see Zeller III 1, 492 sq. ed. 3 or Stoics etc. pp. 500 sq. E. Tr.

ut accepimus: cf. § 33 acceperim; 2, § 5.

10. **non pertinacia**: Plat. Gorg. 515 B *οὐ φιλονεικίᾳ*: cf. 2, 9 sine pertinacia; 2, 7 sine ulla contentione; 2, 65 pertinacia ...calumnia...studio certandi, and n. on 2, 14 Arcesilae calumnia. The charge of *pertinacia* is frequently deprecated by the debaters in Cicero's dialogues; cf. Fin. 1, §§ 27, 28; ib. 2, §§ 9, 107; Tusc. 2, 5. Pertinacia is the bad side of perseverance, the good side being perseue-

cesilas sibi omne certamen instituit, non pertinacia aut studio uincendi, ut mihi quidem uidetur, sed earum rerum obscuritate, quae ad confessionem ignorationis adduxerant Socraten ut iam ante Socraten Democritum, Anaxagoran, Empedoclen, omnis paene ueteres, qui nihil cognosci, nihil percipi, nihil sciri posse dixerunt, angustos sensus, imbecillos animos, breuia curricula uitae et, ut Democritus, in profundo ueritatem esse demersam, opinionibus et institutis omnia teneri, nihil ueritati relinqui,

G; *descistis* Harl. 1. 7 docere: *doce* PAEUψ Harl. 1, Burn. 8 discidium: sic AEVψ Burn.; *dissidium* Harl. 2. 11 mihi quidem: *quidem mihi* AGPV; om. *quidem* Harl. 1. 12 ut iam ante: *et ueluti amantes* codd.; *et i. a.* Dau. HBM. 15 imbecillos: *inbecilles* GE. 16 demersam: *diuersam* Eψ Harl. 1, Burn.; *dimersam* in rasura Harl. 2.

rantia (Inu. 2, 165) or constantia (Marc. 31) or peruicacia (as is elaborately explained by Attius l. 9, ed. Ribbeck). In N. D. 1, 13 the Academy is called *procax*, which may be a corruption for *peruicax*. Aug. contr. Ac. 2, 1 speaks of 'Academicorum uel calumnia uel pertinacia uel peruicacia'.

11. **obscuritate**: = propter obscuritatem in § 29; a rather strong ex. of the causal ablative. Cf. Leg. 1, 31 dolor in maximis malis ducitur, cum sua asperitate, tum quod...where see Du Mesnil's n.; Draeger § 228. For the context cf. 2, 7; Fin. 2, 15 rerum obscuritas, non uerborum.

12. **Socraten**: his position with regard to scepticism will be considered in n. on 2, 74.

ut iam ante S.: Fab. and Turn. vainly defend the MSS reading. For the correction cf. Fin. 2, 17; and if *et* be read, Fam. 15, 16, 1; Fin. 2, 34; Rep. 1, 31; also Brut. 107; Diu. 1, 88 (in the last two passages *atque ante*). Democritus (460—357 B.C.) was really younger than Socrates (468—399) who died the earlier of the two by 42 years.

13. **Democritum Anaxagoran Empedoclen**: for D. see n. on 2, 73, for Anax. n. on 2, 72; for Emp. n. on 2, 74.

omnis paene ueteres: Plut. Col. 1121 E says that the *σοφισταὶ* of Arcesilas' time accused him of attributing falsely his own doctrines to Socrates, Plato, Parmenides, Heraclitus. For the contributions to scepticism of the Eleatic school see n. on 2, 74. Those of Heraclitus were considerable, but curiously enough are not mentioned definitely by Cicero, though from him probably came the sceptic vein in Plato, principally at least. Heraclitus was not a thorough sceptic, since he assumed the possibility of arriving at sound knowledge by reasoning, though he often denounced the uncertainty of sense-knowledge; cf. fragm. IV ed. Bywater '*κακοὶ μάρτυρες ἀνθρώποισι ὀφθαλμοὶ καὶ ὦτα, βαρβάρους ψυχὰς ἐχόντων*'. Pyrrho as well as Arcesilas accused these *φυσικοὶ* of scepticism; cf. Diog. 9, 72 sq.

14. **cognosci...percipi...sciri**: all words of the same import; see n. on 2, 23 comprehensi percepti cogniti constituti.

15. **angustos sensus**: Plat. Phaed. 65 B *ἆρα ἔχει ἀλήθειάν τινα ὄψις καὶ ἀκοὴ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἢ τά γε τοιαῦτα καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ ἡμῖν ἀεὶ θρυλοῦσιν, ὅτι οὔτ' ἀκούομεν ἀκριβὲς οὐδὲν οὔτε ὁρῶμεν*: ib. 83 A *ἀπάτης μὲν μεστὴ ἡ διὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων σκέψις, ἀπάτης δὲ ἡ διὰ τῶν ὤτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων.* Cf. also Empedocles' lines beginning *στεινωποὶ μὲν γὰρ πάλαμαι*, R. and P. § 168.

imbecillos animos: Emped. l. l. *οὔτ' ἐπιδερκτὰ τάδ' ἀνδράσιν οὔτ' ἐπακουστά, οὔτε νόῳ περιληπτά*: below, 2, 7 in iudiciis infirmitas.

breuia curricula uitae: Emped. l. l. *παῦρον δὲ ζώης ἀβίου μέρος κ.τ.λ.* The metaphors in *curriculum cursum* are often applied to life, as in Arch. 28; Sest. 47.

16. **ut Democritus**: see n. on 2, 124 ut Xenocrates.

in profundo: n. on 2 § 32.

17. **opinionibus...omnia teneri**: so Timon in Paul, Sillorum fragmenta V *ἄνθρωποι κενεῆς οἰήσιος ἔμπλεοι ἀσκοί.*

et institutis: for this Vaucher most ignorantly reads *inueteratis;* the word

45 deinceps omnia tenebris circumfusa esse dixerunt. Itaque Arcesilas negabat esse quicquam quod sciri posset, ne illud quidem ipsum, quod Socrates sibi reliquisset: sic omnia latere censebat in occulto: neque esse quicquam quod cerni aut intellegi possit: quibus de caussis nihil oportere neque profiteri neque adfirmare quemquam neque adsensione approbare, cohibereque semper et ab omni lapsu continere temeritatem, quae tum esset insignis, cum aut falsa aut incognita res approbaretur, neque hoc quicquam esse turpius quam cognitioni et perceptioni adsensionem approbationemque praecurrere. Huic rationi quod erat consentaneum faciebat, ut contra omnium sententias dicens in eam

1 deinceps: *denique* coni. Bentl. ediderunt HBM; cf. § 32. dixerunt: post Man. incl. HBM. 2 ne illud: *nec ill.* G. 3 reliquisset: post hoc addit G "ut nihil se scire sciret." censebat: om. Orell. post Goer. 4 possit: *posset* coni. Ernesti, ed. HBM. 6 adsensione: *assertione* MSS et infra *assertionem*,

inst. renders the νόμῳ of Democritus in his well-known utterance given by Sext. A. M. 7, 135 νόμῳ γλυκὺ καὶ νόμῳ πικρόν, νόμῳ θερμόν, νόμῳ ψυχρόν, νόμῳ χροιή· ἐτεῇ δὲ ἄτομα καὶ κενόν.

1. **deinceps omnia**: πάντα ἐφεξῆς: 'all things one after another'. Cf. Tusc. 5, 8 deinceps omnes; Clu. 148; De Or. 1, 37; Val. M. 1, 5 ext. 2 deinceps omnibus proeliis. The reading is quite sound.

tenebris: so 2, 61 tantis offusis tenebris; 2, 122; also see n. on 2, 73, where Democritus' σκοτίη γνῶσις is mentioned.

dixerunt: for the repetition after *dixerunt* above cf. n. on 2, 31.

2. **illud...ipsum**: see n. on 2, 74; also cf. nn. on 2, 28.

3. **reliquisset**: *reliquerat* might have been expected, as Cic. had no doubt about the fact; but he often prefers to put an undoubted fact as it is regarded by another person, when there is no necessity for so putting it.

4. **in occulto**: n. on 2, 83 in paruo.

6. **cohibereque**: for *que* used in place of an adversative particle see Draeger II^1, p. 41. For *cohibere* cf. 2, 94 cohibes adsensum. And for que after ĕ, n. on 2, 29.

7. **lapsu**: 2, 68 sustinenda est assensio ne praecipitet.

8. **incognita**: = **incerta**; n. on 2, 16.

9. **turpius**: N. D. 1, 1 quid est temeritate turpius? See n. on 2, 66.

quam: the double comparison in *turpius hoc quam* is well illustrated by Madv. on Fin. 1, 19, who qu. N. D. 1, 38; De Or. 1, 169 (very like our passage); ib. 2, 38 and 302; Verr. 4, 77; Att. 4, 8 B, 2; add Diu. 1, 87 quid uero hoc turpius quam quod idem (Epicurus) nullam censet gratuitam esse uirtutem? A similar pleonasm is common in Greek.

cognitioni et perceptioni: ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ καταλήψει.

10. **praecurrere**: = φθάνειν, as in Lucr. 1, 371 illud...praecurrere cogor; cf. Off. 1, 102; Diu. 1, 118.

11. **ut...deduceret**: the whole clause is an explanation of *quod*, and, taken with *faciebat*, implies that A. *actually did* win over most of his contemporaries.

contra omnium sententias: n. on 2, 7 contra omnis dicere.

dicens in eam: Wopkens Lect. Tull. 29 actually defends the text against Madvig's correction, quoting Hand, who says of it 'nihil inanius'!

12. **deduceret**: in the sense of making converts *traducere* is more common, as in Off. 2, 10; De Or. 3, 121; Fin. 4, 2.

paria...momenta: we have here the distinctive principle of Arcesilas, which marks him off from Carneades. He stated that if the arguments on both sides of any question whatever were weighed they would be found exactly to balance. Cf. Numenius ap. Eus. Pr. Eu. 14, 4, 15 of Arcesilas εἶναι πάντα ἀκατάληπτα καὶ τοὺς εἰς ἑκάτερα λόγους ἰσοκρατεῖς ἀλλήλοις: Sext. A. M. 9, 207 ἰσοσθενεῖς λόγοι: id. P. H. 1, 9 ἰσοσθένεια τῶν

plerosque deduceret, ut cum in eadem re paria contrariis in
partibus momenta rationum inuenirentur, facilius ab utraque
parte adsensio sustineretur. Hanc Academiam nouam appel- 46
lant, quae mihi uetus uidetur, si quidem Platonem ex illa
vetere numeramus, cuius in libris nihil adfirmatur et in utramque
partem multa disseruntur, de omnibus quaeritur, nihil certi
dicitur: sed tamen illa, quam exposuisti, uetus, haec noua nominetur:
quae usque ad Carneaden perducta, qui quartus ab
Arcesila fuit, in eadem Arcesilae ratione permansit. Carneades
autem nullius philosophiae partis ignarus et, ut cognoui ex eis,

assertio, exc. G. 9 esse turpius: *esset t.* MSS. 11 dicens in eam: *dies iam* MSS exc. G; corr. Maduig; *disserens de sua* G, quae est aperte coniectura librarii; secuti tamen sunt HBM. 12 plerosque: *pleros* APVψ. 15 mihi: *nisi* E; cf. § 14. 18 exposuisti: MSS *exposui*; corr. Durand.

λόγων (the same phrase in Diog. 9, 101): ib. 1, 183 ἴση πιθανότης: ib. 1, 26 ἰσοσθένης διαφωνία: to the same purpose are the common phrases ἀρρεψία (P. H. 1, 190) and ἀοριστία (ib. 1, 198). This doctrine of Arcesilas places him exactly on a level with Pyrrho; cf. Num. ap. Eus. pr. Eu. 14, 6, 5 Μνασέας γοῦν καὶ Φιλόμηλος καὶ Τίμων οἱ σκεπτικοὶ σκεπτικὸν αὐτὸν προσονομάζουσιν, ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἦσαν, ἀναιροῦντα καὶ αὐτὸν τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ ψευδὲς καὶ τὸ πιθανόν...ἦν τοίνυν Πυρρώνειος πλὴν τοῦ ὀνόματος. So Timon quoted by Num. 14, 5, 12 traces Arcesilas' inspiration to Menedemus, Pyrrho and Diodorus, as well as to Crantor and Theophrastus. Sextus finds it hard to draw a distinction between Arcesilas and the Sceptics; see P. H. 1, 232—234 where he says that A. considered ἐποχὴ an ἀγαθὸν, οὐ πρὸς τὸ φαινόμενον (like the Sceptics) but πρὸς τὴν φύσιν. Plutarch wrote a treatise περὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς τῶν Πυρρωνείων καὶ Ἀκαδημαικῶν: see Volkmann I p. 111. The description given of A. by Aristo the Chian is well known: 'πρόσθε Πλάτων, ὄπιθεν Πύρρων, μέσσος Διόδωρος' (parodied from Homer: see Sext. l. l.; Eus. l. l.; Diog. 4, 33). As to his supposed esoteric and dogmatic teaching see n. on 2, 60. For the *expression* 'momenta rationum' cf. n. on 2, 124.

14. **adsensio sustineretur**: see 2, 59 n.

hanc...uidetur: a very different view in De Or. 3, 67 Academicorum nomen est unum, sententiae duae.

15. **Platonem**: on the connexion of Arc. with Plato see 2, 74 n.

ex illa uetere: 'as belonging to the old school'. The construction is elliptic for 'quasi ex. i. u. esset' or 'ut e. i. u. prouectum'; the nearest parallel I have found is Verr. 3, 170 ciuitates, ex quibus in primis numeranda est ciuitas Halesina; cf. such expressions as in Ter. Eun. 165 ex Aethiopia ancillulam; also Nägelsb. Stil. § 124, 5.

16. **cuius in libris etc.**: nn. on 2, 74.

nihil...et: Draeger II p. 20.

in utramque partem: the practice is discussed in n. on 2, 7. Diog. 4, 28 says of Arcesilas that he 'πρῶτος εἰς ἑκάτερον ἐπεχείρησε'. In 9, 51 a similar statement is made about Protagoras. The phrase *in utramque partem* (ἐπ' ἀμφότερα) is common throughout Latin, e.g. Ter. Haut. 47 and 440; Hor. S. 2, 2, 66 in neutram partem; Cic. Att. 3, 21 quamcumque in partem.

17. **omnibus**: for *omnibus rebus*: see n. on § 27.

18. **exposuisti**: the MSS error is of a common kind; cf. § 5 where one MS has *didici* for *didicisti*.

noua: the general name for the Academy from the time of Arcesilas; so Fin. 5, 7; Leg. 1, 39 recens A. In Cic. we find no trace of a division of the Academy into Old, Middle (beginning with Arcesilas) and New (beginning with Carneades), which Sextus P. H. 1, 220 says was the division generally adopted.

19. **quartus**: see 2, 16.

20. **Carneades autem**: it would seem that in the lost part of the sentence Cic. went on to admit that Carneades did introduce innovations. For general in-

qui illum audierant, maximeque ex Epicurio Zenone, qui cum ab eo plurimum dissentiret, unum tamen praeter ceteros mirabatur, incredibili quadam fuit facultate.........

1 epicurio: *epicuro* A Harl. 2, Eψ; *Epicuro et* Harl. 1, Burn. 3 *dicendi* addit Krische: *et to* G; om. cett.; *et copia dicendi* HBM.

formation about Carneades the student must go to Zeller.

1. **Epicurio Zenone**: for the position of the epithet, preceding the name, see n. on 2, 137 Stoicus Diogenes. As to Zeno, consult Zeller, III 1, 373, ed. 3 or Stoics etc. p. 389, E. Tr.

3. **facultate**: probably the next word was *dicendi:* cf. De Or. 2, 161 Carneadi uis incredibilis dicendi. Carneades' power of oratory made a very great impression on the Romans at the time of the famous embassy. Cf. Lucilius l. 14, ed. Lachmann, quoted from Lactantius, 'Lucilii, apud quem disserens de re difficillima ostendit non posse id explicari nec si Carneaden ipsum Orcu' remittat'. Cf. also De Or. 3, 68; Rep. 3, 8; Gell. 6, 14, 10 uiolenta et rapida Carneades dicebat (from Polybius).

ACADEMICORUM POSTERIORUM FRAGMENTA.

Ex Libro I.

1. Nonius p. 65 Merc. *Digladiari dictum est dissentire et dissidere, dictum a gladiis. Cicero Academicorum lib. I*: quid autem stomachatur Mnesarchus? quid Antipater digladiatur cum Carneade tot uoluminibus?
2. Nonius s. u. *concinnare* p. 43. *Idem in Academicis lib. I*: qui cum similitudine uerbi concinere maxime sibi uideretur...

Ex Libro II.

3. Nonius p. 65. *Aequor ab aequo et plano Cicero Academicorum lib. II uocabulum accepisse confirmat*: quid tam planum uidetur quam mare? e quo etiam aequor illud poetae uocant.

2 qui cum: *quicum* Quich. et M e coni. Halmii. 3 e quo: *ae quo* cod. Paris. Nonii, n. 7667, unde Quicherat *ab aequo* coniecit, M scripsit.

1. **Mnesarchus**: see n. on 2, 69.

Antipater: cf. n. on 2, 143.

digladiatur: 'crosses swords'; the word is almost, if not quite, confined to Cicero's writings; the metaphorical sense is in Off. 1, 28; Tusc. 4, 47; the literal in Leg. 3, 20. Cf. the odd word *digladiabilis* given by the Dictt. from Prudentius; also N. D. 1, 93 Epicurus... Timocratem...totis uoluminibus conciderit.—Evidently this fragment belongs to that historical justification of the New Academy with which I suppose Cic. to have concluded the first book of the second edition; see Introd. pp. 44—46.

2. **similitudine**: 'owing to the resemblance'; *cum* is of course conjunction, not preposition.—It is difficult to imagine the context in which this fragment occurred. It cannot refer to the harmony so often asserted by Antiochus to exist between Stoics and Old Academics, since that depended on resemblance of doctrine, not of terms. On consideration, I cannot see that August. contr. Ac. 2, 14 and 15 imitates the context of this passage, as Krische supposes (p. 58).

concinere: somewhat rare in the metaphorical use; cf. Fin. 4, 60; ib. 5, 83; N. D. 1, 16; ib. 2, 19; Liu. 6, 35, 9 concinentes collegas; Amm. Marc. 22, 16, 13 monumentorum ueterum concinens fides. Concentus is often the equivalent of consensus; cf. Sen. ben. 6, 30, 3 concentu consensuque; Plin. pan. 46; also *συνᾴδειν*, Plato, Phaed. 92 C and often; *συνῳδός*, Arist. Eth. Nic. 1, 8, 8; *τὰ ἀπᾴδοντα*, Sext. P. H. 1, 200.

3. **quid tam planum etc.**: this fragm. clearly forms part of those preliminary sceptical arguments which Cic. in the first edition included in his answer to Hortensius; see Introd. pp. 44—46. The argument ran: 'what seems so level as the sea? Yet it is easy to prove it not level.' Quicherat qu. in support of his reading Varro L. L. 7, 23 aequor...quod aequatum poetae uocant.

poetae: the best prose writers avoid *aequor* in the sense of *sea*; like so many other poetical expressions, it was first used in prose by Sallust; it is common from

4. Nonius p. 69. *Adamare. Cicero Academicorum lib. II*: qui enim serius honores adamauerunt uix admittuntur ad eos nec satis commendati multitudini possunt esse.

5. Nonius p. 104. *Exponere pro exempla boni ostentare. Cicero Academicis lib. II*: frangere auaritiam, scelera ponere, uitam suam exponere ad imitandum iuuentuti.

6. Nonius p. 121. *Hebes positum pro obscuro aut obtuso. Cicero Academicorum lib. II*: quid? lunae quae liniamenta sunt? Potesne dicere? cuius et nascentis et senescentis alias hebetiora, alias acutiora uidentur cornua.

7. Nonius p. 162. *Purpurascit. Cicero Academicorum lib. II*: quid? mare nonne caeruleum? At eius unda, cum est pulsa remis, purpurascit, et quidem aquae tinctum quodam modo et infectum....

8. Nonius p. 162. *Perpendicula et normae. Cicero Academicorum lib. II*: atqui si id crederemus, non egeremus perpendiculis, non normis, non regulis.

6 sunt? Sic Quich. ex Nonii codd.; *sint potesne* H B M. 7 et quidem... infectum: haec Nonio non Ciceroni tribuit Quich., qui pro lectionibus codicum *tinctum* et *infectum* dedit *tinctae* et *infectae*. 9 adulescentibus: *lentibus* codd.,

Val. M. onwards. *Aequor* with the sense of *planities* is met with only once in prose, viz. Cic. Diu. 1, 93 in camporum patentium aequoribus; where the Leyden MS 84 has (*a pr. manu*) ecoribus and the true reading may be *regionibus*.

4. **qui enim etc.**: this fragment refers either to the late arrival of Stoicism on the field of philosophy or to the late period of life at which Antiochus broke away from the New Academicism.

adamauerunt: see n. on 2, 9.

commendati...esse: here *commendati* is a mere adjective; Cic. could not have written the perfect infinitive. Cf. Prou. cons. 38 huic dignitati esse commendati uolunt; Arch. 18; Verr. 4, 81; Off. 1, 28 desertos esse. A curious passage is Fam. 12, 13, 1 (Cassius) neque enim omnium iudicio malim me a te *commendari*, quam ipse tuo iudicio digne ac mereor *commendatus esse*.

possunt esse: see n. on 2, 22.

5. **frangere etc.**: nothing can be guessed as to the context of this fragm.

iuuentuti: dependent on *exponere*.

6. **quid? lunae etc.**: this belongs to arguments such as we have in 2, 105 and elsewhere, where the changing aspects of the same object are treated as invalidating the evidence of the senses.

senescentis: often used of the moon, as by Plin. n.h. 2, 41.

7. **quid? mare**: this fragm. must form part of the same passage as no. 6; it closely resembles 2, 105; so closely that either the reference to book II in Nonius is wrong, or Cic. transferred the matter of 2, 105 to an earlier part of the work, in writing the second edition.

nonne: for the position of this word in the sentence cf. n. on 2, 86.

unda: 'its waters'. This collective sense of *unda* is rare in prose; cf. Liu. 24, 34, 11 nauem undae affligebat.

cum est pulsa: for the indicative cf. Madv. on Fin. 1, 10.

aquae: it is difficult to guess the complete construction here; *aquae* cannot be nom. plural, as Cic. would not use the plur. to denote the sea.

8. **atqui etc.**: the argument is: 'if the senses were as trustworthy as you dogmatists assert, we should have no need of instruments to aid them'.

si id crederemus: i.e. if we believed in the certitude of our senses.

perpendiculis: plumb lines; norma

9. Nonius p. 394. *Siccum dicitur aridum et sine humore...... Siccum dicitur et sobrium, immadidum... Cicero Academicorum lib. II*: alius (*color*) adultis, alius adulescentibus, alius aegris, *alius sanis*, alius siccis, alius uinulentis...

10. Nonius p. 474. *Vrinantur. Cicero in Academicis lib. II*: si quando enim nos demersimus, ut qui urinantur, aut nihil superum aut obscure admodum cernimus.

11. Nonius p. 545. *Alabaster. Cicero Academicorum lib. II*: quibus etiam alabaster plenus unguenti puter esse uidetur.

Ex Libro III.

Cicero ad Att. XVI. 6. § 4. *De gloria librum ad te misi: at in eo* prooemium *id est, quod in Academico tertio.*

12. Nonius p. 65. *Digladiari...idem tertio:* digladiari autem semper, depugnare cum facinerosis et audacibus, quis non cum miserrimum, tum etiam stultissimum dixerit?

unde *ualentibus* Quich. M; *senibus* ed. Nonii 1500. alius sanis: sic ed. Nonii 1514, HB. 11 puter esse: sic HB; *putre esse* codd.; *putere* Quich. M, aliquot edd. Nonii secuti. uidetur: *uideatur* Quich. M. 12 cum fac.: *in fac.* codd., fortasse recte; *et fac.* Quich. M.

(which seems to come in some way from γνωρίμη) is the mason's square (γνώμων); regula is a carpenter's rule (κανών).

9. **alius adultis**: sc. color, 'complexion' (so in Fin. 2, 64 and often). Changes of complexion in health and sickness were much dwelt on by the sceptics, as may be seen from Sext. A. M. 7, 198 and 413; P. H. 1, 44.

sanis...siccis: see n. on 2, 88.

10. **si quando etc.**: the diver here is in the position of the fishes noticed in 2, 81, which are unable to see what lies immediately above them, and so illustrate the narrowness of the power of vision.

nos: for nosmet ipsos, as often in Cic.

urinantur: to the exx. in the lexica add Plin. n. h. 2, 111; cf. *urinator* 'diver'; *οὐρία* a kind of water-bird.

aut...admodum: cf. n. on 2, 86.

11. **quibus etc.**: in view of this fragment, the statement made in Introd. p. 62 that the tenth sceptic τρόπος is not represented in the *Academica*, requires modification.

alabaster: here only in classical Latin with the sense of ἀλάβαστος or ἀλάβαστρος, a box of ointment; the use does not occur again till the Vulgate.

puter: used by Varro, but rather less common than the form *putris* which Gerlach wished to read here.

esse uidetur: note the dactylic rhythm not avoided, for which see n. on 2, 117.

12. **digladiari autem etc.**: this and the succeeding fragments to no. 19 inclusive must (if rightly referred to book III) form part of Varro's answer to Cic., for which see Introd. p. 50. Fragments 12—16 incl. must have formed part of the new matter introduced into the second edition. The purport of the context of fr. 12 was probably this: just as there is a limit beyond which the battle against criminals cannot be maintained, so after a certain point we must cease to fight against perverse sceptics and let them take their own way. Cf. 2, 17 id quidam e philosophis...non putabant. Krische p. 62 seems to think that Varro here accused the younger Stoics, Mnesarchus and Panaetius, of betraying the battle against the sceptics. But where else is it said that even Panaetius abandoned the Stoic κριτήριον?

audacibus: 'desperadoes'; see my n. on Lael. 19.

13. Nonius p. 65. *Exultare dictum est exilire. Cicero Academicorum lib. III*: et ut nos nunc sedemus ad Lucrinum pisciculosque exsultantis uidemus...

14. Nonius p. 123. *Ingeneraretur ut innasceretur. Cicero Academicorum lib. III*: in tanta animantium uarietate, homini ut soli cupiditas ingeneraretur cognitionis et scientiae!

15. Nonius p. 419. *Vindicare, trahere, liberare... Cicero Academicorum lib. III*: aliqua potestas sit, uindicet se in libertatem.

16. Lactantius Inst. diu. VI. 24. *Cicero......cuius haec in Academico tertio uerba sunt:* quod si liceret, ut eis qui in itinere deerrauissent, sic uitam deuiam secutis corrigere errorem paenitendo, facilior esset emendatio temeritatis.

17. Diomedes p. 373, ed. Putsch: p. 377, ed. Keil. *Varro ad Ciceronem tertio* fixum *et Cicero Academicorum tertio*: †malcho in opera adfixa.

18. Nonius p. 139. *Mordicibus et mordicus pro morsu, pro morsibus...... Cicero Academicorum lib. III*: perspicuitatem, quam mordicus tenere debemus, abesse dicemus. = *Lucullus* § 51.

13 uidemus: *uideamus* codd. 16 secutis: *secutos* codd. M. 17 Academicorum: *Academicarum* codd. 18 mordicibus: sic codd. omnes. 19 ei: *ii* uel *hii* codd. Luculli; *lib. II* codd. Nonii, cum scribae uoce *ii* essent decepti. quae:

13. **et ut nos nunc**: if this really belongs to book III, then Cic. must have transferred from § 125 to § 55 of the *Lucullus* the strikingly similar words 'ut nos nunc simus ad Baulos Puteolosque uideamus', changing them to suit the circumstances of the second edition; substituting therefore *Lucrinum* for *Baulos* and *pisciculosque exsultantis* for *Puteolos* because Puteoli was not visible from Varro's villa on the Lucrine lake. It is of course possible that the reference in Nonius is wrong and that the words in *Lucullus* 125 were allowed to stand in the second edition where they were in the first, with the necessary changes. Krische gives what seems to me a highly improbable explanation, that Varro illustrated the trustworthiness of the senses by pointing out the clearness with which the fish were seen leaping out of the water.

pisciculos exsultantis: the sign of fine weather; a touch therefore in keeping with the scenery of the dialogue (Introd. p. 47). Cf. Pacuuius ap. Ribbeck I 132 (of sailors) profectione laeti piscium lasciuiam intuentur; Petron. § 109 (Bücheler), alius exsultantes quaerebat fuscina pisces; on the other hand Cic. Diu. 2, 145 says that 'exsultantes loligines' portend a storm.

14. **in tanta etc.**: the passion for knowledge implanted in the human heart was no doubt used by Varro as an argument to show that absolute knowledge must be attainable. The same line is taken in 2, 31; Fin. 3, 17 and elsewhere.

cognitionis et scientiae: cf. n. on 2, 24 comprehensi...constituti.

15. **aliqua etc.**: the reference in our texts of Nonius to book III is, I think, almost certainly wrong. There are numerous parallels in Cicero's speech in the *Academica Priora*, none in that of Lucullus. If the words we have here were

19. Nonius p. 117. *Gallinas. Cicero Academicorum lib. III*: qui gallinas alere permultas quaestus caussa solerent: ei cum ouom inspexerant, quae gallina peperisset dicere solebant. =*Lucullus* § 57.

Ex Libro IIII.

20. Nonius p. 69. *Adstipulari positum est adsentiri. Cicero in Academicis lib. IIII*: falsum esse Stoici dicunt et eorum adstipulator Antiochus. =*Lucullus* § 67.

21. Nonius p. 65. *Maeniana ab inuentore eorum Maenio dicta sunt; unde et columna Maenia. Cicero Academicorum lib. IIII*: item ille cum aestuaret ueterum, ut Maenianorum, sic Academicorum uiam secutus est. =*Lucullus* § 70.

22. Nonius p. 99. *Dolitum, quod dolatum usu dicitur, quod est percaesum uel abrasum uel effossum... Cicero dolatum Academicorum lib. IIII*: non enim est e saxo sculptus aut e robore dolatus. =*Lucullus* § 100.

quae id codd. Luculli. 20 esse: *esse et* unus cod. Luculli (A a pr. m.). 21 item: *interim* codd. Luculli. uiam: *uitam* cod. Non. optimus (Paris. n. 7667); *umbram* codd. Cic. 22 dolatum: *dolatus* cod. optimus Non. saxo...robore: *saxo aut cultus e robore* codd. Non.

really put in Varro's mouth, they can only have figured as a quotation from his opponents.

potestas: here the equivalent of 'free will'; see n. on 2, 37.

uindicet...libertatem: phrases taken from the legal formulae of the *caussa liberalis*.

16. **quod si etc.**: the words are strikingly like *Lucullus* § 9. In all probability we have here a fragment of the proemium to book III (Att. 16, 6, 4).

ut...sic: see n. on 2, 14 uos ut illi.

emendatio: n. on 1, 13.

17. **malcho...adfixa**: *malcho* is possibly a mistake for *malleo*, a hammer; cf. Vitruu. 10, 22 naues malleolis confixae; Plaut. Men. 2, 3, 52 nauem saepe fixam, saepe excusam malleo (Brix *fissam*). Opera is probably also an error for *opere*. If these words really occurred in the third book of the *Academica*, second edition, we must suppose that they formed part of a concrete illustration appended in some way to the description of a δόγμα in *Lucullus* § 27 where the word *fixum* stands. But may we not suppose that Diomedes has mixed up his quotations; that he really meant to quote *fixum* only from *Academica* III and the words *malcho...adfixa* from Varro's *De lingua Latina* III?

18. **mordicus**: possibly the *mordicibus* of the MSS is an error for *mordicitus*, a word formed like *publicitus* and once read dubiously in Pl. Aul. 2, 2, 57; see Ritschl, Opusc. 2, 248. Perhaps however Nonius imagined there was a word *mordices* equivalent to *morsus*. The reading *mordicibus* also occurs in some MSS of Hygin. Fab. 273. Cic. has *mordicus tenere uerba* in Fin. 4, 78.

21. **uiam**: a mistake for *umbram*. An error nearly the converse of this is found in the MSS of N. D. 1, 39 *umbram*, where Schömann rightly reads *uim*; see Mayor ad loc.

23. Nonius p. 164. *Rauum fuluum. Cicero Academicorum lib. IIII*: quia nobismet ipsis tum caeruleum, tum rauom uidetur, quodque nunc a sole conlucet... =*Lucullus* § 105.
24. Nonius p. 107. *Exanclare est perpeti uel superare. Cicero Academicorum lib. IIII*: credoque Clitomacho ita scribenti ut Herculi quendam laborem exanclatum. =*Lucullus* § 108.
25. Nonius p. 163. *Pingue positum pro impedito et inepto. Cicero Academicorum lib. IIII*: quod ipsi Antiocho pingue uidetur et sibi ipsum contrarium. =*Lucullus* § 109.
26. Nonius p. 122. *Infinitatem. Cicero Academicorum lib. IIII*: at hoc Anaximandro, populari et sodali suo, non persuasit, is enim infinitatem... =*Lucullus* § 118.
27. Nonius p. 65. *Natrices dicuntur angues natantes. Cicero Academicorum lib. IIII*: sic enim uoltis tantam uim natricum uiperarumque fecerit. =*Lucullus* § 120.
28. Nonius p. 189. *Vncinatum ab unco. Cicero Academicorum lib. IIII*: nec ut ille qui asperis et hamatis uncinatisque corpusculis concreta haec esse dicat. =*Lucullus* § 121.
29. Martianus Capella V. § 517 ed. Eyssenhardt. *Cicero......in Academicis*: latent ista omnia, Varro, magnis obscurata et circumfusa tenebris. =*Lucullus* § 122.
30. Nonius p. 102. *E regione positum est ex aduerso. Cicero Academicorum lib. IIII*: nec ego non ita. Vos etiam dicitis esse e regione nobis in contraria parte terrae qui aduersis uestigiis stent contra nostra uestigia. =*Lucullus* § 123.
31. Nonius p. 80. *Balbuttire est cum quadam linguae haesitatione et confusione trepidare. Cicero Academicorum lib.*

23 uid. adnot. ad Luc. § 105. 24 ut: om. codd. Cic. Herculi: sic codd. Non. 25 impedito: sic (uel *impedimento*) codd.; *imperito* edd. Non. uidetur: *uidebatur* codd. Cic. 28 corpusculis: *corporibus* codd. Cic. 29 magnis

23. **rauom**: *flauum* is an inferior reading of one MS of Non. and some MSS of Luc.; there is no need to suppose (with Krische p. 64) that the epithet was changed in the second edition.

quodque nunc: see n. on 2, 105.

28. **corpusculis**: probably a change in ed. 2 from *corporibus* of the *Lucullus*; cf. 1, 6 and Aug. c. Ac. 3, 23.

29. **magnis obscurata**: changed from *Lucullus* 122 crassis occultata.

31. **dictus**: in *Luc.* 135 dixi, which should probably be read here, as Cic. would not say *dictus* for *dictus est*.

32. **mihi autem etc.**: probably to be referred to Cicero's speech in the second book.

ea ipsa etc.: even the dogmatists did not contend that sense reveals to us the whole nature of objects (see 1, 42); hence the limitation here, which is similar to that in 1, 30 res eas quae subiecta sensibus uiderentur.

33. **talia etc.**: this fragm. belongs to

IIII: plane, ut supra dictus, Stoicus perpauca balbuttiens. = *Lucullus* § 135.

Ex Libris Incertis.

32. Lactantius Inst. diu. III. 14. *Haec tua uerba sunt* (*sc. Cicero!*): mihi autem non modo ad sapientiam caeci uidemur, sed ad ea ipsa quae aliqua ex parte cerni uideantur, hebetes et obtusi.

33. August. contra Academicos II, § 26. *Id probabile uel ueri simile Academici uocant, quod nos ad agendum sine adsensione potest inuitare*......Talia, *inquit Academicus*, mihi uidentur omnia quae probabilia uel ueri similia putaui nominanda: quae tu si alio nomine uis uocare, nihil repugno. Satis enim mihi est te iam bene accepisse quid dicam, id est, quibus rebus haec nomina imponam; non enim uocabulorum opificem, sed rerum inquisitorem decet esse sapientem. [*Proximis post hunc locum uerbis perspicue confirmat Augustinus haec ipsius esse Ciceronis uerba.*]

34. Augustin. c. Acad. III. § 15. *Est in libris Ciceronis quae in huius causae* (*i.e. Academicorum*) *patrocinium scripsit, locus quidam*......Academico sapienti ab omnibus ceterarum sectarum, qui sibi sapientes uidentur, secundas partis dari, cum primas sibi quemque uindicare necesse sit; ex quo posse probabiliter confici eum recte primum esse iudicio suo, qui omnium ceterorum iudicio sit secundus.

35. Augustin. c. Acad. III. § 43. *Ait enim Cicero* illis (*i.e. Academicis*) morem fuisse occultandi sententiam suam nec eam

obscurata: *crassis occultata* codd. Cic. 30 uid. adn. ad Luc. § 123. 31 dictus: *dixi* codd. Cic.

the speech by Cic. in the second book of the second ed., which no doubt incorporated the speech of Catulus in ed. 1; cf. Introd. pp. 42 sq.

nominanda: n. on 1, 43.

opificem: n. on 2, 144.

34. **Academico etc.**: this undoubtedly belongs to the second book and is a jocular application of the Carneadean πιθανόν, as is clear from the words 'posse probabiliter confici'. The argument reminds us of the voting of the Greek leaders at the Isthmus after the battle of Salamis, when each proposed to confer on *himself* the first prize for wisdom and skill, while each agreed to give Themistocles the second prize (Herod. 8, 123). Halm has included a long passage which follows in Augustine, but it has so few genuine traces of Cicero's style that I do not think it worth while to give it.

35. **morem fuisse etc.**: if 2, 60 be

cuiquam, nisi qui secum ad senectutem usque uixissent, aperire consuesse.

36. Augustin. De ciuit. Dei VI. 2. *Denique et ipse Tullius huic* (*i.e. M. T. Varroni*) *tale testimonium perhibet, ut in libris Academicis eam quae ibi uersatur disputationem se habuisse cum M. Varrone,* homine, *inquit,* omnium facile acutissimo et sine ulla dubitatione doctissimo.

compared it will be seen that Catulus or Cic. in the first edition alluded to the supposed esoteric teaching of the Academy. This fragment therefore probably belongs to the speech of Cic. in the second book of the second ed., not, as Krische thinks, to the speech of Varro in the third book.

36. **homine etc.**: to all appearance these words occurred in the proemium mentioned by Cic. Att. 16, 6, 4. Augustine repeatedly jests at Cicero for using the words *sine omni dubitatione* here, while professing to hold the doctrine *omnia esse dubitanda.*

Besides the actual fragments of the second edition, many indications of its contents are preserved in the work of Augustine entitled *Contra Academicos*, which, though written in support of dogmatic opinions, imitated throughout the second edition of the *Academica* of Cic. No writings of the Classical period had so great an influence on the culture and opinions of Augustine as the *Academica* and the lost *Hortensius*. I give, partly from Krische, the scattered indications of the contents of the former which are to be gathered from the bishop's works. In Aug. *Contr. Ac.* II. 14, 15, we have what appears to be a summary of the lost part of Book I to the following effect. The New Academy must not be regarded as having revolted against the Old; all that it did was to discuss that new doctrine of *κατάληψις* advanced by Zeno. The doctrine of *ἀκαταληψία* though present to the minds of the ancients had never taken distinct shape, because it had met with no opposition. The Old Academy was rather enriched than attacked by the New. Antiochus, in adopting Stoicism under the name of the Old Academy, made it appear that there was a strife between it and the New. With Antiochus the historical exposition of Cic. must have ended. From this portion of the first book, Aug. derived his opinion (*Contra Ac.* II. 1) that New Academicism was excusable from the necessities of the age in which it appeared. Indications of Book II in Aug. are scarce, but to it I refer *Contra Ac.* I. 7 *placuit Ciceroni nostro beatum esse qui uerum inuestigat etiam si ad eius inuentionem non ualeat peruenire;* also *ibid.* III. 10 *illis* (*Academicis*) *placuit esse posse hominem sapientem, et tamen in hominem scientiam cadere non posse.* These I refer to Cicero's development of the *probabile* in Book II, although I ought to say that Krische p. 65 maintains that the substance of Catulus' exposition in the *Ac. Priora* was transferred to Book IV of the *Ac. Posteriora*. As this would leave very meagre material for Book II, nothing indeed excepting the provisional proof of the deceptiveness of the senses, I cannot accede to his arrangement; mine, I may remark, involves a much smaller departure from the first edition. Allusions in Aug. to the attack on the senses by Cic. in Book II are difficult to fix, as they apply equally well to the later attack in Book IV. As to Books III and IV, I do not think it necessary here to prove from Aug. the points of agreement between them and the *Lucullus*, which will find a better place in my notes on the latter, but merely give the divergences which appear from other sources. These are the translation of *σοφίσματα* by *cauillationes* in *Luc.* 75 (Seneca *ep.* 111), and the insertion in 118 of *essentia* as a translation of *οὐσία*.

M. TULLI CICERONIS

ACADEMICORUM PRIORUM

LIBER SECUNDUS.

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1 I. MAGNUM ingenium L. Luculli magnumque optimarum artium studium, tum omnis liberalis et digna homine nobili ab eo percepta doctrina, quibus temporibus florere in foro maxime potuit, caruit omnino rebus urbanis. Vt enim admodum adulescens cum fratre pari pietate et industria praedito paternas

4 urbanis: *humanis* codd. excepto V a secunda manu; A tamen uocem *urbanis*, quattuor codd. Dauisii *urbanus*, post u. *admodum* addunt.

2. **tum**: introduces, as in § 43, and often, a clause forming part of an enumeration, where the preceding clause or clauses are not introduced by any particle such as *cum* or *tum*.

liberalis et digna homine nobili: for Roman feeling on these subjects see Introd. p. 23. As to the expressions cf. De Or. 1, 17 eruditio libero digna; ib. 1, 72; ib. 1, 137; Lael. 89; Fin. 5, 47; Tim. 1; Rab. perd. 16; Pis. 22; Seneca ep. 88, 2 quare liberalia studia dicta sint uides; quia homine libero digna sunt.

3. **percepta**: 'gained', won'; 'cf. percipere fruges 'to reap', Cat. m. 24.

4. **caruit ... rebus urbanis**: carere often means 'to be unavoidably absent from', 'to be cut off from', as in Mil. 18 foro carere; Att. 9, 19, 1 Roma carere; Brut. 32 forensi luce caruit; Verr. 4, 41; Iuuen. 11, 53. This sense is easily derived from the meaning of the root of *careo*, viz. *skar*, separate, divide, for which see Corssen, Ausspr. 1, 403. So Ter. Ph. 517 urbe priuari. The abstract subjects of *caruit*, viz. ingenium, studium, doctrina, have their parallel in *uis*, the subject of *afuit* in § 3. For the three nouns with singular verb see n. on 1, 11.

admodum adulescens: see n. on § 86.

5. **fratre**: M. Lucullus, consul in 73 B.C.

paternas inimicitias...persecutus: the elder Lucullus was most righteously condemned, yet Roman feeling was entirely on the side of his sons when they endeavoured to ruin the man who had prosecuted their father for his misdeeds. The duty of a son in such cases is curiously discussed in Off. 3, 90, from which passage it will be seen that Seneca was altogether out of harmony with popular sentiment when he laid down the maxim (De Ira 2, 34, 3) nihil est iniquius quam aliquem heredem paterni odii fieri. Revenge is assigned by Cicero (Off. 2, 50) as one of the few motives which would justify a man of high position in appearing as a prosecutor.

inimicitias magna cum gloria est persecutus, in Asiam quaestor
profectus, ibi permultos annos admirabili quadam laude pro-
uinciae praefuit; deinde absens factus aedilis, continuo praetor—
licebat enim celerius legis praemio—post in Africam, inde ad
consulatum, quem ita gessit ut diligentiam admirarentur omnes,
ingenium agnoscerent. Post ad Mithridaticum bellum missus
a senatu non modo opinionem uicit omnium, quae de uirtute
2 eius erat, sed etiam gloriam superiorum. Idque eo fuit mira-
bilius, quod ab eo laus imperatoria non admodum exspectabatur,

2 permultos: *per multos* H Bait. 5 diligentiam: hic Cant. uocem *multi* inserit. 6 agnoscerent: *cognoscerent* G Harl. 8 etiam: *et* ψ. 9 exspectabatur: V² Cant.;

1. **magna cum gloria**: the same expression in Liu. 6, 10, 6.

quaestor: cf. the n. on § 11 pro quaestore.

2. **permultos annos**: about ten years, 87—77 B.C.

3. **factus aedilis**: in 78 B.C.

4. **celerius**: before the usual time, the customary interval not having been observed.

legis praemio: an unusual expression, which has generally been regarded as a variation for *legis beneficio* 'thanks to a certain enactment'. The Latinity of the phrase has been hastily denied by those who have condemned the prologue to the Lucullus as spurious. We have an exact parallel in Balb. 57 legum praemiis 'rewards resting on, or depending on, statutes'. The similar usage of *beneficio* followed by a gen. with the sense of 'thanks to' is very common in the whole of Latin prose literature; so too Verg. Aen. 8, 658 *dono* noctis opacae; Ouid. Met. 10, 476 caecae *munere* noctis. Cf. esp. Vat. 27 ut homo consularis spoliaretur beneficio et aequitate legis tuae; Arch. 31 caussa quae beneficio legis comprobetur; Brut. 224; Val. M. 3, 7, 9; also Mur. 89 noua poena legis. The circumstances of the statute by which Lucullus benefited can only be conjectured. Mommsen, Staatsrecht 1 429 supposes that a special act was passed as a reward for certain services of which no record is preserved. It is far more likely that Sulla, who by his *lex de magistratibus* vigorously re-enacted the old *lex annalis*, introduced a clause excepting from its operation a number of his own officers. It is well known that Sulla put one of his leading officers, L. Lucretius Ofella, to death, because he sued for office in contravention of the law without having secured Sulla's permission. Val. Max. 6, 9, 9 speaks of Ventidius as having been consul and praetor in succession. Nothing is gained by the correction *procemio;* and the phrase *legis prooemium* for *exordium* is hardly Latin; see Leg. 2, 16.

in Africam: scarcely to be described as an ellipse of a verb of motion (so Du Mesnil on Leg. 2, 69 styles it), since the construction is exactly parallel to that of *in Asiam* above. With *inde* a verb like *rediit* must be supplied.

8. **superiorum**: a somewhat extravagant statement, seeing that Sulla was among the *superiores*.

9. **laus**: in the sense of 'merit' or that which deserves praise; as above, 1 § 12 and often; so *praemium* in Verg. Aen. 12, 437 means 'a deed worthy of reward'.

admodum: the use of *admodum* with verbs, though much rarer than with adjectives, is occasionally found throughout Latin prose.

10. **diuturnum...gerente**: the passage only means that Murena's war fell within the time of Lucullus' pro-quaestorship (for which see n. on § 11). The war occupied less than two years, 83—81 B.C.

11. **in Asia pace consumpserat**: for the readings see crit. n. There is no real difficulty in the passage, which has been much discussed by the editors. Cicero indeed *nearly* always says *consumere aliquid in aliqua re;* not *aliqua re* merely. Madvig on Fin. 5, 53 says 'always', but this is a too sweeping statement. There are two classes of exceptions to the rule. First, we have nouns used adverbially in the ablative, which do not require the preposition; so *pace* here has the sense of

qui adulescentiam in forensi opera, quaesturae diuturnum tempus Murena bellum in Ponto gerente in Asia pace consumpserat. Sed incredibilis quaedam ingeni magnitudo non desiderauit indocilem usus disciplinam. Itaque cum totum iter et nauigationem consumpsisset partim in percontando a peritis, partim in rebus gestis legendis, in Asiam factus imperator uenit, cum esset Roma profectus rei militaris rudis. Habuit enim diuinam quandam memoriam rerum, uerborum maiorem Hortensius, sed quo plus

spectabatur Cψ Harl. 11 *in Asia pace:* VG Cant.ψ (de quo errat Dau.) H; *in Asiae pace* ABE; *in Asia in pace* Guilelmius et M; *in [Asia] pace* Bait. 14 percontando: V^2ψ; *percontendo* A; *percontanda* B; *percontenda* V^1; *percunctando* Cant. Harl.

tranquillo, the prep. being no more needed than in the phrase *pace alicuius dicere;* Livy often uses *pace et bello*, and cf. Prop. 4, 1, 17 quod pace legas; and a similar use is Tusc. 4, 23 hoc loco consumitur. Then, further, the instrumental abl. does undoubtedly sometimes follow *consumere* in Cic.; e.g. Fam. 7, 1, 1; ib. 11, 27, 5. Caesar uses the abl. with or without *in* almost indifferently; Livy mostly the simple abl. [If em. were needed *cum pace*, which is not uncommon in Cic., would be far more probable than *in pace*, on account of the preceding *in*, which indeed most likely induced Cic. to omit *in* before *pace;* cf. Att. 6, 2, 6 nonis Maiis in Ciliciam cogitabam; ibi cum Iunium Mensem consumpsissem, atque utinam in pace (magnum enim bellum impendet a Parthis) etc. To take *Asia* as an adjective qualifying *pace* (so Corti on Lucan 1, 106 and others) is absurd; nor is the expression *Asiae pace*, 'the peace of Asia' supportable.]

12. **incredibilis quaedam**: here *quaedam* really emphasizes the adjective by rendering it indefinite; as though its degree were beyond expression and must be left to the imagination. So *diuinam quandam* below; and τὶς in Greek, often.

indocilem: the passive sense (= *non doctum*) is undoubtedly rare, if not unique, in prose, though easily paralleled in poetry; e.g. Prop. 1, 2, 12 et sciat indocilis currere lympha uias; Ouid. Trist. 4, 1, 6 indocili numero; the poets use too *indocilis = indoctus* of persons and more rarely *docilis = doctus* (Lucan 1, 326 and 426). With the context cf. Plin. ep. 1, 20, 12 quod me docuit usus magister egregius; Pan. 15 ita egisti tribunum ut esse dux statim posses, nihilque discendum haberes tempore docendi.

13. **totum iter**: = totum itineris tempus.

14. **rebus gestis**: 'military history'; a common sense of the phrase. In Sallust. Iug. 85 Marius bitterly ridicules those who learn the art of war from books. Ancient commanders studied the history of warfare not a little; cf. Cato m. 12, and below, § 4; Balb. 47; Pro imp. Cn. P. 28 where the Scholiast supposes Lucullus to be hinted at; Font. 43 C. Marium, P. Didium, Q. Catulum, P. Crassum, non litteris homines ad rei militaris scientiam sed rebus gestis ac uictoriis eruditos.

15. **factus**: 'trained', 'fully formed'; almost = perfectus, as in Att. 2, 24, 3 factus institutusque; Brut. 30 and 325; De Or. 1, 63; ib. 3, 184; Or. 172; Verr. 4, 126; Nep. Att. 13, 4 domi natum domique factum; so in Acad. 1, 17; Hor. sat. 1, 5, 33 and 1, 10, 58; Plin. pan. 20 *imperator factus* is contrasted with *imp. futurus*.

16. **rei militaris rudis**: these words have been much insisted on by those who have condemned the whole prologue as spurious. Undoubtedly Lucullus had in early life served with distinction during the Social war (Plut. Luc. 2) and Cicero's statement that his quaestorship was passed in tranquillity is incorrect, since he had engaged in operations both by land and sea of considerable importance. But Cicero was far from infallible in matters of history, and historical blunders of far greater magnitude than this would be needed, in order to prove the spuriousness of a piece of writing so thoroughly in Cicero's style.

diuinam quandam memoriam: the same phrase occurs in De Or. 2, 360.

17. **uerborum maiorem Hortensius**:

in negotiis gerendis res quam uerba prosunt, hoc erat memoria illa praestantior, quam fuisse in Themistocle, quem facile Graeciae principem ponimus, singularem ferunt, qui quidem etiam pollicenti cuidam se artem ei memoriae, quae tum primum proferebatur, traditurum respondisse dicitur obliuisci se malle discere; credo, quod haerebant in memoria quaecumque audierat et uiderat. Tali ingenio praeditus Lucullus adiunxerat etiam illam, quam Themistocles spreuerat, disciplinam. Itaque ut litteris consignamus quae monumentis mandare uolumus, sic ille in animo
3 res insculptas habebat. Tantus ergo imperator in omni genere

5 discere: *quam discere* tres codd. Dauisii; ut est in ed. Heruagiana. 12 in-

as this clause stands in partial opposition to the preceding words, an adversative or concessive particle might have been expected to introduce it. The omission of the particle in such circumstances occurs now and then, though not often. The distinction between the memory for words and the memory for facts is insisted on in De Or. 2, 359; cf. too Tusc. 1, 65. The memory of Hortensius became proverbial; see Tusc. 1, 59; Brut. 301; Sen. contr. 1 intr. § 19; Quint. 10, 6, 4 and 11, 2, 24; Val. M. 8, 7, ext. 15, 16 (where Mithridates and Cyrus are quoted as having extraordinary memory).

2. **Graeciae principem**: Cicero expresses different judgments elsewhere; as in Tusc. 1, 4 Epaminondas, princeps meo iudicio Graeciae (Themistocles being named in the same sentence); De Or. 3, 139 Epaminondan, haud scio an summum uirum unum omnis Graeciae; Off. 2, 60 Periclen principem Graeciae.

3. **ponimus**: esse omitted; cf. n. on 1, 36. The construction with a person for object is rare, as was remarked by Ranitz; cf. Nep. Alc. 11, 6; Sall. Iug. 24, 7.

singularem: cf. Fam. 7, 5, 3 where Trebatius is credited with *memoria singularis:* so too Suet. gram. 7.

qui quidem etc.: the same story is given in Fin. 2, 104; De Or. 2, 199 and 351.

4. **artem memoriae**: this was said to have been founded by Simonides (who is the person meant by *cuidam*); see Tusc. 1, 59; Plin. n. h. 7, 89. As to the character of the ancient *memoria technica* cf. Ad Herenn. 3, 28 sq.; Quintil. 11, c. 2; Cic. Fin. 5, 2; Xenoph. Symp. 4, 62.

6. **credo**: the parenthetical *credo* is usually, but not always, ironical in Cic.; cf. § 77.

8. **consignamus**: litteris consignare is a common phrase in Cic.; it is doubtful whether *litteris* is the local or the instrumental ablative; probably the latter.

9. **monumentis mandare**: n. on 1, 3.

in animo ... habebat: cf. Seneca, contr. 1. intr. § 18 superuacuos sibi fecerat codices; aiebat se in animo scribere; also De Or. 2, 360 Charmadam, Metrodorum, quorum uterque tamquam litteris in cera, sic se aiebat imaginibus in eis locis quos haberet, quae meminisse uellet, scribere; and the μνήμονες δελτοὶ φρενῶν of the Greeks.

10. **insculptas**: rare in the metaphorical use; so in N. D. 1, 45; ib. 2, 12 innatum et in animo quasi insculptum.

genere: 'department'; cf. n. on 1, 3; also Deiot. 12 quanta in omni genere bellorum gloria; Cat. m. 18 uersatus in uario genere belli.

12. **instrumento et apparatu**: both these words are frequently used of war at all periods of Latin; the former refers rather to strictly military equipments, the latter to commissariat arrangements and the like. For the former cf. Leg. 2, 45; Sall. Iug. 43, 3; Caes. B. G. 6, 30, 2; Liu. 42, 53, 4; Iustin. 9, 8, 5; Curt. 9, 3, 11; Amm. Marc. 21, 6, 6; 26, 7, 12. For the latter Phil. 5, 30; Caes. B.C. 3, 41, 3, and 44, 1; ib. 2, 2, 1; Liu. 2, 50, 1; 4, 12, 5; 6, 9, 2; 42, 47, 2; Curt. 3, 7, 13; 4, 2, 12; Sen. ben. 6, 31, 8. The phrases *instruere, apparare bellum* are also common. Yet Ranitz argues that Cic. could not have applied these words to warfare! The reading of some MSS *instrumentis* can hardly be right here, though in some of the passages quoted both words are used in the plural. For the conjunction of the two words cf. De

belli fuit, proeliis, oppugnationibus, naualibus pugnis totiusque belli instrumento et apparatu, ut ille rex post Alexandrum maximus hunc a se maiorem ducem cognitum quam quemquam eorum, quos legisset, fateretur. In eodem tanta prudentia fuit in constituendis temperandisque ciuitatibus, tanta aequitas, ut hodie stet Asia Luculli institutis seruandis et quasi uestigiis persequendis. Sed etsi magna cum utilitate rei publicae, tamen diutius quam uellem tanta uis uirtutis atque ingeni peregrinata afuit ab oculis et fori et curiae. Quin etiam, cum uictor a Mithridatico bello reuertisset, inimicorum calumnia triennio tardius

strumento: *instrumentis* Gψ Cant. Harl. et multae edd. ueteres; *instrumenti* V. 17 sed etsi: *sed* om. Harl. ψ.

Or. 3, 23; also n. on § 32 instrumenta uel ornamenta.

post Alexandrum maximus: 'greatest since the time of Alexander', rather than 'greatest next after Alexander'. Mithridates is of course meant. Cf. Iustin. 37, 1, 7 superioris aetatis omnes reges superauit (Mithridates).

14. **legisset**: the subject is *rex* not Lucullus. In any case quos legisset = de quibus l. by a not uncommon idiom. With things the usage is very frequent, as in Balb. 47 bella legere; Leg. 1, 2 lucus...lectus; Pro Marc. 9; Nep. Them. 9, 4 res colloqui for *de rebus* (loqui aliquam rem is common); Liu. 2, 26, 4 audito bello; Plin. ep. 7, 19, 7; so the poets often; cf. too n. on § 32 ea quae disputentur. But the same use occurs (though less commonly, with persons; so probably in De Or. 2, 25 (where see Wilkins' n.); Ovid too has *legor, legimur;* cf. Tr. 4, 4, 14; also Nep. Ar. 1, 2 audire aliquem = de aliquo; Alc. 11, 6 reliquos ordiamur; Hann. 13, 4 imperatores explicare; Sen. Rh. c. 3, pr. 3 auditus longe maior erat quam lectus; *scribere aliquem* is very common.

fuit ut stet: cf. §§ 10, 92; Lieven, cons. temp. p. 42.

16. **hodie**: hodieque (for hodie quoque) which Drakenborch on Liu. 5, 27 wished to read here, is not Ciceronian nor is it found before silver Latin. In passages like De Or. 1, 103 and Verr. 5, 64 (some MSS) the *que* connects clauses and does not modify *hodie*. See Madvig, Opusc. 1, 390.

stet...seruandis: for the administrative measures of Lucullus in Asia see Plut. Luc. 23. The sense is not 'flourishes in consequence of observing', but 'stands by, or clings to the observance of', etc. Cic. very often uses *stare* with the abl. in this sense, particularly in the phrase *stare alicuius iudicio*, 'to stand by some one's opinion'; so Flacc. 65; Tusc. 2, 63 and 5, 81; Off. 3, 110; Cluent. 132. Similar usages are of frequent occurrence in all Latin, but I do not know a passage in which the noun in the abl. is accompanied by the gerundive, as here.

17. **etsi etc.**: in Cicero, and the best writers, when a clause with *etsi* has not a verb of its own, the verb of the principal clause must be capable of being supplied with the secondary clause. See Madv. on Fin. 5, 68; in Att. 9, 11, 1 it is necessary to read *uix ueri similest* for *simile*. The same rule holds good of *quamquam*, for which see n. on § 74. Usage in silver Latin was laxer.

18. **tanta uis uirtutis**: this particular kind of substitution of 'res pro persona' is illustrated by Nägelsbach, Stilist. p. 431, ed. 6. Add to his exx. Sall. Cat. 48, 5 tanta uis hominis magis leniunda quam exagitanda uidebatur; also cf. § 53 grauitatis iudicium.

ingeni: it is noticeable that the word *ingenium* occurs here for the fifth time in Cicero's description of Lucullus.

20. **inimicorum**: the leader of these was the infamous Memmius; see Plut. Luc. 37.

calumnia: strictly, a fraudulent use of legal forms; συκοφαντία. Sallust, Cat. 30, 4, says of Q. Marcius Rex and Q. Metellus Creticus 'impediti ne triumpharent calumnia paucorum'.

triennio: Lucullus left his province at the end of 67 B.C. and only triumphed at the end of 64, or beginning of 63.

quam debuerat triumphauit. Nos enim consules introduximus paene in urbem currum clarissimi uiri, cuius mihi consilium et auctoritas quid tum in maximis rebus profuisset dicerem, nisi de me ipso dicendum esset, quod hoc tempore non est necesse. Ita priuabo illum potius debito testimonio quam id cum mea laude communicem.

4 II. Sed quae populari gloria decorari in Lucullo debuerunt, ea fere sunt et Graecis litteris celebrata et Latinis. Nos autem illa externa cum multis, haec interiora cum paucis ex ipso saepe cognouimus. Maiore enim studio Lucullus cum omni litterarum generi tum philosophiae deditus fuit quam qui illum ignorabant arbitrabantur, nec uero ineunte aetate solum, sed et pro quaestore aliquot annos et in ipso bello, in quo ita magna rei mili-

2 paene: *pene sero* Cant. 3 profuisset: *profuissent* cod. Eliensis Dau.; *fuisset* Harl. 5 ita: *itaque* Vψ et edd. ueteres non nullae. 8 litteris: *in l.* Cant. 11 generi: *genere* codd. exc. Harl. 12 et pro quaestore: *et quaestor* Lamb. Faber, alii; sed uid. adn. ad § 11. 17 quique: B[1] H Bait. M; *quicque* V[1]; *cumque* V[2] A, sed A *cum* a manu sec. in ras.; *quicumque* Harl. 18 quam ante: *qua a.* coni.

2. **in urbem**: until his triumph Lucullus would remain outside the city.

3. **profuisset**: but for the conditional *dicerem* Cic. would probably have written *profuerit*.

5. **priuabo...testimonio**: cf. Vell. 2, 32, 2 uero testimonio fraudare noluit.

potius quam...communicem: for the construction of potius quam see n. on § 23; for the phrase 'communicare aliquam rem cum aliqua re' see my n. on Balb. 24.

8. **ea fere...Latinis**: for the structure of this clause cf. n. on 1, 17 erant...soliti.

9. **externa...interiora**: cf. Diu. 2, 124 sed haec quoque in promptu; nunc interiora uideamus; Fam. 3, 10, 9 litterae interiores.

cum paucis...cognouimus: just in the same way in the 'De Oratore' Cic. strove to combat the general opinion that Antonius and Crassus were unlearned; in De Or. 2, 1 he says they took care to conceal their Greek learning. For Lucullus see Introd. p. 33.

11. **deditus fuit**: note the difference between this and deditus est; Roby, Gram. § 1453.

12. **pro quaestore**: n. on § 11.

14. **sub ipsis pellibus**: cf. Rep. 1, 17 Rutilius quidem noster etiam sub ipsis Numantiae moenibus solebat mecum interdum eius modi aliquid conquirere.

16. **eum secum habuit**: so Pompeius carried about the historian Theophanes with him on his campaigns; see Arch. 24. There is an obscure passage in Att. 13, 33, 3 which seems to imply that Lucullus conferred on Antiochus the honorary military rank of quaestor.

18. **ea memoria quam dixi**: many edd. have read *qua dixi*. With our passage cf. Fin. 1, 29 ista sis aequitate quam ostendis, where Madv. has an admirable note; see also Bentl. on Hor. sat. 1, 6, 15 iudice quo nosti. In such passages as ours the reading is often uncertain, but the accusative of the relative predominates. In the following passages the best texts give the abl., viz. Ter. Haut. 1, 1, 35 causa qua dixi; Nep. Hann. 3, 1 hac qua diximus aetate; Fam. 13, 64, 2 eo studio quo ostendisti; Tim. 15 ea comparatione qua dixi. In Cat. m. 56 all MSS have delectatione qua dixi, but as the demonstrative pronoun (eā) does not occur in the passage, editors are probably right in reading *quam*. When the relative is in any other case than the abl. fem. or neut. it is easier to trust the MSS, as in Caes. B. G. 5, 2 sexcentas eius generis cuius supra demonstrauimus. A kind of attraction is afforded by the MSS reading *quantam* in bk. 1 § 7; but there the case is very different. In the present passage and all those quoted above, it is possible

taris esse occupatio solet, ut non multum imperatori sub ipsis pellibus oti relinquatur. Cum autem e philosophis ingenio scientiaque putaretur Antiochus, Philonis auditor, excellere, eum secum et quaestor habuit et post aliquot annos imperator, quique esset ea memoria, quam ante dixi, ea saepe audiendo facile cognouit, quae uel semel audita meminisse potuisset. Delectabatur autem mirifice lectione librorum, de quibus audiebat.

Ac uereor interdum ne talium personarum cum amplificare **5**
uelim, minuam etiam gloriam. Sunt enim multi qui omnino Graecas non ament litteras, plures qui philosophiam, reliqui, etiam si haec non improbent, tamen earum rerum disputationem principibus ciuitatis non ita decoram putant. Ego autem, cum Graecas litteras M. Catonem in senectute didicisse acceperim,

Bentl.; scr. Bait. 20 audiebat: *audierat* Ernesti. 21 ac: *at* coni. Goer.; ediderunt Bait. M. 22 minuam etiam: *m. et* Cant. 23 reliqui: *reliqui qui* A² BV Cant. ψ Harl. H Bait. M et edd. plurimae antiquiores; *reliqui* A Dau.; *aliqui qui* coni. Bentl. Mihi quidem persuaderi non potest Ciceronem ita dixisse: "reliqui sunt qui putent." 25 putant: sic ψ; *putent* MSS cett. et edd.

to complete the construction; thus *ea memoria qua dixi* may be understood as *ea m. q. d. eum esse*, but no similar explanation of *ad uitae constantiam quantam possum* is feasible. Wopkens, Lect. Tull. p. 5 tries to defend it, but can quote nothing really like it. [Cf. Val. M. 3, 7, 1 loco quo praedixerat.]

19. **potuisset**: a condition is wrapped up in the words 'uel semel audita' = 'si semel tantum audisset'; hence the subjunctive, as compared with the indicative *potuit* in § 1.

20. **de quibus audiebat**: 'concerning which (books) he heard (Antiochus speak)'. It is quite unnecessary to explain the text (with Madvig) as equivalent to 'de eis rebus de quibus audiebat'. Cf. § 11 libri de quibus dictum est; Cat. m. 83.

21. **ac**: this or *atque* at the beginning of a sentence often (like καὶ μὴν) calls close attention to some new point. See, e.g. above, 1 § 22; Arch. 2; Sest. §§ 3, 8, 11; and cf. Nägelsbach, Stil. § 193.

personarum: 'public characters'; see my n. on Arch. 3, and cf. Nep. pr. 1, summorum uirorum personis; Fam. 15, 17, 2 πρόσωπον πόλεως.

22. **minuam etiam gloriam**: this has been (most hastily) condemned as spurious on the score of sound; see Wopkens, Lect. Tull. p. 30. With this passage cf. Phil. 2, 86 uereor ne imminuam summorum uirorum gloriam.

sunt enim etc.: there are some good remarks in Baldi, die Gegner der griechischen Bildung in Rom 2, 27 on the Roman detractors of philosophy, and on the general unwillingness of prominent Romans to own to a knowledge of things Greek. Cf. Introd. p. 23.

24. **earum rerum disputationem**: Madv. Em. 1, 119 (concerning 1 § 33) cast doubt on the construction *philosophiae disputationes* for *de ph. d.*; cf. however Or. 11 oratoris d. (var. l. *oratoria*); Brut. 46 d. rerum illustrium; De Or. 2, 134 generum dubitatione. Many illustrations of this usage will be found in a pamphlet by Wichert, 'Ueber den Gebrauch des adjectivischen Attributs etc.', Berlin 1875, p. 4.

25. **non ita decoram**: as Madv. on Fin. 1, 1 remarks, *non ita* in the sense of *non admodum* only occurs in Cicero and the older writers before adjectives and adverbs; before verbs *non ita ualde* is used (see e.g. N. D. 1, 86). In Cic. *haud ita* is not thus found, though other writers have it. *Non tam* is employed by Cic. in the same way as *non ita* (Fin. 4, 63); *non tam multum* also occurs for *non ita multum* (De Or. 2, 341); so *non tam ualde* in Petron. § 17.

26. **M. Catonem**: see the Introd. to my ed. of the 'Cato maior' p. 22.

P. autem Africani historiae loquantur in legatione illa nobili, quam ante censuram obiit, Panaetium unum omnino comitem fuisse, nec litterarum Graecarum nec philosophiae iam ullum auctorem requiro.

6 Restat ut eis respondeam, qui sermonibus eius modi nolint personas tam grauis illigari. Quasi uero clarorum uirorum aut tacitos congressus esse oporteat aut ludicros sermones aut rerum colloquia leuiorum! Etenim, si quodam in libro uere est a nobis philosophia laudata, profecto eius tractatio optimo atque amplissimo quoque dignissima est, nec quicquam aliud uidendum est nobis, quos populus Romanus hoc in gradu collocauit, nisi ne quid priuatis studiis de opera publica detrahamus. Quod si, cum fungi munere debebamus, non modo operam nostram numquam a populari coetu remouimus, sed ne

1 legatione: *legione* A^1 V Cant.; *religione* ψ; *regione* Harl. 10 aliud: *aliud ut* ABV[1]; fuit ergo *aliut* in archetypo. 12 debebamus: *debeamus* codd. aliquot et edd. 13 remouimus...fecimus: *remouemus...facimus* codd. exc. A^2 (*faecimus*); corr. Durand. 18 popularis: *populares* codd. plerique, quos tamen hic neglegit ipse Halmius, propterea quod *illustris* praebent. Indicium hoc est orthographiam

1. **Africani**: probably dependent on *comitem*, not on *historiae*, though the latter construction is possible; cf. Diu. 1, 72 Sullae historia.

historiae: though the singular is commoner, yet the plural not unfrequently occurs in the sense of 'history'. For the personification cf. Att. 2, 5, 1 quid historiae de nobis ad annos DC praedicarint? Leg. 1, 2 dum Latinae loquentur litterae; Dom. 86 ut annales populi Romani locuntur; Fin. 2, 48 consuetudo loquitur; Cael. 47 Baiae locuntur; Brut. 181 monumenta locuntur; Val. Max. 3, 4, ext. 2 litterae locuntur. For *loqui* as used here see n. on § 101.

in legatione: Scipio was censor in the year 142. The embassy is mentioned in Rep. 3, 47 and 6, 11 (where it is placed *after* the censorship); Iustin. 38, 8, 8; Val. Max. 4, 3, 13; Plut. Apophthegm. 200 F; Athen. XII 549 D and XIV 657 F and VI 273 B; Strabo 669; Diod. XXXIII 18. Many scholars have misunderstood the word *comitem* here. It means, not that Scipio was sole ambassador, and his sole companion Panaetius, but that Panaetius constituted Scipio's whole personal staff or suite. Many of the writers above quoted remark on the simplicity adopted by Scipio in the East. It is certain that he was accompanied by two other ambassadors, Sp. Mummius and L. Metellus, and indeed it was not the Roman practice to send out envoys singly. Velleius 1, 13, 3 mentions Panaetius as the constant companion of Scipio 'domi militiaeque'; cf. too De Or. 2, 154. [Val. Max. carelessly places the embassy *after* the destruction of Numantia.]

2. **obiit**: so Rep. 6, 11 cum obieris legatus Aegyptum.

4. **auctorem**: it is astonishing that Bentley and Davies should have thought the text unsound. For a defence of it (though that is hardly necessary) see Wopkens, Lect. Tull. p. 34 and Hand's n. there.

restat: rather careless, since after this charge is disposed of, one or two others still remain. Cf. § 7 restat unum genus.

5. **personas tam grauis**: cf. what Cic. says (Fin. 1, 1) of friends who 'philosophiam personae et dignitatis (Ciceronis) negant esse'.

illigari: 'entangled'; as though in something bad. Sermonibus is probably instrumental abl. The dative construction with *illigare* is found in Hor. Od. 1, 27, 23 but not in the best prose.

6. **aut ludicros sermones**: condensed for 'aut quasi oporteat clarorum uirorum ludicros esse sermones'.

litteram quidem ullam fecimus nisi forensem, quis reprendet nostrum otium, qui in eo non modo nosmet ipsos hebescere et languere nolumus, sed etiam ut plurimis prosimus enitimur? Gloriam uero non modo non minui, sed etiam augeri arbitramur eorum, quorum ad popularis illustrisque laudes has etiam minus notas minusque peruolgatas adiungimus. Sunt etiam qui negent 7
in eis, qui in nostris libris disputent, fuisse earum rerum, de quibus disputatur, scientiam: qui mihi uidentur non solum uiuis, sed etiam mortuis inuidere.

III. Restat unum genus reprehensorum, quibus Academiae ratio non probatur. Quod grauius ferremus, si quisquam ullam disciplinam philosophiae probaret praeter eam, quam ipse sequeretur. Nos autem, quoniam contra omnis dicere quae

non ex codicibus solis, ut uoluit Halmius, esse constituendam. 20 in eis: *in his* codd. H Bait.; corr. Orellius. 26 dicere: *qui d.* C; *qui scire sibi uidentur d.* Cant. ψ (qui tamen *dicere* ante u. *qui* ponit) edd. multae ueteres; *dicere qui scire uidentur* Harl.; post *qui* H lacunam indicauit, quam ad supplendam *qui se scire arbitrantur* coni.; atque ita scripserunt Bait. M. V in margine habet "*uel qui scire sibi uidentur.*" *Qui* ego sustuli.

7. **si...laudata**: for the 'Hortensius' see Introd. p. 31. As to the expression, cf. Leg. 1, 62 (sapientia) laudata est a te uere.

9. **nec quicquam etc.**: similar pleas are urged in Fin. 1, 10 and the prologue to Fin. 3.

10. **gradu**: so 'degree' was of old used in English.

11. **de opera publica**: cf. Fin. 3, 7 nihil operae rei publicae detrahens, where *opera rei publicae* is the same as *opera publica* here, and *operae* depends on *detrahens* not on *nihil.*

13. **populari coetu**: so Phil. 2, 63 c. populi Romani.

14. **litteram fecimus**: Cic. elsewhere says 'litteram scribere'. Cf. Tibul. 3, 1, 12 indicet ut nomen littera facta tuum.

nisi forensem: the 'Republic' and 'De Legibus' hardly come under this description.

16. **ut plurimis prosimus**: cf. 1 § 11 and Introd. p. 22. Seneca, ep. 8, 1 makes an apology for devoting himself to philosophy, which contains many reminiscences of Cicero. One reason he urges is a desire 'ut prodesse pluribus possem'.

17. **non modo non minui**: observe non modo...sed repeated thrice in two sentences.

19. **sunt qui negent**: see Introd. p. 32. The reproach was true and is but feebly repelled here. In Cato m. 3 Cic. actually apologises for making Cato seem more learned than he really was.

21. **non solum...sed etiam**: Orelli's contention that *sed etiam* cannot be used unless *non solum* (and not merely *non* which Goer. gives here) precedes, is easily refuted. See Boot on Att. 3, 15, 5.

23. **reprehensorum**: reprehensor is an unfavourable critic; a favourable or neutral critic is existumator.

24. **si quisquam**: when *quisquam* appears in a conditional clause the supposition is nearly always one which is regarded as unfulfilled or incapable of fulfilment; see Draeger, hist. synt. 1^2 § 48 b.

26. **sequeretur**: unlike English, Latin often brings the verb in relative clauses under the influence of the conditional particle, just as much as the verb in the principal clause. See Draeger 1^2 § 151, 2; Du Mesnil on Leg. 1, 29.

contra omnis dicere: cf. 1, 46 contra omnium sententias dicens; also below § 60 n. The Academic (or rather New Academic) practice of arguing against all opinions follows as a direct consequence from the doctrine of the ἰσοσθένεια τῶν λόγων, for which see n. on 1, 45. Cf. also De Or. 1, 84 mos erat patrius Academiae aduersari semper omnibus in disputando; ib. 1, 263. This practice, called εἰς ἑκάτερα

uidentur solemus, non possumus quin alii a nobis dissentiant recusare: quamquam nostra quidem caussa facilis est, qui uerum inuenire sine ulla contentione uolumus, idque summa cura studioque conquirimus. Etsi enim omnis cognitio multis est obstructa difficultatibus eaque est et in ipsis rebus obscuritas et in iudiciis nostris infirmitas, ut non sine caussa antiquissimi et doctissimi inuenire se posse quod cuperent diffisi sint, tamen nec illi defecerunt neque nos studium exquirendi defetigati relinquemus, neque nostrae disputationes quicquam aliud agunt nisi ut in utramque partem dicendo eliciant et tamquam exprimant aliquid, quod aut uerum sit aut ad id quam proxime accedat.
8 Nec inter nos et eos, qui se scire arbitrantur, quicquam interest,

2 facilis: codd. plerique; *facilior* Cant.ψ Harl. et V in marg. 4 obstructa: *obstricta uel obstructa* Cant. 6 antiquissimi: *et a.* codd. 5 Dauisii. 10 dicendo: *d. et*

ἐπιχείρησις (Numen. ap. Euseb. 14, 7, 15; cf. also ἐπαμφοτερίζειν, Galen. Plac. 4 § 365, ed. Müller) or 'in utramque partem disputatio' (above, 1, 46; De Fat. 1; Tusc. 2, 9; N. D. 2, 168; De Or. 3, 107) is sometimes traced by Cic. back to Aristotle, Plato and Socrates, but occasionally with more truth to the Megarians, who were the great cultivators of ἀντιλογικοὶ λόγοι (Plato, Phaedo 90 B). In Fin. 5, 10 the use made by Aristotle and the use made by Arcesilas of the 'in utramque partem disputatio' are contrasted.

dicere quae uidentur: cf. Fin. 2, 2 ad ea, si quid uideretur, diceret. With the reading *qui scire uidentur* we might compare Parad. 40 omnes qui aliquid scire uidentur.

2. **caussa facilis**: a forensic expression in Planc. 5; Verr. 5, 126 and 173 (so too *caussa explicata* in Tusc. 5, 85) to which is opposed *caussa difficilis* in Cluent. 57; Fin. 3, 2.

uerum inuenire: cf. § 60 ueri inueniendi caussa.

3. **sine ulla contentione**: n. on 1, 44. Contentio = φιλονεικία = pertinacia in 1 § 44. With the whole context cf. Tusc. 4, 7 defendat quod quisque sentit; sunt enim iudicia libera etc.

4. **conquirimus**: Tusc. 4, 7 quid sit in quaque re maxime probabile requiremus.

5. **in rebus obscuritas**: above, 1, 44 rerum obscuritate; Fin. 2, 15.

in iudiciis infirmitas: 1, 44 imbecillos animos.

6. **ut diffisi sint**: in the principal clause we have a present *est*, which is however equivalent to *est et fuit*, as Lieven explains it (p. 49).

antiquissimi et doctissimi: on the other hand 'recentissima quaeque sunt correcta et emendata maxime' (1, 13).

9. **disputationes agunt**: Nägelsb. Stil. p. 432, ed. 6 has some excellent remarks on the kind of personification which arises in the scientific style of writings.

10. **dicendo**: something may be said in favour of the words *et audiendo:* see Wopkens, p. 34.

eliciant: used *in re simili*, De Or. 1, 158; ib. 3, 79; Fin. 2, 2.

exprimant: 'embody'; cf. n. on § 77.

11. **ad id**: some edd. omit *ad;* but in only one passage does Cic. omit it with *accedere;* i.e. Mil. 59 proxime deos accessit. Cf. § 36 n.

12. **eos...arbitrantur**: cf. n. on § 7 dicere quae uidentur. Here, of course, *scire* implies absolute, indestructible knowledge. In Tusc. 1, 60 Cic. says of himself as opposed to the dogmatists, 'nec pudet, ut istos, fateri nescire quod nesciam'.

14. **probabilia**: πιθανά, for which see § 33.

sequi: 'act upon'; see §§ 99—101; and cf. (for the expression) § 70 n.

15. **liberiores et solutiores**: for the words see n. on § 105; as to the thought cf. § 120 quanti libertas est etc.; Leg. 1, 36 tua libertas disserendi.

16. **nec ut omnia etc.**: with this whole passage, which excellently expresses the

nisi quod illi non dubitant quin ea uera sint, quae defendunt, nos probabilia multa habemus, quae sequi facile, adfirmare uix possumus. Hoc autem liberiores et solutiores sumus, quod integra nobis est iudicandi potestas, nec ut omnia, quae praescripta a quibusdam et quasi imperata sint, defendamus necessitate ulla cogimur. Nam ceteri primum ante tenentur adstricti quam quid esset optimum iudicare potuerunt: deinde infirmissimo tempore aetatis aut obsecuti amico cuidam aut una alicuius, quem primum audierunt, oratione capti de rebus incognitis iudicant et, ad quamcumque sunt disciplinam quasi tempestate delati, ad eam tamquam ad saxum adhaerescunt. Nam quod 9
dicunt omnino se credere ei, quem iudicent fuisse sapientem,

audiendo ABEM. 16 praescripta a quibusdam et quasi: Cant.; *pr. et quibus et quasi* codd. cett.; *pr. et qu.* edd. 18 ante: *autem* Cant. 24 omnino: G et V in marg. Harl. et aliquot codd. Dauisii; *omnino omnia* ψ.

spirit of the New Academy, cf. Tusc. 2, 5 eamque (philosophiam) nos adiuuemus nosque ipsos redargui refellique patiamur. Quod ei ferunt animo iniquo, qui certis quibusdam destinatisque sententiis quasi addicti et consecrati sunt, eaque necessitate constricti ut etiam quae non probare soleant, ea cogantur constantiae caussa defendere; nos, qui sequimur probabilia nec ultra quam id quod ueri simile occurrit, progredi possumus, et refellere sine pertinacia, et refelli sine iracundia parati sumus. Publilius Syrus probably had the Academics in view when he wrote (l. 282, ed. Ribbeck) 'incertus animus dimidium est sapientiae'.

praescripta: a word of the jurisconsults; Or. 141; Madvig on Fin. 2, 3.

17. **a quibusdam**: cf. amico cuidam below.

quasi imperata: so 'quasi dictata' in Tusc. 2, 26; N.D. 1, 72; Fin. 4, 10. Quasi = 'almost', as often; e.g. § 35.

defendamus: cf. § 137 haec tibi tam sunt defendenda quam moenia.

necessitate ulla cogimur: so § 120 quanti libertas ipsa aestimanda est, non mihi necesse esse quod tibi est; N. D. 1, 17 auditorem aecum, libero iudicio, nulla eius modi adstrictum necessitate, ut mihi uelim nolim sit certa quaedam tuenda sententia; Tusc. 4, 47 digladientur illi per me licet, cui nihil est necesse; ib. 4, 7 nos nullius unius disciplinae legibus adstricti, quibus in philosophia necessario pareamus.

18. **ante tenentur etc.**: cf. N. D. 1, 66 ante enim iudicasti Epicureum te esse oportere quam ista cognouisti; the last word illustrates the use of *cognitis* below.

19. **infirmissimo tempore aetatis**: for the expressions here cf. my n. on Lael. 74; also Flacc. 5 and Tusc. 5, 62 eis se adulescens improuida aetate irretierat erratis. As to the thought, Off. 1, 117 should be compared, particularly these words: itaque ante implicatur aliquo certo genere cursuque uiuendi quam potuit quid optimum esset iudicare.

20. **cuidam...alicuius**: an example to show the not uncommon interchangeability of *quidam* and *aliquis*, the uses of which grammarians have too often tried to separate by hard and fast lines. *Cuipiam*, read here by many edd., though possible, is not necessary, as may be seen by looking through any list of examples of quispiam, e.g. that in Draeger 1 § 47.

21. **iudicant et**: for this *et* introducing a *consequence* of a preceding verb, see exx. in Draeger II p. 28.

22. **tempestate**: Hor. ep. 1, 1, 14 nullius addictus iurare in uerba magistri, Quo me cumque rapit tempestas, deferor hospes. For *quasi* see n. on 1 § 17.

23. **ad saxum**: adhaerescere occasionally takes a dative in Cic., but only when it has a metaphorical sense. In the literal use, the dat. with *adhaerere* first occurs in Virgil, then in the silver prose.

24. **dicunt...sapientem**: these words are no doubt directed against the Epicureans. Cf. Seneca ep. 33, 4 non sumus sub rege: sibi quisque se uindicat. Apud

probarem, si id ipsum rudes et indocti iudicare potuissent—statuere enim qui sit sapiens uel maxime uidetur esse sapientis—sed ut potuerint, potuerunt omnibus rebus auditis, cognitis etiam reliquorum sententiis. Iudicauerunt autem re semel audita atque ad unius se auctoritatem contulerunt. Sed nescio quo modo plerique errare malunt eamque sententiam, quam adamauerunt, pugnacissime defendere quam sine pertinacia quid constantissime dicatur exquirere. Quibus de rebus et alias saepe nobis multa quaesita et disputata sunt et quondam in Hortensi uilla, quae est ad Baulos, cum eo Catulus et Lucullus nosque ipsi postridie

3 ut potuerint, potuerunt: Lamb. Madu. H Bait. M; *ut potuerunt* codd. 4 autem: Lamb. etc.; *aut* codd. atque: addidit Lamb.; om. codd. 8 nobis:

istos quicquid dicit Hermarchus, quicquid Metrodorus, ad unum refertur. More generally, N. D. 1, 10 obest plerumque eis, qui discere uolunt, auctoritas eorum qui se docere profitentur, desinunt enim suum iudicium adhibere, id habent ratum quod ab eo quem probant iudicatum uident; Quint. 3, 1, 22 neque me cuiusquam sectae uelut quadam superstitione imbutus addixi. To the same effect Sen. dial. 7, 1, 4; 8, 3, 1; 9, 1, 16. For *nam quod dicunt* introducing the sentence cf. *nam quod aiunt* in Tusc. 4, 57.

omnino: with *credere;* 'put absolute trust in'. With the context cf. § 115 non me quidem sed sapientem dico scire.

1. **rudes et indocti**: 'while still untrained and unlearned'.

2. **statuere...sapientis**: cf. § 117 quamcumque (disciplinam) eliget, insipiens eliget; Plin. ep. 1, 10, 4 ut enim de pictore scalptore fictore nisi artifex iudicare, ita nisi sapiens non potest perspicere sapientem; Diog. 1, 103 *θαυμάζειν δὲ ἔφη (Ἀνάχαρσις) πῶς παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἀγωνίζονται μὲν οἱ τεχνῖται, κρίνουσι δὲ οἱ μὴ τεχνῖται.*

3. **ut potuerint, potuerunt etc.**: Madvig's emendation (based on Lambinus) still remains the most satisfactory out of the large number which have been proposed. The objections urged against it by its latest critic (Weidner in Philologus XXXVIII 90) are very forced and trivial. The MSS corruptions are most satisfactorily accounted for by the concurrence of two such similar forms as potuerint and potuerunt, which led to the omission of one. Exactly parallel corruptions are found in the MSS of Tusc. 3, 82 (see Kühner) and Fin. 2, 30 (see Madvig). The concessive *ut* with the perfect subjunctive is also likely to have been unfamiliar to the scribes. The confusion of *an*, *aut*, *autem* and the omission of *atque* [after *audita*] are exceedingly common.

4. **re semel audita**: cf. *unius alicuius oratione* above. The *Academica* is throughout a sermon on the text 'philosophi credula natio' (Sen. N. Q. 6, 26, 3).

6. **adamauerunt**: 'have learned to love'; the *ad* has the same force as *πρὸ* in *προμανθάνειν*, 'to learn on and on', 'to learn by degrees', not (as the lexica absurdly say) 'to learn beforehand, and so to learn thoroughly'. *Adamare* thus gains a sense stronger than that of *amare;* see Sen. ep. 71, 5 who distinguishes between the two words. Cf. fragm. 4 and Fin. 1, 69 *consuetudine adamare* (a passage which disproves the assertion, repeated by Lewis and Short, that in the best Latin only the perf. and plup. occur).

7. **pertinacia**: n. on 1, 44.

quid constantissime dicatur: Fin. 5, 79 quaerere quid constanter dicatur; Tusc. 5, 26 sibi constanter conuenienterque dicere.

9. **Hortensi uilla**: Introd. p. 47 n.

10. **Catulus et Lucullus nosque**: for *et...que* see n. on 1, 43. When an enumeration consists of three or more members, the first two being either introduced by *et...et*, or without particles, the third or succeeding members may be accompanied by *que;* cf. Fin. 1, 12 and also ib. 5, 1 Quintus pater *et* T. Pomponius Lucius*que* noster; N. D. 1, 45; Rep. 6, 12. Passages where there are only two members, and the *que* is attached to the second, while *et* goes with the first, are exceptional, especially in Cic., who however

uenissemus, quam apud Catulum fuissemus. Quo quidem etiam maturius uenimus, quod erat constitutum, si uentus esset, Lucullo in Neapolitanum, mihi in Pompeianum nauigare. Cum igitur pauca in xysto locuti essemus, tum eodem in spatio consedimus.

IV. Hic Catulus 'etsi heri' inquit, 'id quod quaerebatur **10**
paene explicatum est, ut tota fere quaestio tractata uideatur, tamen exspecto ea, quae te pollicitus es, Luculle, ab Antiocho audita dicturum'. 'Equidem', inquit Hortensius, 'feci plus quam uellem: totam enim rem Lucullo integram seruatam oportuit. Et tamen fortasse seruata est: a me enim ea, quae in promptu

om. V Cant. ψ Harl. et al. codd. Dauisii; *a nobis* Lamb. 19 Lucullo: Cant. ψ (errat Dau.); *Catulo* uel *Catullo* cett.

seems to have had a tendency to attach *que* to a personal pronoun, which may account for the irregularity. Cf. Fin. 5, 64 et eos...nos*que*; Off. 1, 155 et ei erudiuerunt multos (so the passage should be read) nos*que* ipsi...; Att. 13, 33, 4 et multi erant nos*que* imparati. The force of the pronoun is also shown in Lael. 14 et Philus et Manilius et alii plures, tu*que* etiam. [The '*que* tertio loco positum', where the first two members of the enumeration have no connective conjunctions, has in Cic. often been disputed; it stands, however, on a different footing from the *et* or *atque* in the third place of an enumeration; these words were almost certainly not so used by Cic.]

11. **fuissemus**: it is difficult to resist the conclusion that, in instances like this, the subjunctive is purely due to a desire for symmetry; exactly similar instances will be found in Cato m. 42; De Or. 2, 7; N. D. 2, 126; cf. n. on § 65.

etiam: this of course does not qualify *maturius*.

12. **Lucullo**: dat., not abl. after *constitutum*. The first beginnings of this dat. after the passive verb are seen in Cic. who uses it only with participles; it is evidently an extension of the dat. commodi.

14. **xysto**: a long colonnade, adorned with flowers, shrubs and statues, open on one side; intended for exercise in rainy weather, or as a pleasant refuge from the heat. Vitruu. 6, 7, 5 gives a description of it. Its use among the Romans seems not much older than the time of Cicero, but later it was an important appendage of the wealthier Roman houses and certain artists, xystici, did nothing else but construct xysti. (Suet. Galb. 15; Aug. 45, 72.) Cf. Brut. 9; Opt. gen. or. 8; Att. 1, 8, 2; Plin. ep. 2, 17 §§ 17, 18, 20; ib. 5, 6 §§ 16, 23; ib. 9, 7, 4; Sen. de ira 3, 18, 4. Cf. too Goehling, De Cicerone artis aestimatore p. 37.

spatio: cf. Leg. 1, 14 spatia nostra *sedes*que; De Or. 2, 20.

consedimus: n. on 1, 14.

15. **id quod quaerebatur**: exactly equivalent to *quaestio* which follows.

16. **explicatum est ut...uideatur**: cf. § 3 above (fuit ut stet); Balb. 30; and, for the general drift, Brut. 142; Diu. 2, 146.

17. **te...dicturum**: on the collocation cf. Madv. on Fin. 1, 50.

18. **dicturum**: for the omission of *esse* cf. n. on 1, 18 exhibiturum.

19. **uellem**: really the apodosis to a condition not expressed, such as 'si modo id fieri posset'. The tense follows that of feci. In passages where the corresponding verb is in the present we have plus quam uelim, as in Liu. 2, 37, 4.

integram seruatam oportuit: this construction is characteristic of Latin Comedy and used occasionally by Cicero, but hardly, if ever, found in other writers. Cf. Verr. 4, 37 signum ablatum non oportet; Cat. 2, 3 (quoted by Draeger II § 443, 1d) is not an example, since the best texts have *interfectum esse*, as in Diu. 2, 91 notam esse oportuit. So in Phil. 7, 3 the right reading is *irritari*. The omission of *esse* with the passive participle after cupio, uolo and the like (e.g. defensam uelle rem publicam) which is common in Cic., but not elsewhere, is very similar. Also constructions like Fin. 5, 13 physicum se uoluit, for which see Madv. on Fin. 2, 102. [Liu. 10, 40, 1 poenitet dilatum certamen.]

20. **et tamen...seruata est**: there is

erant, dicta sunt, a Lucullo autem reconditiora desidero'. Tum ille 'non sane', inquit, 'Hortensi, conturbat me exspectatio tua, etsi nihil est eis, qui placere uolunt, tam aduersarium, sed quia non laboro quam ualde ea quae dico probaturus sim, eo minus conturbor. Dicam enim nec mea nec ea, in quibus, si non fuerint, non uinci me malim quam uincere. Sed mehercule, ut quidem nunc se caussa habet, etsi hesterno sermone labefactata est, mihi tamen uidetur esse uerissima. Agam igitur, sicut Antiochus agebat: nota enim mihi res est. Nam et uacuo animo illum audiebam et magno studio, eadem de re etiam saepius, ut etiam maiorem exspectationem mei faciam quam modo fecit Horten-

4 quam ualde: *quamquam u.* codd. 5 nec ea: *et ea* Bait. si non fuerint: *si uera n. f.* Cant. V (a manu sec.) Dau.; *si non fuerit ueritas* Harl.; *non si falsa fuerint uinci* M. 6 non uinci: *non* om. codd. me malim: *non m.* H. 7 labefactata: Cant. ψ B^2 V^2; codd. multi *labefacta*; cf. 1 § 33. 11 mei faciam:

an exactly similar touch in De Or. 2, 350 where Crassus says to Antonius, in reference to the discussion, 'mihi nihil aut non multum relinquis' and Antonius replies 'quantum tibi ego reliquerim, erit in tua potestate; si enim uere agere uolueris, omnia tibi relinquo'.

in promptu...reconditiora: cf. Diu. 2, 124 in promptu...interiora; also above, 1 § 4 and 2 § 4.

2. **exspectatio ... aduersarium**: so Rep. 1, 37 permagnam tu quidem exspectationem, quod onus est ei qui magnis de rebus dicturus est grauissimum, imponis orationi meae.

4. **non laboro etc.**: cf. Flacc. 10 numquam laborant quem ad modum probent, quod dicunt; Fam. 3, 12, 3 me laborantem quo modo tuear quae tuenda sunt; Tusc. 3, 46 quid enim laboro nisi ut ueritas explicetur? Plato, Phaedo 91 A οὐ γὰρ ὅπως τοῖς παροῦσιν ἃ ἐγὼ λέγω δόξει ἀληθῆ εἶναι προθυμήσομαι.

5. **dicam enim etc.**: cf. Fin. 1, 13 uerum inuenire uolumus, non tamquam aduersarium conuincere.

si non fuerint: the text is perfectly sound. *Esse* and *uerum esse* are in Cic. almost interchangeable expressions. Cf. Att. 10, 16, 3 *si id fuerit*, turpem Catonem! N. D. 1, 60 quid non sit, quid sit; Tusc. 5, 52 *quae nisi sunt*, sublata uirtus est; below § 52 quod non sit; § 90 si essent; § 134 nisi alterutrum sit. Cicero says almost indifferently *sunt ista* (see exx. in n. on 1, 9, above) and *sunt ista uera* (as below, §§ 26, 119, also Fam. 7, 18, 4 and Diu. 2, 32). In Leg. 1, 2 the true reading is probably *sint ista sane uera*. Further *esto* and *uerum esto* are often indifferent; the former is too common to need illustration; for the latter see Fin. 2, 75 and 92. [Cf. n. on 1, 43.]

7. **hesterno sermone**: see Introd. pp. 42 sq.

labefactata est: Cic. does not use the verb *labefacio*, nor probably does Livy; see Weissenborn on 3, 64, 3.

8. **agam igitur etc.**: Cic. rather overdoes the attempt to force on his readers a belief in Lucullus' learning.

10. **eadem...saepius**: this clause is abruptly introduced; cf. n. on § 2 uerborum maiorem Hortensius. I have sometimes thought that *etiam* in this clause is a corruption for some participle such as *dicentem* (or perhaps *de re etiam* for *disserentem*). Cf. § 11 Antiochum saepe disputantem audiebam; § 12 cum audirem Antiochum disserentem.

12. **ereximus**: cf. Or. 122 ordiri orationem...quo auditor erigatur; so Brut. §§ 200, 290; Sext. Rosc. 60.

13. **Alexandriae**: Lucullus was sent by Sulla to Alexandria in the winter of 87—86 to try and raise a fleet (cf. Plut. Luc. 2). As Egypt was then independent, the title *pro quaestore* is, strictly speaking, incorrect. If §§ 1, 2, 4, 11 be compared, it will be seen that Cic. regards Lucullus as *quaestor* or as *pro quaestore* during the whole time of his service under Sulla in the East. The readings in these sections have been frequently condemned

sius'. Cum ita esset exorsus, ad audiendum animos ereximus. **11**
At ille, 'cum Alexandriae pro quaestore' inquit 'essem, fuit Antiochus mecum et erat iam antea Alexandriae familiaris Antiochi Heraclitus Tyrius, qui et Clitomachum multos annos et Philonem audierat, homo sane in ista philosophia, quae nunc prope dimissa reuocatur, probatus et nobilis, cum quo Antiochum saepe disputantem audiebam, sed utrumque leniter. Et quidem isti libri duo Philonis, de quibus heri dictum a Catulo est, tum erant adlati Alexandriam tumque primum in Antiochi manus uenerant: et homo natura lenissimus—nihil enim poterat fieri illo mitius—stomachari tamen coepit. Mirabar: nec enim umquam ante uideram. At ille, Heracliti memoriam implorans,

ei facerem Cant.; *ei* est in V ψ Harl. 13 pro quaestore: *quaestor* Lamb. Dau.; cf. § 4. essem: *issem* codd. exc. Cant. (*esse*); *Alexandriam issem* Goer. 18 leniter: *leuiter* Cant. Harl. 20 adlati: *allati* codd. (*alati* B[1] Cant.). 21 fieri: om. Cant.

by scholars, but are indubitably right. Though a man was, technically speaking, only *quaestor* for one year, and afterwards *pro quaestore* by prorogation, yet the popular language did not always maintain the distinction. As Mommsen remarks (Staatsrecht I, 188) it is almost impossible in the case of most pro-quaestors to determine whether they obtained the title by grant of some imperator or by actual prorogation from the senate. See the examples quoted in his note. During the greater part of the time of his service under Sulla, Lucullus was probably not even *pro quaestore*, but, strictly speaking, *legatus pro quaestore*, i.e. an officer nominated by Sulla, but enjoying the title and privileges of a pro-quaestor. The provincial governors appointed by Sulla held office for unusually long periods; thus Sextius governed Macedonia for eleven years at least. It should be observed that Cic. rarely, if ever, employed nominatives like *proconsul*, *propraetor*, *proquaestor;* thus *pro consule*, *pro praetore*, *pro quaestore* are attached to the names of the officers, whatever be the case in which those names stand. Cf. e.g. Phil. 2, 97 post M. Brutum pro consule; Vat. 12 C. Cosconio (dat.) pro consule. The nearest approach to the real compound nouns is in Diu. 2, 76 cum bella a proconsulibus et a propraetoribus administrantur (where however the preposition *a* may perhaps be due to corruption in the MSS). After Cicero's time the composite substantives *proconsul* and *propraetor* came into free use; but *proquaestor* was never at any time a Latin word.

14. **iam antea Alexandriae**: as *Alexandriae* occurs in the line above, *ibi* might have been expected here.

15. **Heraclitus**: hardly known excepting from this passage.

Clitomachum: see Zeller III 1, p. 523, ed. 3 (E. Tr. p. 532).

16. **quae nunc...reuocatur**: sc. a Cicerone. Philo's only notable pupils had combined to form the so-called 'Old Academy', and when Cic. wrote the 'Academica', the New Academic dialectic had been without a representative for many years. Cf. Introd. p. 16.

17. **probatus et nobilis**: 'of repute and even renown'.

cum quo: rather unusual for *quicum;* Cic. less commonly has *quocum* (as in Rab. Post. 19). So *cum quibus* occasionally takes the place of *quibuscum*.

18. **et quidem**: = καί γε. The function of these particles is emphatically to draw attention to some new point. Hence their common use in introducing something intended to weaken an opponent's argument (see Madv. on Fin. 1, 35).

19. **libri duo**: cf. 1, 13; Introd. p. 59.

21. **et**: = 'whereupon'; in this sense ac is commoner, but see n. on 1, 3 and cf. n. on § 34, below.

natura: n. on 1, 15. With the context cf. N. D. 1, 93 Phaedro nihil elegantius, nihil humanius; sed stomachabatur senex, si quid aspere dixeram.

23. **uideram**: sc. eum stomachari. It

quaerere ex eo uiderenturne illa Philonis, aut ea num uel e Philone uel ex ullo Academico audiuisset aliquando? Negabat. Philonis tamen scriptum agnoscebat; nec id quidem dubitari poterat; nam aderant mei familiares, docti homines, P. et C. Selii et Tetrilius Rogus, qui se illa audiuisse Romae de Philone et ab
12 eo ipso illos duos libros dicerent descripsisse. Tum et illa dixit Antiochus, quae heri Catulus commemorauit a patre suo dicta Philoni, et alia plura, nec se tenuit quin contra suum doctorem librum etiam ederet, qui Sosus inscribitur. Tum igitur et cum Heraclitum studiose audirem contra Antiochum disserentem et item Antiochum contra Academicos, dedi Antiocho operam diligentius, ut caussam ex eo totam cognoscerem. Itaque compluris dies adhibito Heraclito doctisque compluribus et in eis

4 homines: *omnes* codd. 5 Tetrilius Rogus: *Tertullus Rhodius* ed. Heruagiana; *Raecilius* Guilelmus; *Rocus* Ursinus; *Tretilius* Harl. 6 duos: *duo* codd. exc. $A^2V^2\psi$ Harl.; uid. adn. ad 1 § 17. 9 et cum: *cum et* M post Goerenzium.

is just possible that *id* has fallen out before umquam.

1. **quaerere**: exx. of the historical infinitive from Cic. are collected in Draeger I^2 § 154.

uiderenturne: for *uiderentur* see n. on § 146; for *ne*, where the answer 'no' is expected, my n. on Cato m. 56; also below § 75. The instance here is peculiar, as *num* follows in the next clause. For the omission of *esse* see my n. on Cato m. 22.

illa...ea: n. on 1, 1 and § 29 below.

Philonis: sc. esse.

e Philone audiuisset: but below, audiuisse *de* Philone. Cic. uses ex, de, ab, after audire (with the sense of 'from') the first being commonest, *de* and *ab* being of about equally frequent occurrence, according to my observations, though Madvig on Fin. 1, 39 seems to imply that *de* is found a good deal oftener than *ab*. Some exx. of *de* and *ex* are collected in Draeger I^2, § 286, 2. Cf. n. on 1, 8 a fontibus.

2. **Academico**: the word is here confined to the sense of 'New Academic'.

3. **Philonis...agnoscebat**: 'he recognised it as a work of Philo'.

nec...quidem: this is of course not a genuine case of nec...quidem with the sense of *ne...quidem*, but possibly even here, as in so many other places where MSS give *nec* for *ne* with following *quidem*, *ne* should be read; cf. n. on 1, 7.

4. **Selii**: known only from this passage. [MS Harl. has *Gellii*.]

5. **Tetrilius Rogus**: the soundness of the text here is doubtful. Rogus (an ill-omened name) occurs nowhere else, but *Rocus* is found (as Ursinus pointed out) on *denarii* of the *gens Crepereia*. If Cic. wrote 'Crepereius Rocus', the changes to 'Tetrilius Rogus' would not seem strange or improbable to any one acquainted with the tricks which even the best Ciceronian MSS play with proper names.

ab eo...descripsisse: 'had copied from Philo's own manuscript'. Cf. Att. 13, 21, 4 scripsit Balbus ad me, se *a te* quintum de finibus librum *descripsisse;* Hor. sat. 2, 3, 33 si quid *Stertinius* ueri crepat, *unde* ego mira *Descripsi* praecepta haec; Liu. 1, 32, 5.

7. **heri**: for this indication of the contents of the lost 'Catulus', see Introd. p. 58.

dicta Philoni: these words do not necessarily imply a personal interview between Ph. and Catulus the elder: the dat. may only mean 'in reference to Ph.'; cf. Phaedrus 1, 7, 3 hoc illis dictum est, 'this fable is à propos of those persons'. Cf. Introd. pp. 42, 60. *Philoni* may be a gloss. What these *dicta* were is plain from § 18, where see nn.

9. **Sosus**: Chappuis quotes Stephanus of Byzantium to show that Sosus, like Antiochus, was a native of Ascalon, and was accounted a Stoic. Chappuis thinks

Antiochi fratre Aristo, et praeterea Aristone et Dione, quibus ille secundum fratrem plurimum tribuebat, multum temporis in ista una disputatione consumpsimus. Sed ea pars, quae contra Philonem erat, praetermittenda est; minus enim acer est aduersarius is, qui ista, quae sunt heri defensa, negat Academicos omnino dicere; etsi enim mentitur, tamen est aduersarius lenior. Ad Arcesilan Carneadenque ueniamus'.

V. Quae cum dixisset, sic rursus exorsus est: 'primum mihi **13**
uidemini—me autem nomine appellabat—cum ueteres physicos nominatis, facere idem, quod seditiosi ciues solent, cum aliquos ex antiquis claros uiros proferunt, quos dicant fuisse popularis, ut eorum ipsi similes esse uideantur. Repetunt enim a P. Valerio, qui exactis regibus primo anno consul fuit, commemorant re-

19 lenior: *leuius* Cant.; *leniorum* ψ; *leuior* Harl. 25 enim a: ita scripsi; *iam* codd. exc. Cant. (*iam a*); *iam a* uel *ii a* edd.

that Sosus was a deserter from the Academic to the Stoic camp.

inscribitur: the present tense here has reference to the multiplication of copies; whenever a copy of the work is made the title 'Sosus' is attached. *Inscriptus est* would have meant that the name 'Sosus' was given to the book, once for all, by its author. The perfect might have been expected here in view of *tenuit* preceding; but the present is everywhere commoner than the perfect; see Cato m. §§ 13 and 59; Tusc. 1, 57; Off. 2, §§ 31 and 87; Brut. 205; Suet. Ner. 11; Tac. Or. 21 and 38. For the perfect see Diu. 2, 1; Or. 2, 61; Att. 8, 5, 2.

et cum: for *cum et* (cf. et item etc. below); a not uncommon transposition. It is in fact here an example of what grammarians call coniunctio (see n. on 1, 9). Cf. also Madv. on Fin. 2, 15; and n. on § 69, below.

10. **et item**: cf. n. above, 1 § 5.

12. **compluris...compluribus**: the repetition is one of the many signs of haste which this treatise betrays.

14. **Aristo**: for Aristus see n. on 1, 12 above.

Aristone: this Aristo was a Peripatetic of Alexandria; see Diog. Laert. 7, 164. Possibly the mistake of Plutarch, Brut. 2 (see n. on 1, 12) in substituting *Aristo* for *Aristus* was due to a reminiscence of our passage.

Dione: Dio belonged to Alexandria, and is stated to have been an Academic. He was probably a pupil of Heraclitus or of Antiochus. In the year 57 B.C. Dio was sent to Rome as ambassador to complain of the conduct of Ptolemy Auletes, and while there was murdered in the house of his entertainer, L. Lucceius. See Cael. §§ 23, 24, 51—55. Chappuis qu. Strabo XVII, p. 796 (ed. Meineke).

15. **plurimum tribuebat**: cf. § 15 plus tribuebat.

17. **minus acer**: cf. § 84 aduersarius facilis.

18. **defensa**: sc. a Catulo.

Academicos: sc. *nouos*, as above, § 11.

19. **lenior**: this seems to supply a better contrast to *acer* than the reading *leuior*. Cf. n. on § 126, below.

21. **rursus exorsus**: cf. exorsus in § 10.

22. **me...appellabat**: n. on 1, 2 me autem dicebat.

physicos: cf. § 55. The attack of Lucullus is answered by Cicero in §§ 72—76. The two passages should be carefully compared.

23. **nominatis**: the word is contemptuously used, as will be seen from the reply in § 75 non nominare modo illustris homines sed imitari.

24. **proferunt**: 'quote'; so used in §§ 14, 53.

quos dicant: note the force of the subjunctive; 'intending to represent them'.

popularis: δημοτικούς.

26. **exactis...anno**: the juxtaposition of the ablative absolute and the ablative of

liquos, qui leges popularis de prouocationibus tulerint, cum consules essent; tum ad hos notiores, C. Flaminium, qui legem agrariam aliquot annis ante secundum Punicum bellum tribunus plebis tulerit inuito senatu et postea bis consul factus sit, L. Cassium, Q. Pompeium; illi quidem etiam P. Africanum referre in eundem numerum solent. Duos uero sapientissimos et clarissimos fratres, P. Crassum et P. Scaeuolam, aiunt Ti. Graccho auctores legum fuisse, alterum quidem, ut uidemus, palam, alterum, ut suspicantur, obscurius. Addunt etiam C. Marium; et de hoc quidem nihil mentiuntur. Horum nomi-

3 annis: *annos* E. 6 duos: A^2BV^2 Cant. ψ Harl. 8 ut uidemus...ut suspicantur: deleuit Gruterus, incluserunt Bait. H. 12 similiter: *simile* codd. exc. ψ.

time, without any connecting link, is worthy of notice. The abl. abs. is a separate independent clause which takes the place of words depending on *primo anno*, such as *post exactos reges* or *ab exactis regibus*.

1. **prouocationibus**: 'different kinds of appeal'; cf. Rep. 1, 62 prouocationes omnium rerum.

tulerint...essent: cf. Lieven p. 49.

2. **tum ad hos**: ellipse of perueniunt (cf. § 42) or ueniunt (cf. § 144). Verbs of motion are often omitted thus; see n. on § 143 a Chrysippo pedem nusquam, and cf. § 71 nunc ad ea (sc. ueniamus), also n. on 1, 2 Roma.

4. **inuito senatu**: the agrarian law of Flaminius (for which see my n. on Cato m. § 11) was the first statute after the Hortensian law of 287 B.C. which passed in spite of the opposition of the senate.

5. **L. Cassium**: the author of a ballot-act (Leg. 3, 35); the judge whose court was called *scopulus reorum;* the propounder of the question 'cui bono?'

Q. Pompeium: the man who made the disgraceful treaty with the Numantines, which was repudiated by Rome in 139 B.C.

P. Africanum: the younger. Cf. Leg. 3, 37 Cassiae legis culpam Scipio sustinet, quo auctore lata esse dicitur.

7. **P. Crassum...P. Scaeuolam**: these men (who were brothers—see Brut. 98) belonged to the not inconsiderable section of the senate which followed Ti. Gracchus at the outset of his agitation. This Scaeuola was father of the Scaeuola to whom Cic. gives constantly the title of 'pontifex', to distinguish him from Scaeuola the 'augur'. The elder Scaeuola himself held the office of pontifex, and was consul in the year when Gracchus was murdered (Att. 1, 19, 4; Verr. 4, 108). Cic. accuses him of half-heartedness concerning the legislation of Gracchus (Tusc. 4, 51; Dom. 91; cf. Val. Max. 3, 2, 17), and Plutarch charges him with secretly instigating Gracchus (Ti. Gracch. 9). Scaeuola presided at the *comitia* when Gracchus sought the tribuneship for the second time (Plut. c. 18). He refused to sanction the irregular attack made on Gracchus and his followers by Nasica. After the murder he, like many others, turned round, and praised the chief murderer, though personally at enmity with him (De Or. 2, 285). Still he opposed the reactionary measures advocated by Scipio (Rep. 1, 31).

8. **auctores legum**: the same phrase in Liu. 6, 36, 7.

ut uidemus: many scholars have thought that the statement about Marius below proves Lucullus to have held that the demagogues lie about all excepting Marius. But the inference is not necessary. All the words *addunt...mentiuntur* imply is that whatever may be the truth of the demagogic statements about others, the statement about Marius is true; but the possible truth of some of the other statements is not excluded. Indeed in § 72 all these statesmen are called 'claros uiros, sed popularis'. Part at least of the difficulty here has arisen from a misunderstanding of the words *ut uidemus*. They form a very common abbreviation for *ut scriptum uidemus*, 'as we find recorded in history'. See n. on § 129 *ut scriptum uideo*. A similar concession about the philosopher Empedocles is made below.

nibus tot uirorum atque tantorum expositis eorum se institutum
sequi dicunt. Similiter uos, cum perturbare, ut illi rem pub- **14**
licam, sic uos philosophiam bene iam constitutam uelitis, Empedoclen, Anaxagoran, Democritum, Parmeniden, Xenophanen, Platonem etiam et Socraten profertis. Sed neque Saturninus, ut nostrum inimicum potissimum nominem, simile quicquam habuit ueterum illorum nec Arcesilae calumnia conferenda est cum Democriti uerecundia. Et tamen isti physici raro admodum, cum haerent aliquo loco, exclamant quasi mente incitati,

14 Xenophanen: *xenoplatonem* C; *zenofontem platonem* Cant. ψ. 17 ueterum: *uestrum* ψ.

11. **expositis**: this word conveys the idea of vulgar handling, profaning, or rendering common. See lexica.

12. **uos...ut illi...sic uos**: this passage is peculiar from the repetition of the pronoun of the second person; but the principle is the same as that in Leg. 3, 5 qui ...ut illi, sic hi; De Or. 2, 130 certos locos, qui ut litterae ad uerbum scribendum, sic illi ad caussam explicandam statim occurrant; Sest. 69; Phil. 13, 44. In these exx. the demonstrative pronoun repeats the relative, but a demonstrative is itself repeated in Fin. 5, 71 ita enim paruae et exiguae sunt *istae* accessiones bonorum, ut quem ad modum stellae in radiis solis, sic *istae* in uirtutum splendore ne cernantur quidem. Simpler examples of the superfluous or rather emphasizing demonstrative will be found collected in Draeger § 37; Kühner Gram. II, § 118. Similar usages are found in Greek. [With our passage cf. Tusc. 4, 32.] For sic... ut, cf. 1, 5; also 1, 10; 2, 70.

13. **bene constitutam**: cf. § 15 constitutam.

uelitis: the subjunctive here, dependent on *cum*, denotes the frequent repetition of the wish; 'whenever you desire'. Roby, Gram. § 1716.

Empedoclen...Socraten: the relation of these philosophers to the sceptic philosophy will be discussed in nn. on §§ 72—74. The omission of Heraclitus here and later as in 1, 44 is remarkable.

16. **nostrum inimicum**: 'the enemy of my family'. Saturninus prosecuted Metellus Numidicus, the uncle of Lucullus. The enmities caused by these political prosecutions often lasted for generations; cf. Flacc. 77.

17. **ueterum illorum**: n. on 1, 44.

calumnia: cf. §§ 18, 65; Fin. 5, 94; N. D. 2, 20 Academicorum calumnia; also n. on 1, 44 pertinacia. In Tusc. 4, 47 Academicorum uerecundia, the tables are turned. In Rep. 3, 9 it is said of Carneades 'saepe optumas caussas ingeni calumnia ludificari solebat'.

18. **Democriti uerecundia**: Cic. always felt a kind of tenderness for Democritus, as Madvig remarks in his n. on Fin. 1, 20. One reason for this was that Cic. loved to pit him against Epicurus. In Diu. 2, 30 Democritus is specially excepted from the charge of *arrogantia* brought against the other *physici*; cf. also § 72 below; and Tusc. 1, 22; N. D. 1, 120.

et tamen: elliptic, the *tamen* modifying something implied rather than expressed. The sense here is 'however little I may agree with the *physici*, nevertheless they seldom hold language such as yours'. On *et tamen* see Madvig on Fin. 2, 84; Munro on Lucret. 5, 1177; also my n. on Cato m. 16.

19. **haerent aliquo loco**: the usual construction with this sense is *haerere in aliqua re* (N. D. 3, 62 in multis nominibus haerebitis; De Or. 2, 163; Fin. 1, 20), but *loco* is used adverbially, like *pace* in § 2, above, where see n. *Haerere* is in this sense also sometimes used absolutely, like *haesitare*, for which see n. on 2, 52, below.

quasi mente incitati: Sen. ep. 79, 14 Democritus quam diu furere uidebatur. Socrates said of the φυσικοί (Xen. Mem. 1, 1, 13) τοῖς μαινομένοις ὁμοίως διακεῖσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους. With *quasi* here (apologetic, and with participle) cf. N. D. 1, 37 Cleanthes *quasi* delirans; and for the whole passage ib. 1, 92; ib. 1, 94; also below, § 74.

Empedocles quidem, ut interdum mihi furere uideatur, abstrusa esse omnia, nihil nos sentire, nihil cernere, nihil omnino quale sit posse reperire; maiorem autem partem, mihi quidem omnes, isti uidentur nimis etiam quaedam adfirmare plusque profiteri se
15 scire quam sciant. Quod si illi tum in nouis rebus quasi modo nascentes haesitauerunt, nihilne tot saeculis, summis ingeniis, maximis studiis explicatum putamus? Nonne, cum iam philosophorum disciplinae grauissimae constitissent, tum exortus est ut in optima re publica Ti. Gracchus qui otium perturbaret, sic Arcesilas qui constitutam philosophiam euerteret et in eorum auctoritate delitisceret, qui negauissent quicquam sciri aut per-

1 quidem ut...uideatur: *quidem uidetur* Cant. 3 maiorem...partem: *maiore parte* Cant. 4 se scire: om. *se* Vψ Harl. 5 quasi modo nascentes: spuria haec iudicauit P. Ciacconus. 8 tum exortus est ut in: edd. post Gruterum; *tum exorsus est in* C; *t. ut exortus e. i.* Cant.; *t. ut exorsus e. i.* V²ψ Harl. 9 per-

1. **Empedocles...uideatur**: the genuineness of these words (often doubted) is amply guaranteed by the criticism they receive in § 74. Compare what Lucretius says of Empedocles (1, 731) 'carmina quin etiam diuini pectoris eius *uociferantur*.' In Lael. 24 the word *uaticinari* is used of him.

2. **cernere**: probably refers to the mind, as *sentire* to the senses; though the contention of Goerenz on Leg. 2, 26 that *cernere* could not be used of the senses is quite wrong.

quale sit: 'in its real essence'.

3. **maiorem partem etc.**: most of them are held [by men in general], while I hold all of them to be even too dogmatic on some points, etc.

4. **plus quam...sciant**: for *sciant*, not *sciunt*, cf. n. on § 23 potius quam...prodat.

5. **quasi modo nascentes**: as several scholars have doubted the genuineness of these words, I give the following passages: Tusc. 2, 5 ut oratorum laus senescat, philosophia nascatur; Sen. ep. 95, 14 fuit uetus illa sapientia tum maxime nascens rudis; N. Q. 7, 32, 1 philosophia adhuc nascitur; Quint. 10, 1, 16 noua illa uelut nascentia; Cic. Or. 39 λογοδαιδάλους, quorum satis arguta multa, sed ut modo primumque nascentia. *Nascens* is often used with the sense not of 'newly-born', but of 'immature', or 'rising'; cf. Brut. 27 where 'nascentes Athenae' is opposed to *adultae*; see also Fam. 1, 7, 8; Plin. ep. 6, 6, 6; ib. 8, 4, 7; ib. 9, 4, 2 quasi incipientia; Petron. sat. § 4 (ed. Büch.) eloquentiam induunt pueris adhuc nascentibus. Similar expressions occur in Greek, as Ael. uar. h. 8, 8 τὴν τέχνην τὴν γραφικὴν ὑποφυομένην ἔτι: ib. 10, 10 ἡ γραφικὴ ἦν τρόπον τινὰ ἐν γάλαξι καὶ σπαργάνοις. [Vell. 2, 99, 1 has 'orientium iuuenum', meaning, exactly, 'rising young men'.] A passage very similar to ours is Arist. Met. 1, 10 ψελλιζομένῃ γὰρ ἔοικεν ἡ πρώτη φιλοσοφία περὶ πάντων, ἅτε νέα τε καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς οὖσα. For quasi with participle see § 74.

6. **haesitauerunt**: n. on § 52.

9. **optima re publica**: cf. De Or. 1, 1. The parallel between the *one* excellent government and the numerous dogmatic schools, all at war with each other, is rather halting. It is worthy of remark that Arcesilas is here treated as a rebel against dogmatism generally, not (as in Book I) against the so-called Old Academic system.

qui...perturbaret: 'bent on disturbing'.

11. **delitisceret**: on the choice between *-esco* and *-isco* in the termination of these verbs see Corssen, Ausspr. 2, 285.

qui negauissent: 'who, as he claimed', had denied'.

12. **quorum e numero**: Cic. nearly always says *quo e numero*, not *quorum*, just as he says *ex eo numero* rather than *ex eorum n.* See Stuerenburg on Arch. 16 and cf. Wichert, über den Gebrauch des adjectivischen Attributs, p. 39; Mayor on Phil. 2, 25.

tollendus est: singular predicate with

cipi posse? Quorum e numero tollendus est et Plato et Socrates,
alter, quia reliquit perfectissimam disciplinam, Peripateticos et
Academicos, nominibus differentis, re congruentis, a quibus Stoici
ipsi uerbis magis quam sententiis dissenserunt; Socrates autem
de se ipse detrahens in disputatione plus tribuebat eis, quos uole- **16**
bat refellere. Ita, cum aliud diceret atque sentiret, libenter
uti solitus est ea dissimulatione, quam Graeci εἰρωνείαν uocant;
quam ait etiam in Africano fuisse Fannius, idque propterea
uitiosum in illo non putandum, quod idem fuerit in Socrate.

VI. Sed fuerint illa uetera, si uoltis, incognita. Nihilne

turbaret sic: *perturbaretur si* V[1]. 17 diceret: om. V, qui in marg. habet a m. 2 *agnosceret*, ut est in ψ Harl.; *cognosceret* Cant.; cf. § 1. 18 est: *esset* Cψ; *erat* Cant. 21 uetera: codd. omnes; *ueteribus* Bentl. H Bait. M; *ueri nota* (et subter *inuestigatum est*) Kayser; sed uid. adn. incognita: *incondita* C. F. Hermann.

double subject; cf. Draeger § 102, also above, 1 § 11 and 43; 2 § 1. For the statement see § 74.

alter...Socrates autem: there is a slight anacoluthon here of the same character as that in 1, 7 siue...si uero, where see n.; also cf. n. on § 46 primum... alterum est.

perfectissimam: this superlative (which some edd. have thought corrupt here) occurs Brut. 118; Or. §§ 3, 47. The similar superlative from *absolutus* is also found.

disciplinam: cf. nn. on 1, §§ 17, 33.

15. **uerbis magis quam sententiis**: cf. 1, 37 ut haec non tam rebus quam uocabulis commutauerat (Zeno), with n. there.

16. **de se ipse detrahens**: the absolute use of *detrahere* is pretty common in Cic. For *de se ipse* cf. n. on § 36 ueritas se ipsa defendet. For Antiochus' view of Socrates see n. on § 74.

plus tribuebat: so § 12 plurimum tribuebat. Cf. Quint. 9, 2, 46 ideo dictus εἴρων (Socrates) agens imperitum et admiratorem aliorum tamquam sapientium.

17. **aliud diceret**: cf. Vell. 2, 62, 6 cum aliud diceret, aliud intellegi uellet; Quint. 6, 2, 15 εἰρωνεία diuersum ei quod dicit, intellectum petit; 9, 2, 45 aliud dicit ac sentit.

18. **dissimulatione**: εἴρων, εἰρωνεία were very generally translated by *dissimulator*, *dissimulatio* (cf. De Or. 2, 269; ib. 2, 350; Hor. ep. 1, 9, 8; Quint. 9, 2, 44). Sometimes we find *simulatio* (Off. 1, 108); sometimes *irrisio* (Verr. 4, 144) with which cf. *derisor* in Hor. A. P. 433 and Sen. ben. 5, 6, 6; also De Or. 2, 261 inuersio uerborum (cf. *inuersa uerba* in Ter. Haut. 372); Quint. 8, 6, 54 illusio, as in De Or. 3, 202; cf. also Tac. 11, 11 sui detractor; and § 74 below.

19. **quam ait etiam**: note that *etiam* goes with the words that follow, not with *quam*, since *quam etiam* in Cic. does not usually stand for *quam eandem.*

Africano...Fannius: almost the same statement in Brut. 299; De Or. 2, 270; Off. 1, 108. Fannius wrote 'Annales' which Brutus epitomised; see Att. 12, 5, 3.

20. **putandum**: for om. of *esse* see n. on 1, 43.

21. **fuerint**: cf. n. on § 102 ne sit.

illa uetera...incognita: all the corrections proposed for this passage rest on a misapprehension of the word *incognita*, which implies, here as in 1, 41 and 2, §§ 8, 18, 114, 133, 138, and elsewhere (so too *incognita res* in 1, 45), that the doctrines in question rest on no foundation of sure knowledge. When Bentley proposed *ueteribus* he forgot the common use of the word *incognitum* as a noun with no case dependent on it, while he thought *illa* meant the doctrines defended by Lucullus, whereas it clearly denotes the doctrines advanced by the ancients. The reading *incondita* must be emphatically condemned. The question here is not between order and no order (which is all that *incondita* could mean), but between knowledge and no knowledge. In other writers too *cognitus* and *incognitus* are used almost as equivalents of *certus* and *incertus*; cf. Lucan. 1, 457 canitis si cog-

est igitur actum, quod inuestigata sunt, postea quam Arcesilas Zenoni, ut putatur, obtrectans nihil noui reperienti, sed emendanti superiores immutatione uerborum, dum huius definitiones labefactare uolt, conatus est clarissimis rebus tenebras obducere? Cuius primo non admodum probata ratio, quamquam floruit cum acumine ingeni tum admirabili quodam lepore dicendi, proxime a Lacyde solo retenta est, post autem confecta

1 actum etc.: *actum? Quot inuestigata...obducere?* Bentl., sed cf. Maduig. Em. in Cic. libr. phil. I 127. sunt: om. Cant. 2 obtrectans: *obtractans* Vψ. 3 definitiones: *diffinitiones* Cant. ψ Harl.; cf. I § 5. 6 cum acumine: *tum a.* Cant. ψ Harl. 7 confecta: *conficta* codd. excepto Harl. (om. ψ); corr. Manut. 10 diu:

nita; Caes. B. C. 3, 87, 2 neque temere rem incognitam pronuntio. *Incognita* and *incondita* are indeed often confused; thus in Vell. 2, 14, 1 all edd. since Acidalius read *incondita* for *incognita*. In Catullus 66, 74 condita quin ueri pectoris euoluam, for *condita cognita* should probably be substituted; cf. also Stat. s. 4, 3, 140. With *illa uetera* cf. Fin. 3, 73 uetera praecepta sapientium, and for *illa* n. on 1, 13 ueterem illam. [Weidner in *Philologus* for 1879, p. 89 proposes *multa* for *illa*. *Vera* has been proposed for *uetera*, and the two words are sometimes confused in MSS, as in Tac. Ann. 12, 58.]

nihilne etc.: the idea here is that expressed by Arist. Eth. Nic. 1, 7, 17 ὁ χρόνος τῶν τοιούτων εὑρετὴς ἢ συνεργὸς ἀγαθός. Aristotle (Tusc. 3, 69) complained of his predecessors because each of them put forward his scheme of philosophy as final, yet he himself anticipated that in a few years from his own time philosophy would receive its finishing touch. Seneca complains that, after all, the ancients 'non inuenta sed quaerenda nobis reliquerunt' (ep. 45, 4), and in an interesting chapter (N. Q. 7, 32, with which cf. ib. 6, 5, 2) tries to account for the slow progress of philosophy. With the present passage should be compared the criticism in § 76.

nihilne est actum quod: the reading *quod* is sound enough; it means 'in that' or 'inasmuch as'; cf. Sen. ep. 74, 22 nihil agitis quod negatis; Varro Sat. Men. (ed. Riese p. 108) nihil egimus quod; Pro dom. 42 quod saluis auspiciis tulisses, iure egisse dicebant, where *quod* is conjunction. The phrase *nihil agere* = 'to achieve a worthless result', is really too common to need illustration were it not that many scholars have misunderstood it here; see therefore Mayor on Iuu. 10, 155; Verg. Aen. 11, 227; many exx. will be found in Merguet's Lexicon to the speeches of Cic. s. u. ago. Cf. too Phaedrus 2, 6, 3 multa agendo nihil agens; Cic. Tusc. 3, 50 me actum habiturum quod egerint 'will consider as sound any result at which they may have arrived'. On the last passage doubt has often been unjustly cast. On the sense of *nihil agere* which we have in our passage there is a jest in Plin. ep. 1, 9, 8 satius est otiosum esse quam nihil agere. [On *quot* see some excellent remarks of Engstrand, p. 21 n. A fatal objection to Bentley's em., which I have not seen put forward, is this, that Cic. does not use *quot* substantivally; his regular substitute is *quam multa*.]

1. **inuestigata sunt**: it is difficult to understand the objection which has been felt by many (e.g. C. F. Hermann) to assuming *illa uetera* as the subject of this verb. The ancient doctrines, says Lucullus, have been thoroughly examined. In the course of that process it is at least probable that discoveries have been made.

Arcesilas...obtrectans: cf. n. on 1, 44, and also the defence against the charge in § 76, where the word *obtrectandi* occurs. The ordinary account of the foundation of the Stoic and New Academic schools based it on a quarrel between Zeno and Arcesilas, who, being both pupils of Polemo, were jealous of each other. See 1, § 35 nn.

2. **nihil noui**: the charge of want of novelty was brought by each of these schools against the other. In Plut. Colot. p. 1121 F it is alleged by the Epicureans against Arcesilas, and at once joyfully admitted by Plutarch. In numerous passages Cic. repeats from Antiochus the same charge against Zeno, and Arcesilas is often excused on account of the provocation Zeno thus gave. See Aug. contr.

a Carneade, qui est quartus ab Arcesila; audiuit enim Hegesinum, qui Euandrum audierat, Lacydi discipulum, cum Arcesilae Lacydes fuisset. Sed ipse Carneades diu tenuit, nam nonaginta uixit annos, et qui illum audierant admodum floruerunt, e quibus industriae plurimum in Clitomacho fuit—declarat multitudo librorum—ingeni non minus in Aeschine, in Charmada eloquentiae, in Melanthio Rhodio suauitatis. Bene autem nosse

d. eam Cant. 13 in Aeschine: Dau.; *in hac nonne* B¹V; *in hoc quam* B²ψA (sed *hac* habet et *o* supra lineam); *in hoc nonucia quam* Cant.; *in hoc nomine* Harl. *in Hagnone* Christ. et eum secuti H Bait. M. Lectio *hac nonne* ex corruptione *haeschine* prodiit.

Ac. 2, §§ 14, 15, with nn. on fragm. 2, 35 of Acad. Post.

3. **immutatione uerborum**: n. on 1, 33. The phrase has also technical meanings; it renders the Greek τρόποι (Brut. 69) and ἀλληγορία (De Or. 2, 261).

definitiones: as we shall have repeatedly occasion to remark, the whole controversy between the Sceptics and the Dogmatists turned on the definition of the unit of knowledge, the καταληπτικὴ φαντασία. See particularly §§ 18, 77, and Introd. p. 55.

4. **clarissimis**: ἐναργεστάτοις: a technical expression, for which see n. on § 18.

tenebras: such expressions abound in Cic. where the New Academy is mentioned; cf. n. on § 30 lucem eriperere, also on § 61; also N. D. 1, 6 noctem offundere; and the jest of Aug. c. Ac. 2, 29 tenebrae quae patronae Academicorum solent esse.

5. **non probata**: Polybius 12, 26 c, 1 says that the New Academy speedily fell into contempt. It seems to have had only three brilliant epochs, under Arcesilas, Carneades and Philo.

7. **Lacyde**: the most important passages concerning him are quoted by Zeller III 1, 497 ed. 3 or E. Tr. p. 586. [The quantity of the *y* is of course long.] He first committed to writing the doctrines of Arcesilas, who left no books behind him. Hence his name is often closely joined with that of his master, as in Tusc. 5, 107. So too Clitomachus was the prophet of Carneades, who wrote nothing; see n. on § 102.

retenta est: 'kept from oblivion'; cf. retineamus in § 18.

8. **Hegesinum ... Euandrum**: little more is known to us of these men than their names.

9. **Lacydi**: this form of the genitive of proper names in -es was almost certainly employed with regularity by Cicero. See Madv. on Fin. 1, 14 and 5, 12; also Varro L. L. 8, 26.

Arcesilae Lacydes: here *discipulus* is easily supplied. The contention of some that such a phrase as 'Arcesilae Lacydes' could stand alone for *Arc. auditor* or *discipulus* = Λ. ὁ τοῦ Ἀρκεσιλάου, is mistaken. None of the passages quoted by Wopkens, Lect. Tull. 8 are sufficient to prove the usage, which Madv. on Fin. 5, 13 decisively rejects. In Fin. 5, 94 Arcesilas noster fuit, erat enim Polemonis, the gen. is excused by the preceding *noster*. Cf. n. on 1 § 13.

10. **tenuit**: the lexicographers (except Georges, who gives an unverifiable reference) quote no instance from Cic. of *teneo* used absolutely, and it probably occurs only in the passage before us. Many exx. from Livy will be found in Riemann, Etudes sur Tite-Live, p. 159. Cf. De Or. 1, 45 florente Academia, cum eam Charmadas et Clitomachus et Aeschines *obtinebant*. In our passage also it is not difficult to supply *Academiam* from the preceding sentences.

12. **Clitomacho**: see n. on § 102.

13. **Aeschine**: called by Diog. 2, 14 the pupil of Melanthius. Next to nothing is known of him. He is just mentioned in De Or. 1, 45, a passage which is decisive against the reading *Hagnone*, adopted apparently by Zeller, III 1, 525 ed. 3 or E. Tr. p. 533 n. One Agnon, who may or may not have been an Academic philosopher, is just mentioned by Quint. 2, 17, 5, and is identified by Zeller with the conjectural Hagnon.

Charmada: see Zeller, as in foregoing note.

14. **Melanthio**: hardly known except from this passage.

17 Carneaden Stratoniceus Metrodorus putabatur. Iam Clitomacho Philo uester operam multos annos dedit; Philone autem uiuo patrocinium Academiae non defuit. Sed, quod nos facere nunc ingredimur, ut contra Academicos disseramus, id quidam e philosophis et ei quidem non mediocres faciendum omnino non putabant, nec uero esse ullam rationem disputare cum eis qui nihil probarent, Antipatrumque Stoicum, qui multus in eo fuisset, reprehendebant, nec definiri aiebant necesse esse quid esset cognitio aut perceptio aut, si uerbum e uerbo uolumus, compre-

4 ingredimur: *aggredimur* V[2] Cant. ψ Harl. 5 faciendum: *faciundum* codd. (*faciunt dum* Cant. Harl.) 6 nec uero: A; *nec uerum* BV; *nec enim* Goer.; *nec*

1. **Stratoniceus Metrodorus**: mentioned in § 78 as an authority for the opinions of Carneades. He must not be confounded with 'Chius Metrodorus' (§ 73) or Metrodorus of Scepsis, or Metrodorus of Lampsacus the Epicurean. For the epithet placed before the name cf. n. on § 137 Stoicus Diogenes.

iam: 'to proceed'; 'further'; the word of course cannot be joined with *dedit*.

3. **patrocinium non defuit**: such advocacy *was* wanting in the time of Arcesilas (§ 16) and after Philo's death (§ 11 n.). For *patrocinium* in connexion with philosophic opinions cf. N. D. 1, §§ 6, 11; Fin. 2, 67; also Plin. ep. 9, 7, 1 bene est; inueni patrocinium.

facere ingredimur: the infin. as after ordior, coepi etc.; so too in 1, 3; but in Fam. 2, 3, 2 ingredior *ad explicandam* rationem sententiae meae.

4. **quidam e philosophis**: probably Stoics. Sextus repeatedly (as in P. H. 2, 1) speaks of '*τοὺς ἀεὶ θρυλοῦντας ὡς μήτε ζητεῖν μήτε νοεῖν ὅλως οἷός τε ἐστιν ὁ σκεπτικὸς περὶ τῶν δογματιζομένων παρ' αὐτοῖς*'. Epictetus, Diss. 1, 5, treats Scepticism as a kind of disease, an *ἀπολίθωσις* or *νέκρωσις*, in presence of which argument is out of place. In another passage, after quoting some sceptic assertions, he leaves them with the remark '*οὐκ ἄγω σχολὴν πρὸς ταῦτα*'. Yet the arguments of the mere sophist are to be faced and refuted by the *φρόνιμος* (Diss. 1, 7, 25). Cf. Acad. Post. fr. 12.

6. **nec esse ullam rationem disputare**: the construction is rare; it occurs below, § 74; Caec. 15; Verr. Act. 1 § 24; Liu. 5, 54, 6; Tac. Hist. 3, 22. It does not substantially differ from such constructions as *consilium est, est animus, ius est, mos est, religio est* etc. followed by the infinitive, on which see Draeger II[2] pp. 314 sq., 358 sq.; Kühnast, Liu. Synt. p. 247 sq. (ed. 2); Kühner, Gram. II § 132, n. 8. So far as the use of *ratio* here is concerned, cf. Plin. ep. 9, 6, 2 si uelocitate equorum traherentur, esset ratio non nulla.

7. **probarent**: taken of course in the strict sense, whereby absolute and unreserved sanction is implied; cf. nn. on § 104.

Antipatrum: see n. on 2, 143.

multus in eo: this constr. of *multus* is not uncommon in Cic. as in Livy and other writers; e.g. Off. 2, 56 est multus in laudanda magnificentia; so Hor. sat. 1, 9, 2 *totus in* illis; ep. 1, 1, 11 *omnis in* hoc (this use of *omnis* is very rare); similarly the constructions *rarus, frequens esse in aliqua re* occur. In Greek *πολὺς* and other words are similarly used. On this predicative or adverbial use of the adjective cf. Kühnast, Liu. Synt. p. 56, ed. 2; Riemann, Etudes sur Tite-Live, pp. 80—84; Draeger § 159; Kühner II § 63 *b*.

eo: ea re, as very often in Cic. More rarely *illo*=*illa re* (Verr. 1, 103). *In eo* for *in ea re* is not uncommon; but Cic. does not use the neuter substantives *ullum* and *nullum* like later writers.

8. **definiri necesse esse**: for the passive inf. see n. on § 42 obscurari uolunt.

cognitio perceptio comprehensio: these three renderings of *κατάληψις* occur together in Fin. 3, 17; cf. ib. 5, 76 percepti comprehensi cogniti; also see n. on § 23 comprehensi...constituti. For the rendering *cognitio* (on which Madv. ad l. passed some unfounded strictures) cf. nn. on 1, 41 *scientiam*, and below, § 31.

9. **uerbum e uerbo**: Goerenz declared that Cic. usually says *uerbum de uerbo*, but I doubt whether he could have pro-

hensio, quam *κατάληψιν* illi uocant, eosque qui persuadere uellent esse aliquid quod comprehendi et percipi posset, inscienter facere dicebant, propterea quod nihil esset clarius *ἐναργείᾳ*, ut Graeci: perspicuitatem aut euidentiam nos, si placet, nominemus fabricemurque, si opus erit, uerba, ne hic sibi—me appellabat iocans—hoc licere putet soli: sed tamen orationem nullam putabant illustriorem ipsa euidentia reperiri posse nec ea, quae tam clara essent, definienda censebant. Alii autem

putabant esse rationis cum iis disp. Cant.; *nec necessarium eis esse ullam r ψ*; *nec enim uerum esse ulla ratione disp.* Dau. e coni. I. M. Bruti. 7 probarent: *probabant* Cant. 17 censebant: *censuerant* AB, correctum ex *censerant*.

duced an instance. We have *uerbum e uerbo exprimere* in § 31; also Fin. 3, 15; Tusc. 3, 7; Top. 35. Similar phrases in Cic. are *ad uerbum exprimere* (Fin. 1, 4; Tusc. 3, 44); *uerbum pro uerbo reddere* (Opt. gen. or. § 14); *eisdem uerbis reddere* (Brut. 301); *totidem uerbis interpretari* (Fin. 2, 100) or *transferre* (Fam. 3, 8, 4).

uolumus: sc. *exprimere*; the ellipse of the infinitive is common with *uelle*; cf. n. on § 10 seruatam oportuit.

10. **illi**: sc. Stoici, from Stoicum above.

eosque: observe the *que* after nec...nec preceding, and cf. n. on § 9 nosque.

11. **aliquid**: properly speaking, this should denote the external object which causes the *κατάληψις* in the mind of the person who perceives it, but as was remarked above (n. on 1, 41 *καταληπτὸν*), object and perception were often by the ancient philosophers carelessly confused. Such expressions as 'to perceive a perception' for 'to perceive an object,' are sometimes met with even in modern writers of the realist school. Cf. § 24 n.

inscienter: the contention of these philosophers was that each *καταληπτικὴ φαντασία* brought with it its own evidence of its truth, which was intuitively borne in on the mind, and was to be accepted by a sort of act of faith.

12. **clarius** *ἐναργείᾳ*: *ἐναργέστερον τῆς ἐναργείας*. The word *ἐναργής* was often used by Plato and Aristotle and the earlier philosophers in the sense of 'self-evident', concerning things where proof was held to be unnecessary. The words received a somewhat more technical application from Theophrastus (Sext. A. M. 7, 218). But Zeno was the first to divide all perceptions into those which are *ἐναργεῖς* and those which are not, and to build *ἐπιστήμη* on the former. *Ἐνάργεια* then is the distinguishing characteristic of the *καταληπτικὴ φαντασία*. We know from Sext. A. M. 7, 162 sq. that Antiochus embraced the Stoic teaching about *φαντασία* and *ἐνάργεια*. On this subject see Sext. P. H. 3, 266; A. M. 7 §§ 143, 218, 257, 364; ib. 10, 68. *Ἐνάργεια* also had a place in the Epicurean system; but that school regarded all *φαντασίαι* as being *ἐναργεῖς*. See nn. on § 79.

13. **ut Graeci**: n. on 2, 124 ut Xenocrates.

perspicuitatem: this is the rendering Cic. usually adopts. In Off. 1, 15 he used in somewhat similar manner the *ἅπαξ εἰρημένον perspicientia*. Cf. too Quint. 6, 2, 32 *ἐνάργεια*, quae a Cicerone illustratio et euidentia nominatur; ib. 8, 3, 61 *ἐνάργειαν*...plus est euidentia, uel ut alii dicunt, repraesentatio quam perspicuitas; ib. 4, 2, 63 euidentiam quae *ἐνάργεια* Graece uocatur; Sen. N. Q. 2, 32, 1 notis euidentibus longeque clarioribus; Val. M. 1, 7, ext. 10. The rendering *declaratio* for *ἐνάργεια* is given in 1, 41.

14. **nominemus**: for the subjunctive see n. on § 31 dicemus, below.

fabricemur: for this word see n. on § 87.

me appellabat iocans: n. on 1, 2 me autem dicebat. Cicero's advocacy of the introduction of new terms was touched on in 1 §§ 5, 6, and no doubt the lost 'Catulus' contained many of the innovations which we find in our Book 1 of the 'Posterior Academics'.

15. **sed tamen**: for this usage, whereby the thread of the exposition, which had been broken, is resumed, cf. n. on 1, 41.

16. **illustriorem**: another rendering of *ἐναργεστέραν*.

negabant se pro hac euidentia quicquam priores fuisse dicturos, sed ad ea, quae contra dicerentur, dici oportere putabant, ne qui
18 fallerentur. Plerique tamen et definitiones ipsarum etiam euidentium rerum non improbant et rem idoneam de qua quaeratur, et homines dignos, quibuscum disseratur, putant. Philo autem, dum noua quaedam commouet, quod ea sustinere uix poterat, quae contra Academicorum pertinaciam dicebantur, et aperte mentitur, ut est reprehensus a patre Catulo, et, ut docuit Antiochus, in id ipsum se induit, quod timebat. Cum enim ita negaret quicquam esse quod comprehendi posset—id enim

3 etiam: *et* Cant. 13 effictum: Dau. cum uno codice; *effectum* cett.; cf. 1 § 27.

2. **ne qui fallerentur**: cf. the expressions in §§ 45, 46.

3. **euidentium**: note that there is no verb *euidere*. For the neuter sense of the participle cf. *praeteruehens* and the like.

6. **noua quaedam**: new, that is, in the school which styled itself New Academic.

sustinere: n. on § 70.

7. **pertinacia**: n. on 1, 44; also on 2 § 14 calumnia.

8. **mentitur**: Cic. in § 78 seems to imply that on matters of fact he distrusted Philo's evidence. The nature of the lie attributed to Philo is discussed in Introd. p. 58.

9. **in id...timebat**: through trying to shun scepticism, he cut from dogmatism its only ground. Cf. below eo...reuoluitur; Sen. ben. 7, 4, 1 his laqueis in quos sponte tua decidisti.

ita...si: so in § 19; the correspondence is with Cic. a very favourite usage, but not much found in other writers; Draeger § 559.

10. **quicquam...posset**: cf. § 17 aliquid quod percipi et comprehendi posset.

11. ἀκατάληπτον: the em. καταληπτὸν (adopted by some edd.) is needless, because of the negative in *negaret*.

13. **triuimus**: cf. n. on 1, 27 tritius; also Fin. 3, 15 nomina quae nunc consuetudo diuturna *triuit*; Diu. 2, 11 'sorites' satis Latino sermone tritus est; Off. 1, 33.

uisum igitur: for uisum see 1, 40. There is the same ambiguity about *uisum* which attaches to φαντασία; by these words sometimes the perception which is fallible is meant, sometimes the καταληπτικὴ φαντασία which is infallible. For *igitur* see n. on 1, 26.

impressum effictumque: cf. § 77 impressum et signatum et effictum; also n. on § 1, 27 expressa atque effecta: and for *im*pressum not *ex*pressum see n. on 1, 19 and Tim. 34 cetera impressa ab illis, quae imitabatur, effinxerat.

14. **ex eo unde esset**: this definition is so important for the succeeding discussion, a great part of which is directed to it (cf. §§ 33, 34, 41, 77, 83, 112), that it must be fully examined. Its Greek original runs thus (Sext. P. H. 2, 4) καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας οὔσης ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον ἐναπομεμαγμένης καὶ ἐναπεσφραγισμένης, οἵα οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος. The definition is given in the same terms by Sext. A. M. 7 §§ 248, 255, 402, 410; also 11, 183; Diog. 7 §§ 46, 50 (in the latter place he adds ἐναποτετυπωμένη to the other two words: so in § 77 impressum et signatum et effictum). In Sext. P. H. 3, 242 and A. M. 8, 86 the definition is given in a shortened form. It will be seen from the terms that a φαντασία may be deceptive in two ways. It may have no real object whatever behind it, may be a mere phantom; this the Greek expresses rather paradoxically by saying that it proceeds from a nonentity (μὴ ὑπάρχον); cf. nn. on § 34. It may however have a real object behind it, and yet produce on the mind the impression that it comes from some other object. Cf. Aristot. Met. 4, c. 29, 1024 b 24 πράγματα μὲν οὖν ψευδῆ οὕτω λέγεται, ἢ τῷ μὴ εἶναι αὐτά, ἢ τῷ τὴν ἀπ' αὐτῶν φαντασίαν μὴ ὄντος εἶναι. [The possible case of a φαντασία ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος being supposed to be ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος is not discussed in the *Academica*.] In other words, the

uolumus esse ἀκατάληπτον—si illud esset, sicut Zeno definiret, tale uisum—iam enim hoc pro φαντασίᾳ uerbum satis hesterno sermone triuimus—uisum igitur impressum effictumque ex eo, unde esset, quale esse non posset, ex eo, unde non esset, id nos a Zenone definitum rectissime dicimus: qui enim potest quicquam comprehendi, ut plane confidas perceptum id cognitumque esse, quod est tale, quale uel falsum esse possit? Hoc cum infirmat tollitque Philo, iudicium tollit incogniti et cogniti, ex quo efficitur nihil posse comprehendi; ita imprudens eo, quo minime uolt, reuoluitur. Qua re omnis oratio contra Academiam susci-

17 uel falsum: *uel uerum u. fals.* Cant.

mind may confuse the impressions produced by two objects, and mistake the one impression for the other. With this mode of falsehood we shall have to deal more particularly later on. We must now examine Cicero's rendering of the definition of the dogmatists. Here *ex eo unde esset* is put in the place of ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον, so that in fact the definition, as Cic. gives it, guards against the second only of the two modes of falsity. In § 77 Cic. says more exactly *ex eo, quod esset, sicut esset.* In n. on § 77 the difficulty of rendering τὸ ὑπάρχον in Latin, and the importance of the addition κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον will be considered. As to the nature of the impression produced on the mind by external objects, the Stoics were not agreed among themselves. Philosophers generally had vaguely spoken of an ἀλλοίωσις ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ (Arist. De An. 2, 5 § 1). Some had figured to themselves this ἀλλοίωσις by comparing it with the impression produced on wax by a seal, and explained memory as the persistence in the mind of such impressions. Cf. Grote, Aristotle II,[1] p. 193; also Quint. 11, 2, 4 quid sit quod memoriam faciat; plerique imprimi quaedam uestigia animo, uelut in ceris anulorum signa seruentur, existimant; so ἴχνος in Sext. A. M. 7, 220 from Theophrastus. To the Stoics the comparison was no mere illustration, for they regarded the mind as wholly material, and capable of being shaped differently by different external forces. Zeno seems to have described φαντασία as a τύπωσις ψυχῆς in the most literal sense, and Cleanthes followed him (Sext. A. M. 7, 228). But Chrysippus considered it impossible for the ψυχή to preserve distinct countless numbers of such impressions; he therefore very vaguely defined φαντασία as ἑτεροίωσις ψυχῆς. Later Stoics substituted for this 'τύπωσις ἐν ψυχῇ ὡς ἂν ἐν ψυχῇ' (Sext. ib. 233), or 'such an impression as the soul is capable of receiving'; but they only avoided the difficulty. On this subject see also Sext. A. M. 7, 293; ib. 7, 372; ib. 8, 400 sq. The views of Epicurus were not dissimilar (Diog. 10, 49). For the words φάντασμα, φανταστὸν see nn. on §§ 47, 88.

17. **tale...possit**: cf. Fin. 5, 76 percipiendi uis ita definitur a Stoicis ut negent quidquam posse percipi nisi tale uerum, quale falsum esse non possit: Sext. A. M. 7, 152 φαντασίαν ἀληθῆ καὶ τοιαύτην, οἵα οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ψευδής. Cf. § 112.

18. **iudicium**: κριτήριον: cf. n. on 1, 30. Antiochus assumes that the καταληπτικὴ φαντασία of the Stoics is the sole foundation of knowledge, though this was a point on which the Stoics were not thoroughly agreed among themselves; see Diog. 7, 54; Sext. A. M. 7, 257.

incogniti et cogniti: 'the unknowable and the knowable'. On this force of the past participle see Nägelsbach, Stil. § 72 b.

19. **efficitur**: the lexica give exx. of 'efficere' with the sense 'to draw an inference'.

imprudens...reuoluitur: Philo's views are discussed in Introd. pp. 58 sq. For *reuoluitur* cf. § 148; Diu. 2, 13 eodem reuolueris; De Or. 2, 130; Tusc. 1, 12; Sen. suas. 3, 2 iterum in malum familiae nostrae fatale reuoluimur.

20. **Academiam**: sc. nouam.

pitur a nobis, ut retineamus eam definitionem, quam Philo uoluit euertere; quam nisi obtinemus, percipi nihil posse concedimus.

19 VII. Ordiamur igitur a sensibus, quorum ita clara iudicia et certa sunt, ut, si optio naturae nostrae detur, et ab ea deus aliqui requirat contenta⟨ne⟩ sit suis integris incorruptisque sensibus an postulet melius aliquid, non uideam quid quaerat amplius. Nec uero hoc loco exspectandum est, dum de remo inflexo aut de collo columbae respondeam; non enim is sum, qui quidquid uidetur tale dicam esse quale uideatur. Epicurus hoc uiderit et alia multa. Meo autem iudicio ita est maxima in sensibus

10 ita est: *ista e.* V^1 Cant. ψ Harl. 14 diducimus: *deducimus* Cant. ψ Harl.

1. **retineamus**: cf. § 16.

2. **nisi obtinemus**: cf. n. on § 93 nisi cauetis. Notice the change from *re*— to *ob-tinere*, and cf. § 144 concitentur... incitabuntur.

3. **clara**: *ἐναργῆ* as before; certa: probably a rendering of *τρανῆ*, a word often used in this connexion by the Stoics.

iudicia: cf. Fin. 1, 64 sensuum iudicia; =*κρίσεις*: also n. on 1, 39 opinionis iudicio.

4. **si optio detur**: so in Greek *εἴ τις αἵρεσιν δίδοι*: also Fin. 5, 89; Sen. dial. 7, 25, 5 si dabitur electio; ib. 6, 12, 3 si ponatur electio; Sen. ep. 66, 19 si quaeratur electio; ib. 92, 13 si detur electio; Plaut. Mil. 170 R si optandum foret.

deus aliqui: for *aliqui* see n. on § 61. As to the supposed god cf. Tusc. 2, 67 si deus qui dixerit.

5. **integris**: = si integri sint. So Liu. 6, 22, 7 integris sensibus; cf. also n. on 1, 19 above.

incorruptis: so *ἀδιάστροφος* is used by the later Greek writers; cf. too Fin. 1, 71 sensibus, id est incorruptis atque integris testibus; Cato m. 72 integra mente certisque sensibus; Tusc. 5, 45 acerrimis integerrimisque sensibus.

6. **quaerat**: for quaesitura sit.

7. **remo inflexo ... collo columbae**: see nn. on § 79.

8. **non enim etc.**: i.e. I do not contend that each sensation truly represents the object which causes it.

9. **uideatur**: Roby § 1777.

Epicurus: n. on § 79.

uiderit: see Roby, Gram. Vol. II, pref. p. cvi, ed. 4 to whose exx. add *uideris*, N. D. 3, 9; cf. also § 76 uidero; § 79 uiderit.

11. **sani ac ualentes**: for *ac* see n. on § 34.

12. **lumen ... diducimus**: cf. Brut. 261 tabulas bene pictas collocare in bono lumine; Hor. A. P. 361 ut pictura poesis; erit quae si propius stes | te capiat magis et quaedam si longius abstes: | haec amat obscurum, uolet haec sub luce uideri. We have here a defence against one of the sceptic *τρόποι*: cf. Sext. P. H. 1, 118 *πέμπτος ἐστὶ λόγος ὁ παρὰ τὰς θέσεις* (*situs*) *καὶ τὰ διαστήματα* (*interualla*) *καὶ τοὺς τόπους*. Cf. nn. on § 81, also Introd. p. 62.

14. **multaque facimus etc.**: with the whole context cf. Sext. A. M. 7, 258 *πᾶς ἄνθρωπος, ὅταν τι σπουδάζῃ μετὰ ἀκριβείας καταλαμβάνεσθαι, τὴν τοιαύτην φαντασίαν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ μεταδιώκειν φαίνεται, οἷον ἐπὶ τῶν ὁρατῶν, ὅταν ἀμυδρὰν λαμβάνῃ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου φαντασίαν. ἐντείνει γὰρ τὴν ὄψιν καὶ σύνεγγυς ἔρχεται τοῦ ὁρωμένου ὡς τέλεον μὴ πλανᾶσθαι, παρατρίβει γὰρ τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς, καὶ καθόλου πάντα ποιεῖ μέχρις ἂν τρανὴν καὶ πληκτικὴν σπάσῃ τοῦ κρινομένου φαντασίαν, ὡς ἐν ταύτῃ κειμένην θεωρῶν τὴν τῆς καταλήψεως πίστιν.* Also Macrobius Saturn. 7, 14, 20—23.

usque eo dum: this looks as if translated from *μέχρις οὗ ἂν* in the Greek text used by Cic. For similar combinations of particles cf. Kühner, Gram. II § 210, 6 *a*.

adspectus ipse: the same expression in N. D. 2, 15.

15. **fidem faciat sui iudici**: with *fidem facere*, *modum f.*, *finem f.* and many similar expressions, the overwhelmingly prevalent construction in the best writers is *alicuius rei* not *alicui rei*. This genitive has very often been changed into the

ueritas, si et sani sunt ac ualentes et omnia remouentur, quae obstant et impediunt. Itaque et lumen mutari saepe uolumus et situs earum rerum, quas intuemur, et interualla aut contrahimus aut diducimus, multaque facimus usque eo, dum adspectus ipse fidem faciat sui iudici. Quod idem fit in uocibus, in odore, in sapore, ut nemo sit nostrum qui in sensibus sui cuiusque generis iudicium requirat acrius. Adhibita uero exercitatione et arte, ut oculi pictura teneantur, aures cantibus, quis est quin cernat quanta uis sit in sensibus? Quam multa uident pictores

16 sui: *suis* ψ. 18 ut...cantibus: incluserunt post Dauisium H Bait. M. quin: *qui non* A Cant. Harl.

dative through ignorance on the part of the writers of MSS and of the editors. Thus in Plaut. Asin. 873 Ussing reads (against the MSS) quid modi amplexando facies? So in Asin. 598 sermonis should be read. In Tusc. 4, 41 all editions give 'qui modum uitio quaerit', but *uiti* should certainly be read; cf. ib. 4, 82 modus sit huius disputationis. Livy's usage fluctuates; thus he has *moram*, *finem certaminis facere* in 3, 2, 10 and 3, 31, 7; but *moram dilectui facere* in 4, 53, 6 and 6, 31, 5. Cf. too *finem caedendi facere* (6, 9, 11); *finem pesti exposcunt* (3, 7, 8); *aderat iudicio dies* (3, 12, 1). The dative after *fides* and *fiducia* (even when unconnected with *facere* or other verbs) is rare in good prose; see n. on § 27 conclusi argumenti fides. With the passage here cf. De Or. 3, 104 ad fidem orationis faciendam; Off. 2, 34 harum duarum ad fidem faciendam pollet iustitia; Quint. 2, 15, 7 non orationis habuit fiduciam; Macrob. Sat. 5, 20 ad fidem sensui faciendam. [In order to avoid the concurrence of two genitives Cic. sometimes uses the dative after *fidem habere*, and the like as in Inu. 1 § 71 eorum orationi fidem habere. On the whole subject see some remarks by Madv. on Fin. 2, 27; and for various verbs used with *fidem* Munro on Lucr. 5, 104.]

sui: the subject of this cannot be *adspectus*, but *quisque* unexpressed. This usage (where *suus* is equivalent to the colloquial English 'one's') is illustrated by Kühner, § 117, 2; Draeger § 28 *c*.

uocibus: Latin has no general abstract word for sound, like *odor* and *sapor*.

16. **nostrum**: probably emphatic, '*we* are not so unreasonable as to call for anything better'. See n. on § 81 at amplius non desideramus.

sui cuiusque generis: strictly, the case of the possessive pronoun should be determined by the case of the noun to which it refers (here *sensibus*); but it often follows the case of *quisque*, as here, *suus quisque* being treated as one expression. See Madv. Fin. 5, 46; Kühner Gram. § 119, 7 *b* and on Tusc. 4, 28; Draeger § 32, 2.

17. **acrius**: = ἀκριβέστερον, as in § 81 and often.

18. **ut...cantibus**: I can see no ground for rejecting these words. Practice and art would naturally cause the beholder's eyes to dwell on a picture which careless spectators would hurriedly survey. Many who have cast suspicion on the passage have missed the sense of *teneantur*, common though the word is in this use; any dictionary will supply plenty of parallels; cf. however esp. Plin. ep. 3, 6, 4 (of works of art) talia denique omnia ut possint a r t i f i c u m o c u l o s t e n e r e, delectare imperitorum; Cic. Fin. 5, 49 si cantiunculis tantus uir teneretur; Plin. n. h. 35, 60 neque ante eum (Apollodorum) tabula ullius ostenditur quae teneat oculos: Cic. Brut. 193 tenet auris orator; Parad. 37 Aetionis tabula te stupidum detinet; De Or. 3, 98 cum nos in antiquis tabulis teneamur; Val. M. 8, 11, ext. 3.

quis est quin: it is almost impossible to draw any distinction in usage between this formula and *quis est qui non*; see Madv. Fin. 2, 27.

19. **quanta uis**: the powers of the senses are elaborately eulogised from the Stoic point of view in N. D. 2, 145—6. For the expression here cf. §§ 30, 37, 74.

in umbris et in eminentia, quae nos non uidemus! Quam multa, quae nos fugiunt in cantu, exaudiunt in eo genere exercitati, qui primo inflatu tibicinis Antiopam esse aiunt aut Andromacham, cum id nos ne suspicemur quidem! Nihil necesse est de gustatu et odoratu loqui, in quibus intellegentia, etsi uitiosa, est quaedam tamen. Quid de tactu, et eo quidem, quem philosophi interiorem uocant, aut doloris aut uoluptatis, in quo Cy-

1 nos non: om. *nos* V Cant. ψ Harl. 5 uitiosa: *obtusior* Schütz; *uilior* Bait. 8 quia sentiatur: *cui assentiantur* coni. Guietus; *cui assentiamur* Dau.;

1. **umbris...eminentia**: 'shade and light'; or 'background and foreground'; sometimes the contrast also expresses the effect due to perspective. The words *umbra...lumen* denote the same contrast as here in Plin. ep. 3, 13, 4; Quint. 12, 10, 4; and often in the elder Pliny. So in Greek σκιά or σκίασμα and λαμπρά; σκιαγραφεῖν too and *adumbrare*. For *eminentia* cf. De Or. 3, 101 habeat illa in dicendo summa laus umbram aliquam et recessum, quo magis illud quod erit illuminatum, exstare atque eminere uideatur; Quint. 2, 17, 21; ib. 11, 3, 46; Cic. Tusc. 3, 3 nullam eminentem effigiem uirtutis sed adumbratam imaginem gloriae; N. D. 1, 75 species quae nihil habeat eminentis. Instead of *umbrae*, *abscedentia* is sometimes used; in Greek εἰσοχαὶ καὶ ἐξοχαί, as in Sext. P. H. 1, §§ 92, 120; ib. 2, 70. In Goehling's pamphlet 'de Cicerone artis aestimatore' (Halle, 1877) p. 70 are some good quotations from Aristotle and other writers who appeal to pictures as illustrating the difference between training and the want of it.

2. **exaudiunt**: the *ex* conveys the idea of catching a distant or faint sound; see my n. on Pro Sulla § 33.

in eo genere: for the omission of a genitive cf. n. on 1, 3 genus hoc.

exercitati: for this use of the plural participle to denote a class see Nägelsbach, Stil. § 28, 3, and cf. § 43, below.

3. **inflatu**: =ἀναβολῇ. Cf. § 86 where the argument here is answered.

Antiopam: a play of Pacuuius, in which came the speech of Zethus against philosophy quoted in De Or. 2, 155.

esse aiunt: Ritschl, Parerga p. 301 sq. quotes from Donatus, de Comoediis 'huius modi carmina ad tibias fiebant, ut his auditis multi ex populo ante dicerent quam fabulam acturi scenici essent, quam omnino spectatoribus ipsis antecedens titulus pronuntiaretur'. Ritschl thinks Donatus invented this statement solely on the strength of our present passage. It is probable that there was no proclamation of the title of the play except that usually contained in the Prologue or opening lines.

Andromacham: the play of Ennius, often quoted by Cic.

4. **ne...quidem**: n. on 1, 6.

5. **gustatu**: Cic. did not use *gustus*, which first occurs in post-Augustan writers.

loqui: there is point here, as 1 § 6; 2 § 53 and often, in the choice of this word in place of *dicere*.

in quibus...tamen: the deceptions of touch and taste, though here lightly passed over, were much discussed by the Sceptic school; see Sext. P. H. 1, 50 sq. It is remarkable how throughout the discussions in the 'Lucullus' concerning the trustworthiness of the senses, the consideration of the sense of sight predominates. Only here and in §§ 86, 103 is hearing mentioned; only here and § 103 taste; touch only here. In all ancient and most modern debates about the senses, sight is treated as so vastly more precious and powerful and trustworthy than the rest, that they are practically left out of the account. It is natural that the dogmatist should pass lightly over some of the weakest points in his case, but it might have been expected that Cic. later in the book would deliver a strong attack on the trustworthiness of the senses other than sight. As to eyesight, cf. Fin. 2, 52 oculorum sensus acerrimus, which is probably imitated from Plato, Phaedr. 250 D; so too De Or. 2, 357 and 3, 160; Arist. Met. 1, 1 χωρὶς τῆς χρείας ἀγαπῶνται (αἱ αἰσθήσεις) δι' αὑτὰς καὶ μάλιστα τῶν ἄλλων ἡ διὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων: De An. 3, 3, 14 (429 a 3) ἡ ὄψις μάλιστα αἴσθησίς ἐστι (cf. Sen. N. Q. 2, 12, 6): Diog. L. 4, 51 (from

renaici solo putant ueri esse iudicium, quia sentiatur? Potestne
igitur quisquam dicere inter eum, qui doleat, et inter eum, qui in
uoluptate sit, nihil interesse, aut, ita qui sentiet non apertissime
insaniat? Atqui qualia sunt haec, quae sensibus percipi dicimus, **21**
talia secuntur ea, quae non sensibus ipsis percipi dicuntur, sed
quodam modo sensibus, ut haec: 'illud est album, hoc dulce,

cui adsentiatur (passive) Madu., cum uno cod. Paris. 10 sentiet: *sentient* B[1]; *sentiat* E Cant. ψ (sed hic *sentiet* ex correctione). 11 insaniat: *insanit* Dau. cum uno codice. 13 quodam modo sensibus: *q. m. mentibus* Cant.; om. *sensibus* ψ.

Bion) *τοσοῦτον διαφέρειν τὴν φρόνησιν τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν, ὅσον τὴν ὅρασιν τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων*: Sext. 7, 411 *εἴ τι ἄλλο καταληπτικόν τινός ἐστι, καὶ ἡ ὅρασις.*

intellegentia: here indicates power of leading the mind to understand external objects.

uitiosa: this word has been often regarded as spurious, but on no intelligible grounds. It simply means 'defective', 'incomplete', a sense which excellently suits the context, and one of which instances are numerous.

7. **interiorem**: see nn. on § 76, from which it will be seen to be astonishing that a dogmatist should have ventured to quote the Cyrenaics as favourable to his views. Antiochus must have done so, as Cicero's Latin here has all the appearance of being closely translated from the 'Sosus'.

8. **quia sentiatur**: probably a rendering of *δι' αὐτὸ τὸ πεπονθέναι.* With the Cyrenaics the *πάθος* of the mind was the sole test of truth. Those who read *cui assentiatur* miss an important point; to say nothing of the doubt that rests on the passive use. See n. on § 99 adsensa. [For the impers. verb cf. § 34.]

9. **igitur**: see n. on 1, 26.

inter et inter: on the (to our notions) needless repetition of the preposition see Kühner, Gram. II § 112 b; also his nn. on Tusc. 1, 27 and 4, 32.

10. **nihil interesse**: the Academics would of course admit that the difference *seems* to exist; what they would deny is that this *seeming* is to be taken for absolute truth.

sentiet...insaniat: I know of no very exact parallel to this passage, though the change of mood here is to some extent similar to that found in the passages given in n. on 2, 140 si sequare, ruunt. But in those examples the change is from subjunctive in protasis to indicative in apodosis, while the converse is the case in our passage (and also in § 43 negauerint...sit where see n.). In such passages as we have here, the subjunctive in the apod. nearly always attracts into its own mood the verb of the prot. See my n. on Cato m. 2 cui qui pareat. Somewhat similar is Tusc. 1, 92 quid c u r e t autem, qui ne s e n t i t quidem.

11. **atqui**: in Cic. this word is never a mere particle of transition like *sed*, *at*, *ceterum*, but always introduces a distinct stage in the development of an argument. One of its uses, to mark the second premiss of a syllogism, is well known; see Madv. on Fin. 1, 58.

12. **talia secuntur**: brief for 'talia sunt ea quae secuntur'.

13. **illud est album etc.**: this passage and the following from Sext. A. M. 7, 345 sq. must come partly from the same source: *αἰσθήσεσι μὲν οὖν μόναις λαβεῖν τἀληθὲς οὐ δύναται...φύσει γάρ εἰσιν ἄλογοι καὶ πλέον τοῦ τυποῦσθαι πρὸς τῶν φανταστῶν μὴ δυνάμενοι παντελῶς ἄθετοι καθεστᾶσι πρὸς εὕρεσιν τἀληθοῦς· οὐ γὰρ μόνον λευκαντικῶς ἢ γλυκαντικῶς δεῖ κινεῖσθαι... ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς φαντασίαν ἀχθῆναι τοῦ τοιούτου πράγματος 'τοῦτο λευκόν ἐστι', καὶ 'τοῦτο γλυκύ ἐστι', τῷ δὲ τοιούτῳ πράγματι οὐκέτι τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἔργον ἐστὶν ἐπιβάλλειν* (cf. 'animo *iam* haec tenemus comprehensa non sensibus')...*συνέσεώς τε δεῖ καὶ μνήμης πρὸς ἀντίληψιν τῶν ὑποκειμένων, οἷον ἀνθρώπου, φυτοῦ, τῶν ἐοικότων. χρώματος γὰρ μετὰ μεγέθους καὶ σχήματος καὶ ἄλλων τινῶν ἰδιωμάτων σύνθεσίς ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος.* It will be seen that the two passages agree very closely. They express notions which were probably not peculiar to any one school, but the language used clearly points to a Stoic source (cf. N. D. 2, 147, quoted in n. on § 22 ars...constat). For the *ἀξίωμα*, of which alone (and not of mere *αἴσθησις*) the Stoics declared that truth and false-

canorum illud, hoc bene olens, hoc asperum'. Animo iam haec tenemus comprehensa, non sensibus. 'Ille' deinceps 'ecus est, ille canis'. Cetera series deinde sequitur, maiora nectens, ut haec, quae quasi expletam rerum comprehensionem amplectuntur: 'si homo est, animal est mortale, rationis particeps', quo e genere nobis notitiae rerum imprimuntur, sine quibus nec
22 intellegi quicquam nec quaeri disputariue potest. Quod si essent falsae notitiae—*ἐννοίας* enim notitias appellare tu uidebare—si igitur essent hae falsae aut eius modi uisis impressae, qualia uisa a

5 mortale: *mortales* Cant. rationis: *rationalis* Cant. 7 disputariue: *aut d.* Vψ Orelli. 9 hae: *eae* H Bait. M, ut est in AB²ψ. 10 eis: *his* codd.; *iis* H Bait. M; uid. adn. ad § 27. 12 uideremus: *uidemus* A¹B¹V. 13

hood could be predicated, see n. on § 96. By the judgment 'illud est album' the 'assensio animi' (see 1, 40) is given to the *φαντασία* or appearance of sense, and so it becomes *καταληπτική*. Further elucidations of this passage are given in nn. on § 30.

1. **bene olens**: for *est* connected with the present participle cf. n. on 1, 23 erant congruentes.

2. **tenemus comprehensa**: brief for tenemus, postquam comprehendimus.

deinceps: really out of place, like primum in § 24.

3. **maiora nectens**: cf. Quint. 7, 10, 7 proxima subnectens.

4. **rerum comprehensionem**: with *rerum* cf. *τῶν ὑποκειμένων* in the passage from Sextus quoted above; with the whole phrase, Sen. ben. 4, 33, 2 certissimam rerum comprehensionem.

5. **si homo est...particeps**: the Stoics laboured much in perfecting their theory of definition (which is not touched by Zeller in his account). Their *ὅροι* were incessantly ridiculed by the sceptics (see *e.g.* Sext. P. H. 2, 208—211) and no doubt by Arcesilas and Carneades and their followers, but Cic. nowhere in the 'Academica' selects this point of the dogmatic stronghold for attack. The particular definition given here is of constant occurrence in the ancient texts (*ἄνθρωπος = ζῷον λογικὸν θνητόν, νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικόν*).

6. **quo e genere**: the expression is here obscure. The words cannot apply exclusively to the last sentence, as might be expected, but must refer to the whole passage from *atqui qualia* to *particeps*. The whole question of the relation of perceptions to conceptions, as stated here and § 30, is reserved for n. on the latter passage. For *genere* (without a genitive dependent) see n. on 1, 3.

notitiae rerum: = *ἔννοιαι*: see n. on § 30.

imprimuntur: n. on § 18 impressum effictumque; also 1, 42 unde notiones rerum in animis imprimerentur.

7. **quaeri disputariue**: the two verbs go closely together and are jointly opposed to intellegi. Differently however N. D. 1, 43 *πρόληψιν*...sine qua nec intellegi quicquam nec quaeri nec disputari potest.

8. **tu uidebare**: Cic. had evidently used the rendering in his speech of the day before.

9. **igitur**: n. on 1, 26.

uisis: the abl. is instrumental.

qualia uisa: for the repetition of the noun in the relative clause see n. on § 49.

10. **possent**: see n. on § 9 fuissent.

uteremur: 'adopt', 'act on'; like *sequi*, which is of such common occurrence in this book. Cf. § 30 alia uisa sic adripit ut eis statim utatur.

11. **consentaneum...repugnaret**: n. on 1, 19.

12. **memoriae**: cf. Sext. A. M. 7, 373 *ἀναιρεῖται μὲν μνήμη, θησαυρισμὸς οὖσα φαντασιῶν, ἀναιρεῖται δὲ πᾶσα τέχνη· σύστημα γὰρ ἦν καὶ ἄθροισμα καταλήψεων.*

quidem certe: this emphatic combination of particles is not uncommon in Cic.; a great number of exx. will be found in Merguet's 'Lexikon' to the speeches, s. u. certe.

14. **potest esse**: it is often said that Cic. preferred this order to *esse potest*, particularly at the end of a clause, in

falsis discerni non possent, quo tandem eis modo uteremur? Quo modo autem quid cuique rei consentaneum esset, quid repugnaret uideremus? Memoriae quidem certe, quae non modo philosophiam, sed omnis uitae usus omnisque artis una maxime continet, nihil omnino loci relinquitur. Quae potest enim esse memoria falsorum, aut quid quisquam meminit, quod non animo comprehendit et tenet? Ars uero quae potest esse nisi quae non ex una aut duabus, sed ex multis animi perceptionibus constat? Quam si subtraxeris, qui distingues artificem ab inscio?

omnis: codd. exc. V[1] (*omni*), Cant. (*et omnis*); *omnem* Walker HM. usus: sic Orelli Bait.: *usum* codd. HM. 17 una aut: BEψM; *una et* AV Harl. H Bait. 18 quam si: *quas si* Walker.

order to avoid the dactylic rhythm. From an observation of several hundreds of passages, I am able to say that this idea is a mistake. The two usages are just about equally common; the choice between them depends on emphasis solely. If *esse* is emphatic then *potest esse* is used. The case is just the same with *esse debet* and *debet esse*, a fact which shows that rhythm has nothing to do with the matter. [Similarly *negat esse*, *putat esse*, *dicit esse*.]

15. **memoria falsorum**: the argument here is ridiculed in § 106. Lucullus has here got hold of the Greek notion that τὸ ψευδὲς is identical with τὸ μὴ ὄν. Plato's 'Sophistes' and in part the 'Theaetetus' is devoted to the criticism of this notion, and the difficulty concerning memory which it occasions is raised in both dialogues.

16. **comprehendit et tenet**: cf. Fin. 5, 76 quisquam potest probare quod perceptum, quod comprehensum, quod cognitum non habet? Madvig has an important n. there on the mood of *habet*. In our passage, as he remarks, the subjunctive would have given quite a different sense. Cf. 1, 18 qui...doceo, with n., also below §§ 62, 135. Comprehendit is beyond doubt the perfect, not the present. *Tenet* as in *animo tenemus comprehensa* above; cf. De Or. 1, 65.

ars...constat: this definition is Stoic; cf. N. D. 2, 147 quanta uero illa sunt quae uos Academici infirmatis et tollitis, quod et sensibus et animo ea quae extra sunt percipimus atque comprehendimus! Ex quibus collatis inter se et comparatis artis quoque efficimus; Fin. 3, 18 quod constent (artes) ex cognitionibus et contineant quiddam in se ratione constitutum et uia; Cic. fragm. ap. Diomed. 414 (ed. Putsch) ars est praeceptionum (read *per*ceptionum) exercitarum constructio ad unum exitum utilem uitae pertinentium; De Fato 11; so Quint. 2, 17, 41; Sext. P. H. 3, 188 τέχνην εἶναι σύστημα ἐκ καταλήψεων συγγεγυμνασμένον: ib. 3, 251; also Sen. ep. 124, 6 omnis scientia atque ars aliquid debet habere manifestum (ἐναργὲς) sensuque comprehensum, ex quo oriatur et crescat. Epictetus similarly defines λόγος as σύστημα ἐκ ποιῶν φαντασιῶν (Diss. 1, 20, 6).

17. **animi perceptionibus**: a periphrasis for ἐννοίαις. Cf. Sext. A. M. 7, 224 ὁ μὲν ἀθροισμὸς τῶν τοιούτων τοῦ νοῦ φαντασμάτων καὶ ἡ συγκεφαλαίωσις τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους εἰς τὸ καθόλου ἔννοια καλεῖται, ἐν δὲ τῷ ἀθροισμῷ τούτῳ καὶ τῇ συγκεφαλαιώσει τελευταῖον ὑφίσταται ἥ τε ἐπιστήμη καὶ τέχνη, ἐπιστήμη μὲν τὸ ἀκριβὲς καὶ ἀδιάπτωτον ἔχουσα, τέχνη δὲ ἡ μὴ πάντως τοιαύτη. Cicero draws no distinction between ἐπιστήμη and τέχνη, nor was any such usually drawn by the Stoics.

18. **quam**: Madvig (Em. 139) referred this to *perceptionem* understood from *perceptionibus*, giving to the singular word the abstract sense 'perceptionem in uniuersum'. Such rapid transitions from plural to singular do certainly occur. There is an ex. in Fin. 2, 61, and Madvig quotes others in his n. there. For the similar transition from singular to plural see n. on 1, 38 perturbationem. On other grounds, however, I think Madvig's interpretation wrong. The antecedent to *quam* must be *ars*, in order to give point to what follows. It is on *ars* not on *perceptio* that the difference rests beween the *artifex* and the *inscius*.

qui distingues etc.: similarly Sext.

Non enim fortuito hunc artificem dicemus esse, illum negabimus, sed cum alterum percepta et comprehensa tenere uidemus, alterum non item. Cumque artium aliud eius modi genus sit, ut tantum modo animo rem cernat, aliud, ut moliatur aliquid et faciat, quo modo aut geometres cernere ea potest, quae aut nulla sunt aut internosci a falsis non possunt, aut is, qui fidibus utitur, explere numeros et conficere uersus? Quod idem in similibus quoque artibus continget, quarum omne opus est in faciendo atque agendo. Quid enim est quod arte effici possit, nisi is, qui artem tractabit, multa perceperit?

4 animo: om. G Cant. 5 modo aut: A Harl.; *m. autem* BV Cant. ψ. 13 non

A. M. 8, 280 *οὐδὲν διοίσει τῆς ἀτεχνίας ἡ τέχνη*: ib. 7, 55 (the same words). It will be remembered that the word *artifex* is applied to the members of even learned professions (cf. De Or. 1, 23) as well as to handicraftsmen.

3. **non item**: see n. on 1, 10 legant... non legant.

4. **animo rem cernat**: the expression is common, as in Fam. 5, 12, 2; Fin. 1, 64; so *animo uidere* (Diu. 2, 91) and cf. Hor. sat. 2, 3, 89 hoc prudentem animum Staberi uidisse. We have here a representation of *θεωρητικόν*. The division of *τέχναι* into *θεωρητικαί, πρακτικαί, ποιητικαί* is as old as Plato and Aristotle. Cf. Arist. Met. 6, 1, 1025 *b*, 21; ib. 9, 2, 1046 *b*, 2, with Bonitz's n.; Diog. 3, 84; Sext. A. M. 11, 197; Quint. 2, 18, 1 cum sint artium aliae positae in inspectione, id est cognitione et aestimatione rerum, qualis est astrologia, nullum exigens actum sed ipso rei cuius studium habet, intellectu contenta, quae *θεωρητική* uocatur: aliae in agendo, quarum in hoc finis est et ipso actu perficitur nihilque post actum operis relinquit, quae *πρακτική* dicitur, qualis saltatio est, aliae in effectu, quae operis quod oculis subicitur consummatione finem accipiunt, quam *ποιητικήν* appellamus, qualis est pictura. Sometimes the *ποιητικαί* are called *ἀποτελεστικαί* or *ἀποτελεσματικαί*. The Greeks however (e.g. Aristotle himself in Eth. Nic. 2, 2, 1) sometimes divided arts into theoretic and practical without distinguishing the two members of the latter branch. It would seem that this was the arrangement in the text of Antiochus here translated by Cic. Three branches can hardly be meant here (though Engstrand thinks so) unless we suppose the text unsound and read *aliquid, aliud ut faciat;* and also insert *in* before *agendo* below. Against this there is however, an insuperable objection. *Moliri* means to produce some tangible result, so that according to Engstrand's supposition *moliatur* must indicate the *ποιητικαί* and *faciat* the strictly *πρακτικαί τέχναι*; but as *agendo* can only refer to the latter, *faciendo* must refer to the former, so that we should have *faciat* and *faciendo* referring to two different kinds of arts, which would be an intolerable confusion. Further the phrases 'moliatur et faciat', 'faciendo atque agendo' have the appearance of comprising, each of them, two representations of one and the same phrase *πρακτική*, after Cicero's favourite fashion. The fact that *aliud...aliud* is here used for *alterum... alterum* is unimportant, as instances are numerous.

5. **geometres**: cf. n. on 1, 17 Stagiriten.

nulla: for *non*; see my n. on Cato m. 74.

7. **explere**: 'complete', 'finish'; cf. Quint. 9, 4, 122 sensus non expleto numero conclusus; Cic. Or. 40 dilatare uerbis et mollioribus numeris explere sententias. In the sense 'to make up a number' *explere numerum* is common, and the application to music is natural, though I have not met with it elsewhere. Similar however is the phrase *impletas modis saturas*, 'satires equipped with music', 'set to music' in Liu. 7, 2, 7; Cic. Leg. 2, 39 illa quae solebant compleri...modis.

8. **continget**: the notion that *contingere* necessarily implies good fortune is long since exploded. See my note on Lael. § 8 and cf. § 52, below.

VIII. Maxime uero uirtutum cognitio confirmat percipi et 23 comprehendi multa posse. In quibus solis inesse etiam scientiam dicimus, quam nos non comprehensionem modo rerum, sed eam stabilem quoque et immutabilem esse censemus, itemque sapientiam, artem uiuendi, quae ipsa ex sese habeat constantiam. Ea autem constantia si nihil habeat percepti et cogniti, quaero unde nata sit aut quo modo? Quaero etiam, ille uir bonus, qui statuit omnem cruciatum perferre, intolerabili dolore lacerari

comprehensionem modo: *non solum modo compr.* Cant. sed eam: *sed etiam* ψ; *et etiam* Harl. 15 ex sese: hic addit u. *aptam* C. F. W. Müller (Philologus XIX 630); uid. tamen adn. meam.

9. **agendo**: n. on 1, 23.

10. **tractabit**: μέλλει μεταχειρίζεσθαι.

11. **cognitio**: 'theory'; as often. Goerenz is quite wrong in taking the word here as representing κατάληψις, for which use see nn. on 1, 40 and 41.

12. **quibus**: loosely referred to *multa*. The antecedent is not *uirtutum* as many (since P. Valentia) have supposed. *Etiam*, be it observed, shows this: not merely the virtues but also all ἐπιστήμη depends on κατάληψις.

13. **non comprehensionem modo etc.**: cf. Sext. A. M. 7, 253, quoted in n. on 1, 41 ita...posset.

14. **stabilem et immutabilem**: Sext. βέβαιον καὶ ἀμετάπτωτον. Cf. also § 27, n. on *stabile*.

itemque: 'and we so speak of wisdom.'

15. **artem uiuendi**: this definition of philosophy is thoroughly characteristic of the post-Aristotelian systems, and was used by all. Sextus constantly talks of ἡ ὀνειροπολουμένη περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη (P. H. 3, 273), the possibility of which he disproves to his own satisfaction (A. M. 11, 168 sq.). So Epictetus, al.; cf. Tusc. 2, 12 ars uitae.

quae...constantiam: in the view of the Stoics, the happiness of the σοφὸς is absolutely unaffected by external circumstances; cf. Fin, 3, 24 sapientia in se tota conuersa est; Parad. 17 totus aptus ex sese.

ex sese habeat: cf. Sen. N. Q. 2, 8, 1 ex se habere intentionem; Ep. 9, 15 summum bonum ex se totum est; ib. 52, 3 hos quibus ex se impetus fuit; Cic. Cat. m. 27 ex te nobilitatus es; Quint. 10, 1, 109 ex se ipso uirtutes extulit; also such expressions as *ex se nasci* (Cael. 19; Sen. ep. 124, 24); *ex se crescere* (Sen. ep. 80, 3); *a se petere* aliquid (Sen. ben. 7, 1, 7; Quint. 7, 10, 10); *a se sumere* (N. D. 3, 88). Greek has some like usages (παρ' αὐτοῦ μαθεῖν κ.τ.λ.).

constantiam: cf. 1, 7 uitae constantiam; also *firmitas* in § 66. The *sapiens* has ἀμετάπτωτος ἕξις (Plutarch. 1058 B), often called ἀκολουθία = 'consistency', as in Sext. P. H. 1, 16; often ὁμολογία, for which word see Fin. 3, 21; cf. also Epictetus, Diss. 1, 3, 4 ἀσφάλεια τῆς χρήσεως τῶν φαντασιῶν; ib. 1, 29 εὐστάθεια; ib. 3, 24, 2 τὸ εὐσταθεῖν.

16. **habeat...quaero**: n. on 2, 140 si sequare, ruunt.

percepti et cogniti: but for the very close connexion in sense between the two participles, *aut* must have been put for *et*, in consequence of *nihil*. So below § 28.

17. **ille uir bonus**: 'the ideal good man'; 'the typical good man'. *Ille* often conveys this sense; cf. Tusc. 5, 36 hic est ille moderatus; also Quint. 8, pr. 3 peritus ille praeceptor; ib. 10, 2, 9 and 10, 2, 21; and ib. 12, 2, 17 ille uir bonus (with the same meaning as here). So sometimes *iste*, as in Fin. 3, 29.

qui statuit etc.: it is not improbable that Cic. in writing these words had in view Regulus, who was to the Romans the type of a 'uir fortis et tenax propositi'. He is also constantly mentioned by Epictetus. The language used by Cic. about Regulus in Tusc. 5, 14; Fin. 2, 65 and elsewhere; Parad. 17 is very similar to that applied by him here to the ideal *uir bonus*. The σοφὸς or *sapiens*, not only in the Stoic, but even in the Epicurean system, is described as absolutely proof against the rack (inter cruciatus beatus—Sen. ep. 71, 18); see Fin. 3 §§ 29, 42, 75; Tusc. 5 §§ 13, 73; Diog. 10, 118. So too Plato, Rep. 361 E.

potius quam aut officium prodat aut fidem, cur has sibi tam grauis leges imposuerit, cum (quam ob rem ita oporteret) nihil haberet comprehensi percepti cogniti constituti? Nullo igitur modo fieri potest ut quisquam tanti aestimet aequitatem et fidem, ut eius conseruandae causa nullum supplicium recuset,
24 nisi eis rebus adsensus sit, quae falsae esse non possint. Ipsa uero sapientia, si se ignorabit sapientia sit necne, quo modo primum obtinebit nomen sapientiae? Deinde quo modo suscipere aliquam rem aut agere fidenter audebit, cum certi nihil erit quod sequatur? Cum uero dubitabit quid sit extremum et ultimum bonorum, ignorans quo omnia referantur, qui poterit esse sapientia? Atque etiam illud perspicuom est, constitui necesse esse initium, quod sapientia, cum quid agere incipiat,

1 quam aut: codd.; *quam ut* Lamb. has sibi: *has igitur sibi* G Orelli; om.

1. **potius quam prodat**: Cic., I believe, *never* wrote *potius quam ut*, which many since Lambinus have wished to read here. Cf. Kühner, Gram. § 194, c, n. 7; Riemann, Etudes sur Tite-Live, p. 218; and esp. Diu. 2, 127 where we find 'potius quam aut...aut' as here. Similarly the subjunctive without *ut* follows on *amplius quam*, *prius quam*, *serius quam*, and other like expressions. In Tusc. 1, 16 haec prius ut confitear me cogunt quam ut adsentiar, the second *ut* is dependent on cogunt, like the first. Probably the *ut* was not used in prose, after such phrases, before Livy. [Cf. above, §§ 3, 14.]

fidem: cf. Sen. ep. 36, 9 ut tormentis non submittat fidem; ib. 71, 17 Regulum poenas fidei pendentem; also Off. 1, 86 and August. c. Ac. 2, 12 who says that the *sapiens* of the Academy must perforce be 'desertor officiorum omnium'.

3. **comprehensi ... constituti**: these words all express the idea contained in the one word κατάληψις: cf. Fin. 3, 15 equidem soleo quod uno Graeci...idem pluribus uerbis exponere; (with which cf. Fin. 3, 55 and Tusc. 2, 46); so above, 1, 44 nihil cognosci, nihil percipi, nihil scire; below, § 83. So in numerous passages (as above, *percepti et cogniti*; § 22 *percepta et comprehensa*, also N.D. 2 §§ 5, 147; De Or. I §§ 20, 50, 193, 204, 222; II § 11; Fin. 1, 64) two of these words are joined together. With *nihil comprehensi* cf. Sen. N. Q. 7, 4, 1 de cometis nihil habere comprehensi. [This use of *percipere = cognoscere* is often misapprehended by editors. Thus Madv. and Halm change *percipi* into *perspici* in Lael. 23; on the other hand *perspectum* is right in Fat. 15 and *perspici* in Fin. 5, 41.]

4. **aequitatem et fidem...eius**: the *eius* shows that the two nouns form one idea, like the 'aecum et bonum', or 'aequi bonique ratio' of the jurisconsults.

6. **possint**: the indicative (which has been read here) is unnecessary, and would convey a different sense.

ipsa sapientia: it is curious that Lucullus should begin with *constantia*, which is a quality of *sapientia*, and deal with *sapientia* itself in the second place.

8. **primum**: strictly should come before *quo modo;* cf. n. on § 21 *deinceps*.

suscipere...agere: 'plan'...'execute'; cf. my n. on Arch. 1 suscipiendam...ingrediendam. For the contention of the dogmatists that, if consistent, sceptics must be wholly inactive, see Introd. p. 56, and cf. § 104.

10. **sequatur**: so *sequi* in § 8 and often = 'act on'; cf. Tusc. 5, 88; Quint. 9, 2, 1; 9, 3, 3.

extremum...referantur: cf. Fin. 1, 11 qui sit finis, quid extremum, quid ultimum quo sint omnia...consilia referenda; so ib. 1, 29; 5, 17. Instead of Cicero's *referre* (ἐπαναφέρειν) Seneca sometimes uses *perferre*, as in Ep. 95, 45. Cf. n. on 1, 19, above.

12. **perspicuom est**: cf. 2, 132 iam illud perspicuom est, with n.

sequatur, idque initium esse naturae accommodatum. Nam
aliter appetitio—eam enim uolumus esse ὁρμήν—qua ad agendum
impellimur, et id appetimus, quod est uisum, moueri non potest.
Illud autem, quod mouet, prius oportet uideri eique credi, quod 25
fieri non potest, si id, quod uisum erit, discerni non poterit a
falso. Quo modo autem moueri animus ad appetendum potest,
si id, quod uidetur, non percipitur accommodatumne naturae sit
an alienum? Itemque, si quid offici sui sit non occurrit animo,
nihil umquam omnino aget, ad nullam rem umquam impelletur,
numquam mouebitur. Quod si aliquid aliquando acturus est,
necesse est id ei uerum, quod occurrit, uideri. Quid quod, si 26
ista uera sunt, ratio omnis tollitur, quasi quaedam lux lumenque

sibi Harl. 24 quid quod: om. *quid* Cant. ψ Harl.; *quid quod si, si* coni. Goer.; *quid si, si* Wichert. 25 lux lumenque: *dux lumenque* Bentl.

13. **necesse esse**: this jingle was not avoided by Cic.; cf. Fin. 4, 46.

quid agere: n. on 1, 23.

14. **naturae accommodatum...appetitio**: the subject of ὁρμή can be better dealt with in connexion with § 30, where see nn.

16. **moueri non potest**: strictly, the subject should be said to be moved, not the desire which he feels; but the inaccuracy is of a sort which is common; cf. Fat. 42 assensio non possit fieri, nisi commota uiso. Cf. § 17 n.

17. **illud...eique**: cf. n. on § 29 haec...eis.

uideri: 'to be seen'; so in §§ 81, 122; but at the end of the section we have the word in its weaker sense 'to seem'. Lucretius often passes rapidly from the one use to the other; cf. 1, 262 with 270, where see Munro's n.; see also Madv. on Fin. 2, 52 and Em. Liu. p. 50 ed. 2. Madvig in his Ep. critica to Orelli expressed a doubt whether the proper passive sense occurred in Cic. outside the philosophical works; but Halm on Sest. 58 gives a few exx. from the speeches.

18. **si...poterit**: for the future cf. § 22 nisi is qui tractabit.

21. **alienum**: this word has four constructions in Cicero, viz. dat. as here; gen., as in 1, 42; abl. with *ab;* abl. without *ab.* The last is much the rarest, and is given by our MSS in some passages where it is probably not genuine.

quid offici sui sit: so nearly always (in Cic. always); not 'quod officium suum sit'. Thus Att. 6, 3, 2 quidnam mei sit offici; Sen. Rh. contr. 2, 7, 2 uos interrogo, iudices, quid officii mei fuerit; Suet. Aug. 56 consuluit senatum quid officii sui putaret; cf. also Fam. 8, 10, 5; Att. 12, 29, 2 de hac re quid tui consili sit. Similar phrases are *aliquid alicuius est arbitri, iudici, consili, muneris,* also *ducere aliquid offici sui.* On these genitive constructions see Kühner II § 84, 3 *b*, n. 10; Draeger § 199. [In many passages such genitives, being unfamiliar to the writers of MSS, have caused textual corruptions. So in Deiot. 7 quid mihi nunc animi sit, *mei* should be read; the construction is then exactly like some of those quoted above. So in Nep. Att. 9, 7 ille autem sui iudici potius quid se facere par esset intuebatur, the word *intuebatur* is evidently a corruption for *arbitrabatur;* in Plin. pan. 36 liberum est discriminis, read *liberi.*]

occurrit: cf. n. on § 127.

23. **si aliquid aliquando**: cf. my n. on Lael. 24.

acturus est: the subject is either *animus*, or the indefinite *quis* understood. See n. on 2, 79 inquit.

24. **si ista uera sunt**: n. on § 10.

25. **tollitur**: the verb *tollere* occurs as frequently in this sense as ἀναιρεῖν does in Sextus. So in other writers, e.g. Lucr. 1, 701. The Greek term is common in Aristotle.

quasi quaedam: n. on 1, 21 quasi partem quandam.

lux lumenque: in metaphorical uses, *lumen* is far commoner than *lux*, which is a much stronger metaphor. Cf. Fin. 3,

uitae? tamenne in ista prauitate perstabitis? Nam quaerendi initium ratio attulit, quae perfecit uirtutem, cum esset ipsa ratio confirmata quaerendo. Quaestio autem est appetitio cognitionis quaestionisque finis inuentio. At nemo inuenit falsa, nec ea, quae incerta permanent, inuenta esse possunt, sed, cum ea, quae quasi inuoluta fuerunt, aperta sunt, tum inuenta dicuntur. Sic et initium quaerendi et exitus percipiendi et comprehendendi tenetur. Itaque argumenti conclusio, quae est Graece ἀπόδειξις,

1 uitae: uid. adn. 6 inuoluta: *in uoluptate* V; *in uoluntate* Cant. ψ Harl.

10 honestum, uirtutis lumen; ib. 5, 58 lumen beatae uitae; also the numerous passages where individuals are called 'lumina ciuitatis' (see my n. on Balb. 48). On the other hand cf. De Or. 1, 184 lux ingeni, with Brut. 59 ingeni lumen est eloquentia; also n. on § 31 luce ueritatis. *Lux* is daylight or sunlight, *lumen* light generally. Where there is no contrast between sunlight and other light, the former may be called *lumen*, but if a contrast is expressed, *lux* only; cf. Fin. 3, 45 solis luce...lumen lucernae; Att. 16, 13, 1 lumina dimiseramus, nec satis lucebat; Suet. Iul. 31 luminibus exstinctis...tandem ad lucem; cf. too § 61 where it is said that the Cimmerians had not *lux* but had *lumen*. The uses of *φῶς* and *φέγγος* in Greek are similar; cf. esp. Sext. A. M. 7 §§ 259, 260 *φαντασίαν εἶναι κριτήριον, τῆς φύσεως οἱονεὶ φέγγος...ἄτοπον οὖν ἐστὶ τοσαύτην δύναμιν ἀθετεῖν καὶ τὸ ὥσπερ φῶς αὐτῶν ἀφαιρεῖσθαι.* This passage is so similar to ours as to lead to a suspicion that in the passage from which Cic. copied the words *φῶς* and *φέγγος* were both applied to *λόγος*. In no other way can we explain the strange combination of two so closely allied metaphors, one weak and one strong, and the very un-Ciceronian collocation, whereby the weak is placed after, and not before, the strong. On the whole I think the passage is sound. No doubt the expression 'dux uitae' is in itself good (see N. D. 1, 40; Tusc. 5, 5; cf. too Lucretius' 'dux uitae dia uoluptas' and Sall. Iug. 1 dux atque imperator uitae animus est), but it is very unlikely that Cic. would join *dux* and *lumen*. A more probable emendation would be *quoddam decus*; cf. *decus ac lumen* in Phil. 2, 54; so Phil. 11 §§ 14, 24; Brut. 59 ut hominis decus est ingenium, sic ingeni lumen est eloquentia; Val. M. 5, 8, 4.

1. **tamenne**: Wichert, Stillehre § 52 shows, from a very full collection of examples, that *tamenne* in Cic. always begins the apodosis to a conditional sentence, which is nearly always introduced by *quid* followed by *si*. He strives hard to prove that Cic. might have written *quid si*, *si* in our passage, which contradicts the rule. This I believe to be impossible, so I have put a note of interrogation for comma at *uitae*. *Quid quod*, as is well known, nearly always introduces a simple, not a complicated interrogative sentence. The protasis of the sentence to which *tamenne* etc. is apodosis, is thus implied rather than expressed, and the slight departure from rule is due to the introduction of the clause *si ista uera sunt*.

perstabitis: persistere is of very rare occurrence, and is probably not used in the best prose. With this passage cf. n. on § 80 in prauitate insistere.

quaerendi initium...quaestionis finis: Cic. often thus interchanges gerund and verbal noun; cf. Tusc. 1 §§ 53, 54 principium mouendi...principium motus; so Lucr. has in 1, 383 initus mouendi, but in 2, 269 and 3, 271 initus motus. On the nature of the gerund here see n. on § 101.

2. **quae perfecit uirtutem**: see n. on 1, 20.

4. **finis inuentio**: cf. Fin. 1, 3 nec modus est ullus inuestigandi ueri nisi inueneris. Similarly at the outset of the Nic. Eth. Aristotle assumes that the fact of the existence of human exertion is sufficient to show that there is an ethical *τέλος*.

6. **quasi inuoluta**: 'veiled, so to speak'. Cf. inuolucrum; also Top. 9 definitio, quae quasi inuolutum euoluit; Fin. 1, 30; Orat. 102; above 1, 15 rebus occultis et inuolutis; N. D. 1, 35 obscuri-

ita definitur: 'ratio, quae ex rebus perceptis ad id, quod non percipiebatur, adducit'.

IX. Quod si omnia uisa eius modi essent, qualia isti dicunt, **27**
ut ea uel falsa esse possent, neque ea posset ulla notio discernere, quo modo quemquam aut conclusisse aliquid aut inuenisse diceremus, aut quae esset conclusi argumenti fides? Ipsa autem philosophia, quae rationibus progredi debet, quem habebit exitum? Sapientiae uero quid futurum est? Quae neque de se

7 exitus: *exitum* Cant. 8 tenetur: *tenet* codd.; corr. Bentl. 12 uel falsa: *uel uera uel falsa* Cant.; cf. § 18. 13 diceremus: *dicemus* codd. exc. Cant.

tate inuoluta naturae; Sen. ben. 7, 1, 6 inuoluta ueritas in alto latet; n. on *euoluere* in § 114. For *quasi* n. on 1, 17.

aperta: a reminiscence of ἐκκαλύπτειν, ἐκκαλυπτικὸς, constantly used in the Greek texts in connexion with argument and definition. See n. on ἀπόδειξις below; also Fin. 1, 30 occulta quaedam et quasi inuoluta aperiri; ib. 4, 67 perspicuis dubia aperiuntur; ib. 2, 5 patefactio rerum opertarum (by definition).

8. **tenetur**: 'is grasped' or 'perceived'; cf. § 22 animo...tenet; Fin. 1, 33 earum rerum hic tenetur a sapiente delectus; Or. 2, 53 neque tenent quibus rebus oratio ornetur; Ter. Eun. 406; Phorm. 214.

argumenti conclusio: so §§ 30, 40, literally, the 'rounding off' or 'completion' of a proof; technically used of the syllogism, or of a train of reasoning drawn up in logical form. So 1, 32 orationis ratione conclusae 'speech rounded off in logical fashion'; below, § 44 argumentum concludi; cf. also N. D. 1, 89 tu, Vellei, non uestro more sed dialecticorum argumenta sententiae conclusisti. In a n. on Fin. 1, 30 interesse inter argumentum et conclusionem rationis, Madv. quotes many illustrations, and explains 'rationis conclusio' to be 'syllogismus et argumentatio per syllogismos procedens'.

ἀπόδειξις: the ordinary Stoic definition; cf. the Pseudo-Platonic ὅροι, p. 414 ed. Stallb.; Sext. P. H. 2, 143 λόγος δι' ὁμολογουμένων λημμάτων (premisses) κατὰ συναγωγὴν ἐπιφορὰν (conclusion) ἐκκαλύπτων ἄδηλον: A. M. 8 §§ 181, 314; Diog. 7, 45 λόγον διὰ τῶν μᾶλλον καταλαμβανομένων τὸ ἧττον καταλαμβανόμενον περαίνοντα; Quint. 5, 10, 11 defines *argumentum* as 'ratio probationem praestans qua colligitur aliud per aliud, et quae quod est dubium per id quod dubium non est, confirmat'.

12. **ea...ea**: the repetition of the same pronoun is unusual in Cic. who prefers variety. Cf. § 35 id...eo; § 71 is...eo; § 74 eis...eos; also Madv. on Fin. 5, 22 and n. on § 1, above; also on 2 § 29 haec ...eis. In the phrase 'haec et horum similia' (De Or. 3, 208) or 'haec et his similia' (Liu. pr. 8) the repetition is regular.

uel falsa: *uel* here like καὶ = 'possibly', 'even', 'actually'; so § 93 uel stertas. The reading *uel uera uel falsa* robs the passage of all point.

notio: sc. *animi*, = ἔννοια, as above.

14. **quae fides**: 'what trust could we put in...' *Fides* like *fiducia* regularly takes the gen. in Cic. and the best writers. [In § 36 eis uisis does not depend on *fides* but on *abrogatur*.] The dat. constr. begins with the poets; cf. Verg. Aen. 3, 69 fides pelago; ib. 10, 152 fiducia rebus. Many other nouns are constructed by the silver writers with dat. which at the best period required a gen.; e.g. *caussa;* cf. Sen. N. Q. 3, 27, 1 tanto malo caussa. Cf. n. on § 19 fidem faciat sui iudici.

ipsa philosophia: cf. § 24 ipsa uero sapientia, and n. on 1 § 6 haec ipsa.

15. **rationibus progredi**: cf. § 44 rebus comprehensis nisa et progressa ratio. To a similar question Sextus answers (A. M. 8, 367) οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναγκαῖον τὰς ἐκείνων δογματολογίας προβαίνειν, πλασματώδεις ὑπαρχούσας.

quem habebit exitum: so below, § 36; similarly N. D. 1, 104 male instituta ratio exitum reperire non potest; Fin. 1, 54 ne uirtutum ipsarum quidem laus reperire exitum potest; Or. 116; Sen. N. Q. 3, 27, 9; ep. 22, 12 numquam exitum inuenies.

16. **sapientiae**: here *sapientia*, the true form of philosophy, is somewhat un-

ipsa dubitare debet neque de suis decretis, quae philosophi uocant δόγματα, quorum nullum sine scelere prodi poterit. Cum enim decretum proditur, lex ueri rectique proditur, quo e uitio et amicitiarum proditiones et rerum publicarum nasci solent. Non potest igitur dubitari quin decretum nullum falsum possit esse sapientis neque satis sit non esse falsum, sed etiam stabile, fixum, ratum esse debeat, quod mouere nulla ratio queat. Talia autem neque esse neque uideri possunt eorum ratione, qui illa uisa, e quibus omnia decreta sunt nata, negant quicquam a falsis
28 interesse. Ex hoc illud est natum, quod postulabat Hortensius, ut id ipsum saltem perceptum a sapiente diceretis, nihil posse percipi. Sed Antipatro hoc idem postulanti, cum diceret ei, qui

6 sapientis neque satis sit: A (sed *neque* in ras.); *sapientisque satis sit* BV Cant. ψ (*sit satis*) Harl.; *sapientique satis non sit* multi editores post Manutium. 12 ei qui: A[1]; *eique* codd. cett. 13 dicere: *diceret* V Cant. 14 posse consentaneum

usually distinguished from *philosophia* in general, which includes false forms. So *sapientia* is often identified with *uirtus* by the Stoics (as in Fin. 3, 49 where Madvig fails to see that the two terms are of identical meaning). Notice that below, *philosophi* uocant δόγματα is said, not *sapientes*.

quid futurum est: for the dat. constr. see n. on § 96.

de se ipsa: ipsa is nom. not abl.; see n. on § 36 se ipsa defendet.

1. **decretis...δόγματα**: so Tusc. 2, 11 quotus quisque philosophorum inuenitur qui *decretis suis* pareat; Tusc. 5, 84 quasi decretum; Fin. 2, 28; Sen. ep. 95 § 58 ad uerum sine decretis non peruenitur; ib. § 60 decreta sapientiae, id est dogmata; ib. § 44 persuasio ad totam pertinens uitam: hoc est quod decretum uoco; also below, § 109. In Fin. 2, 105, as well as below, § 133, the word *dogma* is treated as Latin, but it never came into common use, though Laberius (Ribbeck, l. 16) makes the accusative *dogmam*.

2. **sine scelere**: cf. § 133.

3. **proditur**: it is curious that Forcellini, uncorrected by his latest editors, and followed by all lexicographers, including Georges and Lewis and Short, should have understood *proditur* here (in both places) to be equivalent to *promulgatur*, in defiance of the context, and of the comments in § 133. With our passage cf. Leg. 1, 21 primum caput libri optimi prodidisse.

lex ueri rectique: 'the moral law'; cf. Leg. 2, 11 assentior, ut quod est rectum uerum quoque sit, where Vahlen quotes Tusc. 3, 73; Fam. 1, 8, 2; also ib. 6, 21, 2 (uere recteque).

4. **proditiones**: cf. Cato m. §§ 39, 40 uoluptas...hinc patriae proditiones, hinc rerum publicarum euersiones; Off. 3, 36.

6. **stabile...queat**: prob. a rendering of the Stoic words quoted above in n. on 1 § 41 scientiam, viz. ἀσφαλῆ καὶ ἀμετάπτωτον ὑπὸ λόγου. Cf. also § 23 stabilem et immutabilem. For the three words *stabile fixum ratum* see n. on § 23 comprehensi...constituti; also cf. § 43; § 141 certum comprehensum perceptum ratum firmum fixum; also above 1 § 41 ita comprehensum ut conuelli ratione non posset.

8. **eorum ratione**: = κατὰ τὸν ἐκείνων λόγον; cf. Fin. 3 §§ 42, 48; Tusc. 5, 87.

9. **a falsis interesse**: cf. Fin. 1, 64 ueri a falso distinctio; Sen. d. 7, 2, 2 a falsis uera diiudicare; in Inu. 2, 151 we have curiously 'res *cum* re differat'. Terence has the constr. *interest res rei*.

10. **Hortensius**: see Introd. p. 44. The demand of Hortensius is commonly met with in Sextus, e.g. A. M. 8, 281, where the supposed dogmatist argues that if proof be impossible, as the sceptic says, there must be a proof to show it impossible; the sceptic doctrine must be provable. Sextus makes substantially the same answer as Carneades. The demand of Hortensius is vigorously put by Epictetus, Diss. 2, 20.

12. **Antipatro**: he is said to have been utterly cowed by Carneades; see Numen. ap. Eus. Pr. Eu. 14, 8, 11.

adfirmaret nihil posse percipi, unum tamen illud dicere percipi posse consentaneum esse, ut alia non possent, Carneades acutius resistebat. Nam tantum abesse dicebat, ut id consentaneum esset, ut maxime etiam repugnaret. Qui enim negaret quicquam esse quod perciperetur, eum nihil excipere; ita necesse esse, ne id ipsum quidem, quod exceptum non esset, comprehendi et percipi ullo modo posse. Antiochus ad istum locum pressius 29
uidebatur accedere. Quoniam enim id haberent Academici decretum—sentitis enim iam hoc me δόγμα dicere—nihil posse percipi, non debere eos in suo decreto, sicut in ceteris rebus, fluctuare, praesertim cum in eo summa consisteret; hanc enim esse regulam totius philosophiae, constitutionem ueri falsi, cogniti

esse: sic V Cant.; ABψ uerba *consentaneum esse* bis posita habent, et ante u. *unum* et post u. *posse*. 15 ut id: AB; *ut ei* V Cant. ψ Harl.; *ut id ei* Lamb. coni.; *utei* coni. H. 23 fluctuare: sic V supra lineam, et Cant. ψ Harl.; *fluctuari* CH Bait. M.

17. **eum nihil excipere**: Sextus guards himself exactly in the same way: P. H. 1, 14 καὶ ἡ φωνὴ 'οὐδὲν μᾶλλον' μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ ἑαυτήν φησι μὴ μᾶλλον εἶναι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τοῖς ἄλλοις ἑαυτὴν συμπεριγράφει; ib. 1, 206 περὶ πασῶν γὰρ τῶν σκεπτικῶν φωνῶν ἐκεῖνο χρὴ προειληφέναι, ὅτι περὶ τοῦ ἀληθεῖς αὐτὰς εἶναι πάντως οὐ διαβεβαιούμεθα, ὅπου γε καὶ ὑφ' ἑαυτῶν αὐτὰς ἀναιρεῖσθαι λέγομεν δύνασθαι, συμπεριγραφομένας ἐκείνοις περὶ ὧν λέγονται. So in A. M. 8, 480 and 481 (an interesting passage). To the same effect are the passages in Diog. 9 §§ 74, 75, 103, 104 concerning Pyrrho the Sceptic: cf. esp. § 104 ἐν ᾧ οὖν λέγομεν μηδὲν ὁρίζειν, οὐδ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὁριζόμεθα. Expressions like these were common property of all the Sceptics (including the New Academics) from Pyrrho to Sextus. Cf. Sen. ep. 88, 45 si Nausiphani credo hoc unum certum est, nihil esse certi...Non facile dixerim utris magis irascar, illis qui nos nihil scire uoluerunt, an illis qui ne hoc quidem nobis reliquerunt, nihil scire. Cf. also n. on § 73 Chius Metrodorus.

18. **et percipi**: for *et* see n. on § 23 percepti et cogniti.

19. **Antiochus etc.**: the argument here is of course as perfectly futile as that of Antipater. It rests entirely on a definition of the function of philosophy which the New Academics could only accept by placing on its terms interpretations quite different from those assigned by Antiochus. For example he would take the words *accipere* and *repudiare* to imply *absolute* approval and *absolute* rejection, while they could only admit a *qualified* approval, and a *qualified* rejection, based on probability merely. Cf. nn. on § 104. We have here then a mere conflict of assertions; as Sext. A. M. 7, 315 says, ψιλῇ φάσει ἴσον φέρεται ψιλὴ φάσις: also ib. 337 φάσει μὲν φάσις ἐπισχεθήσεται.

pressius: the word is ridiculed in § 109; it also occurs in Fin. 4, 24; Tusc. 4, 14; Amm. Marc. 29, 2, 4; Vell. 2, 129, 2. Cf. also Hortens. fr. 56 (ed. Müller) quis te aut est aut fuit umquam in partiundis rebus, in definiendis, in explicandis *pressior?* Also the use of *premere*, as in N. D. 2, 20 Zeno premebat alio modo; Diu. 2, 46; Fin. 4, 78; Tusc. 1 §§ 13, 88; Fat. 31; Sen. contr. 1, 1, 15; ib. 1, 7, 13.

21. **sentitis iam etc.**: cf. § 18 iam... triuimus.

23. **fluctuare**: 'to be at sea'. *Natare* is used in the same way in N. D. 3, 62; Sen. ep. 35, 4. The deponent *fluctuari* does not appear in Latin before Livy, after whose time it becomes common; occurring e.g. ten times in the prose works of Seneca, while *fluctuare* is found four times. The confusion of the active and passive or deponent forms is of common occurrence in MSS; cf. Madv. Em. Liu. 716 ed. 2.

summa: cf. Fin. 2, 86 summa philosophiae.

hanc: for *hoc* by attraction; see n. on § 30.

24. **ueri falsi**: n. on § 92.

incogniti; quam rationem quoniam susciperent docereque uellent quae uisa accipi oporteret, quae repudiari, certe hoc ipsum, ex quo omne ueri falsique iudicium esset, percipere eos debuisse; etenim duo esse haec maxima in philosophia, iudicium ueri et finem bonorum, nec sapientem posse esse, qui aut cognoscendi esse initium ignoret aut extremum expetendi, ut aut unde proficiscatur aut quo perueniendum sit nesciat; haec autem habere dubia, nec eis ita confidere, ut moueri non possint, abhorrere a sapientia plurimum. Hoc igitur modo potius erat ab his postulandum, ut hoc unum saltem, percipi nihil posse, perceptum esse dicerent. Sed de inconstantia totius illorum sententiae, si ulla

2 quae uisa, *quaeuis* codd.; corr. H; *quae a quouis* edd. uetustiores. oporteret: *op. et* H, ut est in Vψ Harl. 6 esse: om. Lamb. Bait., incl. M. 8 abhorrere: *abh. est* ψ; *est abh.* Harl. 12 sit ut: codd.; *est* Ernesti et H Bait.;

1. **docereque**: Cic., like Lucretius, has no objection to the enclitic *que* following on ĕ, even in words of much greater length than *docere;* cf. 1, 45 cohibereque.

2. **accipi**: 1, 40 uisa...quasi accepta sensibus.

hoc ipsum: refers back to *decreto suo.*

3. **ueri falsique iudicium**: equivalent to *iudicia rerum* in Fin. 1, 22. For *iudicium* see n. on 1, 30.

6. **esse initium**: the *esse* is emphatic; the thorough-going sceptics know nothing of the *existence* of the *cognoscendi initium*, while the less thorough are in doubt about it.

7. **haec...eis**: Cicero very often varies pronouns thus, the less emphatic *is* being used to re-echo the more emphatic *ille*, *iste* or *hic*. We had an example in 1 § 1; cf. also 2 §§ 11, 25; and see Madv. on Fin. 5, 22; Mayor on Phil. 2, 30; Liu. 5, 29, 9 quod illi sperarent...falli eos. The instances in which the second pronoun is more emphatic than the first are rather rare; e.g. above, 1, 16 hic... illum; below, § 73 is...ille; Nep. Att. 10, 4 eum et illius causa.

8. **moueri**: so κινεῖσθαι constantly in Sextus.

9. **erat**: here we have the judgment of Lucullus, not that of Antiochus.

12. **sit, ut opinor, dictum satis**: like ἱκανῶς εἰρήσθω. Opinor, or some like phrase, often accompanies a deliberative or concessive subjunctive in Cic., though the usage is very rare elsewhere; thus Att. 10, 9, 1 Melitam opinor capessamus (rashly altered by many scholars); Fin. 3, 20 sic, ut opinor, appellemus; Off. 1, 8 rectum, opinor, uocemus; Phil. 2, 47 incidamus, opinor, media; Att. 13, 14, 3 opinor igitur consideremus; ib. 9, 6, 2. So too Ter. Phorm. 140 adeam, credo. The use of the perfect subjunctive passive in the concessive sense is common, e.g. *dictum sit* = εἰρήσθω in Fin. 1, 37 sed de clarorum hominum factis illustribus satis hoc loco dictum sit (where Madvig reads *dictum est* needlessly and against all the MSS); Inu. 2, 50 hoc sit nobis dictum; Quint. 6, 3, 26; Varro, L. L. 6, 35 sit satis dictum (as here); also *positum sit* = κείσθω in Fin. 4, 25; Or. 14; cf. too Off. 1 §§ 121, 160; Sen. ben. 7, 16, 2; ep. 123, 16; Quint. 7, 1, 21; ib. 11, 1, 6. [In Ac. 2, 17; Fin. 3, 21 and 24; N. D. 1, 109 si placet is attached to a subjunctive in the same way.]

14. **sequitur**: evidently a reference to the order of the arguments in the 'Sosus' of Antiochus.

15. **abstrusior**: this comparative is rare; possibly found here only.

physicis: probably from *physica;* cf. 1, 6.

16. **libertatem et licentiam**: et = 'and even'; cf. § 127, n. on exigua et minima.

17. **abditis rebus et obscuris**: n. on 1, 19 natura et rebus occultis.

18. **lucem eripere**: this reproach is commonly urged against the sceptics: so they are said *animum eripere* (§ 38), *sensus eripere* (§ 109), *orbare sensibus* (§ 61 n.). Cf. too n. on 16 clarissimis

sententia cuiusquam esse potest nihil approbantis, sit, ut opinor, dictum satis.

X. Sequitur disputatio copiosa illa quidem, sed paulo **30**
abstrusior—habet enim aliquantum a physicis—ut uerear ne maiorem largiar ei, qui contra dicturus est, libertatem et licentiam. Nam quid eum facturum putem de abditis rebus et obscuris, qui lucem eripere conetur? Sed disputari poterat subtiliter, quanto quasi artificio natura fabricata esset primum animal omne, deinde hominem maxime, quae uis esset in sensibus, quem ad modum primum uisa nos pellerent, deinde appetitio ab his pulsa sequeretur, tum ut sensus ad res percipiendas intendere-

uid. tamen adn. meam et Muelleri defensionem. 19 primum: sic Harl., *prima* AV Cant. ψ; corr. H, quem sequitur Bait.; *primo* M cum Lambino.

rebus tenebras obducere; also the whole of § 61; N. D. 1, 6 eam philosophiam quae lucem eriperet et quasi noctem quandam rebus offunderet: Sext. P. H. 1, 20 τοιοῦτος ἀπατεὼν ἐστιν ὁ λόγος ὥστε καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα μόνον οὐχὶ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ἡμῶν ὑφαρπάζειν. For the expression cf. Liu. 10, 32, 6 ut lucis usum eriperet (nebula). The following passage is strikingly similar to ours: Tibull. 1, 9, 35 illis eriperes uerbis mihi sidera caeli | lucere et puras fulminis esse uias.

sed: this word is so commonly used where the thread of an exposition is in any way interrupted that Madvig's desire to alter it here is astonishing. See above, n. on 1, 41.

subtiliter: cf. 1, 6 subtilitas.

19. **artificio**: Cic. uses *artificium* and *ars* almost indifferently; cf. e.g. N. D. 2, § 57; De Or. 2, 83; below, §§ 86, 114.

fabricata esset: n. on § 87.

20. **quae uis esset in sensibus**: this was partially done in § 20. Here Cic. seems to have forgotten the argument there; cf. § 37 where Lucullus says 'cum uim quae esset in sensibus explicabamus'. For the expression cf. § 74 parum magnam uim esse in sensibus.

21. **appetitio**: this is Cicero's regular rendering of the Stoic expression ὁρμή, impulse. This, according to the Stoics, is aroused whenever the mind becomes cognisant of any object which is in harmony with nature (κατὰ φύσιν, or ᾠκειωμένον τῇ φύσει: see above, § 24; also below, § 38, and n. on 2, 131 conciliatione naturae). Objects of the contrary character arouse aversion (ἀφορμή) while the absolutely indifferent objects (cf. nn. on 1, 36) arouse neither feeling. The Stoics assumed that ὁρμή implied συγκατάθεσις: so Stob. Eth. § 164 identifies the two, saying τὰς ὁρμὰς συγκαταθέσεις εἶναι: Plut. Sto. rep. 1057 B μήτε πράττειν μήτε ὁρμᾶν ἀσυγκαταθέτως: cf. too Sen. ep. 113, 18 omne rationale animal nihil agit nisi primum specie alicuius rei irritatum est, deinde impetum cepit, deinde assensio confirmauit hunc impetum; ib. 124, 3 his (i.e. sensibus) tribuistis appetitionis et fugae arbitrium. In every act of sensation, then, mind and sense are inextricably linked together (see n. on § 37) and ὁρμή is the bond that brings the two together. [The whole subject of ὁρμή, which is very imperfectly treated in histories of philosophy—even Zeller's—will be fully dealt with in my forthcoming edition of the 'De Finibus'.] Other renderings of ὁρμή are 'appetitus' (Off. 1, 101 etc.) through which comes our 'appetite'; 'impetus' (Off. 1, 105; Sen. ep. 113, 2); 'irritatio' (Sen. ep. 9, 17).

22. **pulsa**: cf. n. on § 24 moueri non potest; also N. D. 1, 26 neque sensum quo non ipsa natura pulsa sentiret [which passage is quite sound, though doubted by Prof. Mayor and edd. generally; cf. Fat. 42 adsensio non potest fieri nisi commota uiso, and my n. in Prof. Mayor's ed. of N. D. l.c.]

ut intenderemus: so Zeno says (Diog. 7, 133) it is the function of physics to inquire πῶς ὁρῶμεν, τίς ἡ αἰτία τῆς κατοπτρικῆς φαντασίας; cf. also § 157.

mus. Mens enim ipsa, quae sensuum fons est atque etiam ipse sensus est, naturalem uim habet, quam intendit ad ea, quibus mouetur. Itaque alia uisa sic adripit, ut eis statim utatur, alia

1 ipse sensus: *ipsa* codd. H Bait. M; corr. Ernesti.

1. **mens...intendit**: cf. Sen. dial. 7, 8, 4 ...idem nostra mens faciat: cum secuta sensus suos per illos se ad externa porrexerit, et illorum et sui potens sit.

sensuum fons est: the mind is called the source of sensation because its action is indispensable to all sensation. So Stob. Phys. 828 (from Aristo) *ψυχὴν...πηγὴν αἰσθήσεων*.

ipse sensus est: for the attraction cf. 1, 16; 1, 29 sapientiam *quem* deum appellant; 1, 30; Lael. 50 beneuolentiam *qui* fons est; Tusc. 4, 23 morbi, quae illi uocant *νοσήματα*: Liu. 3, 34, 6 leges... qui...fons est iuris; Hor. s. 2, 8, 22. Many exx. will be found in Draeger § 111; Kühner, Gram. II § 12. The theory that the mind is not distinct from sensation was often put forward in ancient times; cf. Arist. Met. 3, 5 (1009 b 12) *διὰ τὸ ὑπολαμβάνειν φρόνησιν μὲν τὴν αἴσθησιν* (of Democritus and others); Diog. 9, 51 (of Protagoras) *ἔλεγέ τε μηδὲν εἶναι ψυχὴν παρὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις, καθὰ καὶ Πλάτων φησὶν ἐν Θεαιτήτῳ*: Plat. Theaet. 185, 191; Sext. A. M. 7, 350 *οἱ μὲν διαφέρειν αὐτὴν τῶν αἰσθήσεων ὡς οἱ πλείους, οἱ δὲ αὐτὴν εἶναι τὰς αἰσθήσεις καθάπερ διά τινων ὀπῶν τῶν αἰσθητηρίων προκύπτουσαν, ἧς στάσεως ἦρξε Στράτων τε ὁ φυσικὸς καὶ Αἰνησίδημος*: cf. too Grote's Aristotle, vol. II, p. 239; and, for Epicurus, Fin. 1, 64. Antiochus had occupied himself with the statements of those who advanced the same theory in his own days (Sext. A. M. 7, 201). Sextus himself thus argues against the dogmatists (A. M. 7, 356) *καὶ ἡ διάνοια εἰ τὸ ἑκάστης αἰσθήσεως ἀναλαμβάνει πάθος αἰσθητικῶς κινεῖται, αἰσθητικῶς δὲ κινουμένη αἴσθησίς ἐστιν, αἴσθησις δὲ οὖσα ἄλογός ἐστι.* The Stoics made the *ἡγεμονικὸν* include all powers, both of thought and of sense (cf. n. on 1, 38); but they merged sensation in thought, rather than thought in sensation. In Tusc. 5, 111 a curious distinction is drawn between taste, touch, smell and hearing on the one hand and sight on the other; the pleasures attaching to the former are said to reside in the bodily organs, while 'in oculis tale nil fit: animus accipit quae uidemus'; there may be there a reminiscence of Plato's 'Philebus'. [It is not altogether easy to reconcile the account of the relation between mind and sense given here with that given in 1, §§ 30, 31, though both accounts proceed from Antiochus.]

3. **alia...alia**: all sensations must leave some impression on the memory, but in the case of some the impression is so transient that it is here disregarded.

alia quasi: see crit. n. and cf. Madv. on Fin. 3, 63 'in uera et aperta partitione nec Cicero nec alius quisquam *aliquis... alius* dixit, multo minus *alius* (in quo iam notatur partitio et alterum membrum praecipitur expectatione)...*aliquis*.' Goerenz's assertion that he can produce 50 exx. of the usage thus condemned, is thoroughly characteristic of the man. Not one *is* produced. In silver Latin *aliquis...aliquis* is sometimes used for *alius...alius*; e.g. Sen. Rh. contr. 10, 3, 2.

utatur: n. on § 22.

4. **recondit**: so the *ἔννοιαι* are called *ἀποκειμέναι νοήσεις* (Plut. Sto. rep. 1057 A; cf. Diog. 10, 33). Cf. Plato, Phaedo 96 B...*τὰς αἰσθήσεις, ἐκ δὲ τούτων γίγνοιτο μνήμη καὶ δόξα, ἐκ δὲ μνήμης καὶ δόξης λαβούσης τὸ ἠρεμεῖν κατὰ ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι ἐπιστήμην*: Arist. Post. An. 2, 19 (99 b 36) *ἐν οἷς δὲ ἔνεστιν* (i.e. *μονὴ τῆς αἰσθήσεως*) *ἐστὶν ἔχειν ἔτι ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ. ἐκ μὲν οὖν αἰσθήσεως γίγνεται μνήμη, ἐκ δὲ μνήμης ἐμπειρία· αἱ γὰρ πολλαὶ μνῆμαι τῷ ἀριθμῷ μία ἐστὶν ἐμπειρία· ἐκ δὲ ἐμπειρίας τέχνης ἀρχὴ καὶ ἐπιστήμης*: so too Metaph. 1, c. 1. In Sext. A. M. 7, 373 memory is called *θησαυρισμὸς φαντασιῶν*, an expression which has many parallels in the writings of Locke and his followers.

similitudinibus etc.: this difficult passage must be studied in close connexion with § 21 and Fin. 3, 33 cum rerum notiones (*ἔννοιαι*) fiant si aut usu aliquid cognitum sit, aut coniunctione aut similitudine aut collatione rationis. In his n. there Madvig quotes Diog. 7 §§ 52, 53; Sext. A. M. 3, 40; ib. 9, 393. The following important passage is not quoted, viz. Sext. A. M. 11, 250 sq. *παντὸς γοῦν πράγματος αἰσθητοῦ ἢ νοητοῦ γίγνεται κατάληψις ἤτοι κατ' ἐνάργειαν περιπτωτικῶς ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν περιπτωτικῶς πεφηνότων ἀναλογιστικὴν μετάβασιν.* Sextus then goes on to say that the general notions

quasi recondit, e quibus memoria oritur. Cetera autem similitudinibus construit, ex quibus efficiuntur notitiae rerum, quas Graeci tum ἐννοίας, tum προλήψεις uocant. Eo cum accessit

3 alia quasi: *aliqua sic* codd.; corr. Faber. 5 construit: *constituit* Harl. et Orelli.

λευκόν, μέλαν, γλυκύ, πικρόν, are arrived at κατὰ περίπτωσιν, i.e. by experience (*usu* in Fin. 3, 33). It is clear then that the *similitudines* of the present passage represent the ἀναλογιστικὴ μετάβασις of Sextus, while the περίπτωσις is left out of view, possibly because it had been dealt with in § 21. Further, Sextus uses ἀναλογία in two ways, to denote (1) all processes taken together by which notions are arrived at which go beyond experience, (2) a particular process, viz. that by which e.g. from the notion of an ordinary man we arrive at the notion of a giant or a dwarf κατ' ἀναλογίαν. Cicero uses *similitudo* in two senses, exactly parallel to the two senses given to ἀναλογία by Sextus. Here *similitudines* has the general sense, while in Fin. 3, 33 it bears the special sense. Space forbids me to pursue this obscure subject farther. Add to the references given above Sext. A. M. 8, 57—59; Diog. 10, 32 (where substantially the same ideas are attributed to Epicurus).

5. **construit**: cf. the fragm. of Cic. quoted in n. on § 22 ars est perceptionum *constructio*. The confusion in MSS between *constituo* and *construo* is common. Thus in N. D. 1, 19 the codex Uffenbachianus alone has *constitui* for *construi*.

notitiae...uocant: ἔννοια is rendered by *notitia* in § 22; Fin. 5, 59; Top. 31; Leg. 1, 24; so too Lucr. 5, 124 but *notities* in 5, 182 and 1047. *Notio* (or in the plural *notiones rerum* as in Fin. 3, 33) is however commoner; so above 1 §§ 32, 42; below, §§ 33, 85, and often in the philosophical works. Occasionally we have *intellegentia*, as in Fin. 3, 21; Leg. 1 §§ 26, 27, 44, 59. Cicero has incurred severe reprehension from Madvig and others for apparently ignoring the distinction between προλήψεις and ἔννοιαι, here and in several other passages, as Top. 31 notionem appello quod Graeci tum ἔννοιαν, tum πρόληψιν dicunt. Now the Stoics undoubtedly did, in their formal definitions, distinguish between προλήψεις, those conceptions which all men must necessarily and without elaborate reasoning processes build on their experience, and ἔννοιαι, those conceptions which are only arrived at by the conscious and purposely applied efforts of the reason. But these philosophers never attempted to point out which conceptions must always be called προλήψεις and which ἔννοιαι: nay, further, they defined the προλήψεις as φυσικαὶ or κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι, and then often spoke of them as ἔννοιαι merely, without the distinctive attribute. Take for example the conception of God. This, the Stoics say, is only arrived at by proof (δι' ἀποδείξεως, Diog. 7, 52). Yet they called this conception indifferently ἔννοια and πρόληψις. So the notions of good and evil, though only arrived at 'collatione rationis' (Fin. 3, 33), are called προλήψεις by Chrysippus (Plut. Sto. Rep. c. 17). Beyond the elementary generalisations from experience of sensations (§ 21) it is difficult to say what conceptions the Stoics, when speaking technically, would have placed under the head of πρόληψις. The προ- in this word (which is sometimes rendered by *praenotio*, as in N. D. 1, 44, or *anticipatio* (ib.), or *praesumptio*, as in Sen. ep. 117, 6) seems to imply that this kind of generalisation is regarded as taking place *before* the reason is thoroughly adult (in the Plac. Phil. 4, 11 the προλήψεις are said to be formed before the age of seven). One more point must be noticed here. The passage before us shows the erroneousness of Madvig's idea (on Fin. 5, 59) that Antiochus combined the Stoic teaching concerning ἔννοιαι with the Platonic theory of ἀνάμνησις. Madvig is led to this surmise by the fact that Cic. in many passages speaks of the προλήψεις as though they were *innate ideas*, whereas it is well known that the Stoics (no less than Locke) regarded the mind at birth as a *tabula rasa*, which is only stocked by experience. But if the προλήψεις are conceptions which all men *must* form at an early age, it is but slightly incorrect to speak of them as 'natura insitae' or 'ingenitae', as Cic. does in so many passages. Chrysippus himself talked of ἔμφυτοι προλήψεις, and such language was no doubt common (cf. Epictet. Diss. 2, 11, 3 ἔμφυτον ἔννοιαν). It was helped by the Peripatetic theory of antecedent *capacities*

ratio argumentique conclusio rerumque innumerabilium multitudo, tum et perceptio eorum omnium apparet et eadem ratio per-
31 fecta his gradibus ad sapientiam peruenit. Ad rerum igitur scientiam uitaeque constantiam aptissima cum sit mens hominis, amplectitur maxime cognitionem, et istam *κατάληψιν*, quam, ut dixi, uerbum e uerbo exprimentes comprehensionem dicemus, cum ipsam per se amat—nihil est enim ei ueritatis luce dulcius—tum etiam propter usum. Quocirca et sensibus utitur et artis efficit quasi sensus alteros, et usque eo philosophiam ipsam corroborat, ut uirtutem efficiat, ex qua re una uita omnis apta sit.

2 eorum: *earum* coni. Christius. perfecta: uid. adn. 7 per se: *propter*

(*δυνάμεις*) often adopted by the Stoic leaders. On this I cannot touch here, nor on the Epicurean use of the terms *ἔννοια* and *πρόληψις*. The latter term was probably invented by Zeno; the former was used by Plato, but quite untechnically, as equivalent to *τὸ ἐν τῷ νῷ ληφθέν*: cf. Phaedo 73 CD *ἔννοια...ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἔλαβον*.

cum accessit: the perfect as in Fat. 36; cf. Madv. on Fin. 5, 41.

1. **rerum**: 'facts'; 'observations'.

innumerabilium: Fin. 2, 113 animi partibus in quibus inest memoria rerum innumerabilium; Tusc. 1, 57 habet memoriam et eam infinitam rerum innumerabilium; Epict. Diss. 1, 14, 8 *μνήμας ἀπὸ μυρίων πραγμάτων*.

2. **perceptio**: here used (like *κατάληψις* occasionally in the Greek texts) of any sure knowledge, whether resting immediately on sensation or not.

eorum: the use of the neut. adjective or pronoun as noun in the genitive is rather rare; see n. on § 8 meorum.

perfecta his gradibus: 'which receives its completion by these steps'. The reading *perfecta* is undoubtedly right. *Ratio perfecta* is equivalent to *uirtus*, itself the equivalent of *sapientia* in the Stoic system, which is followed by Antiochus here; cf. n. on 1, 20 and on 2, 27 above. So far as Latinity goes, *profecta* (Manutius) and *progressa* (Weidner, Philologus XXXVIII, 125) would be possible (cf. n. on § 44 nisa et progressa), but they give a very inferior sense.

4. **uitae constantiam**: see n. on § 23.

5. **cognitionem**: probably here a rendering of *κατάληψις*: see n. on 1, 41 scientiam, and cf. Fin. 3, 49 cognitiones comprehensionesque rerum appetitionem mouent; ib. 3, 17; above Ac. 2, 17 n. and 23 n.

6. **uerbum e uerbo**: n. on § 17.

exprimentes: n. on § 77.

dicemus: there is at least a presumption that this is an error of the MSS for dicamus; cf. Fin. 3, 20 with Madvig's n.; also Wesenberg, Em. 1, p. 18; Kühner on Tusc. 4, 12, from which it will be seen that in these explanations of Greek words Cic. nearly always uses the subjunctive; so above, § 17 nominemus; cf. too Val. M. 7, 4 pr. We have, however, in 1 § 30 nos appellare *possumus*; and 1, 40 nos appellemus *licet*, and in 2 § 18 and 24 uolumus; so *appello* in Fin. 3, §§ 20, 45, 55. The repetition involved in *dixi...dicemus* is unusual in Cic., who commonly avoids such things as *dico dixisse* (using *aio dixisse* etc.); see my n. on Lael. 46; also cf. n. on § 55, below, and Madv. on Fin. 1, 41 ad ea cum accedit...quid est quod huc possit...accedere: he quotes N. D. 2, 145; Diu. 1, 129; Off. 1, 8; add to these passages Att. 15, 13, 3 uelis uelim; Tusc. 3, 28 ita uisum sit ut uideatur; Off. 2, 22 dicemus, si dixerimus; above 1, 46 n.; Weissenborn on Liu. 5, 19, 2. These and many other exx. (see e.g. Arch. 3 with my n.) show that Cic. was by no means so careful to avoid awkward repetitions as many modern scholars have tried to make him out to be.

7. **per se amat**: so in Fin. 3, 17 the *καταλήψεις* are said to be 'propter se asciscendas', i.e. in Stoic phrase they belong to the class of *δι' αὑτὰ ληπτὰ* (Stob. Eth. 132), or *προηγμένα* (Diog. 7, 107). In our passage, the *καταλήψεις* are treated as belonging to things which (to use the words of Diogenes) *καὶ δι'*

Ergo ei, qui negant quicquam posse comprehendi, haec ipsa eripiunt uel instrumenta uel ornamenta uitae uel potius etiam totam uitam euertunt funditus ipsumque animal orbant animo, ut difficile sit de temeritate eorum, perinde ut caussa postulat, dicere.

Nec uero satis constituere possum quod sit eorum consilium 32
aut quid uelint. Interdum enim cum adhibemus ad eos orationem eius modi: 'si ea, quae disputentur, uera sint, tum omnia fore incerta', respondent: 'quid ergo istud ad nos? Num nostra

se Lamb. dulcius: *dilucius* V^1; *dilucidius* V^2 Cant. ψ Harl. 10 apta sit: *a. est* H. 11 posse: om. Cant. 18 disputentur: *disputent* H (auctore Christio) Bait.

αὐτὰ προῆκται, καὶ δι' ἕτερα...δι' αὐτὰ μὲν ὅτι κατὰ φύσιν ἐστὶν· δι' ἕτερα δὲ ὅτι περιποιεῖ χρείας οὐκ ὀλίγας.

ueritatis luce: cf. n. on § 26 lux lumenque; also De Or. 2, 36 historia est lux ueritatis; Pro Lig. 6 lux liberalitatis et sapientiae.

8. **propter usum**: the change from *per* to *propter* induced Lambinus to read *propter* in the first place. But cf. Lael. 80 carent amicitia per se et propter se expetita, where *per se* is 'in itself', i.e. by virtue of its own constitution; *propter se* 'for its own sake'.

quocirca...alteros: a summary of the argument in § 20, which shows how art heightens the power of sensation.

9. **philosophiam...uirtutem**: n. on § 27 sapientiae.

12. **eripiunt**: n. on § 30 lucem eripere.

uel instrumenta uel ornamenta uitae: the word *instrumentum* is freely used in this metaphorical sense; and the particular expression 'instrumentum uitae' occurs in Sen. ep. 17, 8; ib. 45, 12; ib. 74, 1; ib. 88, 20; ib. 95, 8 (cf. too ib. 76, 24 rerum uitam instruentium). Similar expressions are 'uitae supellex' (Lael. 55); 'philosophiae supellex' (Fin. 5, 96); 'quasi quidam ornatus uitae' (Off. 1, 93 where however the sense is different). The word *ornamentum*, it should be noticed, does not exactly correspond in sense with our 'ornament,' but is rather 'equipment'. The whole expression 'instrumenta uel ornamenta' closely resembles 'instrumentum et apparatum' in § 3. The two verbs *instruere* and *ornare* are frequently used by Cic. together, as in Fin. 4, 61; *instructus* and *ornatus* are joined in scores of passages.

13. **euertunt**: see n. on § 99 uitae euersio.

animal...animo: Cic. allows *animus* to all creatures, not merely *anima*; the rule formerly often given (e.g. by Forc. s.u. *animans*), that *animus* applies only to human beings, is mistaken. See Fin. 5, 38 with Madvig's n. The word *animal* was generally derived from *animus*: cf. Tusc. 1, 21 nihil esse omnino animum, et hoc esse nomen totum inane frustraque animalia et animantis appellari; so in N. D. 1, 26 and 3, 36; also Sen. ep. 113, 2 animum constat animal esse, cum ipse efficiat ut simus animalia, et cum ab illo animalia nomen hoc traxerint. For the expression 'animal orbare animo' cf. Off. 3, 26 hominem ex homine tollere; so Fin. 5, 35; also § 37 inanimum...animal.

14. **temeritate**: we have here a 'tu quoque', since *προπέτεια* was the favourite charge which the sceptics brought against the dogmatists. See n. on § 67 temeritate.

16. **consilium aut quid uelint**: the expression is tautological; cf. Leg. 3, 33 quid sibi lex aut quid uerba ista uellent; Catull. 63, 55 ubinam aut quibus locis. When a question is slightly changed in Latin *aut* is often put where we might expect *et*; e.g. Caes. B. C. 2, 35, 2 quis esset aut quid uellet: Tusc. 1, 25 quo modo aut cur? So Lael. 17; Nep. Dat. 6, 6; Liu. 5, 45, 3 quae aut unde, but Cic. Rep. 2, 6 quis et unde; Diu. 2, 72 quae aut ubi, but Ac. 1, 9 qui et ubi.

18. **disputentur**: Cic. frequently uses this passive, though he does not say 'disputare aliquam rem'; so below, §§ 38, 40; and cf. § 74 indicanda.

19. **quid ad nos?** See n. on § 94 quid ad illum?

num nostra culpa est? Cf. Att. 14, 14, 2; ib. 15, 20, 2.

culpa est? Naturam accusa, quae in profundo ueritatem, ut ait Democritus, penitus abstruserit'. Alii autem elegantius, qui etiam queruntur, quod eos insimulemus omnia incerta dicere, quantumque intersit inter incertum et id, quod percipi non possit, docere conantur eaque distinguere. Cum his igitur agamus, qui haec distingunt, illos, qui omnia sic incerta dicunt, ut stellarum numerus par an impar sit, quasi desperatos aliquos relinquamus. Volunt enim—et hoc quidem uel maxime uos animaduertebam moueri—probabile aliquid esse et quasi ueri simile, eaque se uti regula et in agenda uita et in quaerendo ac disserendo.

9 eaque se uti: *eamque secuti* V ex correctione; etiam ψ Harl.; *eamque sicuti* Cant. 11 est ueri et falsi: uerba *ueri et falsi* incl. Lamb. H Bait. M. 17 quicquam

1. **accusa**: note the singular, though *adhibeamus* precedes. For some similar changes of number, see n. on § 79.

in profundo ueritatem: cf. 1, 44; also Diog. 9, 72 Δημόκριτος...ἐν βυθῷ ἡ ἀλήθεια: see N. Q. 7, 32, 4 fundum in quo ueritas posita est. The ordinary rendering 'well' for βυθὸς is far too weak: render rather 'abyss'. There is (as has been pointed out to me) a Scandinavian legend which recalls this dictum of Democritus.

2. **elegantius**: κομψότερον: see n. on § 146. For the ellipse cf. Leg. 2, 29 melius Graeci atque nostri; ib. 3, 46 Graeci hoc diligentius. For the application of *eleganter* to philosophical arguments cf. Kühner on Tusc. 1, 55.

3. **omnia incerta**: Sen. ep. 88, 5 Academicum omnia incerta dicentem.

4. **incertum**: cf. Numen. ap. Eus. Pr. Eu. 14, 7, 15 διαφορὰν εἶναι ἀδήλου καὶ ἀκαταλήπτου, καὶ πάντα μὲν εἶναι ἀκατάληπτα, οὐ πάντα δὲ ἄδηλα (quoted as from Carneades); also see below, § 54.

id quod percipi non possit: notice the cumbrous rendering of ἀκατάληπτον. In the corresponding passage of the second edition, Cic. probably inserted *incomprehendibile*, having ventured on *comprehendibile* in 1, 40.

6. **stellarum numerus**: this frequently occurs as a type of uncertainty and even of those things which can have no interest for any human being. See Sext. P. H. 2 §§ 90, 97; ib. 3, 177; A. M. 7 §§ 243, 393; ib. 8 §§ 147, 317 (where it is reckoned among τὰ αἰώνιον ἔχοντα ἀγνωσίαν); ib. 11, 59. Cf. Plin. n. h. 2, 95 ausus rem etiam deo improbam, numerare stellas; Catull. 61, 203 siderumque micantium subducat numerum; Off. 1, 154; Epictetus, Diss. 1, 28, 3.

7. **desperatos aliquos**: ἀπονενοημένους τινάς. The *aliquos*, like the τινάς, conveys a touch of contempt; so in § 72 popularis aliquos.

8. **uolunt**: 'they wish to make out'.

9. **moueri**: a reference no doubt to the speech of Catulus. August. contr. Ac. 2, 15 refers to this passage, which must therefore have been preserved in the second edition.

probabile et quasi ueri simile: merely a tentative duplicated translation of πιθανόν, the Carneadean phrase. C. F. Hermann, De Philone Larissaeo p. 16, insists that Cic. has here confused two views, that of Carneades, who used the word πιθανόν, and that of Philo who used εἰκός; that while *probabile* represents πιθανόν, *ueri simile* represents εἰκὸς and that *quasi* implies that εἰκὸς was less familiar than πιθανόν. This shows how far astray a great scholar may go through ignorance on a small point of diction. There is not a particle of evidence to show that Philo advanced a theory of probability different from that of Carneades (see nn. on § 104). In the present passage the only two systems hinted at are those of Arcesilas and Carneades. See n. on 1, 45 paria momenta. As Augustine well understood (contr. Ac. 2, 16) Cic. renders Carneades' πιθανὸν indifferently by *probabile* and by *ueri simile*.

eaque: for the attraction see n. on § 30.

10. **ac disserendo**: for the *ac* see n. on § 34.

XI. Quae ista regula est ueri et falsi, si notionem ueri et **33** falsi, propterea quod ea non possunt internosci, nullam habemus? Nam si habemus, interesse oportet ut inter rectum et prauom, sic inter uerum et falsum. Si nihil interest, nulla regula est nec potest is, cui est uisio ueri falsique communis, ullum habere iudicium aut ullam omnino ueritatis notam. Nam cum dicunt hoc se unum tollere, ut quicquam possit ita uideri, ut non eodem modo falsum etiam possit uideri, cetera autem concedere, faciunt pueriliter. Quo enim omnia iudicantur sublato reliqua se negant tollere: ut si quis, quem oculis priuauerit, dicat ea, quae cerni

possit: *q. uerum possit* Manut. ex uetere quodam libro, ut ipse affirmat; *ita uerum* Bait. M. 18 possit uideri: *possit ita u.* codd.; corr. Lamb.

11. **regula ueri et falsi**: the insertion of these words here (though they follow below) is emphatic and intentional. Cf. n. on § 43 illa vera definitio.

notionem: *ἔννοιαν*: see n. on § 30.

13. **rectum et prauom**: the absolute nature of the distinction would not be allowed by the Academics, any more than in the other case.

15. **uisio...communis**: cf. *κοινὴ φαντασία τοῦ τε ἀληθοῦς καὶ ψευδοῦς* in Sext. 7, 164 and 175; also his use of *ἀπαράλλακτος*, *ἀπαραλλαξία*, explained in n. on § 34. The rendering *uisio* for *φαντασία* is given by Quint. 6, 2, 29; *uisus* in N. D. 1, 12 is exceptional and doubtful, in spite of Prof. Mayor's argument ad l.

16. **iudicium**: = *κριτήριον* (n. on 1, 30): **notam**: = *σημεῖον* (n. on § 84, below). Both these words are of constant occurrence in the Greek texts.

17. **ita uideri**: not improbably, *uerum* has fallen out after *ita* in the MSS; cf. § 34 quod ita mihi uideatur uerum.

eodem modo falsum: the Academics persistently refused to admit the last clause of the definition of *καταληπτικὴ φαντασία* given in n. on § 18; cf. Sext. A. M. 7, 164 *οὐδεμία ἐστὶν ἀληθὴς φαντασία οἵα οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ψευδής*. See n. on § 112.

19. **quo enim etc.**: the following Stoic argument given by Sext. A. M. 7, 260 is strikingly similar: *ὃν τρόπον ὁ χρώματα μὲν ἀπολείπων, καὶ τὰς ἐν τούτοις διαφοράς, τὴν δὲ ὅρασιν ἀναιρῶν ὡς ἀνύπαρκτον ἢ ἄπιστον, καὶ φωνὰς μὲν εἶναι λέγων, ἀκοὴν δὲ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἀξιῶν, σφόδρα ἐστὶν ἄτοπος (δι' ὧν γὰρ ἐνοήσαμεν χρώματα καὶ φωνάς, ἐκείνων ἀπόντων οὐδὲ χρῆσθαι δυνατοὶ χρώμασιν ἢ φωναῖς), οὕτω καὶ τὰ πράγματα μὲν ὁμολογῶν, τὴν δὲ φαντασίαν τῆς αἰσθήσεως, δι' ἧς τῶν πραγμάτων ἀντιλαμβάνεται, διαβάλλων, τελέως ἐστὶν ἐμβρόντητος καὶ τοῖς ἀψύχοις ἴσον αὐτὸν ποιῶν.* The whole context in Sextus has many echoes in the 'Academica'; Sextus probably borrowed from a work of Chrysippus which Antiochus also had at hand when writing his 'Sosus'.

20. **ut...dicat**: Madvig on Fin. 4, 30 takes *ut* to mean 'for example', the rest being a conditional sentence. No doubt *ut* is often thus used to introduce an illustration or example, expressed by a complete conditional sentence; a usage which has often been misunderstood by writers of MSS and by editors. Clear examples are Tusc. 4, 61; Diu. 1, 86; ib. 2, 129; Fin. 2, 112; ib. 4, 30; N. D. 1, 88; Off. 1, 144; 3, 107; so too Liu. 6, 40, 12; Hor. sat. 1, 1, 46; ib. 2, 3, 92; Quint. 4, 2, 27; ib. 5, 10, 59 and 62; ib. 5, 11, 24. But the tense of *priuauerit* prevents our passage from ranking with those just enumerated. I have therefore put a comma after *si quis*, and have supposed the passage to belong to a very numerous class, in which the illustrative *ut* is followed by a conditional clause, without any apodosis; see e.g. Tusc. 4, 59; ib. 5, 74; Diu. 2, 133; N. D. 3, 76; Off. 1, 145 and 3, 62; Brut. 287; Inu. 1, §§ 80, 92, 93, 94; Hor. sat. 1, 1, 90; ib. 1, 6, 66 (uelut si); ib. 2, 4, 49; ep. 1, 17, 3; Tac. A. 2, 20; Quint. 3, 6, 94; ib. 3, 10, 1; ib. 4, 5, 27; ib. 5, 10, 34 and 52; ib. 5, 13, 35; ib. 6, 1, 4; ib. 7, 1, 22; ib. 7, 2, 4; ib. 7, 3, 4, also 30 and 33; ib. 7, 4, 14 (bis); ib. 8, 2, 12 and 16; ib. 11, 2, 23; ib. 11, 3, 182; ib. 12, 5, 2. Madvig's objection to this

possent, se ei non ademisse. Vt enim illa oculis modo agnoscuntur, sic reliqua uisis, sed propria ueri, non communi ueri et falsi nota. Quam ob rem, siue tu probabilem uisionem siue probabilem et quae non impediatur, ut Carneades uolebat, siue aliud quid proferes quod sequare, ad uisum illud, de quo agimus, tibi
34 erit reuertendum. In eo autem, si erit communitas cum falso, nullum erit iudicium, quia proprium in communi signo notari

1 se ei non: ABr; om. *non* V; *non se ei* G Cant. ψ Harl. 3 siue probabilem: *s. improbabilem* codd.; corr. Faber. 4 aliud quid: codd. Halmii; *quid aliud* Cant. ψ Harl. 7 in communi: u. *in* incl. H Bait.; eiecit M, auctoribus Manut. et Lamb. 8 habeo: B in ras. et Harl.; *abeo* A[1]V Cant. ψ. 9 ut non: V[2] Cant. ψ

way of taking our passage, that it is against the order of the words, is trivial. In many places (as Balb. 27) where *ut si* is followed by *two* verbs, it is doubtful whether the construction is of the kind first mentioned above, or whether the *ut* is consecutive and governs the second verb, as it undoubtedly does in Off. 1, 147; Leg. 2, 49; Quint. 3, 6, 13; ib. 5, 8, 2.

agnoscuntur ... nota: cf. § 84 agnoscendo...notam.

2. **propria**: refer to 1, 41.

ueri et falsi nota: cf. Lucr. 1, 699 quid nobis certius ipsis sensibus esse potest, qui *uera ac falsa notemus?*

3. **probabilem...impediatur**: cf. § 59. The various degrees of probability recognised by Carneades are very clearly explained by Sextus A. M. 7, 166 sq. The φαντασία which is merely πιθανή, is that sensation which at first sight, without further inquiry, seems probably true (§§ 167—175). Now no sensation is perceived *alone;* the percipient has always other synchronous sensations which are able to turn him aside (περισπᾶν, περιέλκειν) from the one which is the immediate object of his attention. This last is only called ἀπερίσπαστος when examination has shown all the concomitant sensations to be in harmony with it (§§ 175—181). The διεξωδευμένη φαντασία ('thoroughly explored') requires more than a mere apparent agreement of the concomitant sensations with the principal one. Circumstances quite external to the sensations themselves must be examined; the time at which they occur, or during which they continue; the condition of the space within which they occur, and the apparent intervals between the person and the objects; the state of the air; the disposition of the person's mind at the moment and the soundness or unsoundness of his eyes (§§ 181—189). The rendering in Zeller's Stoics, etc., Eng. Tr. p. 524, of the words πιθανὴν καὶ ἀπερίσπαστον καὶ διεξωδευμένην by 'probable undisputed and tested' is very misleading. In our passage we have only the first two of these three stages of probability; see n. on *circumspectione* in § 35. [The words περισπᾶν, ἀπερίσπαστος are in common use in the later Greek; e.g. Epict. Diss. 1, 29, 59.]

6. **si erit**: possibly *ei* has fallen out after *si.*

communitas: when two sensations are capable of being mistaken one for the other they are said to be ἀπαράλλακτοι or ἐπιμιγεῖς, or to possess ἀπαραλλαξία or ἐπιμιξία. These phrases are of constant occurrence in Sextus, e.g. P. H. 1, 127; A. M. 7, 403.

7. **nullum erit iudicium**: 'we shall find no standard' (of truth and falsehood).

proprium in communi signo: cf. Aug. contr. Ac. 2, 11 his signis uerum posse comprehendi, quae signa non potest habere quod falsum est; similarly ib. 3, 18 and 22. Cf. Acad. 1, 41 where Zeno said that only those *uisa* were true 'quae *propriam* quandam haberent declarationem earum rerum quae uiderentur'. *Signum* is merely, like *nota*, a rendering of the Greek σημεῖον: see n. on § 84. The preposition *in* is here perfectly correct; we have here a rendering of words such as 'τὸ ἴδιον ἐν κοινῷ (sc. ἀληθοῦς καὶ ψευδοῦς) or ἀπαραλλάκτῳ σημείῳ οὐχ οἷόν τε σημειοῦσθαι,' i.e. the peculiar stamp of truth cannot be imprinted on a sign which may belong to something false. 'Notare in aliqua re' occurs also in De Or. 3, 186.

non potest. Sin autem commune nihil erit, habeo quod uolo: id enim quaero, quod ita mihi uideatur uerum, ut non possit item falsum uideri. Simili in errore uersantur, cum conuicio ueritatis coacti perspicua a perceptis uolunt distinguere et conantur ostendere esse aliquid perspicui, uerum illud quidem impressum in animo atque mente, neque tamen id percipi atque comprendi

Harl.; *non* V[1]; *ne* A; *ne* in ras. B. item: *idem* r et Orelli. 10 conuicio: Madvig.; *conuincio* (et supra lineam *iudicio* ut est in Cant. ψ Harl.) V; *conuinctio* (*conuincti ac* m. 2) B; *conuinti* (*conuicti ac* m. 2) A; *conuitio* H Bait. ueritatis: *ueritate* A. 12 impressum: *et i.* (ut est in Harl.) Madv. Bait. 13 atque comprendi: *ac c.* codd. (exc. E *atque*) edd. (exc. Lamb. *aut*); uid. adn.

Cf. too § 71 signari in animis; Or. 121 uerbo in quo duas res significari uidemus. With proprium cf. the very frequent use of ἴδιον and ἰδίωμα in Sextus, e.g. A. M. 9, 410; also *proprietates* in § 56, below.

10. **errore**: cf. N. D. 1, 31 sunt eisdem in erratis fere.

conuicio ueritatis: cf. Or. 160 conuicio aurium; Fam. 16, 26, 1 uerberaui te tacito cogitationis conuicio; Q. fr. 2, 9, (11), 1 epistulam hanc conuicio efflagitarunt codicilli tui; Phil. 2, 17 uoce paene litterarum c o a c t i; also the line of Publilius Syrus (ed. Ribb. 585) spes est salutis ubi hominem obiurgat pudor; Val. M. 4, 3, 14 continentia plebis tacitum crudelium uictorum conuicium fuit; ib. 4, 7, 3 Lucius Reginus posteritatis conuicio lacerandus. As to the meaning of *conuicium* cf. Cael. 6 maledictio autem nihil habet propositi praeter contumeliam, quae si petulantius iactatur, conuicium, si facetius, urbanitas nominatur. A. W. Zumpt on Mur. 13 rightly says of the Ciceronian use of the word 'non unum maledictum appellatur conuicium sed multorum uerborum quasi uociferatio'; but he is wrong in asserting that the plural is found only in Att. 2, 18, 1; it occurs also in N. D. 2, 20 (according to the certain conj. of Davies); Fin. 1, 69; pro dom. 16; Cluent. 39; and probably Balb. 41 (see my crit. n. there).

11. **perspicua ... perceptis**: there is something to be said in favour of C. F. Hermann's idea that this distinction was insisted on by Philo. The words *conuicio ueritatis coacti* compare well with what is said of him in § 18 sustinere uix poterat etc. The repetitions *perspicuom ... perspicue—impressum ... impressa* seem to indicate that some special uses of the terms ἐναργὴς and ἐντετυπωμένος are represented here. But there is very much that is fanciful about Hermann's argument. He insists for example (De Philone Larissaeo p. 14) that Philo borrowed his use of ἐναργὴς from Plato, but almost the only evidence he can give is a passage which verbally, but accidentally, coincides with ours, and its context, viz. Rep. 484 C ἢ οὖν δοκοῦσί τι τυφλῶν διαφέρειν οἱ τῷ ὄντι τοῦ ὄντος ἑκάστου ἐστερημένοι τῆς γνώσεως καὶ μηδὲν ἐναργὲς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἔχοντες παράδειγμα. Even the Sceptics speak of ἐναργῆ: cf. Sext. P. H. 2, 10 τὰ κατ' ἐνάργειαν ὑποπίπτοντα.

12. **impressum**: probably *et* has fallen out in the MSS before this word. For the use of *impressum* see n. on § 18.

13. **animo atque mente**: the words *animus* and *mens* are frequently thus joined by Cic. See my nn. on Cato m. §§ 36, 41.

percipi atque comprendi: the alteration of the *ac* of the MSS was a necessity, since Cic. most certainly did not write *ac* before a guttural, whatever may have been his reason for avoiding it. It is rarely given by our MSS of Cic., and that their evidence in such cases is worthless is proved by the care which Cic. took to substitute for *ac*, when followed by a guttural, *atque* or *et* or *que*, in phrases of a kind where *ac* is regularly used in the absence of the guttural. Where two words are so closely allied as *percipere* and *comprehendere* here (being of identical meaning) Cic. nearly always uses *ac* to connect them, yet elsewhere in the 'Academica' we always have *percipere et comprehendere* and the like (see §§ 23, 40, 105, 106). This fact in itself is sufficient to condemn the MSS reading here. When Cicero connects two expressions by *et* and one of the expressions has two branches, which require to be connected by a conjunction, *ac* is the conjunction

posse. Quo enim modo perspicue dixeris album esse aliquid,
cum possit accidere ut id, quod nigrum sit, album esse uideatur,
aut quo modo ista aut perspicua dicemus aut impressa subti-
liter, cum sit incertum uere inaniterne moueatur? Ita neque
color neque corpus nec ueritas nec argumentum nec sensus neque
35 perspicuom ullum relinquitur. Ex hoc illud eis usu uenire solet,
ut, quidquid dixerint, a quibusdam interrogentur: 'ergo istuc
quidem percipis?' Sed qui ita interrogant, ab eis irridentur;
non enim urguent, ut coarguant neminem ulla de re posse con-
tendere nec adseuerare sine aliqua eius rei, quam sibi quisque

3 impressa: *menti impr.* Dau. Bait. (et V in marg.); *in animo impr.* M; qui uerbum *moueatur* impersonale (quod dicunt) esse non uiderunt; *enim impr.* Harl. 4 inaniterne: *inaniterue* codd.; corr. Man. moueatur: *moueamur* H auctore

regularly used, not *et*. Instances are exceedingly numerous; cf. e.g. § 32 *et* in agenda uita *et* in quaerendo *ac* disserendo. Now this form is so often departed from where *ac* would go before a guttural, that we may safely conclude that Cic. had an insuperable objection to its use in such circumstances. Cf. e. g. Tusc. 3, 46 saporem *et* corporum complexum *et* ludos *atque* cantus; Fin. 1, 43 *et* terroribus cupiditatibus*que* *et* temeritate. In Fam. 1, 7, 3 de te *ac* de tuis ornamentis *et* commodis, the *ac* and the *et* would almost certainly have changed places but for the *c* in *commodis*. My argument is strengthened by the fact that in exactly similar circumstances Cic. conspicuously avoids writing *ac* before a vowel or *h*; see Tusc. 4, 1; N. D. 2, 95; Orat. 10; De Or. 1, 95; ib. 3, 63. Also Academ. 1, §§ 1, 3, 23; 2, 19. Scholars are agreed that not only Cic. but nearly all other classical writers avoided *c* before vowels, but they are still so frequently unaware of the facts relating to its occurrence before gutturals that it is often introduced in such a position by conjecture, a proceeding certainly incautious and reprehensible. Thus Orelli read *ac caste* in N. D. 1, 3 in defiance of all the MSS, also *ac grauitate* in Velle. 2, 92, 2 though, so far as the recorded readings go, there is nothing to show that Velleius anywhere used *ac* irregularly. So Madvig (after Bremi) in Fin. 5, 50; Baiter after Allen in Fin. 5, 27 (where Holstein has an absurd n.); Kühner (after Orelli) in Tusc. 1, 54; Weissenborn in Liu. 4, 34, 4. What I have said of Cic. holds good as strongly of many other authors; thus in Halm's text of Nepos *ac* only occurs once before a guttural (Pel. 5, 3 where *simul* should be read for *simul ac*); only once too in the recent texts of Catullus (64, 147 where *simul a!* should be read for *simul ac*). In many instances where our texts give us *ac* irregularly it is impossible to say on what authority it rests, since matters like these are regarded as beneath their notice by collators of MSS. I have noted the following exx. of *ac* before *c*; Diu. 2, 4 (Christ's text in Baiter and Halm's ed.); Fin. 4, 17 (Madv.); Att. 5, 11, 2 (Boot); ib. 12, 40, 5; ib. 13, 21, 2; Fam. 4, 5, 5; ib. 5, 10 *a*, 3 (the last four passages in Wesenberg's text); in Tusc. 2, 48 *atque custodia* is now read. *Ac* before *g* in Orat. 22 (Jahn); Fam. 12, 7, 1; De Or. 1, 8; before *q* in De Or. 3, 57 (Boot keeps *ac* before *ita* in Att. 8, 12 *a*, 4). As to other authors *ac* before a guttural is commonest in the texts of Livy and Varro. In Weissenborn's text of Livy, books 1, 2, 4, 5, there are sixteen instances; in Müller's text of Varro's Ling. Lat. about ten. In recent texts of the early Latin literature rare exx. only occur, as Ennius, an. 247 (Vahl.); Plaut. Bacch. 145 (where Teuffel rightly conj. *aut*). In Bonnell's Quintilian there are about three or four instances; in Roth's Suetonius not more than four. In Vergil there is no instance, in Horace but one (*ac gnatis* in some edd. of Sat. 1, 1, 83, others *natis*, which is a far likelier form in Hor.). These facts will show how circumscribed is the area over which the usage extends.

1. **perspicue...album**: cf. Sextus' frequent use of εἰλικρινῶς: e.g. P. H. 1, 92 εἰλικρινῶς ἡδύ.

placere dicit, certa et propria nota. Quod est igitur istuc ues-
trum probabile? Nam si, quod cuique occurrit et primo quasi
adspectu probabile uidetur, id confirmatur, quid eo leuius? Sin **36**
ex circumspectione aliqua et accurata consideratione, quod uisum
sit, id se dicent sequi, tamen exitum non habebunt, primum quia
eis uisis, inter quae nihil interest, aequaliter omnibus abrogatur
fides, deinde, cum dicant posse accidere sapienti ut, cum omnia
fecerit diligentissimeque circumspexerit, exsistat aliquid quod et
ueri simile uideatur et absit longissime a uero, ne si magnam

Christio; *animus mou.* Manut. 6 illud eis: om. Cant. 7 quidquid: *quicquid* codd. Halmii; *quid ψ* Harl.; *quid quis* Cant. dixerint: *dixerit* B[1]V Cant. 10 quisque: *quisquam* Cant. 12 occurrit: *occurrerit ψ*. 19 ne si: Madu.: *si* Cψ Harl.; *sin* Cant. magnam partem: *magna parte* AB[2].

3. **subtiliter**: cf. ἀκρίβεια or ἀκριβῶς, often in Sext. e.g. P. H. 2, 123 εἰ μὴ μετ' ἀκριβείας καταλαμβάνεται τὸ σημεῖον.

4. **inaniter**: simply = 'deceptively', the opposite of *uere;* the words *falsus* and *inanis* often go together, as in Fam. 5, 8, 3; Diu. 2, 127; so in Greek κενὸς and ψευδὴς are often interchangeable. Here *inaniter* covers both of the modes of falsity explained in n. on § 18; often however *inanis* and its cognates are applied to only one of those modes; viz. that whereby we suppose sensations to proceed from external objects when the supposed objects really are mere phantoms. Cf. Fin. 5, 3 me species quaedam *commouit, inaniter* scilicet; Tusc. 4, 13 animus *inaniter* exsultat; Liu. 6, 28, 7 inanium rerum inanes ipsas cogitationes uoluentes; so *motus inanis* (animi), N. D. 1 §§ 105, 106; *per se moueri* (of the mind), Diu. 2, §§ 120, 126, 139. There are many similar expressions in Sextus; cf. A. M. 8, 213 κενοπαθούσης τῆς αἰσθήσεως: ib. 8, 184 κενοπαθείας αἰσθήσεων: ib. 8, 354 κενοπαθήματα καὶ ἀναπλάσματα τῆς διανοίας: ib. 7, 241 διάκενος ἑλκυσμός: ib. 8, 67 διάκενος φαντασία. In Plac. Phil. 4, 12 διάκενος ἑλκυσμὸς is quoted as an expression of Chrysippus, who defined it as πάθος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀπ' οὐδενὸς φανταστοῦ γιγνόμενον, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ σκιαμαχοῦντος καὶ ἐπιφέροντος τὰς χεῖρας. For *inaniter* further cf. Hor. ep. 2, 1, 210 ille per extentum funem mihi posse uidetur ire poeta meum qui pectus *inaniter* angit; Catull. 66, 41 *inaniter* adiurare = peierare; Sen. ben. 7, 10, 3 inanium opinione (a rendering of κενοδοξία); N.Q. 1, 15, 8 inanis uerorum corporum imitatio; see too below, § 47 *inaniter moueantur.* [In Diu. 1, 129 where MSS give 'animi hominum cum aut somno soluti uacant corpore, aut mente permoti per se ipsi liberi incitati mouentur', read *soluti et liberi* (cf. n. on § 105), striking out *liberi* later, also *inaniter* for *incitati.*]

moueatur: the impersonal use is like that of sentiatur in § 20. For *moueri* of the mind see 1, 35 n.

5. **color etc.**: see § 103.

6. **relinquitur**: the opposite of *tollere* (n. on § 26); cf. Hor. sat. 1, 10, 51 tollenda relinquendis.

9. **non urguent etc.**: 'they are not eager to prove'. The subject to *urguent* is 'Academici'.

10. **sine aliqua**: 'without *some*'; sine ulla would be 'without *any*', and therefore inapplicable here. See Draeger I[2] p. 91; and cf. Acad. 1, 24 and 27.

11. **certa et propria**: joined together also in De Or. 3, 149; Inu. 1, 66.

12. **quasi**: 'almost'; so often; e.g. § 8.

13. **id...eo**: n. on § 27 ea...ea.

14. **circumspectione**: we have here a reference to the term περιωδευμένη sometimes applied (in place of the commoner διεξωδευμένη) by Carneades and his followers to the φαντασία which reaches the third and highest degree of probability (see n. on § 33).

15. **exitum**: n. on § 27.

primum quia ..deinde: cf. n. on § 46 primum...alterum est, also De Or. 1, 186.

16. **eis uisis etc.**: i.e. if we do not really know whether any one sensation is true or false, we must distrust all. Cf. § 40.

17. **fides**: n. on § 27.

18. **exsistat**: n. on 1, 23.

19. **longissime a uero**: cf. the com-

partem quidem, ut solent dicere, ad uerum ipsum aut quam proxime accedant, confidere sibi poterunt. Vt enim confidant, notum eis esse debebit insigne ueri, quo obscurato et oppresso quod tandem uerum sibi uidebuntur attingere? Quid autem tam absurde dici potest quam cum ita locuntur: 'est hoc quidem illius rei signum aut argumentum et ea re id sequor, sed fieri potest ut id, quod significatur, aut falsum sit aut nihil sit omnino'. Sed de perceptione hactenus. Si quis enim ea, quae dicta sunt, labefactare uolet, facile etiam absentibus nobis ueritas se ipsa defendet.

37 XII. His satis cognitis, quae iam explicata sunt, nunc de

1 quidem: om. Cant. ad uerum ipsum aut: *ac u. i. ut* Cant. Harl. 3 obscurato: *obscuro* codd. H Bait. M; corr. Lamb. 7 nihil sit: u. *sit* om. A[1]; incl. H Bait.; M laudat Wesenb. ad Tusc. 1 §§ 60, 76 et 4 § 9. 9 absenti-

mon expression *uero propius* (Quint. 3, 6, 14).

ne si magnam partem etc.: the Academics contended that while appearances probably do not mislead us in the majority of instances, yet we can never be absolutely certain in any particular case that we have not been misled.

2. **accedant**: sc. Academici. That the reading *aut uerum* may be right is shown by Mil. 59 proxime deos accessit Clodius. In Fam. 1, 21, 4 Cic. even has the dative after *proxime accedere;* so Caes. B. C. 1, 72, 5. Cf. § 7 n.

ut: 'in order that'.

3. **insigne**: rarely used in the singular as a noun; here a translation of ἰδίωμα.

quo obscurato: cf. *quo...sublato* in § 33 and *obscurari* in § 42.

6. **signum aut argumentum**: σημεῖον ἢ τεκμήριον.

ea re: the correlative of *qua re* (which should be written as two words, not one) and very common in Cic.

7. **id quod significatur**: τὸ σημειωτὸν in Sextus; i.e. the object from which the appearance proceeds.

falsum: i.e. something different from what it seems.

9. **absentibus...defendet**: there is an allusion to the forensic use of these words. As *adesse* means to appear as counsel for a litigant, so *abesse* means to decline a brief; cf. Sull. 14 (with my note); Cluent. 198; also Fin. 3, 1 uoluptas si ipsa pro se loquatur nec tam pertinaces habeat *patronos;* Cael. 63 ueritas se per se ipsa defendet; Quint. 12, 1, 33 bonas caussas etiam sine doctrina satis per se tuetur ueritas ipsa. The difference between *se ipsa defendet* (this is nearly always the order of the words in Cic., not *ipsa se*) and *se ipsam* is easily seen, but the latter form is comparatively rarely used by Cic. Cf. § 15 de se ipse detrahens; § 27 de se ipsa dubitare debet; Mayor on Phil. 2, 118.

12. **adsensione...approbatione**: note the double translation, and cf. 1, 40.

13. **non quo...sed**: slightly anacoluthic, for *non quo...sed quia;* common in Cic. Similarly above, primum quia... deinde, for deinde quia; cf. Madv. Fin. p. 796, ed. 3 and n. on § 46 below.

latus locus: cf. n. on § 112 campus. The juxtaposition of the two metaphors, *locus* and *fundamenta*, is rather grotesque.

14. **fundamenta**: cf. N. D. 1, 44 quod fundamentum huius quaestionis est, id praeclare iactum uidetis. [In Sen. dial. 6, 2, 3 bene *legerat* nulli cessura ponderi fundamenta, read *iecerat*.]

uim...sensibus: n. on § 30. The reference is to § 20.

17. **inanimum**: the constant form in Cic. who does not use *inanimatum* (Madv. on Fin. 4, 36); nor *inanimale*, which seems to have authority in Liu. 21, 32, 7.

18. **nihil agens**: cf. Schiller's Wallenstein 'wenn ich nicht wirke mehr, bin ich vernichtet' (qu. by Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, p. 74). Cf. N. D. 1, 101 nihil agentem deum non queunt cogitare.

cogitari: 'imagined'; see n. on § 48.

adsensione atque approbatione, quam Graeci *συγκατάθεσιν* uocant, pauca dicemus, non quo non latus locus sit, sed paulo ante iacta sunt fundamenta. Nam cum uim, quae esset in sensibus, explicabamus, simul illud aperiebatur, comprehendi multa et percipi sensibus, quod fieri sine adsensione non potest. Deinde cum inter inanimum et animal hoc maxime intersit, quod animal agit aliquid—nihil enim agens ne cogitari quidem potest quale sit—aut ei sensus adimendus est aut ea, quae est in nostra potestate sita, reddenda adsensio. At uero animus 38
quodam modo eripitur eis, quos neque sentire neque adsentiri uolunt. Vt enim necesse est lancem in libra ponderibus imposi-

bus: *tacentibus* Walker. 17 inanimum: *animum* codd. 20 reddenda: *credenda* V²ψ Cant. (*cr. esse*) Harl.; *cedenda* coni. Dau. 21 neque sentire: om. *neque* Christ., perperam. 22 libra: *libram* BV²M Harl.; *liberam* V¹.

19. **sensus adimendus**: cf. § 61 eam philosophiam quae nos spoliat indicio, priuat approbatione, omnibus orbat sensibus.

20. **in nostra potestate sita**: the constant expression in Cic. to convey the idea of free will. Cf. N. D. 1, 69, and De Fato, almost *passim*.

reddenda adsensio: the Stoic theory of sensation (adopted in its entirety by Antiochus) recognised two factors as involved in every act. The subject is involuntarily affected by the object, hence in one sense his will is not free and his attitude is passive and not active. So sensation is an *ἀβούλητον πάθος* (Sext. P. H. 1, 22) and the Stoics talk of *ἀνάγκη παθῶν* (ib. 1, 23); cf. A. M. 8, 316—320; ib. 11, 148; ib. 8, 397 *τὸ μὲν γὰρ φαντασιωθῆναι ἀβούλητον ἦν*: also an interesting passage in Gellius 19, 1 (copied by Aug. c. d. 9, 4), where a quotation is given from a work of Epictetus not now extant; see too Epict. Diss. 1, 1; Stob. Phys. 1, c. 41 §§ 24, 45; Ps. Plut. Plac. Phil. 4, 11, 12; Fat. 42 adsensio non possit fieri nisi commota uiso. The nature of the impression which the mind receives in sensation was dealt with in n. on § 18. When the mind becomes cognisant of the external object through the impression it has received, it has to decide whether it will *assent* (*συγκαταθήσεται*) to the impression as correctly representing the object or not. Without *συγκατάθεσις* neither action follows nor desire (*ὁρμή*—see n. on § 30). Cf. Plut. Sto. Rep. 1057 Wytt. *καὶ μὴν ἔν γε τοῖς πρὸς Ἀκαδημαικοὺς ἀγῶσιν ὁ πλεῖστος αὐτῷ τε Χρυσίππῳ καὶ Ἀντιπάτρῳ πόνος γέγονε περὶ τοῦ μήτε πράττειν μήτε ὁρμᾶν ἀσυγκαταθέτως, ἀλλὰ πλάσματα λέγειν καὶ κενὰς ὑποθέσεις τοὺς ἀξιοῦντας οἰκείας φαντασίας γενομένης, εὐθὺς ὁρμᾶν μὴ εἴξαντας μηδὲ συγκαταθεμένους.* But there is a limitation on the freedom of the will even here. While, theoretically, the will is absolutely free to accept or reject any impression, its decision in practice will depend on its healthiness or unhealthiness, that is on its conformity with reason, or otherwise. The healthy reason will uniformly accept the true and refuse the false, while the action of the unhealthy reason will be irregular. In every act of sensation therefore mind and sense are equally involved; see 1, 40 adsensione animorum; N. D. 2, 147, 150; Sext. P. H. 1, 128 where the *αἰσθήσεις* are called the *ὁδηγοὶ τῆς διανοίας*: A. M. 8, 56. [The term *συγκατάθεσις* seems to involve a military metaphor and to mean literally 'piling arms along with'. Sometimes *πρόσθεσις* is used in the same sense, as by Epict. Diss. 1, 4, 12; cf. too *ἀπροσθετεῖν* in Diog. 9, 76.]

animus eripitur: not merely *sensus*. For *eripitur* see n. on § 30.

21. **sentire ... adsentiri**: a play on words. Cf. also the Stoic doctrine 'sensus ipsos adsensus esse' (§ 30) and Sext. A. M. 8, 335 a.

22. **ut enim necesse est...non approbare**: this passage seems at first sight to contradict the expression of free will made just before. The inference has been drawn that the Stoics held all men to be incapable of refusing assent to *ἐναργῆ*,

tis deprimi, sic animum perspicuis cedere; nam quo modo non potest animal ullum non appetere id, quod accommodatum ad naturam appareat—Graeci id *οἰκεῖον* appellant—sic non potest obiectam rem perspicuam non approbare. Quamquam, si illa, de quibus disputatum est, uera sunt, nihil attinet de adsensione omnino loqui; qui enim quid percipit, adsentitur statim. Sed haec etiam secuntur, nec memoriam sine adsensione posse constare nec notitias rerum nec artis, idque, quod maximum est, ut sit aliquid in nostra potestate, in eo, qui rei nulli adsentietur, non
39 erit. Vbi igitur uirtus, si nihil situm est in ipsis nobis? Maxime autem absurdum uitia in ipsorum esse potestate neque peccare

1 quo modo non: om. *non* Vψ Cant. Harl. 4 perspicuam non approbare: om. Vψ Harl.; Cant. om. *perspicuam non* et pro *approbare* praebet *appetere*. 5 attinet: *attinens* V; *attingens* Cant. ψ Harl. 6 omnino: *omni* codd. 7 adsensione posse constare: *perceptione constare posse* Cant. 13 et quas: *et quas* V. 14 ad-

though men in general (the σοφὸς alone excepted) were supposed to be capable of mistaking false impressions for true (so V. Brochard 'De assensione Stoici quid senserint', Paris 1879, p. 9). There is no passage in the Greek sources, so far as I am aware, which can be adduced in support of this interpretation; and it stands in contradiction to the frequent Stoic assertions of the imperfect man's fallibility. The true explanation I take to be that given above; viz. that the statements we have here were intended by Antiochus to apply only to the perfectly healthy reason of the entirely perfect man. Cf. Epictetus, Diss. 3, 7, 15 *ἀδύνατόν ἐστι τῷ ψευδεῖ φαινομένῳ συγκαταθέσθαι καὶ ἀπὸ ἀληθοῦς ἀπονεῦσαι.* There is a passage in Sext. A. M. 7, 257 which verbally resembles ours, but is substantially different. Speaking of a *φαντασία* which is accepted *after thorough examination and discussion*, he says *αὕτη ἐναργὴς οὖσα καὶ πληκτική μόνον οὐχὶ τῶν τριχῶν, φασί, λαμβάνεται, κατασπῶσα ἡμᾶς εἰς συγκατάθεσιν.*

lancem...deprimi: Fin. 5, 92; Tusc. 5, 51.

1. **cedere**: *εἴκειν* is of constant occurrence in the Greek texts; see e.g. Sext. P. H. 1, 193 and 230; Diog. 7, 51 *τῶν δὲ αἰσθητικῶν μετὰ εἴξεως καὶ συγκαταθέσεως γίγνονται (αἱ φαντασίαι)*; also § 66 of this book.

quo modo...sic: n. on § 146.

2. **appetere id**: *ὁρμᾶν πρὸς ἐκεῖνο.*

3. **οἰκεῖον**: n. on § 131 conciliatione naturae.

4. **rem**: here=*uisum*, rather awkwardly.

5. **de quibus disp. est**: but above, § 32 quae disputata sunt.

6. **omnino**: belongs to *nihil.*

adsentitur statim: this seems at first sight to contradict glaringly the argument in § 19, which was to the effect that examination was necessary before sensations were accepted as true. Two explanations of the inconsistency are possible: (1) that the perfect man has no need of this examination, his instinct always leading him right, and that he alone is spoken of here, (2) that the sensation is not regarded as becoming *καταληπτική* till the examination has been gone through, and that, judgment having been given in its favour, acceptation follows instantaneously. It is also possible that Antiochus (who was quite capable of such inconsistency) in one passage copied the opinion of the earlier, and in another that of the later Stoics about the *καταληπτικὴ φαντασία*: as to which see n. on 1, 41.

7. **haec secuntur**: n. on § 30 sequitur.

memoriam etc.: the point here is somewhat different from that in § 22 where memory and the arts were mentioned. There it was argued that their existence is impossible without *κατάληψις*: here it is contended that they cannot exist without *συγκατάθεσις.*

8. **quod maximum est**: this little clause is common, e.g. Ter. Hec. 457; Sen. ep. 37, 3; Lael. 29 quod maius est. For

quemquam nisi adsensione, hoc idem in uirtute non esse, cuius omnis constantia et firmitas ex eis rebus constat, quibus adsensa est et quas approbauit, omninoque ante uideri aliquid quam agamus necesse est, eique, quod uisum sit, adsentiatur. Qua re qui aut uisum aut adsensum tollit, is omnem actionem tollit e uita.

XIII. Nunc ea uideamus, quae contra ab his disputari **40** solent. Sed prius potestis totius eorum rationis quasi fundamenta cognoscere. Componunt igitur primum artem quandam de eis, quae uisa dicimus, eorumque et uim et genera definiunt,

sentiatur: *adsentiri* Lamb.; *assentiamur* Dau. coni. H; *oportet uos* M; obelisco notauit B. 19 potestis: *oportebit* uel *opus erit* 20 artem q.: *q. artem* Cant.

maximum see n. on 1, 6 magnum.

10. **ubi igitur uirtus**: we here touch on one of the greatest difficulties of the Stoic system. As we saw (n. on 1, § 29) when they discoursed of the general government of the universe, they professed a rigid fatalism, but when they turned to moral questions, they preached most strongly the doctrines of free will and individual responsibility for action. It would be out of place to discuss here the struggles made by the Stoics, especially Chrysippus, to bridge over the chasm between these two parts of their teaching. By far the most important source of information on this question is the instructive fragment of Cicero's De Fato which has come down to us. Cf. particularly §§ 40—44. A *resumé* (clear but incomplete) will be found in Zeller III, 1, 164 sq. ed. 3 or Stoics E. Tr. pp. 168—172; see also Brochard's pamphlet, pp. 35 sq.

11. **uitia etc.**: this argument is of course drawn from the generally admitted necessity of punishing offences. Cf. Fat. 40 non sunt igitur neque adsensiones neque actiones in nostra potestate. Ex quo efficitur ut nec laudationes iustae sint nec uituperationes nec honores nec supplicia.

12. **hoc idem**: the juxtaposition of two contrasted sentences, without the second being accompanied by any adversative particle to mark the contrast, is common in Cic.; see n. on 1, 16.

13. **constantia et firmitas**: §§ 23, 66.

quibus...approbauit: a double rendering of *οἷς συγκατέθετο*.

14. **ante uideri etc.**: for the argument cf. § 25, also for the passive sense of *uideri* the n. there.

15. **adsentiatur**: for the doubtful passive use cf. n. on § 99 adsensa. As to the change of construction (*uideri* and *adsentiatur* both depending on *necesse est*) see Madv. on Fin. 5, 25, who quotes N. D. 3, 36.

16. **actionem tollit**: Fat. 29 omnis e uita tolletur actio; Fin. 5, 54 somnus aufert sensus actionemque tollit omnem; an answer to the contention is given below, § 104. Cf. Fin. 1, 64 (from Epicurus) sublata cognitione et scientia, tollitur omnis ratio et uitae degendae et rerum agendarum.

18. **ea uideamus**: so Phil 2, 20 maiora uideamus; Fin. 2, 82.

quae...disputari: n. on § 32.

19. **potestis...cognoscere**: 'you have an opportunity of learning'. The text seems perfectly sound.

eorum rationis: for the double gen. cf. n. on § 128 omnium rerum una est definitio comprehendendi.

quasi fundamenta: the *quasi* probably marks a translation from the Greek; cf. the words *ὥσπερ θεμέλιος* in Sext. A. M. 5, 50; above § 37. The whole of this section, if attentively considered, will be seen to be translated very closely from the Greek original.

20. **artem**: 'method'; used here like the Gk. *τέχνη*: see Madv. on Fin. 3, 4; Mayor on Iuuen. 7, 177 artem scindes Theodori.

21. **uisa**: here perfectly general = *φαντασίαι*, while *id quod percipi et comprehendi possit* is special = *καταληπτικὴ φαντασία*.

uim: the definition of the whole class of *φαντασίαι*: *genera* = the subdivisions or species which the class comprises.

in his, quale sit id, quod percipi et comprehendi possit, totidem uerbis quot Stoici. Deinde illa exponunt duo, quae quasi contineant omnem hanc quaestionem: quae ita uideantur, ut etiam alia eodem modo uideri possint nec in eis quicquam intersit, non posse eorum alia percipi, alia non percipi: nihil interesse autem, non modo si omni ex parte eiusdem modi sint, sed etiam si discerni non possint. Quibus positis unius argumenti conclusione tota ab his caussa comprehenditur. Composita autem ea conclusio sic est: 'eorum, quae uidentur, alia uera sunt, alia falsa, et quod falsum est, id percipi non potest: quod autem uerum uisum est id omne tale est, ut eiusdem modi falsum etiam possit uideri'. Et 'quae uisa sint eius modi, ut in eis nihil intersit, non posse

4 non posse: Man.; *posse* A¹VG Cant. ψ; *non omnes posse* BA²E. 12 quae uisa sint: codd.; *q. u. sunt* edd.; *u. sint* autem cum lectione *posse* cohaeret, cum oratio ea sit quam obliquam uocant. non posse accidere: *n. potest a.* H Bait. M.

1\. **in his**: *his* is neuter and refers generally to the part of the sentence which precedes: 'in the course of these proceedings'.

percipi et comprehendi: above, n. on § 24.

totidem uerbis: 'at as great length'. Of course the only purpose which the Academics had in laying down these definitions was to show that there was no real thing which corresponded to the definition of the καταληπτικὴ φαντασία. Carneades largely used the method of *reductio ad absurdum*.

2\. **quasi**: it is doubtful whether this marks *contineant* as a rendering of a Greek word, or merely apologises for the metaphor it contains.

contineant...quaestionem: so § 22 memoriae, quae artis continet; § 107 illa sunt lumina duo quae caussam istam continent; Tusc. 4, 65 una res uidetur caussam continere; Off. 2, 84. The same sense is very frequently found in the passive *contineri*.

3\. **quae ita...possint**: the expressions closely resemble § 33 ut quicquam... uideri. Also § 83 should be very closely compared. For understanding the context it is essential to distinguish clearly the sensation (*uisum*) from the *object* or *thing* which causes it. Here the argument is that two *things* may give rise to two *sensations* so much alike that the person who experiences *one* of the *sensations* cannot tell which of the two *objects* or *things* has caused it (cf. § 34 nn.).

4\. **in eis**: sc. uisis.

5\. **eorum**: the objects.

percipi: = καταλαμβάνεσθαι.

nihil interesse autem: 'now no difference does exist' i.e. between two *uisa*; that is to say 'we are entitled to assume that no difference exists'. The sceptic is not concerned to prove the absolute similarity of the two *sensations* which are caused by the two dissimilar *objects*; it is sufficient for him if he can show that human faculties are not perfect enough to judge infallibly concerning any difference which may exist: cf. § 85.

6\. **eiusdem modi**: like *eodem modo* above and in § 33; here used as a less emphatic phrase than *eadem* would have been.

sint: the real subject is *uisa*.

discerni: sc. alterum ab altero.

7\. **argumenti conclusione**: see n. on § 26.

8\. **caussa**: 'question at issue'. Cf. Leg. 1, 17 nobis complectenda in hac disputatione tota caussa est.

9\. **eorum quae uidentur**: = uisorum. The general drift of the argument here is this: some *uisa* do accurately represent the objects from which they proceed, while others do not; but we have no means of recognising which *uisa* belong to these two different classes; we are therefore obliged to distrust all *uisa*.

alia uera etc.: the whole context is well illustrated by what Numenius ap.

accidere ut eorum alia percipi possint, alia non possint. Nullum 41
igitur est uisum quod percipi possit'. Quae autem sumunt, ut
concludant id quod uolunt, ex his duo sibi putant concedi:
neque enim quisquam repugnat. Ea sunt haec: 'quae uisa falsa
sint, ea percipi non posse', et alterum: 'inter quae uisa nihil
intersit, ex eis non posse alia talia esse, ut percipi possint, alia
ut non possint': reliqua uero multa et uaria oratione defendunt,
quae sunt item duo, unum: 'quae uideantur, eorum alia uera
esse, alia falsa', alterum: 'omne uisum, quod sit a uero, tale esse,
quale etiam a falso possit esse'. Haec duo proposita non prae- 42
teruolant, sed ita dilatant, ut non mediocrem curam adhibeant et
diligentiam; diuidunt enim in partis et eas quidem magnas:

13 alia non possint: om. Cant. 20 quae uideantur: *eorum quae u.* A^{2}B^2 Cant. 24 et eas: *et* om. Vψ.

Eus. Pr. Eu. 14, 8, 4—10 says of Carneades. The whole passage is too long to quote, but cf. esp. §§ 6, 7 *τὸ γὰρ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν συγχωρῶν, ὥσπερ συνεργαζόμενος τῆς ζητήσεως τρόπῳ, παλαιστοῦ δεινοῦ λαβὴν δοὺς περιεγίγνετο ἔνθεν...παραλαβὼν γὰρ* (so Dindorf, but the right reading is evidently *παραβαλών*) *ἀληθεῖ μὲν ὅμοιον ψεῦδος, καταληπτικῇ δὲ φαντασίᾳ καταληπτὸν ὅμοιον... οὐκ εἴασεν οὔτε τὸ ἀληθὲς εἶναι οὔτε τὸ ψεῦδος.* The impossibility of being certain whether the impressions of sense correctly represent the objects which cause them has been the theme of sceptics in all ages. Cf. Berkeley, *Principles* § 89 'all scepticism arises from a supposition of a difference between *things* and *ideas*'; Sext. P. H. 1, 22 *περὶ μὲν τοῦ φαίνεσθαι τοῖον ἢ τοῖον τὸ ὑποκείμενον* (i.e. the *object* from which the *impression* proceeds) *οὐδεὶς ἴσως ἀμφισβητεῖ, περὶ δὲ τοῦ εἰ τοιοῦτον ἔστιν ὁποῖον φαίνεται ζητεῖται.* On the limits of ancient scepticism as compared with modern see Introd. p. 54.

et quod falsum est: on the somewhat unusual *et* for *atqui* in the *assumptio* see Draeger II^2 p. 25.

10. **quod uerum uisum est**: = qu. uisum est uerum esse; cf. § 34 uideatur uerum.

11. **uideri**: note the avoidance of *esse* and cf. n. on *nihil interesse autem* above.

12. **eius modi......intersit**: again a clumsy rendering of *ἀπαράλλακτα*: see n. on § 34.

non posse: Madv. on Fin. 1, 30 somewhat arbitrarily denies that Cic. could begin reporting a philosopher's opinions in *oratio recta* and then change to *or. obl.*, although he allows the contrary change to be not uncommon. M. examines no other passages, but in § 101 we have an instance precisely similar. Cf. too Kühn. Liu. Synt. p. 236, ed. 2.

14. **quae...uolunt**: simply a periphrasis for the Greek *λήμματα* 'premisses'; see n. on § 44.

16. **neque...repugnat**: merely a parenthetic remark by Lucullus. In § 83 it is stated that the first of the *second* pair of statements is conceded by all but the Epicureans (who held all *uisa* to be *uera*—see § 79); the whole battle against the Stoics and Antiocheans therefore turns on the fourth and last statement.

uisa...percipi: see above, n. on 1 § 41 *καταληπτόν*.

18. **alia talia**: for the disregard of euphony cf. n. on 1, 6 quam quibusnam quisquam.

21. **a uero**: for this use of the preposition see n. on § 105 a sole collucet.

22. **proposita**: = *θέσεις* as in Fat. 4 Academicorum contra propositum disputandi consuetudinem.

praeteruolant: 'skim over'. As to the fondness of Cic. for *uolare* and its compounds, see Nägelsb. Stil. § 132.

23. **dilatant**: 'develope'; so Parad. 2 dilatare argumentum: N. D. 3, 22 d. locum.

24. **diuidunt**: sc. proposita.

primum in sensus, deinde in ea, quae ducuntur a sensibus et ab omni consuetudine, quam obscurari uolunt. Tum perueniunt ad eam partem, ut ne ratione quidem et coniectura ulla res percipi possit. Haec autem uniuersa concidunt etiam minutius. Vt enim de sensibus hesterno sermone uidistis, item faciunt de reliquis, in singulisque rebus, quas in minima dispertiunt, uolunt efficere eis omnibus, quae uisa sint, ueris adiuncta esse falsa, quae a ueris nihil differant: ea cum talia sint, non posse comprehendi.

43 XIV. Hanc ego subtilitatem philosophia quidem dignissimam iudico, sed ab eorum caussa, qui ita disserunt, remotis-

2 quam obscurari: *quae obscurare* coni. Dau. scr. Bait. 11 horum: *harum* Lamb. al.; *rhetorum* uel *oratorum* coni. H. 12 dissimilitudinesque: *similitudi-*

1. **in sensus**:=in ea quae ad sensus pertinent. See n. on 1, 20 in naturam et mores.

ea...sensibus: cf. nn. on § 21, above.

2. **omni consuetudine**: 'general experience', κοινὴ συνήθεια in Sext. A. M. 1 §§ 86, 97, 152; ib. 8, 129. For consuetudo=συνήθεια cf. n. on § 87.

obscurari: it is strange that so many scholars should have considered the passive verb corrupt here. It is the prevailing though not universal custom, not only of Cic. but of the other classical prose writers, to use the passive infinitive with verbs of desire, even where the active would stand and make sense, and where it would be naturally used by moderns. Cf. e. g. 1, 2 occultari uelit; 1, 32 explanari uolebant; Fin. 1, 28 percurri disciplinam placet; Balb. 6 condemnari uolunt; Fam. 6, 14, 1 id tibi a me declarari uolo. Many exx. are to be found in Livy and Nepos. Edd. and writers of MSS have often wrongly altered the passive into the active inf. in such passages; see Madv. Em. Liu. p. 44 n. ed. 2. [Cf. also above § 17 *definiri* aiebant necesse esse; Verg. Aen. 3, 461 haec sunt quae nostra liceat te uoce *moneri*.] Vaucher's em. *obseruare solent* is simply fatuous, and W. Christ's *obseruare nolunt* is utterly wanton without being ingenious.

3. **ne ratione quidem**: this theme is developed below, §§ 91 sq. Hume, Essays, ed. Green and Grose II 127 'it may seem a very extravagant attempt of the sceptics to destroy reason by argument and ratiocination, yet this is the grand scope of all their inquiries and disputes'.

4. **uniuersa**: 'general propositions.'

minutius: adverb.

5. **de sermone uidistis**: for the omission of *fieri* see n. on 2, 121.

6. **in...rebus**: 'in the case of each matter'. For the construction *in rebus efficere* cf. n. on 1, 28.

7. **efficere**: 'to prove'; as often.

eis...sint: a periphrasis for *omnibus uisis*. For the position of *ueris* cf. § 34 quod ita mihi uideatur uerum.

adiuncta esse: Sext. A. M. 7, 164 πάσῃ τῇ δοκούσῃ (sc. φαντασίᾳ) ἀληθεῖ καθεστάναι εὑρίσκεταί τις ἀπαράλλακτος ψευδής: almost in the same words ib. 438; cf. too 252, 415; Numen. quoted above in § 41 n.

8. **ea**: sc. *uisa* in general; *comprehendi* has of course the strict sense of καταλαμβάνεσθαι.

9. **subtilitatem**: n. on 1, 7.

11. **definitiones...partitiones**: cf. 1, 32 n. As Kirchmann (pref. to his trans. p. 10) remarks, the ancient sceptics never attacked the formal validity of the laws of thought as laid down by logicians, but rather tried to prove them useless for the attainment of any solid results. Cf. § 91 below.

horum: 'such things'. The change to *harum* is unnecessary (see Kühner Vol. II § 15, 1) and spoils the sense. The feminine would have to be strictly referred to *definitiones* and *partitiones*, while the neuter extends the reference to all processes *of the kind*. Cf. N. D. 2, 79 si inest in hominum genere mens fides uirtus concordia, unde haec in terram nisi a superis defluere potuerunt? Sen. ep. 92, 19 crus solidum et lacertus et dentes et h o r u m sanitas.

simam. Definitiones enim et partitiones et horum luminibus utens oratio, tum similitudines dissimilitudinesque et earum tenuis et acuta distinctio fidentium est hominum illa uera et firma et certa esse quae tutentur, non eorum qui clament nihilo magis uera illa esse quam falsa. Quid enim agant si, cum aliquid definierint, roget eos quispiam, num illa definitio possit in aliam rem transferri quamlubet? Si posse dixerint, quid dicere habeant cur illa uera definitio sit? Si negauerint, fatendum sit, quoniam uel illa uera definitio transferri non possit in falsum, quod ea definitione explicetur, id percipi posse, quod

nesque (om. *dissim.*) Aψ. 18 si negauerint: *sin n.* Dau. 19 uel illa: *uel* incl. H; *uel illa* incl. Bait., eiecit M. uera: *a uero* V (corr.) ψ Cant. 20 quod ea: *uel q. ea* ψ Cant.

luminibus: a technical rhetorical term, = σχήματα, for which cf. De Or. 3 §§ 202—208; Brut. 69; Or. §§ 134—138; Volkmann, Rhet. d. Gr. u. Röm. pp. 391 sq. ed. 2. See also n. on § 107 lumina.

12. **tum**: n. on § 1, above.

13. **tenuis**: 'refined', 'subtle', as in Hor. s. 2, 4, 36 tenui ratione saporum.

acuta distinctio: cf. Brut. 303 diuidebat acute.

fidentium: § 120 leuitatem temere adsentientium; n. on § 20 exercitati.

uera...firma...certa: n. on § 27.

14. **nihilo magis**: one of the most famous Sceptic catchwords; see Diog. 9, 74 (of Pyrrho) *διὰ τῆς οὖν Οὐδὲν ὁρίζομεν φωνῆς τὸ τῆς ἀρρεψίας πάθος δηλοῦται· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ διὰ τῆς Οὐδὲν μᾶλλον*, with the succeeding sentences; similarly Sext. P. H. 1, 14; ib. 1, 188 sq. and often elsewhere; Gell. 11, 5, 4. With the expressions here cf. Sen. ep. 88, 44 Nausiphanes ait ex his, quae uidentur esse, nihil magis esse quam non esse. In § 58 (below) we find *nihil* not *nihilo* magis; see n. there.

17. **transferri**: 'be adapted'; cf. § 50 transferri, with n. The Academic would of course answer here that his *ὅρος* is based on probability merely, like all the rest of his judgments, while Lucullus argues as though the *ὅρος* were admitted by the Academic to be absolutely and irrefragably true.

18. **dicere habeant**: the forms *habeo dicere* and *habeo quod dicam* are both found not uncommonly in Cic.; for the former see Balb. 33; S. Rosc. 100; Diu. 2, 136; Part. or. 10; N. D. 1, 63; for the latter Diu. 1, 131; ib. 2, 8; Cato m. 85; Lael. 104. The only other infinitives used by Cic. after *habeo* are apparently *polliceri* in Fam. 1, 5a, 3; *docere* in Orat. 144; and *scribere* in Att. 2, 22, 6. The inf. after *habeo* is not common out of Cic.; see Draeger II § 413, 4; later writers have also the constr. *habeo dicendum* (Sen. contr. 9, 5, 1). Cf. also § 17 facere ingredimur; § 46 facere constitui.

cur...sit: Lucullus tacitly assumes the principle stated in Sext. P. H. 2, 209 *μοχθηροὺς ὅρους εἶναι τοὺς περιέχοντάς τι τῶν μὴ προσόντων τοῖς ὁριστοῖς* and in the schoolmen's maxim 'definitio non debet latior esse definito suo'. Cf. nn. on §§ 56, 57.

negauerint...sit: for the change from indic. in protasis to subj. in apodosis, see n. on § 20 sentiet...insaniat; also cf. n. on § 140 si sequare, ruunt.

19. **uel**: 'even', as above, § 26 and below, § 93 uel stertas licet, and often. It is strange that so many edd. should have thought the word spurious here.

uera: the repetition of the word here is emphatic and somewhat sarcastic; for similar reasons the words *ueri et falsi* were repeated in § 33.

20. **falsum**: here not an unreality, but merely a thing misconceived; see n. on § 18.

quod minime uolunt: cf. § 18 eo quo minime uolt; § 54 quod nolunt; Phil. 2, 19 illud cuius est, non dico audaciae, sed, quod minime uolt, stultitiae. For the accusative *quod* cf. n. on § 17.

minime illi uolunt. Eadem dici poterunt in omnibus partibus.
44 Si enim dicent ea, de quibus disserent, se dilucide perspicere nec ulla communione uisorum impediri, comprehendere ea se fatebuntur. Sin autem negabunt uera uisa a falsis posse distingui, qui poterunt longius progredi? Occurretur enim, sicut occursum est. Nam concludi argumentum non potest nisi eis quae ad concludendum sumpta erunt ita probatis, ut falsa eiusdem modi nulla possint esse. Ergo si rebus comprehensis et perceptis nisa et progressa ratio hoc efficiet, nihil posse comprehendi, quid potest reperiri quod ipsum sibi repugnet magis? Cumque ipsa natura accuratae orationis hoc profiteatur, se

1 partibus: par*tibus A, unde *pariter rebus* coni. C. F. Hermann. 9 nisa:

1. **partibus**: i.e. at every step in the controversy; so § 42 diuidunt in partis.

2. **perspicere**: see n. on § 53.

3. **communione**: ἐπιμιξία: see n. on § 34 communitas.

impediri: as above, § 33 impediatur, where the argument is essentially the same as here.

comprehendere: καταλαμβάνεσθαι, as usual.

4. **a falsis ... distingui**: Hor. ep. 1, 10, 29 uero distinguere falsum; also n. on § 27 a falsis interesse.

5. **occurretur**: ἀπαντᾶν is thus constantly used by Sext. and other late writers. So *occurrere* in § 46 and *occurritur* in Off. 2, 7.

6. **concludi argumentum**: n. on § 26 argumenti conclusio.

eis...erunt: periphrasis for λήμματα as in § 41. In the later Greek texts the two premisses of a syllogism are together called λήμματα, but if contrasted, the first is styled λῆψις, the second πρόσληψις (*sumptio* and *assumptio* in Diu. 2, 108).

7. **ita probatis etc.**: the word *probatis* would not have been sufficient alone, since the Academics used *probatio* in a certain sense; see § 99.

ut...esse: cf. the language used of the καταληπτικὴ φαντασία in §§ 18, 112.

8. **possint esse**: for the collocation see n. on § 22, above.

9. **nisa et progressa**: cf. Tusc. 2, 47 ratio quae conixa per se et progressa longius fit perfecta uirtus; also above § 27 philosophia quae rationibus progredi debet; Fin. 5, 46 progressa ratio. The abl. *rebus* is instrumental, as is always the case after *niti* with the sense 'to strive', as in Sall. Cat. 11, 2 ille uera uia nititur; Iug. 93, 4 nisus ramis...saxis; Liu. 2, 50, 9 nisi corporibus armisque rupere cuneo uiam (i.e. not 'resting on their bodies, etc.' but 'using their bodies and weapons in the struggle'). Cf. Plato, Theaet. 168 D τῷ τοῦ παιδὸς φόβῳ ἀγωνίζεσθαι. In Cic. as in other authors *nisus* usually means 'striving', *nixus* 'resting', but our MSS do not permit us to make the rule absolute. In Tusc. 2, 47 quoted above, the original reading was probably *conisa*, which being a rare word was misunderstood and turned first into *connexa* (which some MSS give) then into *conixa*. [It is not unlikely that in Fin. 5, 58 rerum principia parua sunt sed suis progressionibus usa augentur, *usa* is a corruption of *nisa*.]

11. **natura accuratae orationis**: little different from *accurata oratio;* cf. Fin. 5, 33 hoc intellegant, si quando naturam hominis dicam, hominem dicere me, nihil enim hoc differt; so N. D. 2, 136 alui natura. Similar periphrases with *natura* are common in Lucretius; see Munro's n. on 2, 646.

orationis: not exactly for *rationis* (as Faber) but used as above § 43 oratio = 'speech'.

profiteatur: for this and the preceding words cf. De Or. 1, 21 uis oratoris professioque ipsa bene dicendi hoc suscipere ac polliceri uideatur; ib. 2, 191 ipsa natura orationis...oratorem...permouet; below, § 73. Sext. often uses ὑπισχνεῖσθαι as *profiteri* is used here; e.g. in A. M. 7, 136.

12. **patefacturam**: cf. the passages quoted in n. on § 26 ἀπόδειξις: the words ἐκκαλύπτειν, ἐκκαλυπτικός, δηλωτικός are often applied to proofs and syllogisms in the later Greek.

aliquid patefacturam quod non appareat et, quo id facilius adsequatur, adhibituram et sensus et ea quae perspicua sint, qualis est istorum oratio, qui omnia non tam esse quam uideri uolunt? Maxime autem conuincuntur, cum haec duo pro congruentibus sumunt tam uehementer repugnantia: primum esse quaedam falsa uisa, quod cum uolunt, declarant quaedam esse uera: deinde ibidem, inter falsa uisa et uera nihil interesse. At primum sumpseras, tamquam interesset: ita priori posterius, posteriori superius non iungitur.

Sed progrediamur longius et ita agamus ut nihil nobis **45**
adsentati esse uideamur, quaeque ab eis dicuntur, sic persequamur ut nihil in praeteritis relinquamus. Primum igitur per-

uisa codd.; corr. Manut. 12 appareat: *apparebat* V² ψ Cant. 20 non iungitur: sic V² Cant.; *coniungitur* cett.

13. **ea...sint**: τὰ ἐναργῆ: see nn. on §§ 17, 34, above.

14. **qualis est**: 'what are we to think of...?' Qualis is often thus used in indignant questions; cf. e.g. § 115, below; Liu. 5, 5, 4.

16. **repugnantia**: so N. D. 1, 30 inter se uehementer repugnantia; n. on § 50, below.

primum...interesse: the attempt to prove that the Academic premisses are ἀλλήλων ἀναιρετικὰ (Sext. P. H. 2, 191) fails. Lucullus confuses *essential* with *apparent* differences. The Academics admitted that some *uisa* might truly represent their source; they contended however that our faculties do not enable us to feel sure in any particular case that a *uisum* is really of such a character. In other words we cannot mark off those *uisa* which bear the true imprint of the objects which originate them, from those other *uisa* which are either mere phantoms or else incorrectly represent the source from which they come.

18. **deinde ibidem**: a rather rare combination of particles, found also in Fin. 1, 19. Similar combinations are *statim deinde* in Verr. 5, 7; *ibidem ilico* in Att. 2, 12, 2; *deinde postea* in Clu. 71 and elsewhere; *post deinde* in Sen. ben. 2, 34, 1; *tum deinde* in Liu. 2, 8, 3 (needlessly altered by edd.); Sen. ep. 101, 4; Quint. 4, 2, 27; *deinde tunc* in Sen. ep. 10, 4; ib. 74, 23; ib. 117, 1; *mox deinde* in Iuuenal. 3, 280 (see further exx. in Mayor's index s. u. 'mox'); *hinc deinde*, Plin. n. h. 4, 122; 6, 77.

19. **priori...iungitur**: cf. Fin. 3, 74 quid posterius priori non conuenit? quid sequitur quod non respondeat superiori? For the use of *prius* here cf. ὁ προηγούμενος λόγος, common in post-Aristotelian texts; also § 67 primum...secundum.

20. **non iungitur**: διήρτηται is the term used by Sextus of the premisses when inconsistent, συνήρτηται, συνάρτησις when consistent (A. M. 8, 430).

21. **progrediamur longius**: similar expressions will be found in §§ 27, 44, 93, 94; Fin. 5, 43; Tusc. 1, 17; Phil. 2, 9. Cf. also n. on § 44 nisa et progressa.

22. **adsentati**: this has been sometimes taken as equivalent to *assensi*, so that Lucullus would mean 'we will argue this question as though we had not yet adopted any definite opinions', i. e. 'with entirely unprejudiced minds'. In a like spirit Cotta at the outset of his discourse in N. D. 3, 7 says 'sic adgredior ad hanc disputationem quasi nihil umquam audierim de dis immortalibus, nihil cogitauerim'. But Cic. does not use *assentari* as the equivalent of *adsentiri* (see Georges on Velleius, p. 37, Leipzig 1877) nor *adsentatio* for *adsensio* (found in Vell. 2, 128, 2). The words *ita ut...uideamur* mean 'so that we may not seem to have flattered ourselves', i. e. 'to have shown undue partiality for our own opinions'. Cf. Lael. 97 is qui ipse sibi assentetur; Fam. 3, 11, 2 mihi ipsi assentor fortasse; Iuuenal. 3, 126 ne nobis blandiar; Plin. ep. 5, 1, 11 nisi forte blandior mihi; Sen. ben. 5, 7, 4 assentator suus. The opposite notion is found in Flacc. 18 sibi aduersari.

23. **ut nihil**: n. on § 48.

in praeteritis: so N. D. 1, 31 in

spicuitas illa quam diximus, satis magnam habet uim ut ipsa per sese ea quae sint, nobis ita ut sint indicet. Sed tamen, ut maneamus in perspicuis firmius et constantius, maiore quadam opus est uel arte uel diligentia, ne ab eis quae clara sint ipsa per sese, quasi praestigiis quibusdam et captionibus depellamur. Nam qui uoluit subuenire erroribus Epicurus eis qui uidentur conturbare ueri cognitionem, dixitque sapientis esse opinionem a perspicuitate seiungere, nihil profecit: ipsius enim opinionis errorem nullo modo sustulit.

46 XV. Quam ob rem cum duae caussae perspicuis et euidentibus rebus aduersentur, auxilia totidem sunt contra comparanda. Aduersatur enim primum, quod parum defigunt animos

6 Epicurus: incl. Bait. eis qui uidentur: *is qui uidetur* Vψ; *si uidetur* Cant. 7 dixitque: *quamquam d.* Cant. 8 profecit: A²B²rψ Cant. M; *proficit* A¹B¹; *fecit* V Bait. H coll. Tusc. 5, 13. 9 nullo m. sustulit: om. Cant. 11 contra: om. Cant. comparanda: *paranda* ψ. 12 aduersatur: *aduersantur* codd.;

erratis; ib. 1, 36 in optatis (also Fam. 2, 13, 2); Fam. 13, 56, 1 in perditis et desperatis; Orat. 59 in remissis; Quint. 11, 2, 2 in cogitatis; Ov. Met. 10, 435 in uetitis; Cic. Off. 1, 32 ex tribus optatis. For the phrase *relinquere in* cf. 1, 36 in mediis r.; Fin. 3, 53.

1. **quam diximus**: 'as we have called it'; see § 17.

ut ipsa: here *ipsa* is probably feminine, though it might be neuter as below, *quae clara sint ipsa per sese.*

3. **maiore opus est arte**: cf. nn. on 1, § 41.

5. **praestigiis**: the words *quasi quibusdam* show (see n. on 1, 21) that Cic. is rendering some Greek term, probably *σοφίσμασι*: cf. Fin. 4, 74 uerborum pr.; Liu. 6, 15, 13 quo magis argui praestigias iubetis uestras; Gell. 13, 24, 2 (ed. Hertz) Graecae istorum praestigiae philosophari sese dicentium umbrasque uerborum inanes fingentium; Sen. ep. 45, 8 compares sophisms to 'praestigiatorum acetabula et calculi, in quibus me fallacia ipsa delectat'. From another point of view Epict. Diss. 3, 12, 1 says *philosophers* are really like *θαυματοποιοί.*

captionibus: another rendering of *σοφίσμασι*: so § 46 captiosis interrogationibus; § 49 captiosissimo genere interrogationis. See n. on § 75.

6. **Epicurus**: see nn. on §§ 79, 80.

7. **cognitionem**: here the verbal noun conveys the idea of *possibility;* see n. on § 51 una depulsio; § 84 distinctio; also Nägelsbach, Stil. § 58 b, to whose exx. add *exactio* in Sen. ben. 4, 39, 2; *curatio* ib. 6, 16, 5.

10. **persp. et euid.**: so Arist. Eth. Nic. 1, 4, 3 *τῶν ἐναργῶν καὶ φανερῶν.*

11. **auxilia**: so, speaking of errors as to *uisa*, Epict. D. 1, 27, 2 *εἰ σοφίσματα ἡμᾶς Πυρρώνεια καὶ Ἀκαδημαϊκὰ τὰ θλίβοντά ἐστιν, ἐκείνοις προσάγωμεν τὴν βοήθειαν.*

12. **primum...alterum est**: this kind of slight anacoluthon is common; so §§ 56...59 primum...illud uero; 107, 108 (exactly as here); De Or. 2, 294 duo... unum...alterum est; similarly Off. 1, 16 (where see Holden's n.); De Or. 2, 120 duo...alterum est. See other exx. in Madvig's first Exc. to his ed. of Fin.; also cf. my nn. on 1, 7 siue...si uero; 2, 15 alter...Socrates autem; below § 52 primum (not followed by deinde).

defigunt: the general subject 'people' is omitted, as is so often the case in Aristotle; cf. n. on § 79 dicit.

13. **ea...ea**: see n. on § 27.

luce: see n. on § 26 and cf. § 122 circumfusa tenebris.

14. **alterum est etc.**: cf. Diog. 7, 89 *διαστρέφεσθαι δὲ τὸ λογικὸν ζῷον, ποτὲ μὲν διὰ τὰς τῶν ἔξωθεν πραγματειῶν πιθανότητας· ποτὲ δὲ διὰ τὴν κατήχησιν τῶν συνόντων*: Plut. Sto. rep. 1036 D (from Chrysippus) *οὐχ ὡς ἔτυχε δὲ οὐδὲ τοὺς ἐναντίους ὑποδεικτέον λόγους οὐδὲ πρὸς τὰ ἐναντία πιθανά, ἀλλ' εὐλαβουμένους μὴ καὶ*

et intendunt in ea quae perspicua sunt, ut quanta luce ea circumfusa sint possint agnoscere; alterum est, quod fallacibus et captiosis interrogationibus circumscripti atque decepti quidam, cum eas dissoluere non possunt, desciscunt a ueritate. Oportet igitur et ea, quae pro perspicuitate responderi possunt, in promptu habere, de quibus iam diximus, et esse armatos, ut occurrere possimus interrogationibus eorum captionesque discutere: quod deinceps facere constitui. Exponam igitur generatim argumenta **47**
eorum, quoniam ipsi etiam illi solent non confuse loqui. Primum conantur ostendere multa posse uideri esse, quae omnino nulla sint, cum animi inaniter moueantur eodem modo rebus eis, quae nullae sint ut eis, quae sint. Nam cum dicatis, inquiunt, uisa

corr. C. Stephanus. 14 sint: *sunt* codd. quod: *q. cum* ψ. 16 possunt: *possint* coni. M. desciscunt: *desistunt* Harl. 18 et esse...possimus: om. Cant. 21 quoniam...illi: haec uerba iniuria suspecta sunt Dauisio. 23 inaniter: *frequenter* coni. Dau.; delendam uocem censuit Walker.

περισπασθέντες ὑπ' αὐτῶν τὰς καταλήψεις ἀφῶσιν, οὔτε τῶν λύσεων ἱκανῶς ἂν ἀκοῦσαι δυνάμενοι, καταλαμβάνοντές τε εὐαποσείστως.

15. **interrogationibus**: n. on 1 § 5; cf. too Sen. ben. 4, 26, 1 ne interrogatione insidiosa capiamur; Epict. D. 1, 7, 11 *ὑπὸ τῶν σοφιζομένων διαπλανηθήσεσθαι ὡς ἀποδεικνυόντων.*

16. **dissoluere**: so in § 75 and *διαλύεσθαι* constantly in Greek.

desciscunt a ueritate: imitated by Amm. 16, 7, 4 a ueritate desciuisse (not quoted in Michaelis' pamphlet).

18. **armatos**: so § 87 armatum esse Carneaden; Tusc. 1, 78 simus armati; ib. 5, 41 uolumus eum qui beatus sit esse saeptum atque munitum. [By the aid of the last passage we may correct Att. 14, 5, 2 non modo saepti uerum etiam magni, by reading *muniti* for *magni.*]

19. **discutere**: 'shatter'. The metaphorical use of the word has sometimes been wrongly suspected, as in Lucan. 1, 119 morte tua discussa fides, where 'shattered' gives excellent sense; yet many edd. change to *discissa.*

20. **facere constitui**: cf. n. on § 43 dicere habeant.

21. **eorum...illi**: n. on § 29; Sull. 19 n.

non confuse: non goes closely with the adverb, so as to form one expression with it. See n. on 1, 39 non corpus.

confuse loqui: this means to disregard the logical rules concerning division, partition and definition. See my n. on 1, 5 definiunt...concludunt, and cf. Fin. 2, 27 Epicurus confuse loquitur; N. D. 3, 19 noli agere confuse; Inu. 1, 49 in praesenti partis argumentandi confuse et permixtim dispersimus; post discripte et electe in genus quodque caussae digeremus; Tusc. 1, 23 cuperem equidem utrumque, si posset, sed est difficile confundere; Galen. De Plac. 1 § 200 (ed. Müller) *συγκεχυμένως δὲ εἴρηται καὶ ἀδιορίστως* (of Aristotle). In Orat. 113 *fuse lateque dicere* is opposed to *dialecticorum scientia;* in Leg. 1, 36 *fuse dicere* and *articulatim d.* (cf. *generatim* here) are contrasted. Cf. too *perplexe loqui, respondere* in Ter. Eun. 817; Liu. 30, 42, 7; ib. 6, 13, 8.

22. **esse**: emphatic, 'to exist'.

nulla: for *non;* common in Cic.; above, § 22.

23. **inaniter moueantur**: my nn. on § 34 will show the absurdity of suspecting these words.

eodem modo rebus eis: cf. n. on § 18.

rebus...quae sint: the contrast is common in Sextus between *ὑπαρκτὰ* and *καθάπαξ ἀνυπαρκτά*, as in P. H. 1, 104 (where he is speaking of dreams).

24. **cum dicatis etc.**: this sentence is slightly anacoluthic.

uisa: Macrob. somn. 1, 3, 2 remarks that Cic. renders by *uisum* (not only *φαντασία* but) *φάντασμα*, which was the term used by Chrysippus (along with *φανταστι-*

quaedam mitti a deo, uelut ea quae in somnis uideantur quaeque oraculis, auspiciis, extis declarentur—haec enim aiunt probari Stoicis, quos contra disputant—quaerunt quonam modo, falsa uisa quae sint, ea deus efficere possit probabilia: quae autem plane proxime ad uerum accedant, efficere non possit, aut, si ea quoque possit, cur illa non possit, quae perdifficiliter, internoscantur tamen? Et, si haec, cur non inter quae nihil sit
48 omnino? Deinde, cum mens moueatur ipsa per sese, ut et ea

1 somnis: *somniis* ψrH. 5 plane proxime: aut *plane* aut *proxime* glossema putauit Durand. accedant: *accedunt* codd. 6 perdifficiliter: *perdifficulter* codd. aliquot deteriores. 7 tamen: hic Bentleio excidisse uidentur uerba *aut ne internoscantur quidem*, coll. §§ 49, 50. sit: *intersit* coni. M., fort. recte;

κὸν) for an impression which is not caused by an external object, but is self-born in the mind. See ps. Plut. Plac. 4, 12; Diog. 7, 50 φάντασμά ἐστι δόκησις διανοίας, οἷα γίνεται κατὰ τοὺς ὕπνους. Diog. himself (7, 46) uses φαντασία in the general sense, as Cic. does *uisum*. Aristotle while not keeping the words φαντασία and φάντασμα altogether distinct, prefers to use φάντασμα of dreams and the like. See Bonitz, Ind. Ar. s. u. [Cf. nn. on §§ 18, 34, 88.]

1. **mitti a deo**: it was the almost universal belief of the ancients that dreams were directly caused by divine intervention. In the interesting tract περὶ τῆς καθ' ὕπνον μαντικῆς, attributed to Aristotle, it is argued (463 b, 12) that dreams are not θεόπεμπτα, though possibly δαιμόνια, because the lower animals dream. The Stoics upheld vigorously all popular superstitions relating to this as to other subjects; see Zeller III p. 344 ed. 3.

in somnis: see n. on § 52.

3. **Stoicis**: not the dat. of the agent, since the construction of *probatur aliquid alicui* is precisely the same as that of *probare aliquid alicui*. See n. on § 9.

quaerunt: after this some analeptic word such as *igitur* might have been expected. Possibly *ergo* which was sometimes written *g̊* in the MSS may have dropt out before the *q* of *quonam*.

falsa: here used κατ' ἐξοχήν: = *inania* or φαντάσματα.

4. **deus ... probabilia**: this, it must be remembered, was admitted by Chrysippus; cf. Plut. St. rep. 1057 καὶ τὸν θεὸν ψευδεῖς ἐμποιεῖν φαντασίας...ἡμᾶς δὲ φαύλους ὄντας ὑπ' ἀσθενείας συγκατατίθεσθαι (from Chrysippus). The argument is *a fortiori;* if the god is able to render plausible such impressions as are purely phantasmal, then much easier must it be for him to give plausibility to impressions which proceed indeed from realities but are liable to be referred to a source from which they do not come. With this § should be closely compared § 50, where it is denied (1) that the god is omnipotent (which is assumed here), (2) that he would interfere in the case of ordinary *uisa* as he admittedly does in the case of dreams.—A similar use of dreams is made in the arguments put in the mouth of the Academic by Epict. D. 1, 5, 6 καταλαμβάνεις ὅτι ἐγρήγορας; Οὔ, φησίν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὅταν ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις φαντάζωμαι ὅτι ἐγρήγορα. Οὐδὲν οὖν διαφέρει αὕτη ἡ φαντασία ἐκείνης; Οὐδέν. The similar arguments in Plato's Theaetetus are well known.

5. **plane proxime**: like *quam proxime ad uerum accedere* in § 36. The use, however, of *plane* with the superlative (though in itself not stranger than that of *longe, multo*) must be regarded as doubtful in Cicero. I have not been able to find an instance before Apuleius. Maxime liberalissima, once read in Att. 12, 38, 3 is now generally rejected; so too *ornatissimum amplissime* in Fam. 3, 10, 10, though of course *plane* with superlative would stand on a different footing from *maxime* and *amplissime*. Cf. my n. on Lael. § 39 minime...acerrimus.

6. **perdifficiliter**: a rare word, occurring perhaps only in this passage. It is quite possible that after this word *internoscantur* has dropt out in the MSS; if it were inserted the construction would be much smoother.

7. **inter quae...omnino**: the ἀδιάκριτοι φαντασίαι of Sext. A. M. 8, 68, and elsewhere; Epict. Diss. 2, 20, 29 φαντα-

declarant, quae cogitatione depingimus, et ea quae uel dormientibus uel furiosis uidentur non numquam, ueri simile est sic etiam mentem moueri, ut non modo non internoscat uera uisa illa sint anne falsa, sed ut in eis nihil intersit omnino: ut si qui tremerent et exalbescerent uel ipsi per se motu mentis aliquo uel obiecta terribili re extrinsecus, nihil ut esset, qui distingueretur tremor ille et pallor, neque ut quicquam interesset inter intestinum et oblatum. Postremo si nulla uisa sunt probabilia quae falsa sint, alia ratio est. Sin autem sunt, cur non

nil simile inueni. · 10 non numquam: Madvig, Bait. M; *non inquam* BVψU Cant.; *non n̄quam* A; *non, inquiunt* (quasi interrogatiua sit sententia) Goer. (praeeunte Manutio) et H. 15 et pallor: *uel p.* Cant.

σία ἀδιάκριτος ὁμοιοτάτη. Cf. nn. on §§ 34, 54. [So ἀπαράλλακτοι φ.; see n. on § 34 communitas.]

8. **omnino**: emphatic at end of clause, as in § 48; Fin. 2, 100 and often.

ipsa per sese: = *inaniter* of §§ 34, 47, where see nn. Simplic. in Epict. often has the expression ψυχὴ ἐνδόθεν κινεῖται.

9. **cogitatione depingimus**: same phrase in § 51 and N. D. 1, 39; cf. too above § 37; below § 82. So § 51 cogitatione informantur; Mil. 79 cogitatione fingere; so too in N. D. 3, 47. Cogitatio, like διάνοια in Greek, is almost the only word in Latin which will render our 'imagination'.

ea quae etc.: such things as ἱπποκένταυροι, which, as Sext. P. H. 1, 162 says, are a παράδειγμα τῆς ἀνυπαρξίας. Cf. Sen. ep. 58, 15 Centauri, Gigantes et quicquid aliud falsa cogitatione formatum habere aliquam imaginem coepit, quamuis non habeat substantiam.

dormientibus etc.: the phantoms of the imagination, of sleep, and of frenzy are largely used by the Sceptics. Arguments founded on them constantly recur in Sextus.

12. **illa**: i.e. the *uisa* spoken of in the last part of § 47 from *quae autem plane* onwards.

nihil intersit: i. e. quod ad mentem attinet; so far as our faculties go.

ut si: it is perhaps best to take this as equivalent to 'just as if', so that the apodosis is understood (see exx. in n. on § 33). The *ut* in *nihil ut esset* and before *quicquam* below will then be consecutive = 'so that'. In ed. 1 (in common with earlier editors) I explained the *ut* in both places as a repetition of the *ut* before *non modo* and before *in eis* above, but I now think the insertion of the clause *ut si... extrinsecus* renders this impossible.

14. **obiecta extrinsecus**: with this whole passage cf. Diu. 2, 139 nullae imagines obrepunt in animos dormientium extrinsecus...animorum est ea uis ut uigeant uigilantes nullo aduenticio pulsu, sed suo motu; also ib. 2, 120 and 126; Fat. 43.

nihil ut: Cic. often seems to take pains to throw *ut* into the second or third place in the clause, particularly when by doing so he brings a negative into prominence. The collocations *ut nihil*, *ut neque* and the like are in fact rare in Cic. Cf. above, 1 § 12 (cr. n.); 2, 45; Fin. 1, 34; Tusc. 5, 60; Off. 3, 29 neminem ut; Brut. 173 uix ut; ib. 82 uix iam ut; ib. 198 dixisse ut; Cato m. 74 mortem ut. In Allen's n. on the last passage a number of other exx. will be found; also from Livy in Weissenborn's n. on 45, 1.

15. **tremor ille et pallor**: Eng. idiom would require us to say 'the two kinds of shivering and paleness'.

16. **intestinum et oblatum**: the contrast corresponds somewhat with the modern 'subjective and objective'. Cf. 1, 40 impulsione oblata extrinsecus...assensionem animorum in nobis positam, also the passages quoted in n. above on oblata extrinsecus. Liu. 3, 15, 7 (and often) contrasts *intestinum* in the ordinary sense with *externum*; cf. too 6, 8, 5 oblata species; so also Sen. de ira 2, 1, 3 and 2, 3, 1. Sext. A. M. 7, 241 ἤτοι τῶν ἐκτὸς ἢ τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν παθῶν.

17. **quae falsa sint**: the subjunctive of definition or classification; Roby § 1680 sq.

alia ratio est: so Fin. 2, 94 alia tole-

etiam quae non facile internoscantur? Cur non ut plane nihil intersit, praesertim cum ipsi dicatis sapientem in furore sustinere se ab omni adsensu, quia nulla in uisis distinctio appareat?

49 XVI. Ad has omnis uisiones inanis Antiochus quidem et permulta dicebat et erat de hac una re unius diei disputatio. Mihi autem non idem faciendum puto, sed ipsa capita dicenda. Et primum quidem hoc reprehendendum, quod captiosissimo genere interrogationis utuntur, quod genus minime in philosophia probari solet, cum aliquid minutatim et gradatim additur aut demitur. Soritas hoc uocant, quia aceruom efficiunt uno addito grano. Vitiosum sane et captiosum genus! Sic enim

6 faciendum: *faciundum* codd. edd. 8 in ph.: *a ph.* V Cant. ψ. 10 quia ac.:

ratio est; cf. too 'ἄλλος ἔστω λόγος', common in Aristotle; and n. on § 51 una depulsio.

2. **sustinere se etc.**: hence the Stoics ap. Diog. 7, 118 deny that the σοφὸς will ever be mad; he will never give way to frenzy like other people. The words *sustinere...adsensu* are equivalent to ἐπέχειν, for which see nn. on §§ 59, 104.

4. **ad**: 'in answer to'.

Antiochus: Sextus often quotes him in the discussion of this and similar subjects.

5. **de hac una re**: this subject probably filled one book or section of the work from which Cicero here copies. See Introd. p. 52 n.

6. **ipsa capita**: αὐτὰ τὰ κεφάλαια, 'merely the heads'. The use with αὐτὸς is commoner than with *ipse*.

8. **genere...quod genus**: the repetition of the antecedent in the relative clause is not uncommon in Cic. and is found in most authors. Cf. § 22 uisis qualia uisa; also Kühner, Gram. § 193, 5, where a number of exx. are given; the usage is perhaps commonest in Caesar and Terence. [In § 50 also *genus* is emphatically repeated: de suo genere in aliud genus.]

9. **gradatim**: so in § 92 minutatim.

10. **soritas**: one of the oldest of Greek fallacies. It took many shapes, but in its original form the sophist put to his victim the question 'does one grain make a heap?' The victim answered 'no'. The questioning went on with the same result up to, say, n grains; after which the respondent admitted that $n+1$ grains *did* make a heap. Hence the difference between n and $n+1$ grains, that is one grain, constitutes a heap, which contradicts the first answer. In Diu. 2, 11 Cic. proposes to render *sorites* by *acerualis*, though he says 'sorites satis Latino sermone tritus est'. Cf. nn. on § 92. The fallacious *sorites* must be carefully distinguished from the chain-inference still expounded in works on logic; an argument in the form 'All A is B, all B is C, all C is D, all D is E, ∴ all A is E'.

hoc uocant: *hoc* has been unjustly suspected. No one quarrels with passages like Verg. A. 3, 173 nec sopor illud erat; Liu. 2, 38, 5 si hoc profectio et non fuga est; Tac. Agr. 43 siue cura illud siue inquisitio erat; an. 4, 19 quasi illud res publica esset; in all which places the neuter pronoun is subject to the verb *esse*, which is followed by a noun in apposition. But the principle is the same whether we say *nec sopor illud erat* or *nec soporem illud uocabant;* cf. particularly Tac. an. 1, 49 non medicinam illud sed cladem appellans; S. Rosc. 106 nihil est quod suspicionem hoc putetis. In the latter passage all known MSS read *suspicionem hoc*, which is needlessly changed by Madvig, Halm, and other recent editors. In truth the principle involved in these constructions is essentially the same as that on which rests the rare but well attested use of a neuter *plural* relative with several antecedents of the masculine or feminine gender; nor are passages like § 76 quid tibi Cyrenaici uidentur, really different. See my note there. In the present passage the change of *number* in passing from *soritas* to *hoc* may seem difficult, but it is very slightly so, and exactly paralleled by Tac. an. 2, 38 non enim preces sunt istud sed efflagitatio.

adscenditis: si tale uisum obiectum est a deo dormienti, ut
probabile sit, cur non etiam ut ualde ueri simile, cur deinde
non ut difficiliter a uero internoscatur, deinde ut ne internos-
catur quidem, postremo ut nihil inter hoc et illud intersit?
Huc si perueneris, me tibi primum quidque concedente, meum
uitium fuerit, sin ipse tua sponte processeris, tuum. Quis enim **50**
tibi dederit aut omnia deum posse aut ita facturum esse si
possit? Quo modo autem sumis ut, si quid cui simile esse
possit, sequatur ut etiam difficiliter internosci possit, deinde ut
ne internosci quidem, postremo ut eadem sint? Vt, si lupi

qui ac. codd.: corr. Lamb. 15 hoc: *hos* Orelli. 21 ut si: V² Cant.; *et si* C; *et ut si* ψ.

11. **uitiosum**: cf. Fin. 4, 50 sorites quo nihil putatis (Stoici) uitiosius. The ordinary chain-inference is there called *sorites* and was certainly used largely by the Stoics. See Zeller III pp. 112 sq. ed. 3 (E. Tr. p. 115; cf. p. 216).

12. **si tale uisum etc.**: the ascending scale as in 47, but more briefly put here. The first *uisum* here (tale ut probabile sit) is the *uisum* which is supposed to be sent during sleep. At each step the word *tale* must be understood. The *uisum ualde ueri simile* corresponds to the *uisa quae proxime ad uerum accedant* in § 47. There are five steps mentioned in each passage.

dormienti: sc. *τινί*: cf. Diu. 2, 143 uisum est tale obiectum dormienti.

15. **hoc et illud**: 'the one thing and the other'; so often, as in N. D. 1, 90. It must be recollected that in the four last stages of the scale *two* uisa are referred to, one of which may possibly be mistaken for the other. See note on § 18.

16. **perueneris**: so N. D. 1, 89 istuc peruenire, of arriving at a conclusion through a chain of reasoning.

primum quidque: '~~each successive~~ step'. This usage is thoroughly illustrated by Madvig on Fin. 2, 105, and by Munro on Lucr. 1, 389 (Lucr. often uses *quicquid* for *quidque*); to their exx. add Sen. N. Q. 1, 2, 7; Att. 10, 12 b, 2 (ed. Wesenb.). In ed. 3 Madv. notes (as I had done in my n. to this passage in my ed. 1) the cognate use of *proximus quisque*. In Off. 2, 75, however, which I then quoted, *proxuma quaeque* should be read for *proxumae quaeque;* see my n. on Lael. 34.

17. **uitium**: used with pointed reference to *uitiosum* above.

quis...dederit: cf. N. D. 1, 89 quem tibi hoc daturum putas? For *dare*='to make admissions', see n. on § 68.

18. **omnia deum posse**: the Stoics (whom Lucullus' authority Antiochus generally followed) accepted fully the doctrine of divine omnipotence; cf. Diu. 2, 86 nihil est, inquiunt (Stoici) quod deus efficere non possit. Various views of divine power are mentioned in Sen. N. Q. 1 prol. § 16; Diu. 2, 106 fac dare deos, quod absurdum est; Plin. n. h. 2, 27 ne deum quidem posse omnia (with context).

19. **sumis ut**: 'make such assumptions that'. In translating verbs which sometimes take the subjunctive with *ut*, sometimes acc. with inf., the distinction between the two constructions should be brought out. With the *ut*-clause, the fact which it contains is viewed as a *consequence* of the action expressed by the verb on which the clause depends, while acc. and inf. merely supply an object to the verb.

ut...sequatur ut: Cic. very frequently subordinates one *ut*-clause to another, and sometimes even a third *ut*-clause to the second, as in Att. 9, 7, 3 quod suades ut ab eo petam, ut mihi concedat, ut idem tribuam.

21. **eadem**: Lucullus here (to use terms employed by Whately) confuses *undistinguishable likeness* with *positive identity*. Cf. § 85 n.

ut si: here merely like our use of 'exempli gratia'. See n. on § 33.

si...similes: the ellipse of the verb *sunt* has so many parallels that it is unnecessary here to insert it. Cf. e. g. Lael. 14 sin autem illa ueriora; Parad. 30 cur hostis Spartacus, si tu ciuis; Diu. 2, 20 si omnia fato (sc. fiunt); ib. 2, 127 si ea quoque diuina; Phil. 3, 14 si ille con-

canibus similes, eosdem dices ad extremum. Et quidem honestis similia sunt quaedam non honesta et bonis non bona et artificiosis minime artificiosa: quid dubitamus igitur adfirmare nihil inter haec interesse? Ne repugnantia quidem uidemus? Nihil est enim quod de suo genere in aliud genus transferri possit. At si efficeretur ut inter uisa differentium generum nihil interesset,
51 reperirentur quae et in suo genere essent et in alieno. Quod fieri qui potest? Omnium deinde inanium uisorum una depulsio est, siue illa cogitatione informantur, quod fieri solere concedimus, siue in quiete siue per uinum siue per insaniam. Nam ab omnibus eius modi uisis perspicuitatem, quam mordicus tenere debemus, abesse dicemus. Quis enim, cum sibi fingit aliquid et

1 similes: *s. sunt* Madv. Bait. eosdem: V (ex corr.) $B^2\psi$ Cant. (*eosdem esse dices*); *eodem* C. 5 possit: ψ Cant.; *posset* C. 11 perspicuitatem...dicemus: uid. fragm. 18. (Nonius *dicamus* praebet, non *dicemus*.) 19 in Epicharmo: *in*

sul; ib. 4, 5 si ille non hostis. The verb *esse* is also constantly omitted by Cicero in short clauses other than these conditional clauses; e. g. Lael. 94 multi autem Gnathonum similes; Parad. 50 nos igitur diuitiores. See other exx. in n. on § 86 iam illa praeclara; also cf. n. on § 133 sin, inquam.

lupi canibus similes: N. D. 1, 97 quid? canis nonne similis lupo? Plato Soph. 231 A *καὶ γὰρ κυνὶ (προσέοικε) λύκος, ἀγριώτατον ἡμερωτάτῳ*: Epict. Fr. 48 (Dübner) *ὥσπερ λύκος ὅμοιον κυνί*.

1. **honestis non honesta**: Sen. ep. 120, 8 sunt uirtutibus uitia confinia et perditis quoque ac turpibus recti similitudo est. For *non-honesta* see n. on 1, 39 non corpus, and for *non bona* cf. Fin. 2, 53.

2. **artificiosis**: 'artistic'; this is the adjective corresponding to *ars*, which is often interchanged with *artificium;* see n. on § 30.

4. **ne...uidemus**: 'have we no eye even for incongruities?' Cf. Orator 16 cernere consequentia, repugnantia uidere; Tusc. 1, 13 pugnantia te loqui non uides? So Phil. 2, 19 tantarum rerum repugnantiam non uideas; n. on 2, 44.

5. **genere...genus**: n. on § 49.

transferri: cf. § 43 where it is said that a true definition is incapable of being applied to more than one *definitum;* also the Stoic principle given in § 85. The drift of these criticisms is that the Academic arguments render logic impossible; a conclusion which the Academics themselves regarded with complacency. See § 91 and cf. Sextus, P. H. 1, 138.

si efficeretur: 'if it were proved'; above, § 18.

7. **in suo genere essent**: the Academic would of course substitute *esse uiderentur* for *essent;* the statement would then exactly represent his contention.

8. **una depulsio**: the verbal noun here has the notion of possibility; see n. on § 45 above. For the phrase here cf. Att. 12, 32, 1 una est uitatio; ib. 15, 1a, 1 una consolatio est; Lael. 78 omnium horum uitiorum una cautio est atque una prouisio; also n. on § 128 omnium rerum una est definitio comprehendendi.

9. **cogitatione**: n. on § 48.

10. **quiete**: slightly poetic for *somno*, but often so used by Cic.

per uinum: cf. Top. 75 per somnum uinum insaniam; Plaut. Mil. 650 (Tyrrell) per uinum; Catull. 50, 6 per iocum et uinum; *per iocum*, *per ludum* are common in prose.

11. **perspicuitatem...dicemus**: see n. on Ac. post. fragm. 18.

13. **se ipse**: n. on § 36.

ad se: i.e. *se ad se*.

15. **cum in hortis cum**: see n. on 1, § 1.

16. **Galba**: the consul of 144 B.C., the leading orator of his time.

18. **uisus...poeta**: the dream was recorded at the outset of the *Annales*, and is referred to by Cic. in Rep. 6, 10, and by Lucr. 1, 124; Hor. ep. 2, 1, 50; Cic. imitated the passage in his poem on

cogitatione depingit, non simul ac se ipse commouit atque ad se reuocauit, sentit quid intersit inter perspicua et inania? Eadem ratio est somniorum. Num censes Ennium, cum in hortis cum Ser. Galba uicino suo ambulauisset, dixisse: 'uisus sum mihi cum Galba ambulare'? At, cum somniauit, ita narrauit:

'uisus Homerus adesse poeta'.

Idemque in Epicharmo:

'nam uidebar somniare med ego esse mortuom'.

Itaque, simul ut experrecti sumus, uisa illa contemnimus neque ita habemus, ut ea, quae in foro gessimus.

XVII. At enim dum uidentur, eadem est in somnis species **52**
eorumque, quae uigilantes uidemus! Primum interest: sed id

epio harmo V Cant. 20 med ego: *me et ego* codd.; corr. Manut. et Lamb.; alii aliter. 23 dum: *cum* V Cant.; somnis: *somniis* ψH. 24 eorumque: *eorum* codd.; corr. C. F. Hermann; *et eorum* al. primum: CEUψr; *plurimum* V (in marg.) G; *sed pl.* Cant.

Marius, where the hero appeared to the poet in a dream.

19. **Epicharmo**: the scope of the poem is not exactly known.

20. **med**: on the use of *med*, *ted* as accusatives see Ritschl. Opusc. 2, 340.

21. **simul ut**: a phrase like the usual *statim ut*. Madvig on Fin. 2, 33 seems inclined to think that wherever *simul ut* or *simul et* is presented to us by MSS, and in some places where *simul atque* is given, the conjunction is due to the fact that the writers of MSS did not understand the usage *simul* for *simul ac*, and so added the conjunction. If so, why did they not add the most ordinary conjunction, viz. *ac?* In the following six passages *simul ut* rests on good MSS authority: Tusc. 4, 5; De Cr. 2, 21; Planc. 14; Phil. 3, 2; Verr. 2, 1, 67; Att. 9, 1, 1. Madvig quotes five exx. of *simul et*, viz. Att. 2, 20, 2; ib. 10, 4, 12; ib. 10, 16. 4; ib. 16, 11, 6; Qu. Fr. 2, 6, 3; add Fin. 2, 33 and 5, 24. It is important to notice that in ten out of the fourteen places just referred to, *simul et* or *simul ut* is followed by a vowel or by a guttural consonant, in which position Cic. would naturally avoid *simul ac* (see n. on § 34). Madvig (n. on Fin. 2, 21) allows that Cic. wrote *similiter et si*, and *s. ut si* for *s. ac si;* such usages are at bottom parallel to those we have been discussing. We may compare Cato m. 17 and the use of *proinde ut* for *proinde ac;* always found in Plaut. according to Brix on Capt. 304; *simul ubi* (doubtful in Liu. 4, 18, 7); *simul primum* in Liu. 6, 1, 6 and elsewhere. [Nipperdey introduces *simul ut* by conjecture in Tac. an. 13, 2.]

22. **ut ea**: sc. facta; *uisa* cannot be supplied, as *gerere uisa* is an impossible expression.

23. **in somnis**: Halm abandons the MSS reading here and § 47, yet strangely allows *somno illo* to stand unchanged in § 88. 'In somnis'='during sleep' is often used with especial reference to dreams; cf. Verg. Aen. 2, 270; 3, 151; 4, 353 and 466 and 557; 12, 908. The phrase *per somnum* in 5, 636 shows that *somnis* is not written for *somniis* owing to metrical difficulties, for Vergil could easily have written *per somnia.* Munro on Lucr. 3, 431 says that *in somnis* is used thirteen times by Lucr.; most of the passages will be found to have distinct reference to dreams. Further cf. Cic. N. D. 1, 82; Ennius, An. 228 V; Ov. Met. 15, 653; Liu. 2, 36, 4. So further *somno illo*, below § 88; similarly Liu. 2, 36, 6; Curt. 4, 2, 17 (who also has *per somnum* in 3, 3, 2 and 4, 3, 21); Plin. n. h. 5, 45.

species: a rendering of φαντασία, as in § 56.

24. **primum**: for the slight anacoluthon involved in the omission of the cor-

omittamus. Illud enim dicimus, non eandem esse uim neque integritatem dormientium et uigilantium nec mente nec sensu. Ne uinulenti quidem quae faciunt, eadem approbatione faciunt qua sobrii: dubitant, haesitant, reuocant se interdum eisque quae uidentur, imbecillius adsentiuntur, cumque edormiuerunt, illa uisa quam leuia fuerint intellegunt. Quod idem contingit insanis, ut et incipientes furere sentiant et dicant aliquid, quod non sit, id uideri sibi, et, cum relaxentur, sentiant atque illa dicant Alcmaeonis:

'sed mihi ne utiquam cor consentit cum oculorum adspectu'...

53 At enim ipse sapiens sustinet se in furore, ne approbet falsa pro ueris. Et alias quidem saepe, si aut in sensibus ipsius est aliqua forte grauitas aut tarditas aut obscuriora sunt quae uidentur aut

3 ne...quidem: *nec u.* A²B²ψ Cant.; *ne u.* V. uinulenti: B¹VM; *uinol.* cett. 10 ne utiquam: necessario hoc pro *neutiquam* dedit, Ribbeck al. (ut est

responding *deinde* cf. n. on § 46 primum ...alterum est.

sed id omittamus: n. on § 116 at illud ante.

1. **illud dicimus etc.**: Diu. 2, 126 praesertim cum Chrysippus Academicos refellens permulto clariora et certiora esse dicat quae uigilantibus uideantur quam quae somniantibus.

3. **uinulenti**: better spelling than *uinolenti;* see C. F. W. Müller's crit. n.

approbatione: 'decision'.

4. **haesitant**: cf. § 14 haerent aliquo loco. Cic. always uses *haesitare* in metaphorical senses. Cf. 1, 4; 2, 15; pro dom. 140 identidem se ipse reuocando, dubitans timens, haesitans; De Or. 2, 202 qui timor! quae dubitatio! quanta haesitatio! The last two words are rejected by most edd. (see Wilkins' n.), but receive support from our passage and pro dom. 140 (precisely like). At all events they show that Sorof was wrong in thinking that Cic. could not have written *quanta dubitatio* and *quanta haesitatio* together. For *reuocant se* further cf. Fam. 6, 7, 3 reuocans me ipse. Horace ep. 1, 5, 16 sq., thinking of an earlier stage in inebriation than that present to Lucullus' mind, draws a picture of the *self-confidence* inspired by wine.

eis quae uidentur: periphrasis for *uisis.*

5. **imbecillius**: cf. 1, 42 opinio...imbecilla.

edormiuerunt: 'have slept off the effects'; cf. Phil. 2, 30 edormi crapulam; and ἀποβρίζειν in Homer; Hor. sat. 2, 3, 61 Ilionam edormit 'sleeps through the part'. Plaut. and Ter. have *edormiscere.*

6. **contingit**: see n. on § 22.

7. **furere**: better taken with *sentiant* than with incipientes: 'are conscious that they are mad'.

quod non sit: see n. on § 10 si non fuerint. Cf. Hor. sat. 2, 3, 208 qui species alias ueris scelerisque tumultu | permixtas capiet, commotus habebitur.

id: emphatic as in § 88 id quaeretur.

8. **relaxentur**: cf. Phil. 2, 39 homines interdum animis relaxantur. In Fin. 2, 94 *relaxare* is used intransitively. Cf. Arist. Ran. 700 ἀνιέναι τῆς ὀργῆς.

Alcmaeonis: a play of Ennius, often quoted by Cic.; cf. § 89. These quotations from poets were a marked feature of the late Greek philosophic writings.

10. **cor**: poetical for *animus.*

11. **sustinet se**, ἐπέχει, as in § 48, where see n.; see nn. on §§ 59, 104. A question much discussed among the Stoics was whether the wise man could lapse into folly. Cleanthes said he could not, Chrysippus that he could 'διὰ μέθην καὶ μελαγχολίαν' (Diog. 7, 127). Some Stoics denied that the σοφὸς could become mad,

a perspiciendo temporis breuitate excluditur. Quamquam totum hoc, sapientem aliquando sustinere adsensionem, contra uos est; si enim inter uisa nihil interesset, aut semper sustineret aut numquam. Sed ex hoc genere toto perspici potest leuitas orationis eorum, qui omnia cupiunt confundere. Quaerimus grauitatis constantiae, firmitatis sapientiae iudicium: utimur exemplis somniantium furiosorum ebriosorum. Illud attendimus in hoc omni genere quam inconstanter loquamur? Non enim proferremus uino aut somno oppressos aut mente captos tam absurde, ut tum diceremus interesse inter uigilantium uisa et sobriorum et sanorum et eorum qui essent aliter adfecti, tum nihil interesse. Ne hoc quidem cernunt, omnia se reddere 54
incerta, quod nolunt? Ea dico incerta, quae ἄδηλα Graeci. Si

in ψ) cum anapaestus desideraretur. 12 ipsius: uid. adn. 16 nihil interesset: Uψ Cant. V (in marg.); om. C. 20 ebriosorum: *ebriorum* Cant., sed *so* supra lineam adscriptum est.

'*προσπεσεῖσθαι μέντοι ποτὲ αὐτῷ φαντασίας ἀλλοκότους, διὰ μελαγχολίαν ἢ λήρησιν*' (Diog. 7, 118).

falsa pro ueris: cf. Sen. ben. 6, 30, 5 uindicare inexplorata pro certis.

12. **et...quidem**: see n. on § 11.

sensibus ipsius: this can only mean 'his *own* senses', as opposed to those of other men. The context seems to show that the original reading was *ipsis;* two reasons for doubt are given (1) dimness affecting the *senses themselves*, (2) dimness inherent in external objects.

14. **perspiciendo**: cf. perspicuitas, perspicuom, perspicientia; nn. on 2, 17.

totum hoc: common in Cic., like *id totum*.

15. **contra uos est**: see n. on § 58 contra nos.

18. **orationis eorum**: for the double gen. cf. n. on § 128.

omnia confundere: 'to make *general* confusion'; a constant charge against the Sceptics; cf. §§ 58, 110 and Sext. A. M. 8, 56 *συγχέουσι τὰ πράγματα*: ib. 8, 157 *συγχέομεν τὸν βίον*: ib. 8, 372 *ὅλην συγχέει τὴν φιλόσοφον ζήτησιν*; Plut. *περὶ κοιν. ἐνν.* 1077 *ὡς πάντα πράγματα συγχέουσι*: and for the phrase § 58; § 84 dubia omnia reddiderit; Phil. 2, 53 omnia perturbare cupienti; Sall. Cat. cc. 2, 10, 37; Caes. b. c. 1, 32, 5; Plin. ep. 1, 20, 19 omnia perturbat ac miscet; Tac. an. 4, 51 cuncta miscuerant; Plin. n. h. 2, 149; Amm. M. 26, 5, 15; ib. 26, 6, 8.

19. **grauitatis**: here for *grauium uirorum;* cf. n. on § 3 tanta uis uirtutis.

utimur: 'we have to put up with'; or 'we find', as in Fin. 1, 2 ut prope modum iustioribus utamur eis. There are similar uses of *χρῆσθαι*.

20. **ebriosorum**: 'habitual drunkards'; a more invidious word than *uinulenti* used above.

illud: the object of *loquamur* not of *attendimus*.

attendimus: this verb has a clause dependent on it in § 111 also.

21. **loquamur**: see n. on 1, 6 and 2, 20 and cf. Orat. § 113.

22. **proferremus**: the protasis, *si attenderemus*, is omitted. This is the true explanation of all the so-called 'jussive' subjunctives dealt with by Madvig on Fin. 2, 35.

23. **tum diceremus**: Lucullus here chooses to treat the appeal to the *ἐποχή* of the wise man when in a state of madness as an admission on the part of the Academics that there is a *real* difference between the clearness of *uisa* in sanity and in madness.

24. **sobriorum**: siccorum in § 88, where see n.

26. **incerta**: the meaning of this will be clear from § 32; in both places Carneades and his followers are hinted at, not (as Zeller and C. F. Hermann thought) Philo.

quod nolunt: n. on. § 43 quod minime uolunt.

enim res se ita habeant, ut nihil intersit utrum ita cui uideatur ut insano, an sano, cui possit exploratum esse de sua sanitate? Quod uelle efficere non mediocris insaniae est. Similitudines uero aut geminorum aut signorum anulis impressorum pueriliter consectantur. Quis enim nostrum similitudines negat esse, cum eae plurimis in rebus appareant? Sed, si satis est ad tollendam cognitionem similia esse multa multorum, cur eo non estis contenti, praesertim concedentibus nobis, et cur id potius contenditis, quod rerum natura non patitur, ut non suo quidque genere sit tale, quale est, nec sit in duobus aut pluribus nulla re differens ulla communitas? Vt si sint et oua ouorum et apes apium simillimae: quid pugnas igitur, aut quid tibi uis in geminis?

1 habeant: *habeat* coni. Goerenz. 2 an sano: *an ut s.* Lamb., fauente Halmio; quod scripsit Bait.; *aut s.* U. 7 cur eo: *cum eo ψ*; *quum eo* Harl. 8 praesertim: *p. id* Cant. 9 suo: *suo in* Lamb.; *in suo* M, ut coni. H. 10 differens ulla communitas: *different u. c.* V[1]; *differente equalitas* Cant.; *d. nulla c.* Lamb. al.; *communitas uisi* (om. *ut*) Madu. ap. Orell. ed. II, et Aduers. II p. 242. 11 si:

1. **res se habeant**: res are here 'external objects'; the change of reading to *habeat* is therefore totally destructive of the sense. The subject of *uideatur* is general, 'anything'; so 2, 20 sentiatur; 2, 34 moueatur. The order *res se ita habet* and the order *se res i. h.* are about equally common; see Madv. on Fin. 1, 25.

2. **an sano**: the omission of the *ut* before *sano* puts the two alternatives into sharper contrast.

cui: of course not an ex. of the dat. of agent after the passive *exploratum*. The dative is really 'dat. commodi'; see n. on 2, 9.

4. **geminorum**: the impossibility of distinguishing between twins, eggs, impressions of seals etc. was a favourite theme with the Sceptics, while the Stoics contended that no two individual things were exactly alike. Cf. §§ 84—86; Sext. A. M. 7, 408—410. A curious story is told by Diog. 7, 162, to the effect that Aristo of Chios, when he contended that the wise man *numquam opinatur* (see n. on § 66) was practically refuted by his fellow-disciple Persaeus, who caused one of two twins to deposit a sum of money with Aristo, after which the other claimed and got it. King Ptolemy Philopator played a similar trick upon the Stoic philosopher Sphaerus (Diog. 7, 177).

5. **negat esse**: n. on § 22.

7. **eo**: = ea re, as often; cf. 1, 3 eo... ea res.

8. **cur id ... communitas**: the MSS reading *ulla* is right if *ut* be made to depend not on *contenditis* (which would require *nulla*) but on *patitur*, so that *nec sit* = *nec natura patitur ut sit.* The words *nulla re differens* (cf. *nihil differens* in § 99) are simply a rendering of the common Greek term *ἀπαράλλακτος* (n. on § 34) or *ἀνεπίκριτος* (Sext. P. H. 1, 98) or *ἀδιάκριτος* (n. on § 47). *Communitas* (which Vaucher says never has elsewhere the sense it has here!) is merely the ordinary rendering of *ἐπιμιγή*, *ἐπιμιξία* or *ἀπαραλλαξία*, as in § 34 (so *communis* in §§ 33, 34). Cf. Plut. *κοιν. ἐνν.* 1077 B *ἀκοῦσαι οὖν ἐστιν αὐτῶν...πρὸς τοὺς Ἀκαδημαικοὺς διαφερομένων καὶ βοώντων ὡς πάντα πράγματα συγχέουσι ταῖς ἀπαραλλαξίαις ἐπὶ δυοῖν οὐσιῶν ἕνα ποιὸν εἶναι βιαζόμενοι.*

9. **natura non patitur**: similar expressions are common; cf. Off. 3, 22 illud natura non patitur ut...; Tusc. 2, 46; Att. 13, 10, 1 nec uidebatur natura ferre ut...; Lucr. 1, 264; Vell. 2, 130, 3; Sen. d. 1, 1, 5; ben. 7, 19, 5; ep. 74, 24; ep. 82, 17 non recipit rerum natura ut...; so ben. 6, 6, 2; N. Q. 2, 14, 1; Quint. 9, 2, 32 natura non permittit; ib. 12, 1, 23; Plin. pan. 40; Sen. Rh. contr. 7, 5, 5.

Conceditur enim similis esse, quo contentus esse potueras; tu autem uis eosdem plane esse, non similis, quod fieri nullo modo potest. Dein confugis ad physicos, eos qui maxime in Academia **55** irridentur, a quibus ne tu quidem iam te abstinebis, et ais Democritum dicere innumerabilis esse mundos et quidem sic quosdam inter sese non solum similis, sed undique perfecte et absolute ita paris, ut inter eos nihil prorsus intersit [et eos quidem innumerabilis] itemque homines. Deinde postulas ut, si mundus ita sit par alteri mundo ut inter eos ne minimum quidem intersit, concedatur tibi ut in hoc quoque nostro mundo aliquid alicui sic sit par ut nihil differat, nihil intersit. Cur enim, inquies, ex illis indiuiduis, unde omnia Democritus gigni adfirmat, in reliquis mundis et in eis quidem innumerabilibus innumerabiles Q. Lutatii

M Bait.; *sibi* codd.; quod multis modis emendatum est. 13 potueras: *debueras* Cant. 14 similis: Cant.; *similes* ψU; de cett. tacetur. 18 inter sese: *inter esse* V, in quo supra u. *esse* m. 2 *se* est scriptum; *inter se* Cant.; *inter se esse* ψ Harl. 19 ita: incl. H auctore Christio. et eos quidem inn.: *et eo q. i.* codd.; incl. H Bait. M.

For *ut* following after *quod* cf. § 52 and Qu. Fr. 1, 1, 5 quae persaepe acciderunt ut...

10. **nec sit**: for the general structure of the sentence cf. Lael. 19 qui ita se ferunt...ut eorum probetur fides...nec sit in eis ulla cupiditas.

11. **ut si**: n. on § 33.

oua ouorum simillima: cf. Sen. ἀποκ. § 11 hominem tam similem sibi quam ouo ouum; Quint. 5, 11, 30 non ouum tam simile ouo; Cic. leg. 1, 29 sui ipse nemo tam similis esset quam omnes omnium. Also the proverb 'tam similem quam lacte lactist' in Plaut. Mil. 242 and elsewhere.

apium: has better authority than *apum;* see Neue, Form. 1² 259 and cf. § 120.

12. **quid pugnas**: so pro Quint. 43; Fin. 2, 16 quid tendit?

in geminis: 'in the case of the twins'. On this use see some excellent remarks by Nägelsbach, Stil. § 123, 3.

15. **eos qui**: 'the very men who etc.' This evidently applies to the whole of the *physici,* whom the Sceptics assailed for their too confident statements. The sense is spoilt by putting the comma after *eos,* as in all editions hitherto.

16. **ne tu quidem**: οὐδὲ σύ.

et: sed might have been expected.

ais dicere: phrases like *dicis dicere* are rather rare; cf. however n. on § 31, above, and Fam. 3, 7, 5; ib. 9, 16, 5; ib. 11, 20, 1; Cn. Pomp. 62; Verr. 4, 73; Planc. 35; Plaut. Bacch. 802; Liu. 4, 48, 6; Sen. dial. 10, 6, 1; Ter. Haut. 860 sentiat sensisse.

17. **innumerabilis**: for this opinion see n. on § 125.

19. **ita paris**: like *ita par, sic par* below. The word *ita* is sound; we might say 'completely and thoroughly in such wise equal'. Cf. Att. 14, 13, 6 quam dissolute, quam turpiter, quamque ita perniciose ut...; somewhat similar is *sic* in Lael. 30. *Ita* is equivalent to *tali modo* as in the common phrase *hoc ita dicendum est* and the like. Strictly speaking equality does not admit of degrees; but the phrase resembles the use of *tam* with superlatives. Cf. also such expressions as *non sat par* in Lucr. 5, 880; *ita non superstitiosus* in Fin. 2, 63; *quam non plus* in Liu. 5, 9, 5; *adeo nimia* in Tac. an. 2, 34.

20. **itemque homines**: this is explained by § 125, which see.

23. **differat...intersit**: for the slight change of expression (so loved by Cic.) cf. Tusc. 2, 35.

24. **indiuiduis**: n. on 1, 6.

omnia: = τὸ πᾶν, the universe; a use common in Lucr. and Cic.; so often *omne*; cf. n. on § 118.

25. **et in**: the repetition of the pre-

Catuli non modo possint esse, sed etiam sint, in hoc tanto mundo Catulus alter non possit effici?

56 XVIII. Primum quidem me ad Democritum uocas, cui non adsentior potiusque refello propter id, quod dilucide docetur a politioribus physicis, singularum rerum singulas proprietates esse. Fac enim antiquos illos Seruilios, qui gemini fuerunt, tam similis quam dicuntur, num censes etiam eosdem fuisse? Non cognoscebantur foris, at domi; non ab alienis, at a suis. An non uidemus hoc usu uenire ut, quos numquam putassemus a nobis internosci posse, eos consuetudine adhibita tam facile inter-
57 nosceremus, uti ne minimum quidem similes uiderentur? Hic, pugnes licet, non repugnabo: quin etiam concedam illum ipsum

4 refello: V[2]EGψ Cant. Harl.; *refellat* A[1]; .*refellam* A[2]U; *refallor* V[1]; *fallor* B. propter: V[2]Grψ Cant. Harl.U; *potest* ABV[1]E; *post* coni. Kayser. Verba *refello propter* suspecta sunt Halmio et Müllero. 7 cognoscebantur: *internoscebantur* coni. Walker; *dignoscebantur* Dau.; cf. tamen § 86. 8 a suis: *ab auis* Cant. 9 uenire:

position with *et...quidem* is unusual, but emphatic.

1. **sed etiam sint**: § 125.

sint, in hoc: an adversative particle would be wanted after *sint* in English. The omission is exceedingly common in sentences of this kind in Cic.; see my n. on Arch. 17. The argument is of the sort strictly called *enthymeme;* cf. Top. 55 sq. and Cope, Introd. to Arist. Rhet. p. 104.

3. **primum**: no *deinde* follows; cf. n. on § 46.

uocas: so § 144 me in contionem uocas; Fin. 5, 85.

4. **potiusque refello**: Vaucher absurdly objects to the dactylic rhythm; see n. on § 117. The adversative use of *potiusque* is familiar in Cic.; so too *ac potius*. The object to *refello* (*eum*) must be supplied from *cui*.

5. **politioribus**: i. e. the Stoics; see § 85.

singularum ... esse: the Academics would as usual refuse to argue the question of *esse*, and substituting *uideri* would deny the proposition.

proprietates: ἰδιότητας or ἰδιώματα: common expressions in Sextus; see n. on § 34.

6. **Seruilios**: cf. § 84. P. Seruilius Geminus was consul in 252 and 248 B.C. His brother Q. seems to have attained no political distinction. [Some coins are extant bearing representations of Castor and Pollux, with the inscription C. Serueil. M. F. Mommsen, Röm. Münzw. p. 553 n. conjectures that the device of the Dioscuri indicates the fact that the Seruilius who struck these coins was a Geminus. But the device is too common on Roman coins to allow of this inference.]

7. **cognoscebantur**: that the reading is right is shown by § 86 oua cognosceret.

9. **putassemus**: the Latins ordinarily said *non putaram* for 'I did not expect', not *non putabam;* this is regularly represented in the subjunctive by the pluperfect, as in Cato m. 4; Att. 6, 1, 6.

10. **consuetudine**: cf. § 42.

internosceremus: slightly irregular sequence after *usu uenire.* No doubt the intervention of *putassemus* is the cause of the irregularity. Lieven, die Consecutio Temporum des Cicero, p. 19 gives the highly artificial explanation that *usu uenire* is regarded as being equivalent to *saepe accidisse.* See n. on § 140.

11. **ne minimum quidem**: a sarcastic repetition from the previous §.

12. **pugnes**: so in § 54.

13. **sapientem**: cf. nn. on §§ 66, 115.

14. **dinotatas**: probably *ἅπαξ εἰρημένον.*

retenturum adsensum: *ἐφέξειν*: cf. nn. on §§ 59, 104.

15. **nisi quod...possit**: cf. n. on § 18.

fuerit: probably perf. subj. representing the fut. exact. of the indic. So § 128

sapientem de quo omnis hic sermo est, cum ei res similes occurrant quas non habeat dinotatas, retenturum adsensum nec umquam ulli uiso adsensurum, nisi quod tale fuerit, quale falsum esse non possit. Sed et ad ceteras res habet quandam artem, qua uera a falsis possit distinguere, et ad similitudines istas usus adhibendus est. Vt mater geminos internoscit consuetudine oculorum, sic tu internosces, si adsueueris. Videsne ut in prouerbio sit ouorum inter se similitudo? Tamen hoc accepimus, Deli fuisse compluris saluis rebus illis, qui gallinas alere permultas quaestus caussa solerent: ei cum ouom inspexerant, quae id gallina peperisset dicere solebant. Neque id est 58
contra nos, nam nobis satis est oua illa non internoscere: nihil

uenisse coni. Dau. 11 ne minimum: *ne* om. CU. 14 dinotatas: CEGψUH Bait. M; *den.* Cant. et editiones uetustiores. 21 qui...solebant: uid. fragm. 19. 23 id est: *idem* Vψ (non Cant.).

cecinerit. See Lieven, Consec. Temp. p. 24.

16. **artem**: 'set of rules', 'system'; a sense resembling the use of *ars* for 'a technical treatise'; for which see Fin. 3, 4 Madv.

18. **consuetudine oculorum**: the same phrase in N. D. 2, 96 and 3, 20. A curious line is quoted by Nonius from Pacuuius' Atalanta (Ribb. fragm. l. 61) habeo ego istam inter uos qui distinguam geminitudinem (=διδυμότητα in Plat. Phileb. 57 D).

19. **uidesne**: see n. on § 11 uiderenturne; also § 75 n.

20. **in prouerbio etc.**: n. on § 54.

21. **compluris**: Cic. sarcastically says in § 86 gallinarium.

saluis rebus illis: 'when affairs there were flourishing'. It is just possible that *illis* may be dat. commodi = 'the people of Delos'; see n. on § 103 Academia...a quibus. For the use of *rebus* cf. Fam. 7, 30, 3 bis est a me iudicio capitis rebus saluis defensus; so ib. 4, 1, 1; Off. 3, 114 quod populus Romanus rebus afflictis tam excelso animo fuisset; Liu. 4, 51, 8; Tibull. 2, 3, 21; Val. M. 3, 2 ext. 7; Nep. Han. 10, 1; Sen. dial. 11, 5, 4; ben. 6, 25, 4; N. Q. 3, 1, 6; Plin. n. h. 5, 8.

gallinas alere: fattening of fowls was a great trade at Delos.

22. **cum inspexerant**: for the indicative cf. Madv. on Fin. 5, 41.

23. **neque id**: i.e. the statement you make, even although it were not susceptible of an explanation.

24. **contra nos**: so § 53; Sen. ben. 6, 31, 8 sed haec res contra nos est; N. Q. 1, 7, 2 in hoc argumento multa pro me sunt; ib. 2, 55, 2; Quint. 4, 2, 75 licet omnia contra nos sint; ib. 6, 4, 18. Other exx. of *pro* in Draeger I^2 § 292, 2. Cf. also § 86 contra te ualere.

satis est etc.: 'we are content *not* to be able to distinguish between the eggs'; cf. Diu. 2, 37 ego enim possum uel nescire; ib. 1, 124. The similarity of eggs was discussed *ad nauseam* by the sceptics and dogmatists. Suidas records that one Hermagoras, a Stoic, wrote a book entitled *ὠοσκοπία* (egg-investigation) *ἢ περὶ σοφιστείας πρὸς Ἀκαδημαικούς*. Cf. Numen. ap. Eus. Pr. Eu. 14, 8, 7 *Καρνεάδης παραλαβὼν* (so Dindorf, but *παραβαλὼν* 'laying alongside' should be read) *καταληπτικῇ φαντασίᾳ ἀκατάληπτον* (Dind. *κατάληπτον*) *ὅμοιον, καὶ ἀγαγὼν εἰς τὰς ἴσας, οὐκ εἴασεν οὔτε τὸ ἀληθὲς εἶναι οὔτε τὸ ψεῦδος, ἢ οὐ μᾶλλον τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου, ἢ οὐ μᾶλλον τὸ ἀπίθανον τοῦ πιθανοῦ* (so I read; Dind. *ἢ μᾶλλον ἀπὸ τοῦ πιθανοῦ*). *ἦν οὖν ὀνείρατα ἀντὶ ὀνειράτων, διὰ τὸ ὁμοίας φαντασίας ἀληθέσιν εἶναι τὰς ψευδεῖς, ὡς ἀπὸ ᾠοῦ κηρίνου πρὸς τὸ ἀληθινὸν ᾠόν*. [There was an art called *ᾠοσκοπική*, divination by boiling eggs, which must not be confused with the *ᾠοσκοπία* of Hermagoras, as is done by Liddell and Scott. See Jahn on Pers. 5, 185.]

nihil magis: i.e. none the more on account of your argument. The words are a retort upon the *nihil magis* of the

enim magis adsentiri par est hoc illud esse, quasi inter illa omnino nihil interesset; habeo enim regulam, ut talia uisa uera iudicem, qualia falsa esse non possint; ab hac mihi non licet transuersum, ut aiunt, digitum discedere, ne confundam omnia. Veri enim et falsi non modo cognitio, sed etiam natura tolletur, si nihil erit quod intersit, ut etiam illud absurdum sit, quod interdum soletis dicere, cum uisa in animos imprimantur, non uos id dicere, inter ipsas impressiones nihil interesse, sed inter species et quasdam formas eorum. Quasi uero non specie uisa iudicentur, quae fidem nullam habebunt sublata ueri et falsi
59 nota. Illud uero perabsurdum, quod dicitis, probabilia uos sequi, si re nulla impediamini. Primum qui potestis non impediri, cum a ueris falsa non distent, deinde quod iudicium est

1 adsentiri: $V^2\psi$ Cant.; *adsentire* CU. par est: *per* AB; V^1 lacunam habet; *potest* V^2 et codd. plerique; corr. Dauisius. quasi: *quam si* codd.; corr. Madu.; *nihilo enim magis...quam si* M contra loci sententiam. 4 discedere: *de-*

Sceptics; see n. on § 43 where Cic. uses *nihilo magis*. I doubt very much whether *nihil magis* was used by Latin writers, at least until very late times. While *nihilo* is common with comparatives at all periods, I have not noticed more than one other example of *nihil* (Balb. 26) nor do the dictionaries supply any. In Plaut. Asin. 2, 3, 14 qu. by Forc. *nihilo mage* is read by recent edd., while in Hor. sat. 2, 2, 29 *nil* is not to be construed with *magis*, as some edd. propose. Cic. does not use *multum quantum etc.* for *multo quanto etc.* with comparatives; *multum maius* in De Or. 3, 92 is untenable, though not yet altered by edd. *Quantum magis* must be allowed in one or two passages of Livy.

1. **adsentiri**: see n. on § 99 adsensa.

quasi etc.: i.e. as though the fact that *we* are unable to distinguish between the eggs proved that there *is* no distinction between them.

4. **transuersum digitum**: so § 116 digitum progredi; § 143 a Chrysippo pedem numquam; Fam. 7, 25, 2 urge igitur nec transuersum unguem, quod aiunt, a stilo; Att. 13, 20, 4 a recta conscientia transuersum unguem non oportet discedere; Plaut. Aulul. 57 si tu ex istoc loco digitum transuorsum aut unguem latum excesseris.

ut aiunt: n. on 1, 18.

confundam omnia: n. on § 53.

5. **natura tolletur**: Lucullus begs the question; he assumes that our *impressions* of objects must exactly represent the objects themselves.

7. **in animos**: the constr. occurs probably here only. So occasionally *addere in* for the dat.; cf. also § 68 committere in. For the plural *animos* see n. on 1, 20 ingeniis.

non uos id: for *uos non*. The negative nearly always takes precedence in a clause over the pronoun, while personal pronouns precede others. Cf. 1, 3 non te ea intermittere, and see Wichert, Lat. Stillehre p. 443.

8. **impressiones**: ἐντυπώσεις: see n. on § 18.

9. **species et quasdam formas**: probably a mere double rendering of the one word εἴδη as in Or. 100; similar exx. in I §§ 19, 23, 30; II 32 n. The sense of the passage is that the Academics allow *apparent* distinctions between *individual* impressions, but deny that the two *classes true* and *false* can be exactly marked off from each other. *Eorum=uisorum*.

specie: 'with reference to their class'. Practically a repetition of the argument in §§ 50, 54 and § 47. We lose in translation by not possessing a word which, like *species*, carries the two senses of 'class' and 'appearance' (§ 52).

11. **nota**: n. on § 84.

perabsurdum: for om. of *est* see n. on § 86 iam illa praeclara.

probabilia: πιθανά.

12. **impediamini**: n. on § 33.

ueri, cum sit commune falsi? Ex his illa necessario nata est ἐποχή, id est adsensionis retentio, in qua melius sibi constitit Arcesilas, si uera sunt quae de Carneade non nulli existimant. Si enim percipi nihil potest, quod utrique uisum est, tollendus adsensus est. Quid enim est tam futile quam quicquam approbare non cognitum? Carneaden autem etiam heri audiebamus solitum esse eo delabi interdum ut diceret opinaturum, id est peccaturum esse sapientem. Mihi porro non tam certum est esse aliquid quod comprehendi possit, de quo iam nimium etiam diu disputo, quam sapientem nihil opinari, id est, numquam adsentiri rei uel falsae uel incognitae. Restat illud, quod **60** dicunt ueri inueniendi caussa contra omnia dici oportere et pro

flectere Cant. 7 in animos: ita codd. exc. uno Dauisii; *in animis* multi edd., adnuente Müllero. 15 id est: *idaem* V; *iden sic* ψ; *ide* Cant. (*epotheide*). 20 eo: addidit primus Dau. 21 id est pecc.: *idem* V[1] Cant.; *item* V[2]ψ, et prorsus similiter infra (*id est numquam*).

13. **cum**: here, as often, almost equivalent to *si*; see n. on § 64.

ueris: sc. uisis.

14. **sit**: the subject is not uerum (as Binder makes it) but *iudicium*. For *commune falsi* our idiom would require *c. falsi et ueri*, but the ancients often omit one of two things put into comparison or contrast, even when there is a word (like *commune* here) which implies both. An extreme ex. is Quint. 5, 7, 29 aliquid quod inter se parum consentiat. Cf. also 85 n.

15. **ἐποχή**: 'suspension of judgment'. The further explanation of this phrase will be found in n. on § 104. Cic. uses ἐπέχειν, ἐποχή familiarly in Att. 6, 6, 3; ib. 6, 9, 3; ib. 15, 21, 2. The verb is represented by *sustinere se ab omni adsensu* in § 48; *retinere adsensum* in § 57; by *ab utraque parte adsensionem sustinere* in 1, 45 (cf. 2, 68); by *adsensionem cohibere* in N. D. 1, 1, and *adsensus cohibere*, below, § 68; *iudicium sustinere* in Sen. ep. 108, 21.

id est: see n. on 1, 32.

sibi constitit: § 63 qui tibi constares.

16. **Arcesilas**: 1, 46 n.

non nulli: cf. § 78 n.

19. **Carneaden etc.**: see § 78 n.

audiebamus: 'we were *constantly* told'. For this force of the imperfect cf. Lael. 37 Ti. quidem Gracchum rem publicam uexantem a Q. Tuberone aequalibusque amicis derelictum uidebamus; Cato m. 49 uidebamus in studio dimetiendi paene caeli atque terrae Gallum.

20. **eo delabi**: cf. § 139 labor eo ut...; Att. 12, 47, 1 eo magis delabor ad Clodiam.

opinaturum: δοξάσειν; n. on § 66.

21. **id est peccaturum**: for *id est* cf. n. on 1, 8. In 1, 42 it was stated that κατάληψις has no moral characteristics. But as the sapiens 'numquam fallitur in iudicando' (Fin. 3, 59) it follows that if *he* pronounces an unfounded opinion, he must sin against the light. Cf. Sext. A. M. 7, 157 οὐχὶ δέ γε τῶν δοξαστῶν ἐστὶν ὁ σοφός, τοῦτο γὰρ ἀφροσύνης ἦν κατ' αὐτοὺς καὶ ἁμαρτημάτων αἴτιον.

porro: the third step in the argument, following on *primum...deinde* above.

22. **est esse**: the collision of *est* with *esse* or *esset* seems to be rather sought than avoided by Cic., so numerous are the exx. Cf. § 83.

iam etiam: see n. on 1, 5 et...etiam.

23. **id est numquam etc.**: n. on 1, 8.

25. **ueri inueniendi caussa**; cf. Rep. 3, 8 neque ignota sit consuetudo tua contrarias in partis disserendi, quod ita facillime uerum inueniri putes; Diu. 2, 8 soli sumus quibus licet uerum exquirere sine inuidia; N. D. 1, 11 eis quibus propositum est ueri reperiendi caussa et contra omnis philosophos et pro omnibus dicere; also Introd. pp. 12, 13.

contra omnia: n. on § 7.

omnibus. Volo igitur uidere quid inuenerint. Non solemus, inquit, ostendere. Quae sunt tandem ista mysteria, aut cur celatis, quasi turpe aliquid, sententiam uestram? Vt qui audient, inquit, ratione potius quam auctoritate ducantur. Quid si utroque? Num peius est? Vnum tamen illud non celant, nihil esse quod percipi possit. An in eo auctoritas nihil obest? Mihi quidem uidetur uel plurimum. Quis enim ista tam aperte perspicueque et peruersa et falsa secutus esset, nisi tanta in Arcesila, multo etiam maior in Carneade et copia rerum et dicendi uis fuisset?

61 XIX. Haec Antiochus fere et Alexandriae tum et multis annis post, multo etiam adseuerantius, in Syria cum esset mecum,

5 utroque: sic Cant.; *utrumque* codd. cett. M. celant: *celamus* Vψ Cant.

1. **omnibus**: = o. rebus; n. on 1, 27.

non solemus ostendere: cf. Tusc. 5, 11 ut nostram ipsi sententiam tegeremus.

2. **mysteria**: the notion that all Academic teachers had an esoteric dogmatism which they taught to their intimate disciples, while professing scepticism to the outside world, was widespread in antiquity. It was probably fostered by Plato's jesting use of such words as ἀπόρρητα (Phaedo 62 B), ἀμύητοι and μυστήρια (Theaet. 153 E). Numenius wrote a work περὶ τῶν Πλάτωνος ἀπορρήτων, from which Eus. Pr. Eu. 13, 5 gives an extract; but N. refuses to believe that Arcesilas had any esoteric teaching (Eus. 14, 6, 6). Yet Arcesilas is (doubtfully) credited with such by Sext. P. H. 1, 232—234 (strangely followed by Geffers De Arc. p. 27); he seems to have misunderstood the well-known line 'πρόσθε Πλάτων, ὄπιθεν Πύρρων, μέσσος Διόδωρος'. What Aristo meant by this was that Arc. was really a Pyrrhonist while professing to be a Platonist (cf. Diog. 4, 33). From Aug. contr. Ac. 3 §§ 41, 43 it would seem that Metrodorus (see on § 78) was the first Academic teacher who openly taught that the scepticism of his predecessors was a mere weapon of offence. Cf. Ac. Post. fr. 35, from which it appears that Cic., probably following Philo (Introd. p. 58), adopted the view of Metrodorus; see also Aug. c. Ac. 3, 38, 41. Numenius ap. Eus. 14, 8, 12 and 14 speaks positively of the concealed dogmatism of Carneades; and Numenius *alone*, according to Diog. 9, 68, turned Pyrrho himself into a secret dogmatist. This last statement must however be erroneous; for Numenius could not have made Arcesilas a pure sceptic, while attributing dogmatism to Pyrrho. Diog. 4, 2 ascribes ἀπόρρητα to Speusippus, and even (2, 135) to Menedemus. Clemens Strom. V 575 A (qu. by Zeller II 2, p. 116 n. ed. 3) applies the contrast between exoteric and esoteric doctrines to *all* schools alike. [For the word *mysteria* cf. Tusc. 4, 55 rhetorum mysteria.]

3. **audient**: but in De Or. 3, 120 ut ei qui audiant (al. *audiunt*) statuere possint.

4. **auctoritate**: cf. §§ 8, 9 nn.

5. **utroque**: here almost substantival = 'a combination of the two'; so in 1, 24, where see n.; and cf. Orat. 201 nec in numeris magis quam in reliquis ornamentis orationis...effugimus poematis similitudinem. Est enim in utroque et materia et tractatio. So § 68 neutrum.

num peius: cf. Att. 8, 3, 3 numquid hoc peius?

8. **perspicueque...falsa**: there is an intentional oxymoron here, reference being made to the technical use of *perspicue* = ἐναργῶς. For the expression cf. N. D. 1, 30; Cael. 26.

nisi tanta etc.: cf. § 16, also 1, 46.

11. **haec**: for the ellipse of the verb cf. 1, 2 hic pauca primo.

12. **cum esset mecum**: n. on 1, 1.

14. **hominem amicissimum**: '*because* you are my very dear friend'. In passages like this Latin suffers from the want of a present participle of the verb *esse*.

me autem appellabat: n. on 1, 2 me autem dicebat.

paulo ante quam est mortuos. Sed iam confirmata caussa te, hominem amicissimum—me autem appellabat—et aliquot annis minorem natu, non dubitabo monere. Tune, cum tantis laudibus philosophiam extuleris Hortensiumque nostrum dissentientem commoueris, eam philosophiam sequere quae confundit uera cum falsis, spoliat nos iudicio, priuat approbatione, omnibus orbat sensibus? Et Cimmeriis quidem, quibus adspectum solis siue deus aliquis siue natura ademerat siue eius loci quem incolebant situs, ignes tamen aderant, quorum illis uti lumine licebat, isti autem, quos tu probas, tantis offusis tenebris ne scintillam quidem ullam nobis ad dispiciendum reliquerunt; quos si se-

Harl.; *celamur* coni. Guilelmus, satis probabiliter. 18 omnibus: V^2GrψU Cant.; *omni* C Bait. M: *omnino* coni. H.

15. **minorem natu**: cf. Lael. 32 tu uero perge, Laeli; pro hoc enim, qui minor est natu, meo iure respondeo.

non dubitabo: for the constructions of *dubito* in Cic. see my n. on Cato m. 16.

tune ... sequere: for the form of the sentence cf. § 62 an tu...negabis; § 125 tune...putes; § 139 tu...copulabis; Tusc. 2, 46 tune ... cum uideris ... exclamabis? *Sequere* is future, as in § 109 and in a similar passage in Fin. 2, 76 eamne igitur rationem sequere, qua... Had Cic. intended the present, he would have written *sequeris*.

16. **extuleris**: see Introd. p. 44.

17. **confundit...sensibus**: cf. § 34 nec ueritas...nec sensus relinquitur; also § 31; § 37 aut sensus adimendus est...aut reddenda assensio; § 38; § 74; § 103. In Fin. 1, 64 Madvig takes exception to the phrase *tolli sensus* for *t. sensuum iudicium*, but we see from the *Academica* that it was customary for the dogmatists to confound the two things when arguing against the sceptics.

18. **spoliat**: cf. N. D. 1, 102 haec oratio deos spoliat motu. For the personification see n. on § 44 cum ipsa natura accuratae orationis profiteatur.

orbat sensibus: cf. Vell. 1, 5, 2 quem (Homerum) si quis caecum genitum putat, omnibus sensibus orbus est; Catull. 51, 5 omnis eripit sensus mihi; a rendering of Sappho's καρδίαν ἐν στήθεσιν ἐπτόασεν: also Catull. 66, 25.

19. **Cimmeriis**: the allusion is to the well-known passage in Homer, Od. 11, 14 sq. The legend was localised in Campania, where, as Strabo and Pliny tell us, there was a town called *Cimmerium*. In Att. 2, 13, 2 we find a similar allusion to Homeric legends relating to Formiae and its district.

20. **deus aliquis**: but *deus aliqui* in § 19. It is very difficult to draw any distinctions in the use of *aliquis*, *aliqui* and the like with substantives. An examination of a very large number of passages has led me to the conclusion that *aliquis* is considerably commoner in this use than *aliqui*, and that with proper names *aliquis* alone is used; so with *Myrmecides* in § 120. The case is somewhat different with *nescio quis*, *nescio qui* etc.; see my n. on § 81.

21. **situs**: n. on 1, 9.

lumine: n. on § 26.

22. **offusis tenebris**: cf. N. D. 1, 6 noctem rebus offundere; also above, 1, 44.

23. **dispiciendum**: this verb (which must be carefully distinguished from *despicere*) primarily means to see through a narrow opening, and so to see imperfectly, or catch a glimpse of anything. So Fin. 2, 97 ut primum dispexit, of a man coming to himself after fainting from a wound; ib. 4, 64 catuli qui iam dispecturi sunt; ib. 4, 65; ib. 5, 41; Diu. 2, 81 uerum dispicere; Att. 2, 20, 5 si dispicere quid coepero; ib. 5, 21, 9; 6, 8, 5; Tusc. 1, 45 qui tum etiam cum has terras incolentes circumfusi erant caligine, tamen acie mentis dispicere cupiebant; Sen. ben. 5, 4, 4 ceteris quibus ad dispiciendam ueritatem non erat offusa caligo (the word is common in Seneca); so Suet. Ner. 19. The similar word διαβλέπειν, found in Plato, Phaedo 86 D (and in one

quamur, eis uinculis simus adstricti, ut nos commouere neque-
62 amus. Sublata enim adsensione omnem et motum animorum et actionem rerum sustulerunt, quod non modo recte fieri, sed omnino fieri non potest. Prouide etiam ne uni tibi istam sententiam minime liceat defendere. An tu, cum res occultissimas aperueris in lucemque protuleris iuratusque dixeris ea te comperisse, quod mihi quoque licebat, qui ex te illa cognoueram, negabis esse rem ullam quae cognosci comprehendi percipi possit? Vide, quaeso, etiam atque etiam ne illarum quoque rerum pulcherrimarum a te ipso minuatur auctoritas'. Quae

2 sublata adsensione: *sublatentem adsensionem* V[1]; *sit latentem assensionem* Cant.;

or two passages in later writers), means also, I think, 'to peep', and has been generally misunderstood.

1. **adstricti**: a retort upon Cicero's exposition of the slavery of the dogmatists in §§ 8, 9, where cf. esp. *ante* tenentur adstricti; also Acad. Post. fr. 15.

nos commouere: 'to move a step'; so often, as Att. 3, 13, 1 nec me Thessalonica commoui; ib. 3, 14, 2; ib. 11, 21, 2; ib. 14, 17, 6; Nep. Ages. 6, 3; also *mouere se* in Att. 5, 12, 1; 7, 16, 3.

2. **sublata**: this has only a hypothetical force, as is seen from the succeeding words. Possibly Cic. wrote *sustulerint*.

3. **actionem rerum**: cf. § 108 actio ullius rei; Off. 1, 83 actiones rerum; ib. 1, 127; ib. 1, 153; Sen. de ira 1, 8, 4; ep. 89, 15; dial. 9, 3, 1. So actio uitae in N. D. 1 §§ 2, 45, 103; Off. 1, 17; Tusc. 5, 66; Diu. 2, 89 and *rerum agitatio* in De Or. 3, 88; Plin. ep. 8, 14, 11. In the best Latin *actus* is only used of plays (for *prauis actibus* in Leg. 1, 31 *prauitatibus* is now read); but in silver Latin *actus* tends to supersede *actio;* thus we have *actus rerum* in Sen. de ira 3, 3, 5; ib. 3, 6, 6; Sen. ep. 56, 8; Suet. Cl. 15 and 23; Ner. 17; Aug. 32; Plin. ep. 9, 25, 3; Quint. 10, 6, 1; ib. 10, 1, 31 actum rei; ib. 3, 6, 26 πρᾶξις is rendered by *actus* not *actio* which Q. seems not to use. So *uitae actus* in Sen. de ira 3, 6, 4 and ep. 90, 18; Quint. 11, 1, 47; Val. M. 6, 3, 3 and 7, 1, 1. According to Georges on Velleius p. 11, that writer has *actus* only once, in 2, 127, 3.

4. **prouide etc.**: cf. Fin. 3, 10 (Cato to Cic.) erat enim, si cuiusquam, certe tuum nihil praeter uirtutem in bonis ducere. Vide ne magis, inquam (Cic.) tuum fuerit non noua te rebus nomina imponere.

uni: 'you of all men'; so N. D. 2, 74 nec uero hoc in te unum conuenit, moribus domesticis ac nostrorum hominum urbanitate limatum; a passage often corrected yet thoroughly sound; 'though what I have said does not hold good against you of all men'.

5. **an tu etc.**: cf. Tusc. 1, 39 an tu, cum me in summam exspectationem adduxeris, deseris? On the confusion between *ain' tu* and *an tu* in MSS see Kühner on Tusc. 5, 35. A very similar appeal, on a philosophical matter, to an event in Cicero's life, will be found in Diu. 2, 46.

6. **aperueris**: so Vell. 2, 34, 3 Cicero...coniurationem aperuit (*si uera l.*).

comperisse: this expression, which Cic. used in the senate with reference to the conspiracy of Catiline, became a cant phrase, with which Cic. was often taunted. Cf. Att. 1, 14, 5 where it is said that Clodius in his *contiones* brought numerous charges against the other senatorial leaders, but as to Cicero 'tantum "comperisse" omnia criminabatur'; see too Fam. 5, 5, 2; pro Sulla 12; Pseudo-Sall. decl. in Cic. 3 qui nihil poterat ('any one who could not bribe you') de eo tibi compertum erat. The word in itself was commonly enough used of getting private information of conspiracies or underhand dealings; see Mil. 73; Phil. 2, 99; Fam. 5, 2, 6; Rep. 2, 60; Val. M. 7, 2, ext. 15; ib. 8, 1, 9; Suet. Iul. 74; Gai. 3; Claud. 26.

7. **licebat**: it is quite possible that *liquebat* may be the right reading; cf. Ter. Eun. 331 illum liquet mihi deierare his mensibus sex septem prorsus non

cum dixisset ille, finem fecit. Hortensius autem uehementer **63** admirans, quod quidem perpetuo Lucullo loquente fecerat, ut etiam manus saepe tolleret, nec mirum, nam numquam arbitror contra Academiam dictum esse subtilius, me quoque, iocansne an ita sentiens—non enim satis intellegebam—coepit hortari ut sententia desisterem. Tum mihi Catulus 'si te' inquit, 'Luculli oratio flexit, quae est habita memoriter accurate copiose, taceo neque te quo minus, si tibi ita uideatur, sententiam mutes deterrendum puto. Illud uero non censuerim, ut eius auctoritate moueare. Tantum enim te non modo monuit, inquit adridens,

sublatenter ass. Harl. 5 an tu : *ain' tu* coni. Goer. 20 te non : *non te* Dau. Madu. H; om. *non* Man. Bait. M, alii.

uidisse : i.e. 'I can swear with a clear conscience'. So Andr. 729 quia si forte opus sit ad erum iurato mihi...ut liquido possim; cf. too the ordinary juristic use of *liquet, non liquet.* In N. D. 1, 74 all MSS have *liquebat* for *licebat.* For Lucullus' support of Cic. see § 3.

qui...cognoueram: n. on § 22 comprehendit.

8. **cognosci ... percipi**: n. on 2, 23 comprehensi...constituti.

10. **minuatur** : cf. Ter. Hec. 616 non minuam consilium.

12. **admirans** : Brut. 219 tum Brutus admirans.

13. **numquam arbitror** : for the position of *numquam,* which really belongs to *dictum esse,* cf. Att. 3, 24, 2 neque enim umquam arbitror ornatas esse prouincias designatorum.

14. **Academiam** : sc. nouam.

subtilius : n. on 1, 6.

iocansne an: the use of ne...an implies, as Madvig says on Fin. 5, 87, more doubt than the use of *ne* alone, in phrases like *uerum falsumne* (§ 143). Originally expressions such as *iocansne an ita sentiens* were realised as direct bimembral questions.

16. **tum mihi Catulus...inquit**: for *inquit* see n. on 1, 18; for *mihi* Jahn on Brut. 91.

17. **memoriter**: this word is fully treated by Madv. on Fin. 1, 34, who shows that it never indicates 'memoria' as opposed to 'de scripto', but 'laudem habet bonae et copiosae memoriae' like μνημονικῶς. His conclusions have been often attacked (as by Seyffert), but stand firm.

19. **censuerim**: Roby § 1540; Draeger § 148 A.

auctoritate: sarcasm, in view of Cicero's statements in §§ 8, 9. Cf. what Atticus says to Cic. in Leg. 1, 36 aut scilicet tua libertas disserendi amissa est, aut tu is es qui in disputando non tuum iudicium sequare, sed auctoritati aliorum pareas.

20. **tantum...monuit** : a difficult passage. *Monuit* alludes to § 61 monere, and to the last two sentences in Lucullus' speech, which Catulus jocularly interprets as containing a covert warning against political troubles to ensue from Cicero's scepticism. *Modo* has been interpreted by nearly all scholars since Madv. Em. 160 to mean 'just now'. The sense given by *tantum non* (with full-stop at end of sentence) is pretty much the same as that afforded by *tantum;* in the first case the meaning will be 'he all but admonished you'; in the second 'he went just so far as to admonish you', i.e. 'he gave just a sufficient hint, no more'. The objection to construing *tantum non* together is that the phrase does not occur in Cic. as the equivalent of *μόνον οὐ*: nor does *modo non.* I have therefore put a note of interrogation at the end of the sentence. If *non* be cast out, *tantum...modo* may be for *tantummodo* by tmesis, like *per mihi gratum* etc.; so Prop. 3, 34, 14 tantum te modo, on which see Munro in 'Journal of Phil.' VI p. 30. [Cf. a probably corrupt passage in Suet. Cl. 38 Ostiensibus repente tantum non satis facientibus modo ueniam dedit.]

inquit adridens: according to Jahn on Brut. 300, *inquit* either stands in a clause by itself, parenthetically, or forms

ut caueres ne quis improbus tribunus plebis, quorum uides quanta copia semper futura sit, adriperet te et in contione quaereret qui tibi constares, cum idem negares quicquam certi posse reperiri, idem te comperisse dixisses? Hoc, quaeso, caue ne te terreat. De caussa autem ipsa malim quidem te ab hoc dissentire; sin cesseris, non magno opere mirabor. Memini enim Antiochum ipsum, cum annos multos alia sensisset, simul ac uisum sit, sententia destitisse'. Haec cum dixisset Catulus, me omnes intueri.

64 XX. Tum ego non minus commotus quam soleo in caussis maioribus, huius modi quadam oratione sum exorsus. 'Me, Catule, oratio Luculli de ipsa re ita mouit, ut docti hominis et copiosi et parati et nihil praetereuntis eorum, quae pro illa caussa

7 alia: *talia* U. 8 destitisse: hic in Cant. ita est scriptum: "*Marcus Tullius Cicero Lucullus liber primus explicit, incipit secundus.*" 11 quadam or.:

a clause with its subject, except in a few instances where it is widely separated from its subject, and receives an extension by the addition of a participle as here, or of some other expression.

1. **tribunus**: Cic. makes a retort in §§ 97, 144.

uides: for the position of this word cf. n. on § 124 quod intellegi quale sit uix potest.

2. **adriperet ... quaereret**: the technical expression for this well-known proceeding of the tribunes was *producere aliquem in contionem*; cf. § 144 in contionem uocas.

3. **idem ... idem**: for this repetition cf. Diu. 2, 77; Phil. 2, 40.

5. **caussa ipsa**: contrasted with *auctoritate* above; cf. § 64 de ipsa re...auctoritas autem. For *ipsa* see n. on 1, 6.

6. **cesseris**: cf. § 70 cessit.

memini...destitisse: on the difference between the construction of *memini* with the present and with the perf. infinitive see my n. on Lael. § 2.

7. **simul ac uisum sit**: 'as soon as it seemed good to him'. Possibly Cic. wrote *s. atque aliud.*

8. **haec Catulus**: there is something in the remark of Ranitz, de libris Acad. p. 14, that with these words probably a new book began (in the second ed.). He compares the very similar beginnings of N. D. II and III. See cr. n.

me intueri: cf. Fin. 2, 1 hic cum uterque me intueretur; Brut. 300 Brutus ...inquit me intuens; N. D. 1, 17. As to the hist. inf. see n. on § 11 quaerere.

10. **commotus**: in Diu. 1, 80 the 'animus commotior' is laid down as necessary for high oratory. Cic. several times uses almost the same words as here concerning the excitement he felt at the outset of an important case; cf. Deiot. 1; diu. in Caec. 41; Cluent. 51; also De Or. 1, 121 where similar language is put into the mouth of Crassus.

soleo: sc. commoueri.

11. **maioribus**: cf. De Or. 2, 88 paruola caussa; ib. 2, 320 paruis atque infrequentibus caussis; de opt. gen. d. 9 minutarum caussarum; Plin. ep. 1, 20, 11 angustissimae causae; Quint. 11, 1, 93 tenues causas...maioribus.

oratione: I have been unable to find an instance of *exordiri* or *ordiri* constructed with the abl. except in a comic line preserved by Cic. pro Cael. 36, where Ribbeck (fr. Com. p. 123 ed. 2) now reads *clamorem exorsa* against the MSS. Either, therefore, *quandam orationem* is the right reading here, or *ab* has fallen out before *huius modi*.

12. **ut**: cf. n. on § 98. It is noticeable that *ita* corresponds to *ut* before *docti* and also to *ut* before *ei*, though each *ut* is of a different class.

docti hominis: the collocation *hominis docti* is very rare in Cic.; see Leg. 1, 28 with Bake's n. As to the praise of Lucullus here, cf. Introd. pp. 32, 47.

13. **et nihil**: see Draeger II[2] p. 9.

dici possent, non tamen ut ei respondere posse diffiderem. Auctoritas autem tanta plane me mouebat, nisi tu opposuisses non minorem tuam. Adgrediar igitur, si pauca ante quasi de fama mea dixero. Ego enim si aut ostentatione aliqua adductus aut **65**
studio certandi ad hanc potissimum philosophiam me applicaui, non modo stultitiam meam, sed etiam mores et naturam condemnandam puto. Nam, si in minimis rebus pertinacia reprehenditur, calumnia etiam coercetur, ego de omni statu consilioque totius uitae aut certare cum aliis pugnaciter aut frustrari cum alios tum etiam me ipsum uelim? Itaque, nisi ineptum putarem in tali disputatione id facere quod, cum de re publica disceptatur, fieri interdum solet, iurarem per Iouem deosque penates

quandam orationem Lamb. Orelli. 14 respondere: *r. me* Dau.; *responderi* Lamb. 21 ego: *ergo* codd. 23 uelim? Itaque: sic U; *itaque uelim* Cψ Cant. 25 iurarem per I.: *iurare I.* Cant.; *iurare me I.* ψ.

14. **posse**: for the omission of *me* see n. on § 128 considerare.

15. **mouebat, nisi opposuisses**: Roby § 1574 (3, 4); Draeger § 550 d.

16. **adgrediar...si ante...dixero**: for the future or present indic. followed by *si* with the future perfect, see Diu. 2, 101 dicam si prius uidero; Lael. 59; Off. 2, 22; de opt. gen. d. § 19; Verr. 3, 40; also Plaut. Capt. 248; Plin. ep. 4, 15, 3; ib. 6, 27, 1; Sen. ep. 24, 19; ib. 36, 12; ib. 58, 13; ib. 78, 3; ben. 6, 15, 3. Sometimes in such phrases *cum* takes the place of *si*, as in Brut. 96 locus dicendi erit cum dixero; so Quint. 3, 6, 1. For the not unfrequent interchangeability of *si* and *cum* cf. Fin. 2, 15 si aut...aut cum; Rep. 3, 23; Hor. ep. 1, 7, 10; cf. also § 59, above. With *adgrediar* we must understand *dicere;* so Off. 2, 1 dicere adgrediar...si prius pauca de instituto ac de iudicio meo dixero.

quasi de fama mea: cf. Off. 2, 1 just quoted; N. D. 3, 5 ante quam de re, pauca de me. For the apologetic *quasi*, 'I may almost say', cf. n. on § 74.

18. **studio certandi**: φιλονεικίᾳ, a fault often alleged against the Academics (n. on 1, 44 non pertinacia) and often similarly disclaimed by the Platonic Socrates, as in Phaed. 91 A; cf. too De Or. 1, 47 Graeculos contentionis cupidiores quam ueritatis.

19. **mores et naturam**: cf. 1, 20 n.

condemnandam: singular with more than one subject; Draeger § 103.

20. **pertinacia**: n. on 1, 44.

21. **calumnia**: n. on § 14. Here there is distinct reference to the legal sense of the word.

de omni...uitae: a strong testimony to Cicero's feeling of the importance of philosophy. Mr Trollope (in his Life of Cicero) shows lamentable ignorance when he affirms that philosophy was no more than an elegant amusement to Cic. and his contemporaries. To a large portion of the educated classes of the time, philosophy was as real a thing as religion is to the same classes now, and they *lived by it* just as much.

22. **certare...pugnaciter**: imitated by Amm. M. 14, 6, 25 pugnaciter aliis certant.

frustrari: the deponent is far commoner in Latin than the active (exx. of which will be found in Neue, Form. II² p. 288); Cic. probably has only the dep. though other writers interchange the two; Plaut. has them both in the same line, Bacch. 546; cf. too Georges on Vell. p. 47. For *fr. me ipsum* cf. Hor. sat. 2, 3, 31; Nep. Hann. 2, 6; Ter. Eun. pr. 14.

25. **interdum solet**: Cic. was probably thinking here solely of his own famous oath on laying down the consulship. The ordinary oath (whence *eiurare magistratum*) was to the effect that the magistrate had done nothing against the laws during his term of office (see Plin. pan. 65). It was customary for the magistrates to address the people before taking the oath; but Cic. was bidden by the tribune Metellus Nepos to pro-

me et ardere studio ueri reperiendi et ea sentire quae dicerem.

66 Qui enim possum non cupere uerum inuenire, cum gaudeam, si simile ueri quid inuenerim? Sed, ut hoc pulcherrimum esse iudico, uera uidere, sic pro ueris probare falsa turpissumum est. Nec tamen ego is sum qui nihil umquam falsi approbem, qui numquam adsentiar, qui nihil opiner, sed quaerimus de sapiente. Ego uero ipse et magnus quidem sum opinator—non enim sum sapiens—et meas cogitationes sic dirigo, non ad illam paruolam Cynosuram,

'qua fidunt duce nocturna Phoenices in alto',

4 iudico: *iudicem* codd.; corr. Ernesti. 8 dirigo: *derigo* M, et infra *derec-*

ceed to the oath at once. He thereupon substituted for the ordinary form an oath that he had saved his country. For the facts see Fam. 5, 2 §§ 6, 7; Att. 6, 1, 22 (where we are told that A. writing to Cic., then in Cilicia, on the last day of Dec. 51, reminded Cic. of his *clarissimum ius iurandum* twelve years before); Rep. 1, 7; Pis. 6; pro dom. 94; Dio C. 37, 38; Plut. Cic. 23. Cic. says the action of the tribune was then absolutely without precedent; Clodius however treated Bibulus so afterwards (Dio 38, 12).

1. **ardere studio etc.**: cf. Hume, Essays, ed. Green, II p. 35 'every passion is mortified by it (the Academic philosophy) except the love of truth'. For the expression cf. Cato m. 50 his studiis flagrantis senes uidimus; for the sense Sen. ep. 45, 4 tu illos (libros) sic lege, tamquam uerum quaeram adhuc, non sciam, et contumaciter quaeram.

quae dicerem: i.e. *quae nunc dico;* the verb is attracted into the conditional construction, contrary to English usage. Madvig on Fin. 1, 25 has admirably handled this topic. Cf. § 75 quae nos fallerent; also n. on 1, 19 referrentur; and on 2, 9 fuissemus.

4. **turpissumum**: cf. 1, 45.

5. **is sum qui**: n. on 1, 35.

6. **adsentiar**: here used κατ' ἐξοχήν 'give an unqualified assent'; see n. on § 104. For the first person with *is...qui* see Draeger § 479.

nihil opiner: n. on § 67 below.

sed ... sapiente: cf. § 57 sapientem, de quo omnis hic sermo est; so § 115; Tusc. 4, 55 nos, ut testificor saepe, de sapiente quaerimus; ib. 4, 59; ib. 5, 107; Sen. dial. 7, 11, 1 cum dico me nihil uoluptatis causa facere, de illo loquor sapiente; ben. 2, 18, 4; also De Or. 3, 75 non quid ego sed quid orator; Sen. dial. 7, 18, 1 de uirtute non de me loquor; also below, *non de me...*

7. **magnus opinator**: so *magnus ueterator* in Qu. fr. 2, 11 (or 13), 4; *m. nebulo*, Att. 6, 1, 25; *m. declamator*, Sen. suas. 2, 15; *m. praeceptor*, Contr. 4, 5; and Liu. 1, 10, 5 ostentator haud minor; Tac. an. 3, 27 nec minor largitor; ib. 1, 30 ut quisque praecipuus turbator; the similar use of *tantus quantus* is common (above, § 3).

non sum sapiens: Sen. dial. 7, 17, 3 non sum sapiens et ut maleuolentiam tuam pascam, nec ero.

8. **dirigo**: cf. Sen. ep. 95, 45 finem summi boni ad quem omne factum nostrum dictumque respiciat, ueluti nauigantibus ad aliquod sidus dirigendus est cursus.

sic non ad etc.: cf. n. on § 113 ita iudico, politissimum.

9. **Cynosuram**: the 'Tyrian Cynosure' of Milton's Comus.

10. **qua fidunt etc.**: from Cicero's 'Aratea'. See N. D. 2, 106, from which it appears that Cic. has slightly adapted the lines here.

Phoenices: so Ovid, Fast. 3, 107; Trist. 4, 3, 1. It is to the navigation of the Phoenicians that Propertius alludes in 3, 19 (Müll. 23), 3 Phoenicum inuenta, a passage often misunderstood. Cf. too Diog. 1, 23, where Callimachus is quoted as authority for naming Thales εὑρετὴν τῆς ἄρκτου τῆς μικρᾶς, in that he wrote of him

καὶ τῆς ἁμάξης ἐλέγετο σταθμήσασθαι
τοὺς ἀστερίσκους ᾗ πλέουσι Φοίνικες.

13. **sed Helicen**: for the omission of the preposition cf. n. on 1, 39 and Off. 1, 136; Tusc. 4, 46; Kühner, Gr. § 112 *b*.

ut ait Aratus, eoque directius gubernant, quod eam tenent,

'quae cursu interiore, breui conuertitur orbe',

sed Helicen et clarissimos Septemtriones, id est, rationes has latiore specie, non ad tenue elimatas. Eo fit ut errem et uager latius. Sed non de me, ut dixi, sed de sapiente quaeritur. Visa enim ista cum acriter mentem sensumue pepulerunt, accipio eisque interdum etiam adsentior, nec percipio tamen ; nihil enim arbitror posse percipi. Non sum sapiens ; itaque uisis cedo nec possum resistere. Sapientis autem hanc censet Arcesilas uim esse maximam, Zenoni adsentiens, cauere ne capiatur, ne fallatur uidere ; nihil est enim ab ea cogitatione quam habemus de grauitate sapientis, errore leuitate temeritate diiunctius. Quid

tius. 12 conuertitur : *conuehitur* $V^2\psi$. 13 sed : *sed ad* U. 14 ad tenue : *attenue* Cψ ; *tenue* Cant. elimatas : AB^2U ; *limatas* B^1V Cant. ψ.

Helicen et...Septemtriones : the passage in N. D. 2, 105 shows that *Helice* was the Greek name for the stars called *septemtriones ;* hence *et* here is merely explanatory. In N. D. l. l. Cic. calls them *clarissimas stellas.*

id est : n. on 1, 8.

14. **latiore** : possibly Cic. wrote *latiores specie,* with which cf. § 99 *specie probabile.* For *latiore* cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. 1, 3, 4 παχυλῶς καὶ τύπῳ τἀληθὲς ἐνδείκνυσθαι.

elimatas : the verb is rare ; see Att. 16, 7, 3 ; Quint. 2, 7, 5 ; *elimati* also should probably be read in Orat. 20. *Limare* is common ; cf. 1 § 2 and *limatus et subtilis* in De Or. 1, 180 and 3, 31 ; also Off. 2, 35 illa, cum ueritas ipsa limatur in disputatione, subtilitas ; Brut. 35, 93, 236 ; Hor. sat. 1, 10, 65 ; Plin. ep. 1, 20, 21 ingenii limatioris ; Phaedr. 3, 10, 48 subtiliter limare mendacium (to explore all the ins and outs of a lying tale). Cic. does not use *lima* to mean 'extreme care' like Plin. ep. 1, 2, 5 limam tuam ; ib. 8, 4, 7 extremam limam.

errem et uager : for the tautology cf. n. on § 32 above ; Fin. 2, 13 uerbum par Graeco et quod idem ualeat ; ib. 1, 55 praesens et quod adest ; Off. 1, 11.

15. **non de me** : cf. De Or. 3, 74 non de memet ipso, sed de oratore ; Lael. 96 ; Or. 104 ; also above sed...sapiente, with n.

18. **cedo** : cf. n. on § 38 ; Epict. diss. 1, 5, 3 ἐπινεύειν τοῖς ἐναργέσι : Sext. P. H. 1, 13 τοῖς κατὰ φαντασίαν κατηναγκασμένοις πάθεσι συγκατατίθεται ὁ σκεπτικός.

19. **sapientis...uidere** : see nn. on § 108.

Arcesilas...Zenoni : for Zeno cf. 1, 42 ; for Arc. 1, 45.

20. **cauere...uidere** : the chiasmus is noticeable. For the change from *cauere* to *uidere* cf. § 80, n. on *uideo...cerno.*

21. **cogitatione** : cf. Arist. Met. 1, 2, 982 a τὰς ὑπολήψεις τοιαύτας ἔχομεν περὶ τοῦ σοφοῦ : Epict. diss. 1, 7, 27 φρόνιμος τοιοῦτος οἷον αὐτὸν ἐπινοοῦμεν : ib. 1, 7, 29 ἡ πρόληψις τοῦ σπουδαίου. As to the exact force of *cogitatio* see n. on § 48.

22. **errore etc.** : cf. 1 §§ 42, 45 ; Sen. N. Q. 7, 30, 1 ne quid temere, ne quid imprudenter aut ignorantes adfirmemus, aut scientes mentiamur.

leuitate : cf. § 120 leuitatem temere assentientium.

temeritate : προπέτεια was the charge constantly brought against the dogmatists by the sceptics. Cf. 1, 42 ; Diu. 1, 7 omnibus in rebus temeritas in adsentiendo turpis est ; N. D. 1, 1 quid tam indignum sapientis grauitate et constantia quam aut falsum sentire aut quod non satis explorate perceptum sit et cognitum sine ulla dubitatione defendere? Off. 1, 18 : Sext. P. H. 1 §§ 20, 177, 186 and 3 § 280 τὴν τῶν δογματικῶν προπέτειαν : ib. 1, 205 προπετεύεσθαι : ib. 1, 212 προπετῶς λεγόμενα : Diog. 7, 46 and 48 contrasts προπέτεια and εἰκαιότης with ἀπροπτωσία and ἀνεικαιότης : Epict. d. 3, 22, 104 προπετὴς συγκατάθεσις. The Stoics not only made their σοφὸς devoid of rashness ; he was, as we have seen, literally infallible ; see Fin. 3, 59. One of the νεῦρα τοῦ φιλοσό-

igitur loquar de firmitate sapientis? Quem quidem nihil opinari tu quoque, Luculle, concedis. Quod quoniam a te probatur—ut praepostere tecum agam, mox referam me ad ordinem—haec
67 primum conclusio quam habeat uim considera. XXI. Si ulli rei sapiens adsentietur umquam, aliquando etiam opinabitur: numquam autem opinabitur: nulli igitur rei adsentietur. Hanc conclusionem Arcesilas probabat: confirmabat enim et primum et secundum. Carneades non numquam secundum illud dabat, adsentiri aliquando. Ita sequebatur etiam opinari, quod tu non uis et recte, ut mihi uideris. Sed illud primum, sapientem, si adsensurus esset, etiam opinaturum, falsum esse et Stoici dicunt et eorum adstipulator Antiochus: posse enim eum falsa a ueris et
68 quae non possint percipi ab eis quae possint, distinguere. Nobis autem primum, etiam si quid percipi possit, tamen ipsa consuetudo adsentiendi periculosa esse uidetur et lubrica. Quam ob rem cum tam uitiosum esse constet adsentiri quicquam aut falsum aut in-

3 agam: $V^2\psi$; *agam iam* CU; *agam et* Cant. 8 non numquam secundum: *n. n. sed* ψ; *n. n. secundum: et* Faber; u. *secundum* delere uoluit Dau., *non numquam secundum* M. dabat etc.: *dabat opinari al.*, *ita sequebatur etiam adsentiri* Manut. 9 ita sequebatur: *id assequebatur* (uel *ads.*) codd. 11 falsum

φου is *συγκατάθεσις ἀπρόπτωτος* (Epict. d. 2, 8, 29).

1. **firmitate**: n. on § 23 constantiam.

opinari: = *δοξάζειν*, to pronounce a confident judgment on insufficient evidence; see nn. on 1, 39 and 42; also cf. Diog. 7, 121 *μὴ δοξάσειν τὸν σοφόν* (of Zeno); ib. 162 *τὸν σοφὸν ἀδόξαστον εἶναι* (of Aristo Chius); ib. 7, 201 Chrysippus wrote '*ἀποδείξεις πρὸς τὸ μὴ δοξάσειν τὸν σοφόν*'. Heraclitus called *οἴησιν* a *ἱερὰν νόσον* (Diog. 9, 7).

3. **praepostere**: in the wrong order; cf. Sen. ep. 23, 1 praeposterum frigus.

4. **primum**: without *dcinde;* cf. n. on § 46.

conclusio: n. on § 26.

si ulli rei etc.: precisely the same argument is urged by Sext. A. M. 7, 156 sq., a passage which has a common source with ours. Both are probably from Clitomachus.

7. **primum...secundum**: n. on § 44 priori...iungitur.

8. **secundum illud**: needless trouble has been made over this passage, as by Goerenz and Rein, Quaest. Tull. p. 29. Carneades granted *as second premiss* the statement 'sapiens adsentietur aliquando'. Hence the conclusion to his syllogism was 'sapiens etiam opinabitur'. For the opinion of Carneades cf. n. on § 78.

9. **quod tu non uis**: the accusative with *uelle nolle* always rests on ellipse of an active infinitive; see a striking ex. in Fin. 3, 68; cf. also n. on § 17.

11. **opinaturum**: supply *fuisse* not *esse;* see n. on § 65 quae dicerem.

12. **adstipulator**: the word is legal in its origin; see the lexica. For Antiochus cf. § 137.

14. **primum**: without *deinde;* n. on § 46.

15. **lubrica**: cf. § 92.

16. **quicquam**: an accusative like *nihil* with *assentati* in § 45. *Quicquam* is put, not *aliquid*, because *uitiosum* is virtually negative; cf. the use of *quisquam* in conditional clauses.

incognitum: see n. on § 16.

17. **sustinenda adsensio**: *ἐφεκτέον*: see nn. on §§ 59, 104.

praecipitet: for the omission of the *general* subject 'one' or 'a man' cf. n. on § 79 dicit. Cic. uses *praecipitare* both transitively and intransitively.

18. **eaque...quae possunt**: *τὰ ἀκατάληπτα τοῖς καταληπτοῖς*.

cognitum, sustinenda est potius omnis adsensio, ne praecipitet, si temere processerit. Ita enim finitima sunt falsa ueris, eaque quae percipi non possunt, eis quae possunt—si modo ea sunt quaedam: iam enim uidebimus—ut tam in praecipitem locum non debeat se sapiens committere. Sin autem omnino nihil esse quod percipi possit a me sumpsero et, quod tu mihi das, accepero, sapientem nihil opinari, effectum illud erit, sapientem adsensus omnis cohibiturum, ut uidendum tibi sit idne malis an aliquid opinaturum esse sapientem. Neutrum, inquies, illorum. Nitamur igitur nihil posse percipi: etenim de eo omnis est controuersia.

XXII. Sed prius pauca cum Antiocho, qui haec ipsa, quae 69
a me defenduntur, et didicit apud Philonem tam diu ut constaret diutius didicisse neminem, et scripsit de his rebus acutissime, et idem haec non acrius accusauit in senectute quam antea

...Antiochus: uid. fragm. 20. esse et: *esse* A^{1}ψ Nonius Bait.; *esset et* Cant.; *esse* [*et*] H. 13 ab eis quae possint: om. V Cant. ψ. 19 eis quae possunt: om. codd. 20 tam in praec.: V; *tamen in pr.* ABE; *in tam pr.* G Cant. Harl., *tam pr. in* ψ. 26 nitamur: *uitamur nitamur* Cant.; *nitamur* bis praebent B^{1}V Harl. 29 didicit: *dicit* A^{1}ψ; om. Cant. 30 didicisse: *dixisse* V (in ras.) Cant. ψ.

19. **si modo**: so often, as in De Or. 2, 37.

20. **tam in praecipitem**: for the position of *in* see n. on § 83 quam in paruo; for the construction *committere in* see n. on § 58 in animos.

22. **a me sumpsero**: cf. the ordinary phrases *ab aliquo sumere, dare, soluere pecuniam;* particularly Plaut. Rud. 2, 5, 21 ab se cantat; Liu. 44, 33, 6 ab se adicientes. See n. on § 23 ex sese habeat.

das, accepero: so Fin. 2, 82 accipio quod dant; Fam. 1, 1, 2 quod dat, accipimus. Dare (above, § 50) = συγχωρεῖν is a common synonym for *concedere;* the two words are interchanged in Diu. 2, 103. So διδόναι often, as in Arist. Met. 1006 a, 24, 27. For the context cf. § 101, where there is an argument similar in form, and Lactant. de falsa sap. 3, 3 (qu. by P. Valentia, p. 278 of Orelli's reprint) si neque sciri quicquam potest, ut Socrates docuit, neque opinari oportet, ut Zeno, tota philosophia sublata est.

24. **cohibiturum**: n. on § 59 ἐποχή: also 1, 45 cohibere...temeritatem.

26. **nitamur...percipi**: so *pugnare* is sometimes directly followed by accusative and inf., as in Fin. 3, 41. The construction would have been smoother if *id* had been inserted as direct object to *nitamur*, leaving *nihil posse percipi* as an explanatory clause. Cf. Fam. 3, 10, 4 illud pugna et enitere ne...; N. D. 1, 75 illud te pugnare uideo ut...; S. Rosc. 8 si hoc solum pugnatur ut...; Plin. ep. 6, 18, 1 quod adnitar. So Prop. 5, 5, 35 tundat Amycle natalem Maiis idibus esse tuam.

28. **pauca**: sc. *loquar* or *disceptabo;* cf. n. on § 32.

haec ipsa...et didicit...et de his: slightly inaccurate for *et haec didicit et de his*. Wopkens, Lect. Tull. p. 45 qu. a number of passages in illustration, not all however to the point; the best are Marc. 8 aduersarium...non modo attollere iacentem, sed etiam amplificare eius dignitatem; Tusc. 1, 75 hoc et, dum erimus in terris, erit illi caelesti uitae simile, et cum illuc ex his uinclis emissi feremur, minus tardabitur cursus animorum. [Cf. n. on 2, 12 *et cum;* the MSS in N. D. 2, 6 give *aut non* for *non aut* and ib. 2, 77 the cod. Uff. has *uel ei* for *ei uel*.]

30. **acutissime**: Cicero often speaks of the *acumen* of Antiochus; see Introd. p. 4.

31. **non acrius**: Madv. Em. 161 shews

defensitauerat. Quamuis igitur fuerit acutus, ut fuit, tamen inconstantia leuatur auctoritas. Quis enim iste dies illuxerit quaero, qui illi ostenderit eam quam multos annos esse negitauisset, ueri et falsi notam. Excogitauit aliquid? Eadem dicit quae Stoici. Poenituit illa sensisse? Cur non se transtulit ad alios et maxime ad Stoicos? Eorum enim erat propria ista dissensio. Quid? Eum Mnesarchi poenitebat? Quid? Dardani? Qui erant Athenis tum principes Stoicorum. Numquam a Philone discessit, nisi postea quam ipse coepit qui se audirent
70 habere. Vnde autem subito uetus Academia reuocata est? Nominis dignitatem uidetur, cum a re ipsa descisceret, retinere

2 quis enim: *quisquam en.* codd. paene omnes; corr. Lamb. 12 facere dicerent: edd. cum Camerario; *facerent* ABE; *fecerunt* VG Harl.; *fecisse dicerent* Cant.

the absurdity of the readings in some old edd., which make Cic. say that the old arguments of Antiochus in favour of New Academicism were weaker than his new arguments against it. For the occurrence of *acutius* and *acrius* in the same passage, cf. De Or. 1, 116 acutius atque acrius uitia in dicente quam recta uideat.

1. **defensitauerat**: a rare verb; cf. §§ 71, 139; Brut. 100; Off. 1, 121. Probably not used, outside these passages, until the Latin of the third cent. A.D.

ut fuit: a number of exx. of parenthetic clauses like this will be found in Krebs-Allgayer, *Antibarbarus*, s. u. *ut*.

2. **quis...dies**: n. on § 81.

4. **excogitauit**: for the omission of the interrogative *nĕ* see n. on 1, 41 feretis.

eadem: i. e. on the subject of *κατάληψις*.

5. **sensisse**: n. on 1, 22.

6. **dissensio**: sc. a Philone.

7. **Mnesarchi**: Numen. ap. Eus. pr. Eu. 14, c. 9 and Aug. contr. Ac. 3, 41 call Antiochus a pupil of Mnesarchus. Cic. nowhere mentions the two together in such a connexion, and indeed the passage before us is sufficient to disprove the assertion. Of Mnesarchus and Dardanus almost the only thing known is that they were pupils of Panaetius.

9. **qui se audirent**: periphr. for *auditores*, pupils.

10. **reuocata est**: cf. n. on 1, 14.

11. **nominis etc.**: Aug. c. Ac. 3, 41 calls Ant. *foeneus ille Platonicus* 'that *tulchan* Platonist', if we may parody a historical Scottish phrase, in which the metaphor is much the same as in *foeneus*.

ipsa: see n. on 1 § 6.

descisceret: above, § 46.

12. **gloriae**: so Aug. c. Ac. 2, 15 Antiochus...gloriae cupidior quam ueritatis.

facere dicerent: *facerent sperare*, which the MSS give, could only mean 'represented as hoping'; but such an employment of *facio* is unexampled in good prose. [The corruption is of a kind not uncommon in MSS; so in Leg. 1, 19 Koch proposes *appellare solet* for the corrupt *appellaret.*]

13. **sperare etc.**: cf. Galen. Plac. Hipp. et Plat. II § 212 ed. Müller *ἀποτετόλμηται γὰρ ἅπαντα τὰ τοιαῦτα πρὸς ἀνθρώπων ἀνατρέψαι φιλονεικούντων ὅσα καλῶς εἴρηται τοῖς παλαιοῖς, ὑπὲρ τοῦ νεωτέραν αἵρεσιν ἰδίαν συστήσασθαι*: so Aug. ciu. d. 18, 41.

14. **sustinere**: 'to bear up against'. There is a reference to the common military sense of the word 'to withstand a charge', as in Liu. 5, 6, 7; Caes. B. C. 1, 47, 2. Cf. § 115 sustinuero Epicurios; § 18 Philo quod ea sustinere uix poterat; Fin. 3, 57; Tusc. 5, 24 hoc illud est quod Theophrastus sustinere non potuit, where Kühner wrongly renders 'aufrecht erhalten', to the detriment of the sense of the passage.

concursum omnium philosophorum: similarly De Or. 1, 42 cum uniuersi (philosophi) in te impetum fecissent.

15. **ceteris**: sc. rebus; see n. on 1 § 27 omnibus.

16. **haec...probet**: cf. Introd. p. 15. Notice the exact force of *probet* as contrasted with *probat*.

18. **cessit**: above § 63 sin cesseris.

sub Nouis: the phrase (similar to *in-*

uoluisse, quod erant qui illum gloriae caussa facere dicerent,
sperare etiam fore ut ei qui se sequerentur, Antiochii uoca-
rentur. Mihi autem magis uidetur non potuisse sustinere con-
cursum omnium philosophorum. Etenim de ceteris sunt inter
illos non nulla communia: haec Academicorum est una sen-
tentia quam reliquorum philosophorum nemo probet. Itaque
cessit, et ut ei, qui sub Nouis solem non ferunt, item ille, cum
aestuaret, ueterum, ut Maenianorum, sic Academicorum umbram
secutus est. Quoque solebat uti argumento tum, cum ei place- **71**
bat nihil posse percipi, cum quaereret, Dionysius ille Heracliotes
utrum comprehendisset certa illa nota, qua adsentiri dicitis opor-

Dau. H. 13 sperare etiam: B[1]V Cant. ψ; *speraret etiam* AB[2]; *cum speraret iam* H; *sperantem* M. 18 Nouis: *nubes* uel *nube* codd.; corr. P. Faber.

ter falcarios and the like) refers to the *nouae tabernae*, a row of silversmiths' or moneychangers' shops skirting the forum. Cf. Varro L. L. 6, 59 sub nouis dicta pars in foro aedificiorum, quod nomen ei peruetustum; Liu. 3, 48, 5; 40, 51, 5 argentarias nouas; De Or. 2, 266. So *sub ueteribus*, referring to the *ueteres tabernae*, Plaut. Curc. 479; Plin. n. h. 35, 25.

non ferunt: '*do* not bear'; we say '*could* not bear'. So often, as Brut. 268 cogitandi non ferebat laborem; Caes. B. G. 3, 19, 3; Nep. Alc. 10, 3.

19. **ut...sic**: cf. n. on § 14.

Maenianorum: these were timber balconies, originally thrown out from the houses or shops round the forum, for the purpose of affording a view of games and spectacles. The *Maeniana* derived their name from Maenius, plebeian consul in 338 B.C., censor in 318, who also set up the *columna Maenia*. For full information see Pauly, Realenc. s. u. Maenius. As to the name cf. the buildings called *Aemiliana* (Suet. Cl. 18), also the kinds of glass called *Vitelliana* and *Vatinia*.

umbram secutus est: cf. De Or. 1, 28 platanus, cuius umbram secutus est Socrates; Plin. ep. 2, 17, 28 aquam umbramue sectantur (pecora); Cic. Leg. 2, 3 amoenitatem et salubritatem hanc sequor. Cic. frequently uses *sequi* in his letters with the sense 'to aim at obtaining', 'to be attracted by'.

20. **quoque solebat etc.**: the sentence, it will be seen, is anacoluthic; the broken thread is knit again by *quod argumentum* near the end.

21. **Dionysius**: called ὁ μεταθέμενος, because, when suffering pain, he was converted from Stoicism to Cyrenaicism or Epicureanism. Almost all the information we have about him comes from Diog. 7, 166—7 and some passages of Cic., viz. Fin. 5, 94; Tusc. 2 § 60; 3 § 19. Dionysius was a good subject for the sceptics, since he had belonged to two different dogmatic schools.

22. **utrum**: the neuter pronoun ('which of the two') not the so-called conjunction; the two alternatives are marked by *ne* and *an*. Passages similar to ours are Diu. 2 §§ 120, 129; Tusc. 4, 9; Fin. 2, 60; Verr. 4, 73; in Caec. 54 (where *ne* is omitted); also Plaut. Bacch. 497 (Ussing). In all these passages there is a stop or pause after the clause with *utrum*, and a fresh start is made. Very different are passages like Inu. 2, 115 utrum copiane sit agri an penuria; Tusc. 4, 59 utrum illudne non uideatur aegre ferendum, an...; Ter. Eun. 721 utrum praedicemne an; so Ad. 382; Plaut. Capt. 267. In these passages the two alternatives are really marked by *utrum ...an*, and *ne* is merely an echo of *utrum*. There is a similar double function, pronominal and conjunctional, of πότερον: see e.g. Plato, Hipp. m. 363 B. Cic. does not use *utrumnĕ*, nor do the writers of his time; see Draeger 1[2] p. 347, to whose exx. add Hor. s. 2, 3, 251; Plin. ep. 8, 14, 17; Sen. suas. 6, 19; contr. 7, 1, 20 and 10, 4, 19. [In Fin. 4, 67 read utrum igitur tandem? perspicuisne dubia aperiuntur an dubiis perspicua tolluntur? All edd. omit the stop after *tandem*.]

nota: see n. on § 84.

tere, illudne quod multos annos tenuisset Zenonique magistro credidisset, honestum quod esset, id bonum solum esse, an quod postea defensitauisset, honesti inane nomen esse, uoluptatem esse summum bonum; qui ex illius commutata sententia docere uellet nihil ita signari in animis nostris a uero posse, quod non eodem modo possit a falso, is curauit quod argumentum ex Dionysio ipse sumpsisset, ex eo ceteri sumerent. Sed cum hoc alio loco plura, nunc ad ea, quae a te, Luculle, dicta sunt.

72 XXIII. Et primum quod initio dixisti uideamus quale sit, similiter a nobis de antiquis philosophis commemorari atque seditiosi solerent claros uiros, sed tamen popularis aliquos nominare. Illi cum res non bonas tractent, similes bonorum uideri

6 curauit: *c. ut* Lamb. H Bait.; quos contra optime disputat Muellerus. 10 philosophis: *physicis* Bentl. coll. § 13. 12 non bonas: om. *non* codd.; addidit

2. **honestum**: n. on 1, 35.

3. **defensitauisset**: n. on § 69.

honesti: a modern would be inclined to write *honestum*, in apposition to *nomen*. Cf. Fin. 5, 18 uoluptatis alii putant primum appetitum. For the genitive see n. on 1, 6 caussas rerum efficientium.

4. **qui...uellet**: sc. Antiochus.

5. **signari in**: cf. n. on § 34 proprium in communi signo notari non potest.

a uero: n. on § 105 a sole.

6. **curauit...sumerent**: the insertion of *ut* is wholly unnecessary. Its omission is exceedingly common with verbs of the class: with *curo* itself there is one undoubted instance in Fam. 2, 8, 1 (a letter of Cic. himself); four other exx. from Cato, Coelius Antipater, Phaedrus, Petronius, and one of *adcuro* from Plautus will be found in Draeger II² pp. 284, 286.

is...ex eo: n. on § 27 ea...ea.

8. **alio loco plura, nunc**: see my n. on Lael. § 1.

ad ea: for the ellipse see n. on § 13 tum ad hos, also on § 143 pedem nusquam.

9. **initio**: § 13.

quale sit: n. on § 44.

11. **solerent**: the past tense follows on *dixisti*. Cf. n. on § 65 quae dicerem and Wopkens, Lect. Tull. p. 47, ed. Hand, who gives a number of exx.

aliquos: n. on § 32 desperatos aliquos.

nominare: cf. § 75.

12. **non bonas...bonorum**: so § 50 bonis non bona. The contrast between negative and positive is needed here; otherwise much might be said for Faber's correction *nouas*, which might have passed to *nobas*, *bonas*. The interchange of *v* and *b* is common; see Munro on Lucr. 5, 545 (cr. n.) and cf. Phil. 2, 55 where the MSS vary between *bonis* and *uobis*, while Halm reads *nobis;* also Fin. 3, 49 (*bonis nobis*).

14. **Anaxagoras**: he was no sceptic, nor does Cic. assert that he was, either here or in 1 § 44 (which Zeller I⁴ p. 910 misunderstands). All that Cic. intends to convey is that Anaxagoras put forward assumptions which cut away the ground from dogmatism. The sceptical tendency of much in Anaxagoras was generally recognised in ancient times, by Aristotle as well as by later writers; see Zeller I⁴ pp. 882, 910 sq.

niuem nigram: Anax. like all other ancients regarded all *things in themselves* as possessing definite colour; he seems to have arbitrarily assumed that the *real* colour of water was black because still water in large masses and of great depth tends to approach that colour. For the snow see Sext. P. H. 1, 33 and for a similar difficulty about colour, A. M. 7, 90; and as to the use made by the sceptics of these difficulties see n. on § 79. There is an obscure joke apparently on this subject in Qu. Fr. 2, 13 (11), 1 risi niuem atram: teque hilari animo esse et prompto ad iocandum ualde me iuuat.

15. **tu**: sc. *non ferres*. The ellipse is rather remarkable; cf. n. on § 82 qui ne nunc quidem; also § 126 quae tu; Tusc. 1, 17 tu, ut uidetur, sc. *puta*.

16. **num hic**: for the omission of *est*

uolunt. Nos autem dicimus ea nobis uideri, quae uosmet ipsi nobilissimis philosophis placuisse conceditis. Anaxagoras niuem nigram dixit esse. Ferres me, si ego idem dicerem? Tu, ne si dubitarem quidem. At quis est? Num hic sophistes? Sic enim appellabantur ei, qui ostentationis aut quaestus caussa philosophabantur. Maxuma fuit et grauitatis et ingeni gloria. Quid 73
loquar de Democrito? Quem cum eo conferre possumus non modo ingeni magnitudine, sed etiam animi, qui ita sit ausus ordiri, 'haec loquor de uniuersis'? Nihil excipit de quo non profiteatur. Quid enim esse potest extra uniuersa? Quis hunc philosophum non anteponit Cleanthi Chrysippo reliquis inferioris aetatis? Qui mihi cum illo collati quintae classis uidentur. Atque is non hoc dicit,

Ascensius; *nouas* Faber, HM. 15 tu, ne si: *tu nisi* V[1]; *tum si* Cant. ψ Harl. 16 num hic: *nunc hic* AB Cant. ψ. 20 sit ausus: *est a.* H. 23 reliquis: *reliquisque* A[2]V[2]ψ; *et rel.* Cant.

see n. on § 86 iam illa praeclara.

sophistes: here treated as the demagogue of philosophy.

sic enim etc.: Cope in the 'Journal of Classical Philology' II 129 lays great stress on this passage as shewing that in Cicero's time the sophists were looked on as pretenders in *philosophy*, and not merely as instructors of youth. But he gives too great importance to the word *philosophabantur*; see Introd. p. 24. Moreover Cic. merely judged of the sophist from Plato, and supplies no fresh evidence as to his real character. With the description here cf. Brut. 30; Val. M. 1, 8 ext. 8 eius studii cuius professores sophistae uocantur, ineptae et mendacis opinationis. It is needless to argue against Vaucher who, appealing to Schaefer on Dion. de comp. uerb. p. 406, ejects the words *sic enim...philosophabantur*, as an *interpretamentum!*

17. **ostentationis**: sc. ἐπιδείξεως.

18. **maxuma etc.**: for the omission of an adversative particle see nn. on 1 § 16; 2 § 2.

19. **Democrito**: cf. n. on § 14 Democriti uerecundia.

20. **ingeni...animi**: 'talent...soul', the intellect contrasted with the temperament.

haec...uniuersis: cf. Sext. A. M. 7, 265 Δημόκριτος ὁ τῇ Διὸς φωνῇ παρεικαζόμενος καὶ λέγων 'τάδε περὶ τῶν ξυμπάντων'. These words probably formed the beginning of either the 'περὶ φύσεως' or the 'μέγας διάκοσμος' in the list of Diog. Laert. 9 §§ 46 sq.

21. **uniuersis**: cf. § 87 res uniuersas.

profiteatur: cf. the use of ἐπαγγέλλεσθαι in Plato and n. on § 44.

22. **esse potest**: n. on § 22.

23. **reliquis**: Cic. does not often write *reliquique* or the like at the end of an enumeration. See Madv. on Fin. 4, 56 and a good n. by Wesenberg on Tusc. 5, 13; to his exx. add Fin. 2, 18 and 106; Tusc. 4, 66; Caes. B. C. 1, 26, 2.

24. **quintae classis**: an expression evidently proverbial, and derived from the Servian system of *classes*, but occurring only here. The only parallel is in Hor. s. 1, 2, 47 tutior at quanto merx est in classe secunda, libertinarum dico. The expression *secunda classis* there is much less easy to understand than *quinta classis* here. Distinct mention of the *classes* in the *comitia centuriata* is astonishingly rare in Latin literature. If very late authors be excluded, the following is, I think, a nearly complete list of passages: Cic. rep. 2, 39; ib. 4, 2; Flacc. 15; Phil. 2, 82; Liu. 1, 43 and 43, 16, 14; Sall. Iug. 86; ps. Sall. de rep. ord. 2, 8; Gell. 7, 13; add Corp. Inscr. 1, 200, l. 37. Our passage has sometimes been appealed to (e. g. by Willems, *Droit Public Romain* p. 57 n. ed. 4; also by Lange) as evidence that the *five* classes existed in the late Republican period. But it no more proves that *five* existed than the passage from Horace proves that only *two* existed. The existence of the *five* classes in the later period depends

quod nos, qui ueri esse aliquid non negamus, percipi posse negamus; ille uerum plane negat esse: sensusque idem non obscuros dicit, sed tenebricosos, sic enim appellat eos. Is, qui hunc maxume est admiratus, Chius Metrodorus initio libri, qui est de natura: 'nego', inquit, 'scire nos sciamusne aliquid an nihil sciamus, ne id ipsum quidem, nescire aut scire, scire nos, nec
74 omnino sitne aliquid an nihil sit'. Furere tibi Empedocles uidetur, at mihi dignissimum rebus eis, de quibus loquitur,

2 ille uerum plane negat esse: codd. *esse* etiam ante *uerum* habent; corr. Dau. sensusque idem: *sensus quidem* codd. 3 sed: *nec* codd.; corr. Guietus. eos:

entirely on inference and combination; there is no distinct and direct testimony.

is...ille: n. on § 29 haec...eis.

2. **uerum negat esse**: Cic. has here probably overshot the mark. Sext. P. H. 1, 214, discussing the difference between the Sceptics and Democritus, justly says 'προδηλοτάτη δὲ γίγνεται ἡ διάκρισις ὅταν ὁ Δημόκριτος λέγῃ ἐτέῃ δὲ ἄτομα καὶ κενόν. ἐτέῃ μὲν γὰρ λέγει ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀληθείᾳ: cf. too A. M. 8 §§ 6, 61. Yet Aristotle, Met. 3, 5 speaks almost as strongly as Cic. — διὸ (on account of the irreconcileable differences of opinion) Δημόκριτός γε φησὶν ἤτοι οὐθὲν εἶναι ἀληθὲς ἢ ἡμῖν γ' ἄδηλον, while Diog. 9, 72 quotes as from D. the maxim 'ἐτέῃ δὲ οὐδὲν ἴδμεν'. The sceptical tendency of Democritus' teaching was indeed generally recognised in ancient times, as by Theophrastus, who defended the senses against the attacks made on them by D. (Zeller II 2, p. 853 ed. 3); and by Colotes the Epicurean, who attacked D. and the other φυσικοὶ named by Cic. as playing into the hands of the Sceptics; Plut. adv. Colot. undertakes their defence. The historical connexion of Pyrrho with Democritus is well known; cf. Numen. ap. Eus. 14, 6, 4; Zeller III p. 479, ed. 3. See further above 1 § 44; 2 § 32; also Introd. p. 54.

non...sed: different from non modo... sed etiam: in the first case the speaker puts entirely from him one of two statements, to accept the other; in the second case the speaker is willing to make both statements, but expresses his preference for one of them. Cf. n. on 1, 10; Kühner on Tusc. 5, 15; also n. on § 7 above; cr. n. on § 75.

3. **tenebricosos**: there is no doubt a reference to the distinction which Democr. drew between σκοτίη γνῶσις and γνησίη γνῶσις, for which see Sext. A. M. 7, 139, and Zeller I^4 p. 778.

appellat eos: the word *eos* is no more superfluous here than in § 93 at uitiosi sunt soritae; frangite igitur eos; or than *eorum* in § 58. The pronoun *is* can nearly always be dispensed with (except when the relative follows it) without much injury to the sense; but in cases like the present we must bow to the consensus of the MSS.

4. **Chius M.**: for the position of *Chius* see n. on § 137.

qui est de: the periphrasis is common in Cic.; see Cato m. § 59, with my n.

5. **nego scire etc.**: Aristocles ap. Euseb. 14, 19, 9 quotes this utterance as from the beginning of a work by Metrodorus περὶ φύσεως: the statement is also cited by Diog. 9, 58 and Sext. A. M. 7, 88, and is possibly referred to by Lucr. 4, 469 denique nil sciri si quis putat, id quoque nescit an sciri possit, quoniam nil scire fatetur. As to the connexion of Metrodorus with Democritus see Zeller I^4 p. 859.

6. **ne id ipsum quidem**: cf. Sen. ep. 88, 45 si Nausiphani credo, hoc unum certum est, nihil esse certi; ib. 46 non facile dixerim utris magis irascar, illis qui nos nihil scire uoluerunt, an illis qui ne hoc quidem nobis reliquerunt, nihil scire. The statement attributed in the text to Metrodorus is thoroughly sceptical. That of Xeniades 'ψευδεῖς εἶναι πάσας τὰς αἰσθήσεις' and that of the Cynic Monimus 'τῦφον εἶναι ἅπαντα' are condemned by Sext. A. M. 7, 399 and 8, 5 as tinged with the spirit of dogmatism.

7. **furere**: § 14 n. Cf. Sen. ep. 79, 14 quamdiu uidebatur furere Democritus!

Empedocles: Sextus A. M. 7, 123 sq. is careful to point out that Emp. was no sceptic, however much he might declaim against the senses. Yet he, along with

sonum fundere. Num ergo is excaecat nos aut orbat sensibus, si parum magnam uim censet in eis esse ad ea, quae sub eos subiecta sunt, iudicanda? Parmenides, Xenophanes, minus bonis quamquam uersibus, sed tamen illi uersibus increpant eorum adrogantiam quasi irati, qui, cum sciri nihil possit, audeant se scire dicere. Et ab eis aiebas remouendum Socraten et Platonem. Cur? An de ullis certius possum dicere? Vixisse cum eis equi-

incl. H Bait. 11 Parmenides: *P. et* Cant. 12 illi: B^1V^1; *illis* cett. 14 aiebas: *aiebat* codd.; corr. Lamb.

the other φυσικοὶ and the Eleates and Plato and Socrates, was constantly claimed by the Sceptics. See an important passage in Diog. 9, 71—74 which strongly resembles the *Academica*.

9. **fundere**: often used of poetical or other excited utterance, as in N. D. 1, 66 physicorum oracula fundo; Diu. 2 §§ 27, 110; Fin. 4, 10; Tusc. 1, 64; ib. 3, 42; ib. 5, 73; De Or. 3 §§ 175, 194; Ter. ad. 769 tu uerba fundis hic sapientia. So *effundere*, Flacc. 69; Vell. 2, 14, 2; cf. Sen. ep. 100, 2 Fabianus mihi non effundere uidetur orationem sed fundere; adeo larga est et sine perturbatione non sine cursu tamen ueniens.

excaecat: cf. n. on § 30 lucem eripere; also on § 61 confundit...sensibus; also Sen. ep. 88, 45 illi (Eleatici) non praeferunt lumen, per quod acies dirigatur ad uerum; hi (the Sceptics) oculos mihi effodiunt.

10. **uim**: n. on § 30.

eis...eos: n. on § 27.

ad ea...iudicanda: cf. n. on the construction of *disputentur* in § 32.

sub eos: in 1, 31 subiectae sensibus, the commoner construction. Madvig's n. on Fin. 2, 48 sub hanc uocem quae sit subicienda sententia, contains a full discussion of the constructions of *subicere*.

11. **Parmenides Xenophanes**: for the omission of *et* see n. on 1 § 16 uarie et copiose. It cannot be disputed that the criticism of sense knowledge advanced by the Eleatic school contributed much to the rise of Scepticism. Many Sceptics claimed Xenophanes as the founder of their school, on the score of such utterances as 'δόκος δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέτυκται'. A full collection of passages concerning the relation of Xen. to Scepticism will be found in Zeller I^4 p. 503 sq., with critical remarks. Parmenides, while attacking the senses, as strongly as Xen., laid greater emphasis on his positive teaching, and therefore is not so often claimed by the Sceptics. Cf. however Diog. 9, 72.

minus bonis: Davies qu. Plutarch. de Audiendo 45 A μέμψαιτο δ' ἄν τις Παρμενίδου τὴν στιχοποιΐαν: cf. *praue factis uersibus* in Hor. ep. 2, 1, 266.

12. **quamquam**: Madv. on Fin. 5, 68 points out that Cic. does not omit the verb from the clause with which *quamquam* goes, unless the verb, if expressed, would be the same with the verb in the contrasted clause (here *increpant*). The same rule holds good for *etsi*; see n. on § 3. The usage of writers later than Cic. is of course laxer. The position which *quamquam* here has in the clause is not very usual in Cic. but pretty common in poets (as in Verg. Aen. 6, 394) and later prose writers (see Nipperdey on Tac. an. 5, 9).

illi: the insertion of the pronoun is justified by the slightly anacoluthic character of the sentence, due to the interposition of the clause *minus...uersibus*, which rendered it advisable to repeat the subject to the verb. Kühner (Gram. II, p. 456, ed. 1878) should not have classed this passage with such as Verg. Aen. 5, 457 *nunc dextra ingeminans ictus, nunc ille sinistra*; that use of *ille* is purely poetical. [It is possible that Cic. wrote *illis*, the sense being 'though in inferior verses, still in those verses, such as they are'.]

13. **adrogantiam**: see n. on § 14.

quasi irati: so *quasi incitati* in § 14. In both places *quasi* = 'almost', as in §§ 8, 35, 64, 82 etc. The construction of *quasi* with a participle instead of a finite verb (as above §§ 14, 15, 26) is extensively used by Cic. and after his time; see Draeger II § 592.

14. **aiebas remouendum**: for om. of *esse* see n. on 1, 43.

15. **certius**: from *certo*, not *certe*.

uixisse cum eis: n. on § 115.

dem uideor: ita multi sermones perscripti sunt, e quibus dubitari non possit quin Socrati nihil sit uisum sciri posse. Excepit unum tantum, 'scire se nihil se scire', nihil amplius. Quid dicam de Platone? Qui certe tam multis libris haec persecutus non esset, nisi probauisset. Ironiam enim alterius, perpetuam prae-
75 sertim, nulla fuit ratio persequi. XXIV. Videorne tibi, non ut Saturninus, nominare modo illustris homines, sed imitari numquam nisi clarum, nisi nobilem? Atqui habebam molestos uobis, sed minutos, Stilponem Diodorum Alexinum, quorum sunt con-

7 sed imitari: *sed etiam i.* ABM Bait. numquam nisi: iniuria haec damnarunt Dau. HM al.; uid. adn. 9 Stilponem; *silibonem* CUψ; *stil borum* et ex correctione *stilbonem* Cant.; corr. Lamb. 14 at dissoluit: *addissoluit* BV;

1. **sermones**: Cic. refers not merely to Plato's dialogues, but to those of many other writers (Socratici) as Aeschines Socraticus, Phaedo, Crito, Simo, Glaucon, Demetrius Phalereus. Dialogues attributed to all these, introducing Socrates as an interlocutor, were current. Cf. 1, 16 and Brut. 31 where the *uberrimi sermones* of Socrates are mentioned.

2. **excepit etc.**: from Plat. Apol. 21 *ἔοικα γοῦν τούτου σμικρῷ τινὶ αὐτῷ τούτῳ σοφώτερος εἶναι, ὅτι ἃ μὴ οἶδα οὐδὲ οἴομαι εἰδέναι.* These words do not justify the *nihil sciri posse* of Cic. who gives the gist of the passage more fairly in 1, 16. In 1, 44 also he only ascribes to Socrates a 'confessio ignorationis'. Cf. Zeller II 1, pp. 102, 3, ed. 3. Socrates attacked preceding philosophers on much the same lines as the Sceptics, but he certainly believed that knowledge might be found. In Cicero's time it seems to have been generally admitted that Socrates was *prima facie* a Sceptic; the Dogmatists, however, maintained that this apparent Scepticism was merely due to his habitual irony. This consideration helps to reconcile the two passages above, 1 § 16 and 2 § 16, which at first sight seem rather inconsistent. It is curious that Socrates should be omitted from the list of philosophers claimed by the Sceptics, as given by Diog. 9, 71 sq.

3. **unum tantum**: with numbers *modo* is ordinarily used, not *tantum*, which in Cic. occurs here only. In § 101 we have *unum modo. Tantum* is used once by Caes. B.C. 3, 19, 1 unum flumen tantum; and occasionally by Livy; see Weissenborn on 3, 56, 4. Cf. n. on § 138 tris *solas* sententias.

4. **Platone**: Sceptics and Dogmatists alike appealed to his writings; cf. Sext. P. H. 1, 221 *τὸν Πλάτωνα οὖν οἱ μὲν δογματικὸν ἔφασαν εἶναι, οἱ δὲ ἀπορητικόν, οἱ δὲ κατὰ μέν τι ἀπορητικόν, κατὰ δέ τι δογματικόν.* On this subject cf. 1, 46 and Introd. p. 54. Sext. P. H. l.l. shews how absurd it is to call Plato a Sceptic, although he brought into greater prominence than ever that antithesis between *νοούμενα* and *φαινόμενα* which nearly all Greek philosophers before him had assumed, and which is the main pillar of Scepticism. Grote, Plato II 301, detects in the *Parmenides* the germs of that particular form of Scepticism afterwards put forward by the New Academy.

5. **ironiam**: here treated as a naturalised Latin word, but in § 15 (where see n.) as Greek.

perpetuam: Quint. 9, 2, 46 cum uita uniuersa ironiam habere uideatur, qualis est uisa Socratis.

6. **nulla ratio**: see n. on § 17.

uideorne: this use of *nĕ*, where a negative answer is expected to the question, is found more or less throughout Latin, but is commoner in Cic. than in any other author. So above § 11 n., below, § 116 estne; Tusc. 5, 36 uideturne.

7. **nominare**: cf. § 14.

numquam nisi: so N.D. 1, 93 Chrysippum numquam nisi Chrysippam uocabat; Tac. an. 1, 26 numquamne ad se nisi filios familiarum uenturos? Sen. N.Q. 1, 4, 1 numquam nisi e contrario; Pl. n. h. 10, 188; Fin. 3, 29 numquam quemquam nisi (Madv.). Cic. of course does not use *non nisi* without separating the two words.

8. **molestos uobis**: there was a great

torta et aculeata quaedam *σοφίσματα*: sic enim appellantur fallaces conclusiunculae. Sed quid eos colligam, cum habeam Chrysippum, qui fulcire putatur porticum Stoicorum? Quam multa ille contra sensus, quam multa contra omnia, quae in consuetudine probantur! At dissoluit idem. Mihi quidem non uidetur, sed dissoluerit sane. Certe tam multa non collegisset, quae nos fallerent probabilitate magna, nisi uideret eis resisti non facile posse. Quid Cyrenaici tibi uidentur, minime con- **76**

* * *dissoluit* A; *ut putat d.* Cant.; *disoluit* Uψ; corr. Dau. 17 Cyrenaici: *cyrenei* uel aliud simile codd. tibi: om. codd.; primus dedit Durand.; tum Madu. Bait. uidentur...qui: incl. H, at unam uocem *uidentur* incl. M, cum Grutero; *uidentur mihi minime* U.

feud between the dialecticians of the Megarian school and those of the Stoa, and Antiochus entirely sided with the Stoics. The disputes between Zeno of Elea and Alexinus are mentioned by Diog. 2, 109; Sext. A. M. 9, 108; between Alexinus and Aristo of Chios by Diog. 7, 163. See also n. on § 143. The connexion of the Megarian school with the rise of Pyrrhonism is well known; see Introd. p. 54; Zeller II 1, p. 213, ed. 3, and III 1, p. 479 sq.

9. **minutos**: cf. Diu. 1, 62 minutos philosophos; so Cato m. 85; Fin. 1, 61 minuti et angusti (homines); Brut. 256 m. imperatores. In Orat. 94 and De Or. 3, 169 Cic. describes the use of *minutus* for *paruos* as a *κατάχρησις*: properly, *minutus* is only applicable to things which are fractions of a whole. It has the proper sense in De Or. 2, 159 genus sermonis concisum atque minutum; Sen. N. Q. 4, 4, 3 m. pluuia. The use of *minutus* for *paruos* is very scantily illustrated in the lexica, but I can only here quote De opt. g. d. 9 m. caussae, as compared with De Or. 2, 320 and 88 paruae or paruolae caussae, and N. D. 2, 123 pisciculi parui, as contrasted with Ter. Andr. 369 and Suet. Aug. 76 pisciculi minuti. [In Off. 3, 116 ab Aristippo Cyrenaici atque Annicerii, philosophi *nominati*, we should read *minuti*, a term likely to have been used of the Hedonists by Cic., just as he applies it to those who deny a future life in Cato m. 85. The illustrations given by edd. ad loc. do not justify the MSS reading.]

contorta: Hieron. ep. 57 contorta Chrysippi acumina; Fronto p. 146 (ed. Naber) ceratinas et soreitas et pseudomenus, uerba contorta et fidicularia.

10. **aculeata**: for the metaphor cf. Parad. 2 minutis interrogatiunculis quasi punctis; Fin. 4, 7 pungunt, quasi aculeis, interrogatiunculis angustis; De Or. 2, 158; § 98 below, aculeos ... tortuosum genus.

σοφίσματα: Cic. no doubt here interposed in the second edition the translation *cauillationes* which Sen. ep. 111, 1 quotes. Seneca himself in ep. 108, 12 has *cauillationes* but in ep. 45, 8 *captiones*. Cf. §§ 45, 46, above, with nn.

sic enim appellantur: so § 73 sic enim appellat eos.

12. **fulcire porticum**: n. on § 87.

13. **consuetudine**: n. on § 87. For *in c. probantur* cf. n. on 1, 28 in omni natura; De Or. 1, 225 (where *probari in* occurs); Fam. 10, 3, 1 ignotam in consuetudine.

14. **at**: for *at enim*, as often.

15. **dissoluerit**: subj. not fut. perf. ind.; for exx. of the concessive perfect subj. see nn. on §§ 9, 29; for *dissoluere* § 46.

16. **fallerent**: n. on § 65 quae dicerem.

uideret: imperf. for pluperf. as so often in Cic. in conditional sentences; see many exx. in Draeger II², p. 722 sq.

17. **quid tibi uidentur**: *quid* for *quales* by a not very uncommon idiom: cf. Fam. 9, 21, 1 quid tibi uideor in epistulis? Att. 13, 10, 1 tibi Seruius quid uidetur? Ter. Eun. 274 sed quid uidetur hoc tibi mancipium? Hor. ep. 1, 11, 1 quid tibi uisa Chios? So Phaedr. 4, 7, 17, but in 1, 11, 13 qualis uidetur opera tibi uocis meae? Sen. Rhet. contr. 1, 6, 4; ib. 7, 6, 13; Fronton. ep. 2, 5.

tempti philosophi? Qui negant esse quicquam quod percipi possit extrinsecus: ea se sola percipere, quae tactu intimo sentiant, ut dolorem, ut uoluptatem; neque se quo quid colore aut quo sono sit scire, sed tantum sentire adfici se quodam modo.

Satis multa de auctoribus. Quamquam ex me quaesieras nonne putarem post illos ueteres tot saeculis inueniri uerum potuisse tot ingeniis tantisque studiis quaerentibus. Quid inuentum sit paulo post uidero, te ipso quidem iudice. Arcesilan uero non obtrectandi caussa cum Zenone pugnauisse, sed uerum

1 qui: in hac uoce frustra offenderunt Lamb. H.

Similar usages are common in Greek, as Plato Charm. 154 D *τί σοὶ φαίνεται ὁ νεάνισκος*; Dem. Lept. § 34 *τί οἴεσθε τοῦτον*; where see Westermann's n. [In Plaut. Most. 4, 3, 1 where Lorenz has quid tibi uisumst mercimoni hoc esse, we should read mercimonium.]

minime contempti philosophi: these words give Cicero's own opinion. For the expressions cf. Diu. 2, 150 philosophi, nec ei quidem contemptissimi; Tusc. 5, 113 Asclepiaden non ignobilem philosophum; Sen. N.Q. 6, 23, 2 Callisthenes, non contemptus uir; Pl. n. h. 8, 81.

1. **qui negant etc.**: Diog. 2, 92 (of Aristippus and his followers) *τά τε πάθη καταληπτά. ἔλεγον οὖν αὐτά, οὐκ ἀφ' ὧν γίνεται.* This statement is identical with one put by Diog. into the mouths of the Sceptics in 9, 103 *μόνα δὲ τὰ πάθη γινώσκομεν.* So Plutarch, Colot. 1120 D, says that the Cyrenaics confine themselves to the *πάθη*: of all that lies outside they say *φαίνεται* not *ἐστί*: hence the *πάθη* formed the only criterion of truth, as is stated above § 20, and below § 142 praeter permotiones intimas nihil putant esse iudici. These *πάθη* were two, *ἡδονή* and *πόνος* (Diog. 2, 86), the *dolor* and *uoluptas* here and in § 20. Cic. here represents the word *πάθη* by the phrase *sentire affici se quodammodo;* in § 142 the phrase *permotiones* represents *κινήσεις*, which Aristippus sometimes used for *πάθη*. But the words *tactus intimus* here and *tactus interior* in § 20 shew that he also used some other expression such as *ἡ ἔσω ἁφή*, which the ancient authorities have not preserved for us. Much as there was in common between the Sceptics and the Cyrenaics, there was one strong difference; the latter held that '*τὰ πάθη καταλαμβάνεται*' (Diog. 2, 92 quoted above, also Sext. A. M. 7, 191), while the Sceptics refused to admit *κατάληψις* even in the case of the *πάθη*. This is explained by Sext. P. H. 1, 215. Hence Lucullus in § 20 is able to appeal to the Cyrenaics as dogmatists. For further information about the Cyrenaics the student must go to Zeller. Hirzel in his work on the *De Finibus* p. 666 sq. has some good remarks.

3. **quo quid colore etc.**: cf. Sext. A. M. 7, 191 *ὅτι λευκαινόμεθα, φασί, καὶ γλυκαζόμεθα, δυνατὸν λέγειν ἀδιαψεύστως...ὅτι δὲ τὸ ἐμποιητικὸν τοῦ πάθους λευκόν ἐστιν ἢ γλυκύ ἐστιν, οὐχ οἷόν τε ἀποφαίνεσθαι. εἰκὸς γάρ ἐστι καὶ ὑπὸ μὴ λευκοῦ τινὰ λευκαντικῶς διατεθῆναι καὶ ὑπὸ μὴ γλυκέος γλυκανθῆναι.*

5. **satis multa de auctoribus**: it is rather surprising that Cic. nowhere in his works mentions Pyrrho as a Sceptic, but merely as a moralist. See n. on § 130. For *auctoribus* cf. Plin. ep. 1, 20, 4 ille mecum auctoritatibus agit.

quaesieras: in § 16. On the use of the pluperfect for the perfect see Draeger 1 § 130 B, to whose exx. add this passage and Lael. 15, also Plaut. Trin. 119 and Mil. 28. Possibly in § 79 dixeram (cf. Orat. §§ 101, 140) is another example, but the meaning there may be 'I had said, before you spoke'.

6. **nonne putarem**: so Tusc. 5, 35 Socrates, cum ex eo quaesitum esset, nonne putaret; where Kühner qu. Fin. 2, 58; ib. 3, 13; Orat. 214.

tot saeculis: not 'during so many ages' but 'after so many ages'.

7. **tantisque studiis**: cf. De Or. 2, 11 nihil esse praeteritum...quod quisquam summis ingeniis, acerrimis studiis...cognosci ac percipi potuisse arbitraretur. As the text stands there is a very strong personification of *studiis;* possibly the *que* has been wrongly inserted by the

inuenire uoluisse sic intellegitur. Nemo umquam superiorum 77
non modo expresserat, sed ne dixerat quidem posse hominem nihil opinari, nec solum posse, sed ita necesse esse sapienti. Visa est Arcesilae cum uera sententia tum honesta et digna sapiente. Quaesiuit de Zenone fortasse quid futurum esset, si nec percipere quicquam posset sapiens nec opinari sapientis esset. Ille, credo, nihil opinaturum, quoniam esset, quod percipi posset. Quid ergo id esset? Visum, credo. Quale igitur uisum? Tum illum ita definisse, ex eo, quod esset, sicut esset, impressum et

10 umquam: A²ψ; *inquam* CU. 16 opinaturum: ed. Ascens.; *opinatur* codd.

copyists; *tantis studiis* will then be a modal ablative 'with so much zeal'. Just so in Cato m. § 78 tot artes tantae scientiae, the words *tantae scientiae* have been wrongly supposed to be parallel to *tot artes*, whereas they form a description of *artes*, *scientiae* being gen. sing. See my n. ad l.

8. **paulo post**: in §§ 91 sq.

uidero: see n. on § 19 uiderit.

te ipso iudice: 'and you shall decide the matter yourself'. Cf. Caec. 48 (to the adversary) te ipsum habebo iudicem; ib. 38 te iudice uincamus necesse est.

9. **obtrectandi**: a retort on § 16.

11. **expresserat**: 'had put into distinct shape'; 'had formulated'. In Cic. *exprimere* differs much from *dicere*, the latter implying the *fact* of utterance merely, the former that by the utterance some careful moulding is given to the statement. Thus in § 31 (and often) *exprimere* is applied to *translation;* and often the sense is to 'body forth' or 'vividly represent' an idea, as in Fam. 3, 11, 4 quod ad me quasi formam communium temporum et totius rei publicae misisti *expressam;* Q. Rosc. 20 persona illa lutulenta impura inuisa in huius moribus natura uitaque est *expressa;* so Att. 8, 11, 1; Lucr. 4, 323 (299 Munro). Phrases like *expressa effigies* or *imago*, *expressum signum* are common.

13. **uera**: of course in the sense of 'apparently true'.

14. **quaesiuit etc.**: §§ 67, 68 should be closely compared.

fortasse: 'we may suppose'.

16. **ille credo etc.**: I quote Vaucher's remark on this passage by way of a warning: 'non respondetur quaerenti quid futurum esset: legam igitur *ille credo nihil futurum, sapientem uero opinaturum*'. As to *credo*, see n. on § 2.

17. **quid...esset**: the question in *or. recta* would be *quid est?* Hence the present passage contravenes the rule that in interrogative sentences, in passing from *or. recta* to *obliqua* verbs finite of the first and third persons are put into the infinitive, those of the second person into the subjunctive. Here the irregularity is due to the influence of *quaesiuit;* cf. Roby § 1782 n. Many passages which are supposed to form exceptions to the rule need not really be so; e.g. in Tac. an. 13, 49 cur...consectaretur, Tacitus may have conceived the question in *oratio recta* as *cur consectaris?* not as *cur consectatur?*

uisum: here = καταληπτικὴ φαντασία.

18. **ita definisse...impressum**: the construction of *definisse* is loosely dependent on *credo*, while *impressum* depends on *definisse*, in spite of *ita*, which is almost redundant. So Fin. 2, 13 eam (uoluptatem) sic definiunt, sublationem animi; where see Madvig's n.

definisse: for the contracted verb-forms in Cic. see Frohwein, die Perfectbildungen auf *-vi* bei Cicero (Gera 1874). F. curiously says -issemus does not occur in Cic.; we have it however in Acad. 1, 1 audissemus, and elsewhere. According to my observations, our MSS give a much larger proportion of contracted forms in the speeches and letters than in the philosophical and oratorical works. There can be no doubt that in *spoken* Latin the contraction was universal, where possible; Quint. 1, 6, 17 condemns the full pronunciation of *audiuisse* as old-fashioned.

ex eo etc.: most points in this definition were examined in n. on § 18, where the important words sicut esset = κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον were omitted by Cic. The words *ex eo unde esset* are a

signatum et effictum. Post requisitum etiamne, si eiusdem modi esset uisum uerum, quale uel falsum. Hic Zenonem uidisse acute nullum esse uisum quod percipi posset, si id tale esset ab eo, quod est, ut eiusdem modi ab eo, quod non est, posset esse. Recte consensit Arcesilas ad definitionem additum: neque enim falsum percipi posse neque uerum, si esset tale, quale uel falsum. Incubuit autem in eas disputationes, ut doceret nullum tale esse uisum a uero, ut non eiusdem modi
78 etiam a falso possit esse. Haec est una contentio quae adhuc permanserit. Nam illud, nulli rei adsensurum esse sapientem, nihil ad hanc controuersiam pertinebat. Licebat enim nihil percipere et tamen opinari, quod a Carneade dicitur probatum:

1 effictum: *effectum* codd.; corr. Man.; cf. § 18. etiamne si: sic U et Dau.; *etiam nisi* Cψ; *etiam si* Cant. eiusdem modi esset: *eius modi e.* codd.; corr. Dau. 4 ut eiusdem modi: *ut eius modi* codd.; corr. Dau. 9 possit

clumsy rendering of ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος, caused by the lack of words like the later *ens* or *essentia*. There is a similar clumsy rendering of ἀνυπαρξία in § 18, and Sen. ep. 87, 40 expressly laments that Latin has no term which precisely represents that word. The invention of *essentia* is assigned by Sen. ep. 58, 6 to Cic.; but the word (with *ens*) is given by Quint. 2, 14, 2 to a Plautus, but in 8, 3, 33 to a Sergius Flavius [where however edd. incline to read Plautus (? Rubellius Plautus—nowhere else described as author, unless perhaps in 10, 1, 124)]; again in 3, 6, 23 *essentia* is given to Plautus. As *Sergius* Plautus is an unknown name, we should possibly read Paullus in all three places, and identify the man with the writer used as an authority by Pliny in Nat. Hist. II; conceivably also with the Sergius Paullus, friend of St Paul; a common interest in Stoicism may have been the link between the two.

2. **uisum uerum**: = φαντασία ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος.

5. **recte...additum**: *recte* to be taken with *additum*: 'agreed that the addition had been rightly made'; cf. § 18 definitum rectissime; § 96 rectissime conclusum; and, for *esse* omitted, n. on 1 § 43. But possibly we should read *recte; consensit Arcesilas; ad def. additum est. Recte* will then be elliptic, referring back, as in Tusc. 5, 25. Or *recte concessit A.; ad def. ad. est;* cf. Fin. 1, 39 tibi recte concessum est. The confusion of *consensit consensisse* with *concessit concessisse* in MSS is constant; see cr. n. on § 118. For the change from *or. obliq.* to *recta* and back again cf. n. on § 41.

8. **a uero**: n. on § 105 a sole.

10. **illud**: the point urged in § 67.

11. **pertinebat**: used here of *close* or *essential* connexion, as in Fin. 3, 55.

12. **Carneade**: cf. §§ 59, 67, 112, 148. This opinion of Carneades 'τὸν σοφὸν δοξάσειν' is, so far as I know, mentioned only by Cicero himself. For δοξάζειν (n. on § 66) is to pronounce an opinion *without reservations*, and in all else that we are told about Carneades (as Eus. pr. Eu. 14, 7, 15) such reservation is mentioned or implied. It was obviously admitted on all hands that Carneades pronounced the opinion we here have, but Clitomachus held that he only did so for the sake of argument. *Probatum* is of course 'approved' not 'proved' as Zeller takes it; cf. § 139.

13. **Philoni**: cf. Introd. p. 59.

Metrodoro: of Stratonice, mentioned in § 16. He preceded Philo in his reaction against extreme scepticism, and maintained (Ind. Herc. col. 26, 4) that Carneades had been misunderstood by all his hearers. From an anecdote in Orat. § 51 it appears Carneades thought that Clitomachus reproduced rather the letter than the spirit of his teaching. The following passage is important: August. contr. Ac. 3, 41 quamquam Metrodorus id antea

equidem Clitomacho plus quam Philoni aut Metrodoro credens, hoc magis ab eo disputatum quam probatum puto. Sed id omittamus. Illud certe opinatione et perceptione sublata sequitur, omnium adsensionum retentio, ut, si ostendero nihil posse percipi, tu concedas numquam adsensurum esse.

XXV. Quid ergo est quod percipi possit, si ne sensus **79**
quidem uera nuntiant? Quos tu, Luculle, communi loco defendis: quod ne id facere posses, idcirco heri non necessario loco contra sensus tam multa dixeram. Tu autem te negas infracto remo neque columbae collo commoueri. Primum cur? Nam et in remo sentio non esse id quod uideatur, et in columba pluris uideri colores nec esse plus uno. Deinde nihilne praeterea dixi-

esse: *posset esse* editores uolgo, nulla necessitate. 15 illud certe...adsensurum esse: haec non recte se habere putat M, qua de caussa, nescio. 20 quod ne id: uocem *id* damnarunt multi; uid. tamen adn. 22 cur: *quur* V (ut § 85) et U.

facere temptauerat; qui primus dicitur esse confessus non decreto placuisse Academicis nihil posse comprehendi, sed necessario contra Stoicos huius modi eos arma sumpsisse.

15. **opinatione**: nn. on 1, 42 and § 108, below.

17. **concedas**: here=sis concessurus. Possibly however *sit necesse* should be read for *esse*.

adsensurum: sc. sapientem.

19. **communi loco**: of course not our 'common-place' but the rhetorical 'τόπος'.

20. **quod ne id**: if *quod* be taken as the connective conjunction='whereas' the reading may be right. Cf. Diu. 2, 127 quod quoniam illud negatis; Rab. perd. 10 quod utinam ego id...sustulissem (where many edd. wrongly eject *id*); Orat. 52 quod quidem ego sentiebam, non te id sciscitari; Ter. Phorm. 157 quod utinam ne Phormioni id suadere in mentem incidisset; Plaut. Capt. 754 quod absque hoc esset; so sometimes a demonstrative pronoun (in the nom. neut.) follows close on such expressions as *quod nisi*, as in Att. 13, 10, 1; Verr. 2, 160; *quod si* and the like. Indeed it would be too much to expect that writers should always avoid the ambiguity caused by the neut. pronoun coming after the conjunction *quod*. If emendation were needed *ita* might be read for *id*, as by C. F. W. Müller in his text; *quod ni ita* is common, e.g. Off. 3, 108; Cato m. §§ 35, 67, 82; Fam. 12, 23, 2; cf. also Tusc. 2, 8.

non necessario: Introd. p. 45.

21. **dixeram**: n. on § 78.

negas...neque: the regular construction; see Madv. on Fin. 1, 30.

infracto remo, etc.: cf. § 19 and Sext. P. H. 1, 119 ἡ αὐτὴ κώπη ἔναλος μὲν κεκλασμένη, ἔξαλος δὲ εὐθεῖα: A. M. 7, 244 and 414; Diog. 9 §§ 85, 86 τὰ ὀρθὰ κεκλασμένα...περιστερᾶς τράχηλος: Lucr. 2, 795 sq. (the pigeon's neck); Sen. N. Q. 1, 3, 9 (the oar); ib. 1, 5, 6 uariis coloribus pauonum ceruix; ib. 1, 7, 2 falsi coloris, qualem columbarum ceruix et sumit et ponit; cf. also Petron. fr. XXIX ed. Bücheler. The bent oar (cf. Lucr. 4, 438 sq.) and the changing colours of the pigeon's neck were two out of a large number of apparent deceptions of sense with which the Sceptics vexed the Dogmatists from the beginning. Others will be found referred to in the passages just quoted, and in Lucr. 4, 379 sq.; Macrob. sat. 7, 14, 20; below §§ 80, 105. Zeno felt it necessary to deal with them in a work περὶ ὄψεως (Diog. 7, 4). The Sceptic use of the 'bent oar' seems to be hinted at in Tennyson's 'Higher Pantheism'—'all we have power to see is a straight staff bent in a pool'.

24. **nec esse plus uno**: Cic. is much less cautious than Sext. P. H. 1, 119, who refuses to say which of two contradictory appearances ἐστί, but ἐπέχει.

mus? Manent illa omnia, iacet ista caussa: ueracis suos esse sensus dicit. Igitur semper auctorem habes, et eum qui magno suo periculo caussam agat! Eo enim rem demittit Epicurus, si

1 manent: ita scripsi (ut in ed. 1); *maneant* codd. iacet: ita scripsi (ut in ed. 1): *lacerat* AVψU; *lecerat* B; *iaceat* Cant. (prima manu, non secunda) et cod. regius Dauisii, quam lectionem defendit Madu. Em. 1, 174, qui postea *laceratur* coniecit et persuasit Baitero; *lateat* Harl.; *blaterat iste tamen et u.* coni. Dau.; *laborat* de Ernestii coni. M, qui ipse *labat* uel *uacillat* uel *claudicat* uel *iacet*

1. **iacet**: cf. Fin. 2, 44 existimo... iacere uestra omnia; ib. 5, 86 iacet ratio Peripateticorum; Diu. 2, 24; ib. 2, 106; so often. *Lacera est* is not a possible reading; *lacerata est* is, though not probable; cf. the common phrases *lacerare aliquem uerbis*, *oratione*, *conuicio*, *maledictis etc.*

2. **dicit**: 'quoth he'; a rather contemptuous way of referring to a man in his presence, like the use of the German 'er'. So *inquit* in N. D. 1, 109 where Mayor rightly keeps the reading of the MSS *inquit* against Halm's correction *inquis;* also ib. 1, 87; ib. 3, 90; Tusc. 2, 29; Balb. 32; below, § 115. Very similar is the omission of the subject to *inquit*, when the subject is quite general 'some one', so that *inquit=inquit aliquis;* the *aliquis* being usually a supposed objector. This is exceedingly common in Seneca, where I have counted 22 or 23 exx. He also has (De ira 3, 3, 1) inquis; cf. too *dicit aliquis* in Sen. ben. 5, 20, 6; *dicit alius* in Sen. Rh. contr. 9, 3, 8. Further see Leg. 2, 59; Hor. sat. 1, 4, 79; Iuuen. 3, 153 with Mayor's n.; *inquit* without subject is not uncommon in Livy; see e.g. 34, 3, 9; 34, 4, 14; so often in Greek φησί, as in Dem. Arist. § 33. This ellipse is not essentially different from that in phrases like *ut aiunt* (see n. on 1, 18) or *inquiunt* (Catull. 10, 14). For other cases of omitted subject see n. on 1, 2 uelit; also *praecipitet* in § 68; further § 46 defigunt.

habes...agat: cf. Sen. Rh. contr. 1, 5, 1 habes qui te uindicet. For the rapid change of subject in passing from *dicit* to *habes* cf. these precisely similar passages; Balb. 32; Leg. 2, 46; Off. 2, 39 and 50; also below, § 101. The introduction of Epicurus here is forced, especially as Lucullus in § 19 had repudiated him. But Epic. is dismissed in § 80 and Hirzel, Unters. III 327 is utterly wrong in saying that throughout §§ 79—83 Cic. refutes Epic. not Lucullus.

3. **eo etc.**: the construction is a little unusual; *ut, si...credendum sit* might have been expected; as the sentence stands *si...esse* is an expansion or explanation of *eo.*

demittit: cf. Plancus ap. Cic. Fam. 10, 8, 2 cum in eum casum me fortuna demisisset.

si unus sensus etc.: the mode in which Epicurus treated the deceptions of the senses closely resembled that used by the Stoics, the differences between the two being merely verbal. Both say that the mind is able to distinguish between trustworthy and untrustworthy impressions by virtue of a quality inherent in trustworthy sensation, to which both give the same name ἐνάργεια: for this term as used by the Stoics see n. on § 17; by the Epicureans Sext. A. M. 7, 216; ib. 8, 63; Diog. 10, 52 (where Cobet is right in reading ἐναργείας for ἐνεργείας). Both schools hold that the perfectly wise man alone possesses the perfect art of distinguishing between sensations; for the Stoics cf. nn. on 1, 42 and 2, 38; for the Epicureans § 45. All other men, according to Epicurus, are liable to form false opinion, δόξα or ὑπόληψις. The facts presented to the senses are always true and real, though the mind draws false conclusions from them; see N. D. 1, 70; Fin. 1, 22; Sext. A. M. 8, 63 πάντα τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἀληθῆ: so ib. 7, 203 sq.; 8, 9 and 185; P. H. 1, 170; Diog. 10, §§ 31, 32, 50 sq., etc. In itself, no one αἴσθησις or φαντασία differs from any other in respect of truth; see Plut. Col. 1124 B. It is noteworthy that this *dictum* of Epicurus, so much ridiculed by Cic., is identical with some utterances of Aristotle, as De an. 2, 6 (too long to quote) where Ar. says that when the senses judge of the things properly belonging to them, as when the eye judges of colour, or the ear of sound, they cannot be deceived, though they may be if they try to judge what the object is in which the colour resides or

unus sensus semel in uita mentitus sit, nulli umquam esse cre-
dendum. Hoc est uerum esse, confidere suis testibus et in **80**
prauitate insistere! Itaque Timagoras Epicureus negat sibi

conicit; *lacera est* coni. H. ueracis: sic (non *ueraces*) VψU Cant. Harl. suos: *uos* V; *nos* ψ; *sanos* M. 2 dicit: *dicis* M; *dicitis* Madu. Bait. habes: *habet* coni. Madu. Em. p. 176, postea *habetis*, quod scripsit Bait. et eum: sic ABψU; uocem *et* iniuria eiecerunt edd. paene omnes. 3 demittit: *dimittit* ABU. 5 uerum: *uirum* coni. Madu., *certum* H. in prauitate: ita scripsi; *inportata* CG; *inportune* ψ Cant. rE.

which gives rise to the sound; similarly ib. 3, 3, 7 *αἴσθησις* and *φαντασία* (the mental side of sensation) differ—*αἱ μὲν ἀληθεῖς ἀεί, αἱ δὲ φαντασίαι γίνονται αἱ πλείους ψευδεῖς*; precisely to the same effect is 3, 3, 12, with which cf. 3, c. 6. That which is immediately present to the senses, according to Epicurus, is a material substance, the *εἴδωλον*, however fine its texture, and is therefore real. But the *εἴδωλον* may have got distorted in its passage from the object to our senses; hence if we conclude that it represents exactly the object we may be wrong. (This is elaborately shewn by Lucr. 4, 379—521 and by Sext. l. l. Cf. Plut. Col. 1121 B *τὸ γὰρ εἴδωλον ἀφ' οὗ πέπονθεν ἡ ὄψις κεκλασμένον ἐστίν· ἡ κώπη δὲ ἀφ' ἧς τὸ εἴδωλον οὐ κεκλασμένη.*) It follows from these premisses that two contradictory impressions are not the one true, and the other false, as other philosophers suppose, but are both equally true; further that the visions of madmen and dreamers are true (Diog. 10, 52 and Sext. as above). See fuller information in Zeller III 1, pp. 385—389; E. Tr. pp. 401 sq. It will be seen that the sole ultimate standard of truth in both the Stoic and the Epicurean systems is the postulated infallibility of the wise man. There is a curious passage in Diog. 9, 106 sq. shewing that both in the case of Epicurus and in that of the Sceptics (he might have added the Stoics) the criterion is *τὸ φαινόμενον*, only Epic. says *τὸ φαινόμενον ἐστί*, while the Sceptics say *τὸ φαινόμενον φαίνεται*.

5. **hoc...esse**: 'this is candour'; for the general structure cf. Diu. 2, 83 hoc est ipsum esse contra se copiosum et disertum; the lexica will supply exx. of *uerus*=fair or candid. The dead set made against the text here by so many scholars is strange; strangest of all is Madvig's em. *uirum esse.* If em. were needed, *ueracem* might be proposed, a sarcastic echo of *ueracis* above. The unexpressed subject of *esse*, with which *uerum* is in agreement, is of course general=*τινά*.

testibus: so the Epicurean in Fin. 1, 71 sensibus, id est incorruptis atque integris testibus; § 81 below.

in prauitate: I take the passage to be a retort on § 26 tamenne in ista prauitate perstabitis; cf. also Tusc. 3, 2 in omni prauitate et in summa opinionum peruersitate uersamur; also Ter. Hec. 484 praue insistas. The construction *insistere in aliqua re* is common in Cic. (in § 94 the preposition is omitted) and *prauitas* is a word liable to corruption; see Leg. 1, 31. But for § 26, which I think decisive in this matter, *in peruersitate* (cf. Tusc. l. l.) or *in importunitate* might have been proposed. *Importune* in itself would give good sense='tyrannically', but it would be difficult to account for its corruption into *importata*, if it were the original reading, whereas it might very well be an intentional correction of the unintelligible *importata*. [Madvig in the ep. crit. to Orelli makes an extraordinary slip, in which he is followed by Halm: he objects to '*et tertio loco positum*', thus treating the three clauses with the three verbs *esse confidere insistere* as though they were exactly parallel in construction, and in fact missing the sense of the passage.]

6. **Timagoras**: only known from this passage. Zeller III^3 1, p. 388 n. remarks, Epicurus himself would not have made the same denial with Timagoras, but would only have refused to conclude that two *objects* caused the two *εἴδωλα*. Yet Lucretius 4, 465 says of such appearances that they occur 'propter opinatus animi quos addimus ipsi | pro uisis ut sint quae non sunt sensibu' uisa'. Lucr. seems to speak from the same point of view as Timagoras.

negat...torsisset: so § 104 cum exposuisset, adiungit. In quotations, the sequence of tenses is in Cic. often irregular;

umquam, cum oculum torsisset, duas ex lucerna flammulas esse uisas; opinionis enim esse mendacium, non oculorum. Quasi quaeratur quid sit, non quid uideatur. Sit hic quidem maiorum similis: tu uero, qui uisa sensibus alia uera dicas esse, alia falsa, qui ea distinguis? Desine, quaeso, communibus locis: domi nobis ista nascuntur. Si, inquis, deus te interroget: 'sanis modo et integris sensibus, num amplius quid desideras?' quid respondeas? Vtinam quidem roget! Audiret quam

3 sit hic: *sic h.* AB²VU Cant. Harl.; *sed ψ.* 5 desine: *et d.* BVψ Cant.; *sed d.* Goer. H Bait. M. 8 audiret: *audies* codd. pler.; *audires* Cant.; corr. Dau. 9 ageret: *agerent* codd.; *ageretur* Dau. H; *egerit* Bait. M cum uno codice Dauisii.

see exx. in Madv. on Fin. 3, 67 and Draeger § 152, 1. The irregularity here is more apparent than real, since the phrase *cum torsisset* is merely a substitute for an active perfect participle.

1. **torsisset**: by placing the finger beneath the eye and pressing it upwards or downwards.

duas...uisas: this deception of sense was much discussed; cf. Eth. Eudem. 7, 13 *διαστρέψαντα (τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν) ὥστε δύο τὸ ἓν φανῆναι* (qu. by Davies); Arist. Problemata 31, 17 (qu. by Faber) discusses the question why, if the eye be pressed sideways, the image is not doubled, unless, along with the lateral, there is also vertical pressure; ib. 3, 30 the writer explains that a drunkard sees double because his eyes do not work together, then adds *ταὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο γίνεται καὶ ἐάν τις κάτωθεν πιέσῃ τὴν ὄψιν*: Sext. A. M. 7, 192 *ὁ δὲ παραπιέσας τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν ὡς ὑπὸ δυοῖν κινεῖται*: Lucr. 4, 447, in discussing the matter, has words strikingly like those here; cf. also Cic. Diu. 2, 120. Sext. P. H. 1, 50 has a similar argument about the difference made to our perceptions of sound by partially stopping the ears.

3. **quid sit**: 'what exists'. Beware of making *mendacium* the subject to *sit*. The Sceptics constantly reminded their opponents that they did not pretend to go beyond *τὸ φαινόμενον*: cf. Sext. P. H. 1 §§ 15, 78, 87, 112, 144; 2 § 75. Numen. ap. Eus. Pr. Eu. 14, 8, says of Carneades '*τὸ γὰρ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ ψευδὲς ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι συνεχώρει*'.

maiorum: = intellectual progenitors; so in § 143; cf. Plato's well-known '*ὁ πατὴρ ἡμῶν Παρμενίδης*', imitated more than once by Proclus: Fin. 4, 14 quid tandem attulerit (Zeno) quam ob rem ab inuentoribus tamquam a parentibus dissentiret; Appuleius, Apolog. p. 477 Oudend. maiores meos, Aristotelem dico et Theophrastum et Eudemum et Lyconem (qu. by Stahr, Arist. b. d. Röm. p. 145). The expression 'maiorum similis' in its ordinary application was proverbial, like our 'chip of the old block'; cf. Ter. ad. 411; Cic. Fam. 12, 22, 2.

5. **desine communibus locis**: *locis* has generally been taken as dependent on *desine;* if so it is probably an unique example of the construction, not only in Cic. but in Latin literature. Even *desinere ab aliqua re* occurs only in a few passages in very late authors. Some scholars since Ernesti have assumed an ellipse of *uti*. But, bold as are the ellipses to be found in Cic., there is always either something in the context to suggest the omitted words, or else the phrase is proverbial, and the ellipse therefore well understood. The ellipse of *uti* would be just as unparalleled as the construction *desine locis*. It is, I think, almost certain that *desiste* was written by Cic.; this verb is often construed with the simple abl., as in § 63; Off. 3, 15; Balb. 52. The passage is quoted with *desine* by Jerome.

6. **domi...nascuntur**: a proverb, used like *γλαῦκ' ἐς Ἀθήνας* and 'coals to Newcastle'. See Plaut. Mil. 194 *domi habet*, and the passages from Pl. in Tyrrell's n.; also Att. 1, 19, 3; ib. 10, 14, 2; Fam. 9, 3, 2; Ter. ad. 412; Sen. ep. 23, 3; Tac. an. 13, 42 domi partam dignationem; ib. 3, 70 bonas domi artes; Pind. Nem. 7, 75 *ὁδὸν κυρίαν λόγων οἴκοθεν*.

si, inquis etc.: referring to § 19.

nobiscum male ageret. Vt enim uera uideamus, quam longe uidemus? Ego Catuli Cumanum ex hoc loco cerno, et e regione uideo, Pompeianum non cerno, neque quicquam interiectum est quod obstet, sed intendi acies longius non potest. O praeclarum prospectum! Puteolos uidemus: at familiarem nostrum C. Auianium, fortasse in porticu Neptuni ambulantem, non uidemus. At ille nescio qui, qui in scholis nominari solet, mille **81**
et octingenta stadia quod abesset uidebat: quaedam uolucres

10 uidemus: *uidebimus* codd. cerno: om. U. et e regione uideo: ita scripsi; *regionem uideo* codd., quod damnarunt H Bait. M. 16 octingenta: *octaginta* G; *octuaginta* Harl.; *octoginta* E et edd. non nulli.

8. **quam nobiscum male**: for the collocation see n. on § 83 quam in paruo.

9. **nobiscum...ageret**: in § 128 praeclareque agi secum, we have the impersonal verb; see n. there.

ut enim etc.: this is of course merely a concession for the sake of argument; Hirzel, Unters. III 326 strangely treats it as sincere.

10. **Catuli**: in one or other of the two villas of Catulus mentioned, the discussion contained in the lost dialogue 'Catulus' took place. See § 9 and Introd. p. 46.

cerno...uideo: the repetition in *et ...uideo* is thoroughly characteristic of Cic. (indeed it is an ex. of the figure called *distributio* by the rhetorical writers); cf. § 66 cauere ne capiatur, ne fallatur uidere; also De Or. 3, 161 illa quae cernere et uidere non possumus; Orat. 16 cernere consequentia, repugnantia uidere; ib. 18 cernebat animo, re ipsa non uidebat; Mil. 79 ut ea cernimus quae uidemus; Scaur. 13 cernitis crudelitate mixtas libidines, uidetis immanis; Tusc. 1, 46 oculis cernimus ea quae uidemus; Quint. 9, 2, 41 (from Cicero) haec quae non uidistis oculis, animis cernere potestis.

12. **o praeclarum prospectum**: in a review in the Academy (1874) of the first edition Prof. Nettleship held that these words are not an outburst of enthusiasm at the fineness of the scenery, but an ironical exclamation, intended to depreciate the merits of the human eyesight. The objection to this interpretation is that the view in question is by no means one which would be taken as a specimen of a *distant* view. I adhere therefore to my former interpretation. Cic. admired and had described at length the scenery on this coast; cf. Att. 1, 13, 5 *τοποθεσίαν* quam postulas Miseni et Puteolorum includam orationi meae. [Quintilian 9, 2, 44 refers to *τοπογραφία* as important for an orator; so Plin. ep. 2, 5, 5.]

14. **C. Auianium**: his cognomen was Flaccus; from Fam. 13, 75 it appears that he was engaged in the corn trade, much of which passed through Puteoli. See also Fam. 13, 79.

porticu Neptuni: probably a public promenade at Puteoli.

non uidemus: n. on 1, 10 legant...non legant.

15. **nescio qui**: our MSS do undoubtedly sometimes give us *nescio qui*, *si qui* etc. with personal names, where we should expect *si quis*. Cf. n. on § 61.

scholis: 'lectures'; cf. Diu. 2, 31 multa eius modi dicuntur in scholis; Fin. 2, 67. From Sext. P. H. 1, 81 sq. it will be seen that many exx. of exceptional physical powers were customarily quoted in lectures.

nominari solet: 'is usually quoted'; so §§ 14, 75.

mille et octingenta: Plin. n. h. 7, 85 [tradit Cic.] fuisse qui peruideret CXXXV M passuum. Plin. then (from Varro) says his name was Strabo (surely a misnomer), and he saw from Lilybaeum the Punic fleet leaving Carthage. Solinus (qu. by Davies) quotes the same passage of Varro; so too Val. M. 1, 8 ext. 14 and Aelian uar. h. 11, 13. Many scholars have wished to read *octoginta* here, to bring the distance more into accord with that given by Varro.

16. **quod abesset**: 'anything that was distant'; subjunctive due to the class-notion.

uolucres: prob. eagles. Sen. ben. 2, 29, 1 quotes the Sceptics as grumbling because eagles can see better than men.

longius. Responderem igitur audacter isti uestro deo me plane his oculis non esse contentum. Dicet me acrius uidere quam illos piscis fortasse qui neque uidentur a nobis et nunc quidem sub oculis sunt neque ipsi nos suspicere possunt. Ergo ut illis aqua, sic nobis aer crassus offunditur. At amplius non desideramus. Quid? Talpam num desiderare lumen putas? Neque tam quererer cum deo, quod parum longe quam quod falsum uiderem. Videsne nauem illam? Stare nobis uidetur,

3 illos: sic Uψ; *ullos* cett. 5 desideramus: *desiderant* Halm. cum Christio. 7 quererer...uiderem: *quereretur* (uel *quaereretur*)...*uiderem* codd.; corr. Man. 11

2. **acrius**: see n. on § 19.

3. **illos piscis qui**: cf. § 105 mare illud quod...uidetur; also Ac. post. fr. 13. The diver in fragm. 10 is in the same position as the fishes here.

neque...et: see § 64 n.

5. **aer crassus**: N. D. 2, 17 terram...quam crassissimus circumfundat aer. Arist. de an. 2, 7, 6 states that Democritus thought '*εἰ γένοιτο κενὸν τὸ μεταξύ, ὁρᾶσθαι ἂν καὶ εἰ μύρμηξ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ εἴη*'; cf. also Sen. N. Q. 1, 2, 7.

at...desideramus: it is very strange that many scholars have failed to see that this is a supposed answer by Lucullus. 'Oh, but *we* do not wish for anything better than the eyes we have'. Then says Cicero 'Of course; do you suppose that the mole feels his need of eyes?' That is, 'You are like the mole, which does not yearn for the light, because it does not know what light is'. The mole, of course, was regarded by the ancients generally as entirely blind. For *amplius* cf. § 19 quid quaerat amplius. Possibly *nos* has fallen out before *non*; cf. § 20 cr. n.

6. **quid...num**: for the position of *num* in the sentence cf. Tusc. 1 §§ 32, 56; 2 § 56 where *quid?* precedes as here; also Tusc. 2, 11 and n. on § 86 quid?...nonne.

talpam: so Cleomedes 2, 1 says Epicurus is '*πολὺ τῶν ἀσπαλάκων τυφλότερος*'.

7. **quererer cum deo**: cf. Vell. 2, 130, 3 audes cum deis queri: so *q. cum fatis, fortuna* in Ovid Met. 10, 724; Servius ap. Fam. 4, 5, 5; and *q. cum aliquo* will be found (beyond the few exx. in the lexica) also in Ovid Met. 1, 733; Sen. ben. 5, 21, 1; dial. 9, 11, 2; ep. 22, 15; Sen. Rh. contr. 1, 4, 10; ib. 1, 8, 2; ib. 2, 5, 14; ib. 7, 6, 14. Cf. too Sen. contr. 4, pr. 4 cum fortuna rixari; Cic. Deiot. 9 querellae cum D.; Sen. dial. 7, 18, 1. Queri cum aliquo (like *λοιδορεῖσθαί τινι* as opposed to *λ. τινὰ*) implies *mutual* recrimination.

8. **stare**: 'to ride at anchor'; see lexica.

9. **at...moueri**: a stock ex. of the deficiencies of sense; so Diu. 2, 120; Sext. P. H. 1, 107; A. M. 7, 414; Sen. N. Q. 7, 25, 7; Lucr. 4, 387 sq. and 2, 308 sq. We have here the *τόπος ὁ παρὰ τὰς θέσεις*: see Introd. p. 62 and § 19 n.

quaere rationem etc.: cf. the very similar remarks in § 105.

10. **ut maxime**: *ut* is concessive and the whole phrase is almost identical in sense with the familiar *si maxime* 'however much'. [Stuerenburg on Arch. § 1 strangely interprets *ut* here as equivalent to *simul atque, cum primum.*]

11. **testem**: n. on § 80.

habere: for the omission of *te* before the infin. see n. on § 128 considerare.

non sine caussa: cf. Diu. 2, 27 philosophi non esse arbitror testibus uti qui aut casu ueri, aut malitia falsi esse possunt.

12. **ostenderis**: 'will have made profession'. The word is carefully chosen to indicate that the statement in question can have only the force of a declaration, not of a proof.

naui: both *naue* and *naui* were in use; see Neue Form. 1^2, p. 214. So with many other stems in *-i*.

13. **remum**: a jest: 'you despised the oar as trivial (§ 19); perhaps even a ship is not big enough to please you; what say you to the sun?' Hirzel, Unters. III 327 fails to see the humour of the passage.

14. **quem**: for the relative at the beginning of the sentence after a question cf. § 75.

duodeuiginti: this was evidently a popular estimate of the size of the sun,

at eis, qui in naui sunt, moueri haec uilla. Quaere rationem cur ita uideatur; quam ut maxime inueneris, quod haud scio an non possis, non tu uerum testem habere, sed eum non sine caussa falsum testimonium dicere ostenderis. XXVI. Quid ego de naui? 82
Vidi enim a te remum contemni. Maiora fortasse quaeris. Quid potest esse sole maius? Quem mathematici amplius duodeuiginti partibus confirmant maiorem esse quam terram. Quantulus nobis uidetur! Mihi quidem quasi pedalis. Epicurus autem

uerum: *te u.* Lamb.; *u. te* Dau. M. 12 quid ego: *sed q. e.* Ern. Bait. 14 duodeuiginti: *duodetriginta* Goer. Roeper.; at uid. § 128.

probably resting on the dictum of some famous mathematician. The only other passage in which this estimate is exactly mentioned is in the commentary of Achilles Tatius on Aratus' *Phaenomena*. Hipparchus determined the diameter of the sun to be 5½ times that of the earth (Montucla, Histoire des Sciences Mathématiques, Paris 1758, Vol. 1, p. 272). Pappus gives Ptolemy's measure of the sun as about 170 times that of the earth; this Achilles Tatius declares to be an incredibly large estimate. Posidonius made out the *circumference* of the earth to be 240,000 stadia, and the *diameter* of the sun 3,000,000 stadia (Lewis, Astronomy of the Ancients, p. 215). Macrobius, however, has a long argument (Somn. Sc. 1, 20, 8 sq.) to shew that the sun is only 8 times as large as the earth. Aristarchus, in his tract on the size and distance of the sun and moon (in Wallis' Opera Mathematica 1688) shews that the diameter of the sun is to the diameter of the earth in greater proportion than 19 to 3 and in less proportion than 43 to 6. According to Pappus, however, Aristarchus held the proportion of the sun to the earth to be greater than 6859 to 27, and less than 79507 to 216. In the Plac. Phil. 2, 20, 1 it is stated that Anaximander affirmed the whole circle of the sun to be 28 times that of the earth, but that the visible portion, which we call the sun, is equal in size to the earth. But in the Plac. Phil. 2, 21, 1 we find that the measure of the sun, according to Anax. is 27 times that of the earth, while Hippolytus qu. by Zeller 1[4] p. 207 n., refers the number 27 to a comparison of the sun's size with that of the moon. The number 28 is confirmed by Stob. Phys. p. 524 Heeren. Eratosthenes, according to Macrob. Somn. 1, 20, 9, also arrived at the number 27. It requires some hardihood to alter the unanimous reading of the MSS here and in § 128 to *duodetriginta*. The number 28 was put forward, so far as we know, solely by Anaximander, and not by the *mathematici*; certainly not by Greek writers generally, as Goerenz assumes. [Other information relating to the measure of the sun will be found in Diog. L. 1 § 24; 2 §§ 1, 8; 7 § 144; Macrob. Somn. 1, 20 §§ 8—32. There was an estimate of the *distance* between the sun and moon which made it 18 times the *distance* from the moon to the earth. Cic. may have got at the number 18 by a confusion similar to that noted above concerning Anaximander. Cf. n. on § 116.]

15. **partibus**: cf. N. D. 2, 102 sol cuius magnitudine multis partibus terra superatur; Fin. 2, 108 maximas uoluptates omnibusque partibus maiores.

16. **quasi**: 'about' as in § 74, corresponding to *fortasse* in Fin. 1, 20 pedalis fortasse (of Epicurus). For *pedalis* cf. Arist. de an. 428 b 3 φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ψευδῆ, οἷον φαίνεται μὲν ὁ ἥλιος ποδιαῖος, πεπίστευται δ' εἶναι μείζων τῆς οἰκουμένης: also the next n.

Epicurus etc.: Diog. 10, 91 (from the 11th book of Epicurus' περὶ φύσεως) τὸ δὲ μέγεθος ἡλίου τε καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἄστρων κατὰ μὲν τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς τηλικοῦτόν ἐστιν ἡλίκον φαίνεται, κατὰ δὲ τὸ κατ' αὐτὸ ἤτοι μεῖζον τοῦ ὁρωμένου ἢ ἔλαττον μικρῷ ἢ τηλικοῦτον ἡλίκον ὁρᾶται: Cic. Fin. 1, 20 sol uidetur huic (Epicuro) pedalis fortasse; tantum enim esse censet, quantus uidetur, uel paulo aut maiorem aut minorem; so Plac. Phil. 2, 21, 4; Cleomedes 2, 1. In this strange dogma Epic. was preceded by Heraclitus and Hecataeus, who affirmed ἥλιον μέγεθος ἔχειν εὖρος ποδὸς ἀνθρωπείου (Stob. Phys. 526, confirmed as to Heraclitus by Diog. 9, 7; Plac. Phil. 2,

posse putat etiam minorem esse eum quam uideatur, sed non multo: ne maiorem quidem multo putat esse uel tantum esse, quantus uideatur, ut oculi aut nihil mentiantur aut non multum. Vbi igitur illud est semel? Sed ab hoc credulo, qui numquam sensus mentiri putat, discedamus: qui ne nunc quidem, cum ille sol, qui tanta incitatione fertur, ut celeritas eius quanta sit
83 ne cogitari quidem possit, tamen nobis stare uideatur. Sed, ut minuam controuersiam, uidete, quaeso, quam in paruo lis sit. Quattuor sunt capita, quae concludant nihil esse quod nosci

3 aut nihil mentiantur aut non multum: sic U; post u. *multum* iterum addunt *mentiantur* AB; *aut nihil mentiantur* (om. cet.) V; *aut non multum aut nihil m.* ψ

21). Cf. also Sen. N.Q. 1, 3, 10; and Aristotle qu. above. A defence of the doctrine is made by Lucr. 5, 564 sq., whose only argument is that quoted from Epic. by Diog. 10, 91; viz. that the sun's colour or brilliance is not changed by distance, much less then its shape; the fires we see on earth are not, he says, changed in shape or brilliance so long as they remain visible. Epic. therefore, it seems, made fire an exception to the rule that distance diminishes the apparent size of objects. Philodemus περὶ σημείων (see Bahnsch's tract on the work, Lyck 1879, p. 23) insists still more on the exceptional character of the sun. The Stoics urged that as at sunset and sunrise it takes a long time for the sun's whole disc to appear above or sink below the horizon, he must either move slowly, or else his disc must be very large; but he admittedly does not move slowly, as he passes over the vast space of heaven in a few hours, therefore his disc is large. Philodemus refuses to admit the dilemma, saying there may be some other cause special to the sun which will account for the phenomenon mentioned. Madvig's remark (on Fin. 1, 20) 'sequebatur hoc ex decreto de sensibus numquam fallentibus et imagines ab ipsis rebus emissas accipientibus' is therefore wrong; this explanation would apply equally to *all* objects, whereas, as we have seen, Epic. made fire an exception. At the same time it would appear from Diog. l. l. that Epic. regarded this dogma as ἐναργὲς or ἐνάργημα and therefore as needing no proof. It is difficult to understand why Epic. allowed that the apparent size of the sun might be *slightly* different after all from the real size. Probably here as elsewhere he argued entirely from analogy—the supposed analogy of fires on earth. Cic. in Fin. 1, 20 ascribes Epicurus' error to his ignorance of mathematics, for which cf. 1, 6; below § 106.

2. **ne...quidem**: n. on 1, 5.

3. **ut oculi etc.**: Arist. de an. 3, 3, 12 αἴσθησις ἀληθής ἐστιν ἢ ὀλίγιστον ἔχουσα τὸ ψεῦδος. Again a close resemblance to the doctrine of Epicurus.

nihil...multum: the same phrase will be found in Att. 7, 3, 5; Fam. 13, 2; De Or. 2, 350; Fin. 5, 59; Tusc. 4, 72; and similar phrases in Tusc. 3, 77; ib. 4 § 6; N. D. 2, 118; Brut. 150; Hor. ep. 1, 15, 33; Sen. ep. 14, 9; ib. 78, 13; Val. M. 4, 4, 11; Catull. 68, 133; Plin. ep. 5, 15, 2; Sen. N. Q. 1, 3, 1. In all these passages *nil*, *nemo* or some such negative word is followed by *aut* with some word modifying the negative. Only rarely does the order of the words in Latin correspond with that of the English phrases 'little or nothing', 'few or none'; so Tusc. 1, 5 non multum aut nihil omnino; Off. 2, 50; Plin. ep. 3, 3, 3. These facts will shew that MSS ψCant. are here wrong.

4. **semel**: see § 79.

credulo: predicative = qui tam credulus est; cf. Nägelsb. St. § 25, 5.

5. **discedamus**: so § 115.

qui ne nunc quidem: sc. sensus mentiri putat. *Quin* for *qui* does not help the sense, nor is *quin* in Cic. immediately followed by a negative; see Madv. Fin. 5, 56. Cic. e. g. does not write *quin nescio*, like Quint. 5, 13, 55 or even *quin immo* (ib. 1, 1, 31); although *quin* may be preceded by a negative, as in *non quin* (Att. 10, 7, 1; ib. 12, 47, 2). For the ellipse with *ne nunc quidem* cf. Rep.

percipi comprehendi possit, de quo haec tota quaestio est. E quibus primum est esse aliquod uisum falsum, secundum non posse id percipi, tertium, inter quae uisa nihil intersit, fieri non posse ut eorum alia percipi possint, alia non possint, quartum nullum esse uisum uerum a sensu profectum, cui non appositum sit uisum aliud, quod ab eo nihil intersit quodque percipi non possit. Horum quattuor capitum secundum et tertium omnes concedunt. Primum Epicurus non dat; uos, quibuscum res est, id quoque conceditis. Omnis pugna de quarto est. Qui igitur **84**

Cant. Harl. (om. *non*). 5 qui ne: *quin ne* e sua coni. H (etiam Pis. § 67); *quid? ne* et mox *uideatur?* Dau. Madu. (ap. Orelli ed. II p. 854) et M. 8 in paruo lis sit: *in paruolis* (uel *paruulis*) *sitis* codd.; corr. Durand.

1, 71 optimo statu ciuitatis, quem si habeamus, etsi ne nunc quidem (*sc. habemus*)... So Parad. 29; Plin. ep. 1, 10, 3; Sen. Rh. contr. 7, 6, 9. Madvig and others seem to have thought the repetition of the *qui* intolerable, but it is in no way more difficult than in passages like § 115, below, or Lael. 11.

6. **ille sol**: δεικτικῶς, as in N.D. 1, 95 solem illum; above, § 81 illos piscis.

incitatione: Sen. N. Q. 1, 3, 10 quem uelocissimum omnium scimus, nemo nostrum moueri uidet, nec ire crederemus, nisi adpareret isse; Diog. 9, 82 (of Pyrrho) καὶ γὰρ ἡμεῖς τὸν ἥλιον ὡς ἑστῶτα βλέπομεν.

celeritas: so Plin. h. n. 2, 6 inenarrabili celeritate (of the sun).

7. **cogitari**: n. on § 48; Tusc. 1, 68 is precisely similar.

8. **minuam controuersiam**: originally a legal phrase; cf. Sen. Rh. contr. 7, 7, 10 hoc erat praeceptum eius, quaedam declamatorem tamquam praetorem facere debere minuendae litis causa. So Fin. 2, 39 minuam contentiones; Caes. B. G. 5, 26, 4 minuere controuersias; ib. 6, 23, 5.

quam in paruo: throughout the history of Latin it was the prevailing custom to separate *tam quam tantus quantus* from the words they qualify by some small word, as preposition or *sit* or the like; cf. 1, 25 quanto id magis; 2, 68 tam in praecipitem locum; § 80 quam nobiscum male; § 97 quam sit cautus; § 125 tam sit mirabilis; so in Off. 2, 67; Fin. 2, 29; ib. 2, 51; ib. 3, 5; Tusc. 1 §§ 29, 30, 33, 82, 107; ib. 5 §§ 35, 63, 106; Lael. 53; Brut. 39; Phil. 1, 27; ib. 2 §§ 104, 117; Vat. 22; Marc. 1; Fam. 2, 1, 1; ib. 13, 26, 2; Q. fr. 1, 2, 14; Liu. 4, 60, 3; 36, 30, 5 and often; Sen. N. Q. 1, 11, 3; ben. 6, 40, 1; ep. 110, 16; Quint. 10, 1, 62; Val. M. 1, 8, 7; 4, 4, 5; Ter. Haut. 955; Hec. 261; Nep. Paus. 2, 5; Pel. 2, 3. Similar collocations are 1, 2 satis eum longo, where see n.; N. D. 2, 35 and Sest. 52 where see Halm's n. in ed. mai.; Liu. 8, 13, 4 admodum a paucis; Nep. Dat. 6, 1 non ita cum magna manu. Instances of a different usage are comparatively rare, particularly in the best Latin; cf. Brut. 8 multo magis; so N. D. 3, 45; Liu. 6, 25, 3 in tam praecipitem; Sen. ep. 18, 15; ib. 49, 3; ib. 86, 9; Sen. Rh. contr. 7, 3, 3; Val. Max. 3, 6, pr. [Cf. Madv. on Fin. 5, 26.]

paruo: for the substantival use cf. n. on 1, 38; also Off. 1, 53 in exiguom angustumque; Lael. 20; above 1 § 45 in occulto.

lis sit: the MSS reading *quam in paruolis sitis* would not be in itself impossible (cf. Leg. 1, 14 in paruis uersari) but the alteration is demanded by the sense. Cf. Sen. ep. 65, 2 eam partem (*sermonis*) quae in lite est; N. Q. 2, 12, 3 ad illa transeamus, in quibus lis est.

9. **capita**: cf. §§ 40 sq.; 77.

quae concludant: '*of a nature to prove*'.

nosci...comprehendi: n. on § 23.

11. **est esse**: n. on § 59.

14. **a sensu profectum**: elsewhere *a uero esse* or *a uero* simply; as in § 41. So Tusc. 2, 46 a uirtute profectum.

cui non appositum sit: see § 40 where this is put more accurately, from the Sceptic point of view: also §§ 41, 77.

17. **non dat**: nn. on §§ 79 and 41.

P. Seruilium Geminum uidebat, si Quintum se uidere putabat, incidebat in eius modi uisum quod percipi non posset, quia nulla nota uerum distinguebatur a falso; qua distinctione sublata quam haberet in C. Cotta, qui bis cum Gemino consul fuit, agnoscendo eius modi notam, quae falsa esse non posset? Negas tantam similitudinem in rerum natura esse. Pugnas omnino, sed cum aduersario facili. Ne sit sane: uideri certe potest; fallet igitur sensum, et si una fefellerit similitudo, dubia omnia reddiderit. Sublato enim iudicio illo, quo oportet agnosci, etiam si ipse erit, quem uideris, qui tibi uidebitur, tamen non ea nota iudicabis, qua dicis oportere, ut non possit esse eiusdem modi falsa.
85 Quando igitur potest tibi P. Geminus Quintus uideri, quid habes

15 est istud quidem: scripsi e coni. Halmii; *sed est q.* AB Harl.; *sedem q.* V; *est q. sed* Cant.; *est q.* U; *istuc quidem* (om. *est*) M. 19 res: V^2rψU Cant.; *re* C; *res a re* H. 22 atque: ita scripsi; *aqua* codd. (*et aqua et* Cant.); *acu* coni. Orelli;

1. **Geminum**: n. on § 56.

3. **nota**: = σημεῖον, a term used by all the late Schools for the sign or rule by which truth might be known. Cf. the title of Philodemus' work 'περὶ σημείων καὶ σημειώσεων'. There is often little to distinguish σημεῖον from κριτήριον (n. on 1, 30). Cf. too Sext. P. H. 1, 191 χαρακτῆρα συγκαταθέσεως καὶ ἀρνήσεως. For *nota* cf. §§ 34 (where *signum* is another rendering of σημεῖον) 36, 58, 110; Diu. 1, 64 and 2, 128; Rep. 2, 6; De Or. 3, 115 (*nota* = χαρακτήρ); Sen. contr. 5, 7; Sen. Clem. 1, 3. 1. In rhetoric σύμβολον is commoner; cf. n. on 1, 32 rerum notae.

distinctione: as in § 86 'possibility of distinguishing'; see n. on § 45.

4. **in...agnoscendo**: cf. § 86.

bis...consul: n. on § 56.

5. **negas...esse**: see below, § 85 Stoicum est etc.

6. **pugnas**: so § 54.

omnino, sed: for this concessive use of *omnino* cf. Lael. §§ 69, 98 (with my nn.); Cato m. §§ 28, 45; Tusc. 2, 35; Mayor on Phil. 2, 42.

7. **aduersario facili**: cf. § 12 minus acer aduersarius.

ne sit: see n. on § 102.

8. **omnia**: cf. n. on § 53 omnia confundere.

9. **iudicio**: n. on 1, 30.

agnosci: the general subject *aliquem* = τινὰ must be supplied, as in § 80 and often.

ipse: Madvig, in a n. on Fin. 2, 93 has carefully examined the use of *ipse* for *is ipse*. He shews that many of the alleged instances are unreal; e.g. when a person or thing has been already mentioned and is clearly understood, there is no need to add the demonstrative pronoun. Apart from this Madv. allows *ipse* = *is ipse* when it immediately precedes a descriptive relative clause, e.g. *ipse qui audit* = αὐτὸς ὁ ἀκούων: so above, 1, 39 ipsam naturam quae, with my critical n. In the present passage, M. refers *ipse erit* to the colloquial use of *ipse* or *ipsus* found in comedy, as in *ipsus est*. It is better to take *ipse qui tibi uidebitur* closely together, and class this with the exx. quoted by M. of *ipse* closely followed by a relative clause. [Cf. 1 § 1 ipsum uenientem uidimus; 1 § 13 ex ipso audiebamus. In § 119 hunc mundum esse sapientem, habere mentem, quae et se et ipsum fabricata sit, we have an instance not covered by Madvig's observations, since *ipsum* is so barred off from *mundum*, that ordinarily, a demonstrative pronoun would be expected. M. has spoken too positively.]

11. **oportere**: supply not *te iudicare*, but *iudicari*, like *agnosci* just before.

ut non etc.: this clause is explanatory of *ea* (in *ea nota*) = *talis*.

12. **quando**: causal, as often in the best Latin.

13. **explorati**: so above, § 54. For the genitive after *quid* cf. n. on § 25.

explorati cur non possit tibi Cotta uideri qui non sit, quoniam aliquid uidetur esse, quod non est? Omnia dicis sui generis esse, nihil esse idem, quod sit aliud. Stoicum est istud quidem nec admodum credibile, nullum esse pilum omnibus rebus talem, qualis sit pilus alius, nullum granum. Haec refelli possunt, sed pugnare nolo. Ad id enim, quod agitur, nihil interest omnibusne partibus uisa res nihil differat an internosci non possit, etiam si differat. Sed, si hominum similitudo tanta esse non potest, ne signorum quidem? Dic mihi, Lysippus eodem aere, eadem temperatione, eodem caelo atque ceteris omnibus, centum Alexandros eiusdem modi facere non posset? Qua igitur notione

aeque H; *eadem caelatura* (pro *eodem caelo aqua*) C. F. Hermann. centum: *certum* CψU Harl.; *cereum* Cant. Alexandros: *Alexandrum* codd. (V tamen *Alexandrus*, Harl. *Alexandriis*).

14. **quod non est**: here=q. n. e. id quod esse uidetur.

sui generis: §§ 50, 54, 56.

15. **nihil...aliud**: put for *n. e. idem cum alia re, quod ab illa diuersum sit.* This only applies to the confusion of *uisa differentium generum* (§ 50). In the next sentence Cic. proceeds to speak of *uisa* of the same class.

Stoicum est etc.: the doctrine that no two individuals of the same species are precisely alike was strongly insisted on by the dogmatists; see the important passages in Sen. ep. 113, 16 and Lucret. 2, 333—380: also Ps. Quint. decl. 8, 12; Quint. 10, 2, 10. In recent times the same doctrine has become one of the main pillars of Darwinism. It is treated, for example, by Haeckel, at the outset of his 'History of Creation' as of vital importance. There seems to have been a considerable Stoic literature devoted to the subject, and of course largely directed against the Sceptics. Besides the works mentioned in n. on § 58 we find works 'περὶ τῶν ὁμοίων' by Chrysippus and Sphaerus; see Diog. 7 §§ 178, 199 and cf. Pl. n. h. 9, 112.

17. **haec refelli possunt**: so Tusc. 1, 80 haec refelli possunt, sunt enim etc.

18. **nihil interest etc.**: cf. § 40 n.

19. **res**: the correction *res a re* is less probable: see n. on § 59, l. 14 sit.

nihil differat: n. on § 99 nihil differens.

20. **ne...quidem**: for the omission of *potest* in the second place cf. n. on 1 § 10 legant...non legant. The form of this sentence, with *si...ne...quidem*, and a question, is common in Livy; e.g. 4, 44, 4; 5, 5, 1; cf. also Cic. Phil. 2, 61.

21. **Lysippus...Alexandros**: we are told that Al. forbade any one to cast a bronze representation of him but Lysippus, or make a painting of him but Apelles: see Hor. ep. 2, 1, 238 sq.; Cic. Fam. 5, 12, 7; Val. M. 8, 11 ext. 2; also Plin. n. h. 7, 125, who adds that only Pyrgoteles was allowed to engrave the conqueror's likeness on gems; cf. too Plin. n. h. 35, 85 and 37, 8. Yet Protogenes painted him (Plin. 35, 106) and Chaereas wrought his effigy in bronze (ib. 34, 75). The representations of Al. made by Lysippus were very numerous: there are extant many copied from L. and some supposed originals.

temperatione: i.e. method of mingling the ingredients of the *aes*. Many different mixtures went by this name.

22. **caelo**: a sharp tool applied to the surface of the metal by the revolutions of a wheel.

atque: the reading *aqua* originated with a copyist who took *caelo* to be 'sky' (Pl. n. h. 34, 143), and also probably *aere* to be 'air', and *temperatione* to be 'climate'. Some of the older edd. quote Plut. to shew that for the ὕδατος βαφή, which was part of the process of working metal, differences in water were important.

23. **notione**: here related to *nota* as *uisio* to *uisum* (§ 33), marking rather the general process than the individual act. For a different use of *notio*, see n. on notitiae in § 30.

86 discerneres? Quid? si in eiusdem modi cera centum sigilla hoc anulo impressero, ecquae poterit in agnoscendo esse distinctio? An tibi erit quaerendus anularius aliqui, quoniam gallinarium inuenisti Deliacum illum, qui oua cognosceret? XXVII. Sed adhibes artem aduocatam etiam sensibus. Pictor uidet quae nos non uidemus et, simul inflauit tibicen, a perito carmen agnoscitur. Quid? Hoc nonne uidetur contra te ualere, si sine magnis artificiis, ad quae pauci accedunt, nostri quidem generis admodum, nec uidere nec audire possimus? Iam illa praeclara, quanto artificio esset sensus nostros mentemque et totam con-

1 in eiusdem: *in eius* codd.; corr. Lamb.

1. **eiusdem modi**: 'after the same type'; so used of works of art in Verr. 4, 4. Our passage is quoted by Goehling, de Cicerone artis aestimatore, p. 11, who ridicules the idea of an artist making a hundred statues exactly alike. But Cicero contemplates here not the *likelihood*, but the bare *possibility* of the thing being done.

sigilla: the singular *sigilium* (dimin. of signum) is not found in classical Latin.

2. **anulo**: cf. § 54.

ecquae: Cic. prob. wrote *ecquae siquae* etc., not *ecqua* etc.

in agnoscendo: so § 84.

distinctio: n. on § 84.

3. **anularius aliqui**: n. on § 61.

4. **Deliacum illum**: but in § 57 *compluris;* cf. Pl. n. h. 10, 155.

5. **adhibes artem**: so § 20 adhibita arte.

aduocatam: note the legal metaphor and cf. § 36 absentibus nobis, with n. On this word *sensibus* depends.

pictor...tibicen: reference to § 20.

6. **simul**: for simul atque; the usage is found all through Latin.

7. **nonne**: for the position of *nonne* after the beginning of the sentence cf. Sest. 47 with Halm's n.; Phil. 2, 20 with Mayor's n.; De Or. 1 §§ 37, 177, 178; Off. 2, 26; 3, 57; Tusc. 1 §§ 28, 102; 3 §§ 26, 64; 4, 54; 5 §§ 88, 98, 105; Diu. 1, 89; 2 §§ 51, 96, 114, 144; Fat. 10; Brut. 190. Often too in other authors, as Val. M. 6, 9, 12.

contra te: n. on § 58 contra nos. Hirzel, Unters. III 331 points out the unfairness of the reply here given to Lucullus, who had *not* said that the senses were *only* trustworthy when highly cultivated.

8. **magnis**: here = 'difficult'; cf. n. on 1, 6.

artificiis: n. on § 30; Pl. n. h. 11, 1.

nostri quidem etc.: for this clause cf. § 14 Empedocles quidem etc.; and § 102. The argument here is precisely paralleled in Diu. 2, 54; Sen. ep. 121, 10.

9. **admodum**: sc. pauci. In Cic. *admodum* generally precedes the word it qualifies (so above § 1 admodum adulescens) while in most other writers the opposite rule prevails. Cf. my n. on Lael. § 2.

iam illa: for *iam* cf. Tusc. 1, 2 iam illa etc., in turning to a new topic; so N.D. 1, 20 and 2, 126 qu. in next n.; De Or. 1, 201; also above 1, 5 and 2, 17; and several of the passages given in the next n.

illa praeclara: *illa* are the sayings of Lucullus in § 30. The omission of *sunt* and the like is common in short clauses like this where great emphasis is thrown on a pronoun; so § 59; cf. N.D. 1, 20 where Baiter rightly reads *iam illa palmaria;* ib. 1, 25 haec quidem uestra; ib. 2, 115; ib. 2, 126 iam uero illa notiora; ib. 3, 80 sed haec uetera; De Or. 2 §§ 227, 246; Off. 1, 38 Poeni foedifragi, crudelis Hannibal, reliqui iustiores; ib. 2 §§ 19, 32; 3 §§ 47, 70, 114; Tusc. 1 §§ 32, 62, 74; 4 §§ 31, 65; Fin. 2 §§ 6, 93; ib. 3, 27; Diu. 1, 124; ib. 2, 51; ib. 2, 78 nam illud admodum ridiculum; Att. 8, 2, 1; Ligar. 11; Fat. 3; Fam. 12, 2, 2; Leg. 1, 42; Caes. B.C. 1, 60, 5; Nep. Thras. 3, 2; Liu. 4, 55, 8; Plin. ep. 3, 9, 25; ib. 9, 9, 2; Sen. de ira 2, 32, 3; Quint. 9, 4, 121. In many of these places editors from time to time have inserted the verb against the MSS. Cf n. on § 50 si lupi canibus similes.

structionem hominis fabricata natura. Cur non extimescam opinandi temeritatem? Etiamne hoc adfirmare potes, Luculle, esse aliquam uim, cum prudentia et consilio scilicet, quae finxerit uel, ut tuo uerbo utar, quae fabricata sit hominem? Qualis ista fabrica est? ubi adhibita? quando? cur? quo modo? Tractantur ista ingeniose; disputantur etiam eleganter; denique uideantur sane, ne adfirmentur modo. Sed de physicis mox et quidem ob eam caussam, ne tu, qui id me facturum paulo ante dixeris, uideare mentitus. Sed ut ad ea, quae clariora sunt, **87**

18 qui id me: *qui idem me* AVU Cant.; *quidem* ψ.

praeclara: ironical as in N. D. 3, 40 omitto illa, sunt enim praeclara. Halm, Bait. and Müller (after Hülsemann) place a note of exclamation at *natura*, with which they construe *praeclara*. It is extremely difficult in that case to give any account of the syntax of the verb *esset fabricata*.

10. **esset**: subjunctive, because the thoughts are carried back by *illa* to the words of Lucullus in § 30. The change from the present *sunt* (understood with *illa*) to the past *esset* is as natural as that in Lucan. 1, 68 aperitur opus quid in arma furentem impulerit populum; or in Sen. suas. 4, 5 *soletis* mihi molesti *esse*, quid *fuerit* etc.; cf. also Cic. Phil. 2, 35 illud Cassianum, cui bono *fuerit*.

esset...fabricata: for the separation of these words see n. on 1 § 17.

constructionem: so N. D. 2, 133 hominis fabricatio.

12. **etiamne**: so in Tusc. 5, 111.

13. **prudentia**: the Stoic πρόνοια, for which see n. on 1 § 29.

scilicet: ironical. Stuerenburg on Arch. 11 objects to the word occurring in an interrogative sentence, and says it is a *dittographia* from *consilio!* But the clause with *scilicet* here has nothing to do with the interrogative form of the sentence; it contains merely a parenthetic description of *uim*.

14. **fabricata sit**: the reference is to § 17; cf. also §§ 119, 121; and N. D. 1, 4; Tusc. 1, 47 foramina illa...callidissimo artificio natura fabricata est; ib. 1, 62; Quint. 2, 16, 12 parens rerum fabricatorque mundi; also N. D. 1, 47 artificium effingitis fabricamque diuinam; Sen. N. Q. 1, 7, 3; further *machinari* in N. D. 2 §§ 128, 149; Tim. 4; Pl. n. h. 22, 107.

15. **ista fabrica**: so N. D. 2, 121 admirabilis fabrica membrorum; ib. 2, 138 incredibilis fabrica naturae; ib. 1, 53; Off. 1, 127. In its original uses *fabrica* means both 'workshop' (Ter. ad. 716) and 'workmanship' or 'art of working' as in N. D. 2, 150 aeris; Diu. 1, 116 f. consectionis.

ubi adhibita etc.: cf. N. D. 1, 19 quibus enim oculis animi intueri potuit uester Plato fabricam illam tanti operis, qua construi a deo atque aedificari mundum facit? Quae molitio, quae ferramenta, quae uectes, quae machinae, qui ministri? ib. 1, 54 eae rerum formae et figurae, quas uos (Stoici) effici posse sine follibus et incudibus non putatis. The form here is very like that in Blake's 'Songs of Experience—the Tiger'—'what art | could twist the sinews of thy heart?...*What the hammer? what the chain? in what furnace was thy brain? what the anvil?*

tractantur...disputantur: the former word is directed to the *substance* of the doctrines, the latter to their *form*.

17. **ne...modo**: for *modo...ne;* a rare usage; cf. Plaut. capt. 177 ne perpauxillum modo; Ter. ad. 835; Tib. 2, 3, 67 ne sint modo rure puellae. In prose I have found no other example. [Hand, in a n. to Wopkens, Lect. Tull. p. 50 most absurdly construes *uideantur ne* together, explaining *uidendum est ne adfirmentur modo.*]

physicis: from *physici*, not *physica;* see § 55.

mox: for the ellipse see my n. on Lael. § 1.

18. **paulo ante**: § 55.

19. **uideare mentitus**: Sen. ben. 5, 12, 1 uideor tibi mentitus.

clariora: sc. quam physica, which are *res occultae;* see n. on 1, 19.

ueniam, res iam uniuersas profundam, de quibus uolumina impleta sunt non a nostris solum, sed etiam a Chrysippo, de quo queri solent Stoici, dum studiose omnia conquisierit contra sensus et perspicuitatem contraque omnem consuetudinem contraque rationem, ipsum sibi respondentem inferiorem fuisse,
88 itaque ab eo armatum esse Carneaden. Ea sunt eius modi, quae a te diligentissime tractata sunt. Dormientium et uinulentorum et furiosorum uisa imbecilliora esse dicebas quam uigilantium siccorum sanorum. Quo modo? Quia, cum experrectus esset Ennius, non diceret se uidisse Homerum, sed uisum esse, Alcmaeo autem

'sed mihi ne utiquam cor consentit......'

7 uinulentorum: ita C et infra *uinulentis; uinol.* cett. 10 diceret: om. E et Orelli. 14 somnia reri: ita scripsi; *somniare* codd.; *somnia sua uisa putare* coni. H, scr. Bait.; *somniasse se* M (*somniasse* iam Lamb.); H etiam coniecit

1. **res uniuersas**: so § 73 uniuersa.

3. **queri solent**: cf. §§ 75, 96.

contra sensus etc.: cf. Diog. 7, 183 (of Chrysippus) τέλος δὲ Ἀρκεσιλάῳ καὶ Λακύδῃ παραγενόμενος (MSS παραγενομένοις) συνεφιλοσόφησε. δι' ἣν αἰτίαν καὶ κατὰ τῆς συνηθείας καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς οἷον ἐπεχείρησε [cf. the εἰς ἑκάτερα ἐπιχείρησις, n. on 1, 46] καὶ περὶ μεγεθῶν καὶ πληθῶν τῇ τῶν Ἀκαδημαικῶν ἐνστάσει χρησάμενος. The words περὶ μεγεθῶν καὶ πληθῶν shew that Chrysippus handled several of the sceptic τρόποι. Diog. 7, 192 mentions books entitled 'παρὰ τὰς συνηθείας' and ib. 198 a work 'κατὰ τῆς συνηθείας πρὸς Μητρόδωρον', in six books, with another περὶ τῆς συνηθείας πρὸς Γοργιππίδην. Plut. Sto. Rep. 1036 D says that the followers of Chrysippus pride themselves on the attack on the senses in his book 'κατὰ τῆς συνηθείας', as far superior to any achievement of the Academics in the same line; then P. proceeds 'ἐκεῖνο δὲ ἀληθὲς ὅτι βουληθεὶς αὖθις συνειπεῖν τῇ συνηθείᾳ καὶ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἐνδεέστερος γέγονεν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ σύνταγμα τοῦ συντάγματος μαλακώτερον'. The last words shew either that Plut. copied our passage (*inferiorem sibi respondentem*) or that Cic. and Plut. drew from the same source. Again, Plut. κοιν. ἐνν. 1059 says that as Caesar was the only man who ever in his sober senses set about destroying his country, so Chr. δοκεῖ...ἀνατρέπειν τὴν συνήθειαν ὡς ἐνι (? ἑνὶ) γοῦν.

4. **omnem consuetudinem**: a rendering of κοινὴ συνήθεια 'common experience'; see n. on § 42. The regular rendering in Cic. for συνήθεια is *consuetudo;* so § 75; N. D. 1, 83. The Greek word is very common: cf. Diog. 9 §§ 88, 105.

contra rationem: the allusion is to Chrysippus' numerous and laborious works on the fallacies, and on all the difficulties of logic. See §§ 95—97 nn.

5. **inferiorem**: sc. *se.*

6. **armatum**: Diog. 7, 183 mentions a line current about Chrysippus 'εἰ μὴ γὰρ ἦν Χρύσιππος οὐκ ἂν ἦν Στοά', which was thus parodied by Carneades 'εἰ μὴ γὰρ ἦν Χρύσιππος, οὐκ ἂν ἦν ἐγώ' (Diog. 4, 62). Similar is the story of Carneades crying out to Chrysippus 'δαιμόνιε, φθίσει σὲ τὸ σὸν μένος', narrated by Plut. St. Rep. 1036 D, who also (1033 F) says that Aristocreon put up a statue with the inscription 'τόνδε νέον Χρύσιππον Ἀριστοκρέων ἀνέθηκε | τῶν Ἀκαδημαικῶν στραγγαλίδων κοπίδα'. For the word *armatum* cf. § 46 n. on *armatos*, and the use of *arma* for logical weapons in Hor. sat. 2, 3, 296. [Milton 'Areopagitica' p. 19 ed. Hales complains (like the Stoics of Chrysippus) 'who finds not that Irenaeus, Epiphanius, Ierom and others discover more heresies than they well confute?']

ea sunt: this goes back to § 87 ea quae sunt clariora.

7. **tractata sunt**: §§ 47—53.

8. **dicebas**: in § 52 imbecillius adsentiuntur.

Similia de uinulentis. Quasi quisquam neget et qui experrectus sit, eum somnia reri et cuius furor consederit, putare non fuisse ea uera, quae essent sibi uisa in furore. Sed non id agitur: tum, cum uidebantur, quo modo uiderentur, id quaeritur. Nisi uero Ennium non putamus ita totum illud audiuisse

'O pietas animi...',

si modo id somniauit, ut si uigilans audiret. Experrectus enim potuit illa uisa putare, ut erant, somnia: dormienti uero aeque ac uigilanti probabantur. Quid? Iliona somno illo

somnia reprobare, quod non est Ciceronianum; *somnia* Faber. 16 uidebantur: *uideantur* codd.; corr. Dau. 19 si modo: *sed m.* U. 20 erant: *erant et* codd.; corr. Madu. Em. 1, 182.

9. **siccorum sanorum**: cf. § 53; fragm. 9; also Afranius l. 61 (Ribbeck) uigilans ac sollers, sicca, sana, sobria; Cic. leg. agr. 1, 1 consilia siccorum; De opt. gen. d. 8 sani et sicci; Sen. dial. 7, 12, 4 uoluptas sobria ac sicca; so ep. 18, 4 and 114, 3. The opposite of *siccus esse* is *madere* 'to be drunk', in Plaut. and Tib. 2, 1, 29.

10. **Ennius**: n. on § 51.

non diceret: the MSS here amply support the verb, but Madv. on Fin. 1, 9 goes too far in asserting that Cic. *could not* have omitted it in a sentence of this form. The omission of *diceret* after *cum* is not unknown; see Tusc. 4, 45; Liu. 1, 48, 2. [In Liu. 42, 38, 5 cum culpam in Ismeniam conferrent et quasdam ciuitates dissentientis in causam deductas, Madvig and others suppose *dicerent* to have dropped out. But the words *quasdam...deductas* 'the fact that certain states had been forced over to his side' stand as a second object to the verb *conferrent*, so that we really have hendiadys; lit. 'they laid to his charge faulty conduct and etc.' = culpam quarundam...deductarum.]

uisum esse: sc. uidere.

12. **sed mihi etc.**: Sext. P. H. 1, 109 actually draws an argument in favour of scepticism from the difference of judgments in the drunken and the sober state, which difference Lucullus supposed to be in his own favour. Sextus pushes all these arguments home more vigorously than Cic. In dealing with ὁ τόπος ὁ παρὰ τὰς περιστάσεις (see Introd. p. 61) he asks who is to determine between conflicting judgments passed in two opposite states, e.g. waking and sleeping. Not the man himself, for he must be in one or other of the states and therefore is μέρος τῆς διαφωνίας and so disqualified.

ne utiquam: the metre necessitates this reading, not *neutiquam*, here and in § 52.

14. **reri**: *rebar* was archaic in Cicero's time (De Or. 3, 153; cf. ib. 82), but Cic. uses *rebatur rebantur reor remur retur rentur;* though in his speeches only the participle occurs. Quint. 8, 3, 26 says of *reor* that though archaic, it is endurable. Sall. has once *rebatur*, the part. or perf. or plup. about 15 times; Caesar avoids the verb; Nepos has only the part. or perf.

16. **id quaeritur**: for the emphatic *id* cf. § 52 aliquid quod non sit, id uideri sibi; Madv. Fin. 5, 22, to whose exx. add Tusc. 2, 47 haec ut imperet...id uidendum est uiro.

nisi uero: used very much like *nisi forte;* see exx. in Merguet's 'Lexikon'.

17. **audiuisse**: n. on § 77.

18. **o pietas an.**: also qu. by Donat. ad Ter. Eun. 560; Vahlen takes the words to be part of Ennius' dream about Homer, for which see n. on § 51.

19. **si modo etc.**: 'if only he dreamed it'; i.e. 'merely because he dreamed it'.

20. **uisa**: = φαντάσματα: n. on § 47. Possibly the MSS reading is right in the sense 'thought his experiences mere phantoms and in fact dreams, as they really were'.

dormienti: for the dat. cf. nn. on §§ 9, 54.

21. **uigilanti**: = si uigilaret; for the two participles used in different ways cf. Madv. Em. Liu. 545 ed. 2.

somno: n. on § 52; to the exx. of

'mater, te appello...'

nonne ita credit filium locutum, ut experrecta etiam crederet? Vnde enim illa

'age adsta: mane, audi: iteradum eadem istaec mihi'?

Num uidetur minorem habere uisis quam uigilantes fidem?

89 XXVIII. Quid loquar de insanis? Qualis tandem fuit adfinis tuus, Catule, Tuditanus? Quisquam sanissimus tam certa putat quae uidet quam is putabat quae uidebantur? Quid ille, qui

'uideo, uideo te. Viue, Vlixe, dum licet'?

Nonne etiam bis exclamauit se uidere, cum omnino non uideret? Quid? Apud Euripiden Hercules, cum, ut Eurysthei filios, ita suos configebat sagittis, cum uxorem interemebat, cum conabatur etiam patrem, non perinde mouebatur falsis, ut ueris moueretur? Quid? Ipse Alcmaeo tuus, qui negat 'cor sibi cum oculis consentire', nonne ibidem incitato furore

'unde haec flamma oritur'?

2 ita: *illa* codd.; corr. Dau. credit: *credidit* coni. H, scr. Bait. 5 uigilantes: *uigilantis* CUψ Dau. 10 uiue: *uiuum* codd. Vlixe: *Vlixes* codd. edd.

in somnis there given add Diu. 1 §§ 46, 49, 51, 52, 54, 55, 57; ib. 2 §§ 143, 144; Val. M. 2, 4, 5; in Diu. 2, 119 we have both *in somnis* and *in somniis;* in Ov. Am. 3, 768 *per somnos;* more in Neue I² 422. For the omission of *in* here cf. Du Mesnil on Leg. 1, 8.

1. **mater, te appello**: a hackneyed quotation from the Iliona of Pacuuius; see Sest. 126; Hor. s. 2, 3, 61; Hyg. fab. 109; Tusc. 1, 106. The ghost of Polydorus speaks to his mother.

2. **credit...crederet**: the change from present to past is sufficiently explained by the intervention of *locutum;* cf. Lieven p. 55.

4. **age etc.**: prob. also from the Iliona; the same words are quoted in Tusc. 2, 44; Att. 14, 14, 1. For *eadem istaec* cf. Ter. ad. 599; and, for the first words, a line of uncertain authorship in Ribbeck I² 246 mane mane porro ut audias.

6. **quid loquar de...**: a mere form of transition, common in Cic. (above, § 72). He immediately goes on to speak of what he implies needs not to be told. So in Fin. 1, 4 C. asks who is so hostile to the name of Roman as not to read the dramas of Ennius and others; yet he goes on with an imaginary speech by such a person.

insanis: used for argument by Pyrrho (Diog. 9, 82) and Sextus (A. M. 7, 61) and Sceptics generally. Epicurus of course contended like Protagoras that all the impressions of madmen were true (Diog. 10, 32).

qualis: n. on § 44.

7. **Tuditanus**: 'qui cum palla et cothurnis nummos populo de rostris spargere solebat' (Phil. 3, 16; cf. Val. M. 7, 8, 1).

quisquam: for the use in an interrogative sentence cf. the commentators on Verg. Aen. 1, 48.

8. **quid ille**: sc. fuit; for *quid* cf. n. on § 75.

10. **uideo**: the speaker is evidently an Αἴας μαινόμενος; the situation in Soph. Aiax 100 sq. is precisely similar. A few words more are given in De Or. 3, 162.

Vlixe: see Madv. Fin. 5, 49. The balance of evidence is decidedly in favour of this form of the voc.; see Neue I² 295, and cf. § 137 Carneade.

et illa deinceps

'incedunt, incedunt: adsunt, adsunt, me expetunt':

Quid cum uirginis fidem implorat?

'Fer mi auxilium, pestem abige a me, flammiferam hanc uim, quae me excruciat!
caerulea incinctae angui incedunt, circumstant cum ardentibus taedis'.

Num dubitas quin sibi haec uidere uideatur? Itemque cetera:

'intendit crinitus Apollo
arcum auratum, luna innixus:
Diana facem iacit a laeua'.

Qui magis haec crederet, si essent, quam credebat, quia uide- **90**
bantur? Apparet enim iam 'cor cum oculis consentire'. Omnia
autem haec proferuntur, ut illud efficiatur, quo certius nihil potest

19 incedunt incedunt: *incede incede* codd. adsunt: semel modo codd. 23 caerulea: *caeruleae* codd. angui: *igni* codd.; corr. Columna.

12. **Hercules**: Eur. H. F. 921—1015; Sext. A. M. 7 §§ 249, 405.

ut...ita: § 119 sic...ut. Many old scholars needlessly suspected *ita*.

14. **moueretur**: for the tense see n. on § 75.

15. **Alcmaeo**: the Roman form of the name was most likely *Alcmeo* or *Alcumeo*; see Ritschl, Op. 2, 513. Ribbeck reads *Alcmeo* here and in § 52. The MSS of the *Academica* give *Alcmeo*, *Alcimeo*, *Alcineo* or *Altineo*.

16. **nonne**: for the late position of the word in the sentence cf. § 86 n. It is especially often thus held back when *quid?* precedes as here. [In Val. M. 8, 5, 5 where *quid* is followed by *nonne* at some distance, a note of interrogation should be placed after *quid*.]

incitato: both abl. and nom. (in some texts) are admissible here; cf. Amm. M. 31, 2, 11 furori incitatissimo; ib. 30, 5, 4 incitato odio (so Suet. Ner. 45); ib. 30, 8, 13 sermone incitato; ib. 26, 10, 18 incitata uertigine; Sen. Rh. c. 9, 6, 1 concitatissima rabies; Caes. B. G. 2, 26, 3 incitato cursu, but B. C. 1, 79, 4 and 3, 46, 5 incitati cursu; so ib. 1, 70, 4 magno cursu concitatos; ib. 3, 93, 5 incitati fuga; ib. 3, 24, 2 incitati studio; Amm. M. 31, 10, 11 spe incitatior. The sense is 'when his madness quickened'.

19. **adsunt, adsunt**: so a fragm. of Ennius ap. Diu. 1, 66 adest, adest fax obuoluta sanguine.

23. **angui**: collective, like *unda* in fragm. 7. The snakes and torches are the invariable accompaniments of the Furies. Nero had visions of his mother in the guise of a Fury 'taedis ardentibus' (Suet. Ner. 34).

25. **dubitas quin**: my n. on Cato m. § 16.

26. **crinitus**: ἀκερσεκόμης: 'Apollo never-shorn'.

27. **luna innixus**: an anonymous correspondent has made to me a suggestion worth considering, that *luna* and *laeua* have changed places. In bending the bow, Apollo would naturally use all the strength he could with his left hand, while he held the string with his right. I agree with Ribbeck that *luna innixus* is unintelligible, as Lamb. declared, who edited *genu* against the metre, an objection which applies to *lunat* (old edd. and Goer.). *Luna* certainly cannot stand for *arcu lunato*, as Faber thought. Davies falls back on the lunacy of the speaker.

29. **crederet**: n. on § 75.

si essent: n. on § 10.

31. **efficiatur**: as in §§ 18, 42, 50 and often.

potest esse: n. on § 22.

esse, inter uisa uera et falsa ad animi adsensum nihil interesse. Vos autem nihil agitis, cum illa falsa uel furiosorum uel somniantium recordatione ipsorum refellitis. Non enim id quaeritur, qualis recordatio fieri soleat eorum, qui experrecti sint, aut eorum, qui furere destiterint, sed qualis uisio fuerit aut furentium aut somniantium tum cum mouebantur. Sed abeo a sensibus.

91 Quid est quod ratione percipi possit? Dialecticam inuentam esse dicitis, ueri et falsi quasi disceptatricem et iudicem. Cuius ueri et falsi, et in qua re? In geometriane quid sit uerum aut falsum dialecticus iudicabit an in litteris an in musicis? At ea non nouit. In philosophia igitur. Sol quantus sit quid ad

6 cum mou.: *commouebantur* C Harl. H Bait. M; *cum commouebantur* Uψ. 11 dialecticus: om. Pluygers. Bait., et deinde *ad illam*.

1. **adsensum**: συγκατάθεσιν in the absolute sense.

2. **nihil agitis**: n. on § 16.

furiosorum: I formerly made this depend on *falsa;* but *falsa furiosorum* without *uisa* is a difficult expression. Goerenz was therefore probably right in making the gen. dependent on *recordatione;* cf. Tusc. 5, 88 inuentorum recordatione confutare. Possibly the first *uel* is a corruption of *uisa*.

3. **non enim etc.**: cf. § 80 quasi quaeratur etc. Sextus often holds similar language, as in P. H. 1, 22, qu. in n. on § 40.

5. **furere destiterint**: for *furore*, the reading of some old edd., cf. n. on § 80.

uisio: n. on § 85 (notio) and 108 (opinationem).

6. **abeo ab**: a form of taking leave of a subject like *redeo ad*, the common form for returning to it; cf. Hor. s. 1, 1, 108 illuc unde abii redeo.

8. **ratione**: cf. § 42. Cic. does not represent so clearly as Sextus P. H. 1, 128 and elsewhere the contention of the Sceptics that intellectual processes, being founded on sensation, lose their certitude along with it. In A. M. 1, 315 S. argues in a similar way against grammarians.

dialecticam: Sext. P. H. 1, 69 sarcastically calls it ἡ ἀοίδιμος διαλεκτική.

inuentam: cf. §§ 26, 27.

9. **quasi disceptatricem**: *quasi* marks here a rendering from the Greek, as so often in this work (1, 17 n.); *disceptatricem* is probably ἅπαξ εἰρημένον. Cf. Sext. P. H. 2, 229 τῶν ἀληθῶν καὶ ψευδῶν λόγων διαγνωστική: Diog. 7, 62.

10. **et in**: *aut* might have been expected; cf. n. on § 32; but in 1, 43 quod et qua de caussa.

in geometriane: this inquiry into the function of dialectic is like that into the function of rhetoric in Plato, Gorg. 453 D sq.; and into the function of divination in Diu. 2, 10 (from Carneades) where the expressions are closely like what we have here.

12. **sol etc.**: a problem for φυσική not διαλεκτική; Diog. 7, 132. It is frequently quoted as a type of a doubtful problem: so De Or. 2, 66; Sen. ep. 88, 27; Quint. 3, 6, 42; ib. 7, 2, 6; ib. 7, 4, 1; similar astronomical problems in Cic. Diu. 2, 10. In Cic. Inu. 1, 8 it is said that Hermagoras the rhetorician made his pupils discuss such problems as 'uerine sunt sensus?' and 'quae sit solis magnitudo'.

quid ad: n. on § 94.

14. **coniunctio**: συνημμένον ἀξίωμα, a Stoic term for a judgment in hypothetical form, as 'si lucet, lucet' below. The rendering *conexum* is given in §§ 96, 143; cf. Fat. 12; Diog. 7, 69 sq.; ib. 7, 190 sq.; ib. 2, 135; Gell. 16, 8, 9 (who gives *adiunctum* and *conexum*); Wilkins on De Or. 2, 158. The Stoics used συμπεπλεγμένον for a judgment composed of parts connected by καὶ...καὶ; see Zeller III 1, 104, 107, ed. 3; Cic. uses *coniunctio* for this also.

disiunctio: διεζευγμένον, a judgment of

illum? Quod sit summum bonum quid habet ut queat iudicare? Quid igitur iudicabit? Quae coniunctio, quae diiunctio uera sit, quid ambigue dictum sit, quid sequatur quamque rem, quid repugnet. Si haec et horum similia iudicat, de se ipsa iudicat; plus autem pollicebatur. Nam haec quidem iudicare ad ceteras res, quae sunt in philosophia multae atque magnae, non est satis. Sed quoniam tantum in ea arte ponitis, uidete ne contra uos **92**
tota nata sit, quae primo progressu festiue tradit elementa loquendi et ambiguorum intellegentiam concludendique rationem, tum paucis additis uenit ad soritas, lubricum sane et periculosum locum, quod tu modo dicebas esse uitiosum interrogandi genus. XXIX. Quid ergo? Istius uiti num nostra culpa est? Rerum natura nullam nobis dedit cognitionem finium, ut ulla

the form 'aut uiuet cras Hermarchus aut non uiuet' (§ 97); cf. Diog. qu. above; Zeller as above.

15. **ambigue dictum**: *ἀμφίβολον*; Sext. P. H. 2, 256 sq.; Diog. 7, 62; Brut. 152; Or. 115; De Or. 2, 111.

quid...rem: so Fat. 9 quae quamque rem res consequatur; above 1, 19 n.

16. **repugnet**: 1, 19 n. on *consentiens;* in most of the passages there quoted *repugnans* occurs; cf. too Epict. D. 2, 24, 14 *τί τίνι ἀκολουθεῖ, τί τίνι μάχεται*: above §§ 44, 50.

haec et horum: n. on § 27.

de se ipsa etc.: similar arguments often occur in Sextus; e.g. P. H. 2, 175 where it is said of *ἀπόδειξις* that it is *ἑαυτοῦ* (not *ἄλλου τινὸς*) *ἐκκαλυπτικόν*. Logic thus becomes, to use Sextus' favourite phrase (not decisive of truth but) *μέρος τῆς διαφωνίας*: cf. e.g. P. H. 1, 98. Logic is here (as usual) attacked on the ground of its *uselessness*, not, as one would expect, on the ground of its formal invalidity; cf. § 43 n. Carneades (Stobaeus Flor. 93, 13) compared Logic to a cuttlefish, which eats up its own limbs; so Hortensius fr. 30 (Müller) dialectica quae se ipsa comest. Epictetus III 2 and elsewhere declaims against dialectic as vigorously as the Sceptics, but only because it leads men to neglect moral culture.

19. **tantum...ponitis**: cf. Fin. 1, 63 in physicis plurimum posuit; also Sext. P. H. 1, 193 *τῶν θρυλουμένων συλλογισμῶν*; ib. 194 *ἐπ' αὐτοῖς μέγα φρονοῦσιν*.

20. **nata**: possibly added by a copyist who did not know the phrase *contra aliquem esse*, for which see n. on § 58. [Ernesti desired to strike out *nata*.]

loquendi: referring to *λογική* which includes both rhetoric and dialectic; see 1, 19 n.

21. **concludendi**: above, n. on § 26 argumenti conclusio; cf. also § 44. *Rationem* probably depends on *tradit*, not on *concludendi*.

22. **paucis additis**: this appears to refer to the actual process of the sorites (for which see n. on § 49), not to the progress of the whole science (cf. Fin. 4, 73); cf. *quanto addito* below and *uno addito* in § 49, also the title of a work wrongly ascribed to Chrysippus, as Diog. 7, 197 says, '*περὶ τοῦ παρὰ μικρὸν λόγου*'.

lubricum locum: a proverbial expression, but here with a hint at *locum*=*τόπον*, in the rhetorical sense; so precisely in Off. 1, 65 and cf. Plin. ep. 1, 8, 6; Sen. dial. 7, 15, 4 locus uolubilis; Sen. Rh. contr. prooem. § 22 spinosum locum; Pl. ep. 3, 3, 4 lubrico aetatis; below, § 108 adsensus lubricos.

periculosum: joined with *lubricus* in § 68; cf. also ib. *tam in praecipitem locum*.

23. **interrogandi**: n. on 1, 5.

24. **quid ergo?** § 95 quid igitur? Cf. n. on 1, 13.

num nostra etc.: so above, § 32.

25. **dedit...ut possimus**: n. on § 3 ut stet.

cognitionem: 'possibility of knowing'; n. on § 45.

finium: 'absolute limits'; the fault of the *sorites* and other fallacies like it lies of

in re statuere possimus quatenus. Nec hoc in aceruo tritici solum, unde nomen est, sed nulla omnino in re minutatim interrogati, diues pauper, clarus obscurus sit, multa pauca, magna parua, longa breuia, lata angusta, quanto aut addito aut dempto certum respondeamus non habemus. At uitiosi sunt soritae.
93 Frangite igitur eos, si potestis, ne molesti sint; erunt enim, nisi cauetis. Cautum est, inquit; placet enim Chrysippo, cum gradatim interrogetur, uerbi caussa, tria pauca sint anne multa, aliquanto prius quam ad multa perueniat quiescere, id est, quod ab his dicitur, ἡσυχάζειν. Per me uel stertas licet, inquit Carneades, non modo quiescas. Sed quid proficit? Sequitur enim qui te ex somno excitet et eodem modo interroget. Quo in

2 sed nulla: *sed ulla* Man. 5 non habemus: u. *non* incl. H Bait. M. 6 frangite: *angite* AUψ. 7 cauetis: *caueritis* Cant. 11 proficit: *proficitur* cod. Dresd.; *proficis* uel *prosis* coni. Dau. 21 respondes: *responde* codd. paene omnes.

course in the treatment of purely relative terms as absolute and definite. Hor. ep. 2, 1, 38 uses *finis* in connexion with the *sorites;* cf. too Persius 6, 80 inuentus, Chrysippe, *tui finitor acerui;* Sen. ben. 5, 19, 9.

1. **quatenus**: the same ellipse in Orat. 73; De Or. 2, 239; similarly Off. 3, 68 ratio postulat ne quid insidiose, ne quid simulate, ne quid fallaciter; ib. 1, 82.

2. **minutatim**: so in §§ 49, 92, also gradatim in §§ 49, 93; Sen. ben. 5, 19, 9 sorites...paulatim subrepit.

interrogati: so § 104; cf. however § 94 interroganti.

3. **diues pauper**: for the omission of the conjunction with words which naturally go in pairs (very common) cf. § 29 ueri falsi; § 125 supra infra etc.; Madv. Fin. 5, 87; Mayor on Phil. 2, 89; n. on § 1, 16 above.

4. **quanto etc.**: 'at what point in the addition or subtraction we may give a definite answer'.

5. **certum resp.**: n. on § 93.

non habemus: *non* is regarded by Madv. Opusc. 1, 508 as a superfluous negative arising from a sort of anacoluthon; he compares In Vat. 3; Fam. 12, 24, both of which passages closely resemble this.

6. **frangite**: the Stoics and particularly Chrysippus (cf. Persius 6, 80 qu. above) spent much time in 'smashing' the *sorites* and other fallacies; cf. esp. Diog. 7, 82: ib. 7, 189 sq., where Diog. gives the titles of a good many of such works, but the result was feeble as we see below.

eos: n. on § 73.

7. **nisi cauetis**: for the present tense after *nisi* see Merguet sub u., where a number of exx. will be found; Draeger II² 701 sq., who however strangely says (p. 704) that the combination of fut. indic. in apodosis with present ind. in protasis is hardly found in the classical period. He has only two exx. from Cic.; but several more will be found in Merguet, l. l. and the list might be largely extended.

8. **gradatim**: § 92 minutatim n.

interrogetur: prob. impersonal, but the subject may be Chrysippus. The subjunctive is 'iterative'; cf. Roby § 1716.

uerbi caussa: but *uerbi gratia* below; Cic. has *exempli gratia* only once, in Off. 3, 50; cf. Seyffert on Cic. Lael. 39.

tria pauca sint: Sext. A. M. 7, 418 τὰ πεντήκοντα ὀλίγα ἐστὶν κ.τ.λ., Diog. 7, 82.

anne: formed like *utrumne* (n. on § 71), *numne*, and not very common in Cic.

9. **id est**: n. on 1, 32. The Greek is thus introduced by *id est* after the Latin translation below, § 95 and in Tusc. 3, 65, where Davies qu. Quint. 2, 15, 4 and 3, 11, 6.

10. **ἡσυχάζειν**: the advice is quoted by Sext. P. H. 2, 253 δεῖν ἵστασθαι καὶ ἐπέχειν: A. M. 7, 416 ὁ σοφὸς στήσεται καὶ ἡσυχάσει. Similar language was held by the Cynics; see P. H. 2, 244 and 3, 66. Epict. D. 2, 18, 18 speaks of the sorites

numero conticuisti, si ad eum numerum unum addidero, multane erunt? Progrediere rursus, quoad uidebitur. Quid plura? Hoc enim fateris, neque ultimum te paucorum neque primum multorum respondere posse; cuius generis error ita manat, ut non
uideam quo non possit accedere. Nihil me laedit, inquit: ego 94
enim, ut agitator callidus, prius quam ad finem ueniam, equos sustinebo, eoque magis, si locus is, quo ferentur equi, praeceps erit. Sic me, inquit, ante sustineo nec diutius captiose interroganti respondeo. Si habes quod liqueat neque respondes, superbe; si non habes, ne tu quidem percipis. Si, quia obscura, concedo; sed negas te usque ad obscura progredi; illustribus

22 superbe: ita codd. exc. ψE (*superbis*), et U (*superbi*, ut est in r); *facis superbe* H; uid. adn. percipis: sic Cant. (om. *si*) et U; *persipis* BVψ; *perspicis* A; cf. adn. meam ad Lael. § 23. 23 illustribus: *in i.* Bait.

as the ἡσυχάζων λόγος: so Diog. 7, 197.

uel: 'even', as in §§ 27, 43.

stertas: *stertere* was proverbially used of very dull or inactive persons: see Lucr. 3, 1048 uigilans stertis, where Munro quotes Plaut. Ter.; also cf. Att. 4, 3, 5 Marcellus candidatus ita stertebat ut ego uicinus audirem, where *stertere* is a bit of election slang like *languere* in Att. 4, 15, 7 or *refrigescere* in 4, 17, 3; Aug. contr. Ac. 3, 25 ter terna nouem esse uel genere humano stertente uerum sit; ib. 3, 22.

11. **proficit**: either this or *proficis* or *proficitur* (in some texts) would be admissible here; the subject of *proficit* is (as Madv. Em. 184 points out) τὸ ἡσυχάζειν.

12. **qui te excitet**: 'one bent on rousing you'.

15. **ultimum...respondere**: for this use of *respondere* 'to put something into an answer' (very common) cf. such things as *morbum excusare, iurare; defendere aliquem rem* 'to put in as a plea': *queri penuriam* (Liu. 6, 30, 9) etc.

16. **manat**: cf. *late patere, serpere*, for which see lexica.

18. **ut agitator**: in the amusing letter to Atticus 13, 21 Cic. discusses renderings of ἐπέχειν and quotes a line of Lucilius 'sustineat currum ut bonu' saepe agitator equosque', adding 'semperque Carneades προβολὴν pugilis et retentionem aurigae similem facit ἐποχῇ'. The line of Lucilius probably referred directly to Carneades. Aug. contr. Ac. 2, 12 renders ἐποχή by *refrenatio et quasi suspensio assensionis*. Cf. § 59 n.

ueniam: subjunctive of course; n. on § 23.

19. **locus...praeceps**: § 68.

21. **quod liqueat**: N. D. 2, 3 si haberem aliquid quod liqueret; ib. 1, 29; also n. on § 62 licebat.

22. **superbe**: the adverb is, I think, protected by Aug. c. Ac. 3, 14, and the ellipse is not stronger than is often found with adverbs; so *facit* or the like is omitted with *inepte* in 1, 18; cf. too Plaut. Bacch. 592 nimis iracunde; Lael. 20; Off. 3, 101 at stulte, qui...; N. D. 1, 70 nihil horum nimis callide; De Or. 2, 169 si Gracchus nefarie, praeclare Opimius; Fam. 9, 15, 3; Qu. fr. 2, 7, 2; Att. 9, 10, 3 male Tarquinius...impie Coriolanus; ib. 15, 27, 2 illud praeclare quod...; Phil. 1, 12; the common 'satin salue?' is also an ex. and similar uses are common in the silver writers, particularly Valerius Maximus. Cf. too n. on 1, 25 bene facis. The Romans laid great stress on the rudeness of failing to answer questions; see Tusc. 1, 17; Fam. 7, 16, 3; ib. 1, 10; Liu. 1, 54, 7; 23, 12, 9; 42, 40 §§ 2, 10; Sen. dial. 2, 10, 2 (in all these passages *superbus* or *superbe* or *superbia* occurs); Val. M. 9, 5, 1 (a consul who refuses to answer shews *tyrannicus spiritus*). The verb *superbire* is not found in the best prose.

si: sc. *taces*; for the ellipse cf. n. on § 50 si lupi canibus similes.

quia obscura: for omission of *sunt* see n. on § 86 illa praeclara.

23. **progredi**: n. on § 45.

illustribus: ἐναργέσι: n. on § 17.

igitur rebus insistis. Si id tantum modo, ut taceas, nihil adsequeris. Quid enim ad illum qui te captare uolt, utrum tacentem irretiat te an loquentem? Sin autem usque ad nouem, uerbi gratia, sine dubitatione respondes pauca esse, in decimo insistis, etiam a certis et illustrioribus cohibes adsensum. Hoc idem me in obscuris facere non sinis. Nihil igitur te contra soritas ars ista adiuuat, quae nec augentis nec minuentis quid
95 aut primum sit aut postremum docet. Quid quod eadem illa ars, quasi Penelope telam retexens, tollit ad extremum superiora? Vtrum ea uestra an nostra culpa est? Nempe fundamentum dialecticae est, quidquid enuntietur—id autem appellant ἀξίωμα, quod est quasi effatum—aut uerum esse aut falsum. Quid igitur? Haec uera an falsa sunt? Si te mentiri dicis idque uerum

7 augentis...minuentis: scripsi de Halmii coniectura; *augendi...minuendi* codd.; *augenti...minuenti* Lamb. 11 quidquid: *quoquid* V Cant. Harl. 12 effatum: *etfatum* B¹; *exfatum* V¹; *ecfatum* HM. 14 an uerum: u. *an* om. codd.; corr. Schütz.

1. **insistis**: 'you halt'; so § 107; Or. 4 consistere. The *in* with *illustribus* is not needed though we have it in § 80, if my reading be right; see Munro on Lucr. 1, 420, and cf. Tusc. 1, 43.

si id: sc. facis.

adsequeris: pres. ind.; see n. on § 61.

2. **quid ad**: always used elliptically, like *nihil ad* (n. on 1, 15); cf. Fin. 2, 85; Phil. 2, 72; Plin. ep. 8, 14, 21; Sen. ep. 26, 10 and 121, 1; above, §§ 32, 92.

3. **irretiat**: so De Or. 1, 43; Tusc. 2, 20; ib. 5, 62; Fin. 5, 49; Vat. 2; Amm. M. 19, 8, 3; Cic. Fat. 7 Chrysippi laqueos; Tusc. 5, 76 laqueos Stoicorum; Diu. 2, 41 uos induitis in eas captiones.

5. **certis et illustrioribus**: for the positive and compar. adj. linked together cf. Tusc. 4, 65 tolerabilia...sedatiora, where Kühner quotes illustrations.

cohibes adsensum: n. on § 59; cf. too 1, 45.

7. **augentis**: I cannot believe the phrase *primum augendi* to be Latin. Gerunds and participles are very often confused in the MSS of Cic. The order of the words is in favour of the em. Davies saw the impossibility of the MSS reading.

9. **retexens**: often used metaphorically by Cic.; it is employed in connexion with Logic in De Or. 2, 158.

10. **ea**: = eius rei; cf. *istius uiti culpa* in § 92.

fundamentum: so (of the same matter) Tusc. 1, 14 in primis traditur.

11. **enuntietur**: the subj. is of course due to the or. obliq., since *quisquis* does not independently take the subj. in Cic.

ἀξίωμα: a sentence expressing a judgment or opinion (n. on § 21). For the different kinds of ἀξιώματα see Prantl, Gesch. d. Logik 440 sq.; Zeller III³ p. 103 sq.; E. Tr. Stoics etc. p. 107 sq. The term itself is Aristotelian; see Bonitz s. u.

12. **effatum**: Sen. ep. 117, 13 enuntiatiuum quiddam, quod alii effatum uocant, alii enuntiatum, alii edictum; but in the *De Fato* enuntiatio is the regular rendering (cf. above *enuntietur*). Cf. § 97 effabimur. In Tusc. 1, 14 we have *pronuntiatum* (referred to by Gell. 16, 8, 8); in Fat. 26 *pronuntiatio;* in Gell. l. l. (from Varro) *proloquium* and *profatum.* The form *ecfatum* may very possibly be right; there is considerable MSS evidence for *ec-* before *f*; see Neue II² 766.

aut...falsum: constantly asserted in the Stoic texts of the ἀξίωμα (Zeller III³ p. 104). The Stoics declared that the terms *true* and *false* apply only to a judgment as expressed in speech (λεκτὸν) not as conceived in the mind.

quid igitur? n. on § 1, 13.

13. **si te mentiri**: the ψευδόμενος (with the sorites and other sophisms) is ascribed to Eubulides as author; see

dicis, mentiris an uerum dicis? Haec scilicet inexplicabilia esse dicitis, quod est odiosius quam illa, quae nos non comprehensa et non percepta dicimus.

XXX. Sed hoc omitto, illud quaero; si ista explicari non possunt, nec eorum ullum iudicium inuenitur, ut respondere possitis uerane an falsa sint, ubi est illa definitio, 'effatum esse id, quod aut uerum aut falsum sit'? Rebus sumptis adiungam ex his sequendas esse alias, alias improbandas, quae sint
in genere contrario. Quo modo igitur hoc conclusum esse iudicas? 96
'Si dicis nunc lucere et uerum dicis, lucet; dicis autem nunc lucere et uerum dicis: lucet igitur'. Probatis certe genus et rectissime conclusum dicitis; itaque in docendo eum primum concludendi modum traditis. Aut quidquid igitur eodem modo

15 non comprehensa: *inc.* U. 19 effatum: *effectum* codd. 21 alias alias: sic U et edd.; *alias* semel codd. cett. 23 lucet...dicis: haec om. codd.; corr. Man. et Dau.

Diog. 2, 108. Countless works were written about it; cf. Sen. ep. 45, 10 ψ. de quo tantum librorum compositum est: Diog. 7, 196—8 (for Chrysippus); ib. 5, 49 where a work by Theophrastus is mentioned; Athen. 9, 401 E says Philetas of Cos died in the attempt to solve it. The sophism has many forms, of which that best known is 'Epimenides calls the Cretans liars, but he is himself a Cretan: does he then lie or tell the truth?' The fallacy of course comes of confusing lying as a characteristic with lying on a particular occasion. Just as *nemo omnibus horis sapit*, so *nemo omnibus horis mentitur;* so Aristotle Soph. El. c. 25. If *mentiri* be taken here to mean lying on the occasion referred to, then the remark of P. Valentia (p. 301 ed. Orelli) is to the point: 'quis umquam dixit "ego mentior", quum hoc ipsum pronuntiatum falsum uellet declarare?' The sophism is given more fully below.

14. **haec**: such things as these: n. on § 43; also cr. n. on 1 § 41.

inexplicabilia: *ἄπορα*: cf. Diog. 7, 44 *ψευδομένους λόγους...ἀπόρους καὶ ἐλλιπεῖς*: ib. 82, 198.

15. **odiosius**: 'more vexatious'; the word in Cic. never has so strong a sense as our 'hateful'.

non comprehensa: n. on 1, 39. The phrase (also in § 99) is the opposite of comprehendibile in 1, 41; in Latin many passive participles have the sense of adjectives in *-bilis*. Cic. does not use either *incomprehensus* or *imperceptus* (Ovid).

17. **sed hoc omitto**: so above, § 78.

18. **iudicium**: *κριτήριον*: see n. on 1, 30.

19. **ubi est**: like *οὐδαμοῦ εἶναι*.

20. **rebus...adiungam**: 'taking certain premisses I will draw the conclusion...'. For *sumptis* see n. on § 44; for *adiungam* cf. De Or. 2, 158 with Wilkins' n.; Tusc. 5, 72 (a description of dialectic) sequentia adiungit.

21. **sequendas**: 'ought to be adopted'; n. on § 70.

improbandas: the only negative of *probandas* in good Latin; *reprobare* belongs to a late period; see Madv. on Fin. 1, 23.

quae: refers to *both* classes.

sint in g. c.: 'are to be classed as contradictory'.

23. **si dicis**: the notion of Orelli that Cic. clipped these trite sophisms as he does quotations from the poets, is improbable.

lucere: n. on § 26.

25. **in doc.**: 'when you lecture'.

26. **modum**: technical in this sense; cf. Top. 57. The Stoics enumerated certain *ἀναπόδεικτοι λόγοι*, of which the *πρῶτος* was in this form (Sext. P. H. 2, 157): *εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἔστιν· φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν*. Sometimes the argument becomes more thoroughly tautological by the use of *ἡμέρα* in both

concluditur probabitis aut ars ista nulla est. Vide ergo hanc conclusionem probaturusne sis: 'si dicis te mentiri uerumque dicis, mentiris; dicis autem te mentiri uerumque dicis, mentiris igitur'. Qui potes hanc non probare, cum probaueris eiusdem generis superiorem? Haec Chrysippia sunt, ne ab ipso quidem dissoluta. Quid enim faceret huic conclusioni? 'Si lucet, lucet; lucet autem: lucet igitur'. Cederet scilicet. Ipsa enim ratio conexi, cum concesseris superius, cogit inferius concedere. Quid ergo haec ab illa conclusione differt? 'Si mentiris, mentiris: mentiris autem: mentiris igitur'. Hoc negas te posse nec approbare nec improbare. Qui igitur magis illud? Si ars, si

14 adeant: V (marg.) r Cant. U Harl.; *uideant* A^{2}BVψ Bait.; *adhibeant* H.

places, as *lucere* is used here. Arguments of this kind were called μονολήμματοι (Sext. A. M. 8, 443; P. H. 2, 167). Cf. also Sext. A. M. 7, 391; 8 §§ 79, 89 sq., 95, 109 sq., 224 sq., 411 sq., 439; Epict. D. 1, 29, 51; Fronto p. 154 Naber (where N. greatly errs); below, § 143.

1. **nulla**: 'worthless'; 1 § 5 n.

5. **Chrysippia**: cf. §§ 75, 87 n.

6. **dissoluta**: so in § 75. Cf. Sen. ben. 5, 12, 2 quid boni est nodos operose soluere, quos ipse, ut solueres, feceris?

conclusioni: Cic. has also the abl. with *facio* and *fio*. Draeger, § 243 marks the dat. as rare and only qu. three exx.; more than a dozen others will be found in Georges-Mühlmann, Thesaurus, s. u. *facio;* to these add Plaut. Cas. 1, 1, 29; Curc. 555; Most. 2, 2, 5 and 3, 2, 89; Cic. Phil. 13, 37; Sen. Contr. 1, 2, 12; Tib. 2, 6, 1; also some exx. in Madv. Fin. 2, 79. The dat. seems exceedingly rare in prose after Cic., if we except the phrases *bene, male facere alicui;* it is dubious in the one passage of Livy where the MSS give it (45, 39, 4). Caes. and Tac. and many other writers avoid both constructions. In many passages (as below, § 107 quid fiet artibus and § 115) we cannot tell whether dat. or abl. was intended. Draeger says that in the best Latin the sentences in which these constructions occur are always interrogative, but it is not so in De imp. Cn. Pomp. 59 where the best MSS have *eo*, not *de eo*. The insertion of *de* with the abl. is not so rare as Draeger says; see Georges-Mühlmann; Cic. also has *in* pretty often.

7. **cederet**: so ἕλκειν; see n. on § 38.

8. **conexi**: n. on § 91 coniunctio.

superius: τὸ ἡγούμενον, the hypothetical part; inferius = τὸ λῆγον, the inference from the condition. See Zeller (as above); and cf. nn. on § 44.

11. **si ars etc.**: these *parallel* protases with one apodosis are beloved by Cic. and must be distinguished from the genuine double protasis (Draeger II^2 756 confuses the cases).

12. **ratio...uia**: cf. the common phrase *ratione et uia*.

13. **hoc extremum...est**: 'this is the length they go'; a favourite form of expression with Cic., occurring very many times in the Letters especially. So too Plato, Phaed. 66 D τὸ δὲ ἔσχατον πάντων ...ὅτι.

14. **tribunum adeant**: Liu. 40, 29, 12 scriba tribunos plebis adit. I know no other ex. of *adire* used of the tribunes, though it constantly occurs in connexion with the praetors. Tribunos adhibere, appellare are of course common phrases. Videre aliquem 'to look to some one' is good Latin; cf. Leg. 2, 67 uideamus Platonem and *uidere aliquid* 'to look after something' is common, as above, § 40; but *uideant* is not suited to the context here.

censeo adeant: *censeo* like many other verbs (curo for example; n. on § 70) takes the subj. sometimes with, sometimes without *ut*. Seyffert on Lael. 17 explains *censeo* in such phrases as parenthetic and the subj. as standing for imperative, but the analogy of other verbs does not favour this explanation.

15. **exceptionem**: in civil suits during the Republican period and early Empire, the chief judge (praetor) did not try the facts out himself, but issued a direction

ratio, si uia, si uis denique conclusionis ualet, eadem est in
utroque. Sed hoc extremum eorum est: postulant ut exci- 97
piantur haec inexplicabilia. Tribunum aliquem censeo adeant:
a me istam exceptionem numquam impetrabunt. Etenim cum
ab Epicuro, qui totam dialecticam et contemnit et irridet, non
impetrent ut uerum esse concedat quod ita effabimur, 'aut uiuet
cras Hermarchus aut non uiuet', cum dialectici sic statuant,
omne, quod ita diiunctum sit, quasi 'aut etiam aut non', non
modo uerum esse, sed etiam necessarium, uide quam sit cautus
is, quem isti tardum putant. Si enim, inquit, alterutrum con-

20 cautus: *catus* Lamb. H Bait. M.

(*formula*) to an inferior judge or judges (*iudex, arbiter, recuperatores, centumuiri*, according to the nature of the alleged facts), telling him to cast the defendant if certain facts were proved, to dismiss him if they were not proved. But the direction to cast the defendant might be more complicated; it might be to cast him if certain facts were proved, *unless* certain other facts were proved. The excepting clauses were called *exceptiones*. If the defendant felt aggrieved by the refusal of the superior judge to insert an *exceptio* for his benefit into the formula, he might appeal to a tribune, who, if not hindered by his colleagues, could secure the boon by the threat of annulling the whole order of the judge; cf. an allusion (in a different matter) in Att. 6, 1, 11. Sen. ep. 48, 12 calls the sophisms *exceptiones* in the same way.

16. **Epicuro etc.**: while continually declaring that the elaborate processes of the ordinary logicians were useless, Ep. had a logic of his own which he called 'canonic', and which aimed at developing the inductive side of logic more than any other ancient system. See the tract of Philodemus περὶ σημείων καὶ σημειώσεων: also Zeller III 1, pp. 383—395, ed. 3.

17. **effabimur**: used here with reference to *effatum* above. The verb only occurs elsewhere (before Livy) in poetry and in connexion with religious formulae. The simple verb *for* is also post-classical in prose; cf. De Or. 3, 153.

aut uiuet etc.: cf. n. on § 95 ἀξίωμα.

18. **Hermarchus**: head of the Epicurean school on the founder's death; see Zeller, p. 369.

20. **necessarium**: for Epicurus' reason cf. Fat. 21 Epicurus ueretur ne, si hoc concesserit, concedendum sit fato fieri quaecumque fiant. A large part of the *De Fato* is taken up with the discussion of this matter. Of two contradictory propositions both cannot be true, but Ep. argued that neither may be. While Democritus allowed ἀνάγκη (Diog. 9, 45), Epic. was its most determined opponent, both in logic and in nature; and Lucretius gives passionate expression to his doctrine. Yet Gomperz is right in maintaining (against Zeller) that Ep., while not a Fatalist, was a Determinist. The lines of the 'finita potestas denique cuique' and the 'quid nequeat, quid possit oriri' were as firmly drawn in the system of Epicurus as in that of Zeno. The logical principle denied by Ep. is of course that now known as the Principle of Excluded Middle.

uide quam: according to Wichert, Stil. 88, this occurs elsewhere only after clauses expressing facts (not causes as in cum...impetrent). He explains the irregularity here by anacoluthon.

quam sit c.: n. on § 83.

cautus: 'wide awake'; this gives a very good contrast to *tardum* 'sluggish'. *Catus* was distinctly archaic and poetical in Cic.'s time (Varro L. L. 7, 46), and is only used once by Cic. (if we exclude quotations) in Leg. 1, 45, where there is an archaic colouring, and the word is qualified there by *ut ita dicam*. [In Tusc. 2, 45 Ep. is called *cautus*, where some edd. with Nonius and inferior MSS read *catus*. If any change were made, I should prefer *acutus*, as below, § 98.]

21. **tardum**: possibly Cic. wrote *bardum*, as in Fat. 10. For the sense cf. N. D. 1, 85 Epicuro, homine minime

cessero necessarium esse, necesse erit cras Hermarchum aut uiuere aut non uiuere; nulla autem est in natura rerum talis necessitas. Cum hoc igitur dialectici pugnent, id est, Antiochus et Stoici; totam enim euertit dialecticam. Nam si e contrariis diiunctio, contraria autem ea dico, cum alterum aiat, alterum
98 neget, si talis diiunctio falsa potest esse, nulla uera est. Mecum uero quid habent litium, qui ipsorum disciplinam sequor? Cum aliquid huius modi inciderat, sic ludere Carneades solebat: 'si recte conclusi, teneo, sin uitiose, minam Diogenes mihi reddet'. Ab eo enim Stoico dialecticam didicerat; haec autem merces erat dialecticorum. Sequor igitur eas uias quas didici ab Antiocho, nec reperio quo modo iudicem 'si lucet, lucet', uerum esse ob eam caussam, quod ita didici, omne quod ipsum ex se conexum sit, uerum esse, non iudicem 'si mentiris, mentiris' eodem modo esse conexum. Aut igitur hoc et illud aut, nisi hoc, ne illud quidem iudicabo.

XXXI. Sed, ut omnis istos aculeos et totum tortuosum genus disputandi relinquamus ostendamusque qui simus, iam

9 conclusi teneo: *conclusit eneo* uel *conclusit teneo* codd.; *conclusi te teneo* coni. Dau., fortasse recte; cf. § 148. Diogenes mihi: *Diogeni* codd. (*diogenis* ψ); corr. H. 15 esse con.: u. *esse* incl. H (auctore Christio) et Bait.; *ex se con.* M. 19 Antiochi:

uafro; Diu. 2, 103 Ep. quem hebetem et rudem dicere solent Stoici.

3. **igitur**: n. on 1, 26.

dialectici...id est...: the definition was necessary, as the term διαλεκτικοί sometimes indicated the Megarians, as in Diog. 2, 106.

4. **e contrariis diiunctio**: so Fat. 12 e repugnantibus coniunctio; Phil. 2, 18 diiuncta atque contraria. The Greek phrase (common in Sext.) is διεζευγμένον ἐξ ἐναντίων: cf. § 91 n.

5. **contraria ... neget**: almost the same words in Fat. 37; cf. Top. 49 negantia contraria aientibus. Adjectives to express the ideas 'affirmative' 'negative' were wanting in Latin till a later time. See n. on § 104.

7. **litium**: in the sense of 'quarrel', the plural is regular; see lexica.

ipsorum: n. on § 84.

cum...inciderat: n. on § 57.

9. **teneo**: on the seemingly absolute use, see n. on § 16.

minam reddet: the argument is modelled on the famous controversy between Corax and Tisias; see Cope in the old *Journal of Philology* No. 7.

Diogenes: Babylonius, who accompanied Carneades to Rome on the famous embassy; cf. § 137.

10. **Stoico**: = cum St. esset; above, § 82 hoc credulo.

12. **iudicem...non iudicem**: the adversative asyndeton is very common; see § 103 n.

14. **eodem modo esse con.**: the text seems sound. In § 96 Cic. has been trying to force Lucullus to admit the identity of method in the two arguments; so here again.

17. **aculeos...tortuosum**: § 75 contorta et aculeata σοφίσματα: other exx. of *tortuosus* in lexica; and cf. Fat. 16 genus distortius enuntiandi...contortiones orationis. Fronto p. 148 Naber calls the dialectici 'tortores'; cf. p. 152.

18. **qui simus**: 1, 9 qui et ubi essemus, with n.

19. **Antiochi ista**: cf. n. on 1, 13 contra ea Philonis. The confusion in the MSS has arisen because the scribes imagined that Cic. here addressed Antiochus.

explicata tota Carneadi sententia Antiochi ista corruent uniuersa. Nec uero quicquam ita dicam, ut quisquam id fingi suspicetur: a Clitomacho sumam, qui usque ad senectutem cum Carneade fuit, homo et acutus, ut Poenus, et ualde studiosus ac diligens; et quattuor eius libri sunt de sustinendis adsensionibus. Haec autem, quae iam dicam, sunt sumpta de primo. **99** Duo placet esse Carneadi genera uisorum, in uno hanc diuisionem: 'alia uisa esse quae percipi possint, alia quae non possint', in altero autem: 'alia uisa esse probabilia; alia non probabilia'. Itaque, quae contra sensus contraque perspicuitatem dicantur, ea pertinere ad superiorem diuisionem; contra posteriorem nihil dici oportere; qua re ita placere: tale uisum nullum esse, ut perceptio consequeretur, ut autem probatio, multa. Etenim contra naturam esset probabile nihil esse, et sequitur omnis uitae ea, quam tu, Luculle, commemorabas, euersio. Itaque et sensibus probanda multa sunt, teneatur modo illud, non inesse in eis quicquam tale, quale non etiam falsum nihil ab eo differens esse possit. Sic, quidquid acciderit specie

Eψ; *Antiochia* (non *Antiochea*) Cant. U; *Antioche* CG; *Antiochea* edd. 31 consequeretur: *consequatur* coni. H; scr. Bait., non necessario. 32 esset...nihil esse et: *esset...n. esset* C et Cant. Harl.; *esset...si n. esset* ψU; corr. Christ.

20. **ut...fingi**: a hint at Philo: see Introd. p. 58.

21. **Clitomacho**: see n. on § 102.

22. **ut Poenus**: 'as might be expected of a Carthaginian'; Colum. 1, 3, 8 acutissimam gentem Poenos; Fin. 4, 56 Poenulus, homo acutus; § 64, above. But Nep. Epam. 5, 2 exercitatum in dicendo, ut Thebanum scilicet 'considering that he was a Theban', the Thebans being slow of speech. The *ut* in these clauses conveys two quite different meanings, according to the context.

et...et...ac: n. on § 34.

23. **sust. adsens.**: n. on § 59.

25. **genera**: Cic. here loosely calls two modes of classifying *uisa* by the name *genera;* but the word *diuisionem* which follows makes all plain, and even without it no reader could fail to understand what is meant. The grave censure of Madv. Fin. pref. p. 65 is therefore misplaced.

26. **quae...non possint**: = *καταληπτά, ἀκατάληπτα.*

27. **alia uisa...non probabilia**: = *πιθανά, ἀπίθανα.*

29. **dicantur**: sc. ab Academicis.

30. **ita placere**: 'this, he says, is his opinion'.

31. **probatio**: with etymological reference to *probabilia,* above; cf. n. on § 44.

32. **contra n. esset**: Cic. here breaks off the quotation from Clitomachus.

33. **omnis**: in agreement with *uitae.* **commemorabas**: §§ 31, 53, 58. The verb *commemorare* is in good Latin a 'verb of speaking' not a 'verb of remembering'; see my n. on Arch. § 29.

34. **euersio**: above, § 31; so in Fin. 5, 28; *perturbatio uitae* in N. D. 1, 3; Tusc. 3, 73; Fin. 3, 50 confunderetur omnis uita; Sext. A. M. 7, 369; so Diog. 9, 104 (of Pyrrho); Plat. Rep. 442 B *καὶ ξύμπαντα τὸν βίον πάντων ἀνατρέψῃ*: similarly Gorg. 481 C. Cleanthes defended Arcesilas from the charge by urging that his acts did not follow his words: Diog. 7, 171. See other references in n. on § 53 omnia confundere.

35. **non inesse etc.**: see nn. on § 18.

36. **nihil differens**: cf. n. on § 54. **acciderit**: fut. perf. ind. not perf. subj. **specie**: as in § 66.

probabile, si nihil se offeret quod sit probabilitati illi contrarium, utetur eo sapiens, ac sic omnis ratio uitae gubernabitur. Etenim is quoque, qui a uobis sapiens inducitur, multa sequitur probabilia non comprehensa neque percepta neque adsensa, sed
100 similia ueri; quae nisi probet, omnis uita tollatur. Quid enim? Conscendens nauem sapiens num comprehensum animo habet atque perceptum se ex sententia nauigaturum? Qui potest? Sed si iam ex hoc loco proficiscatur Puteolos stadia triginta, probo nauigio, bono gubernatore, hac tranquillitate, probabile uideatur se illuc uenturum esse saluom. Huius modi igitur uisis consilia capiet et agendi et non agendi, faciliorque erit ut albam esse niuem probet, quam erat Anaxagoras, qui id non modo ita esse negabat, sed sibi, quia sciret aquam nigram esse, unde illa concreta esset, albam ipsam esse ne uideri

10 uideatur: *ei u.* Lamb. Bait. 14 concreta: *congregata* codd.; corr. Man.

1. **si...contrarium**: an indication of the technical term ἀπερίσπαστος, for which see n. on § 33.

2. **utetur ... gubernabitur**: the passage strongly resembles a sentence in N. D. 1, 12, which has sometimes been wrongly suspected by editors.

3. **sapiens**: = tamquam sit s.

inducitur: originally a word of the theatre: 'is brought on the stage'; so often in Cic.

sequitur: n. on § 70.

4. **non comprehensa**: see n. on § 95.

adsensa: in Neue, Form. II^2 p. 270, 271 will be found a collection of exx. of *adsentio* and *adsentior* (passive). It follows from them that while the use of the *perfect* forms is well attested, the *present* ind. and subj. and pres. infinit. act. and pass. and also the imperf. ind. act. pass. are extremely doubtful wherever they occur in writers before Lactantius, although Quint. 9, 3, 7 says there were speakers who in his time used *adsentio*. From Quint. 1, 5, 13 and Gell. 2, 25, 9 it is clear that *adsentio* was not regarded as Latin in the time of Cic. To Neue's exx. add Rep. 3, 47 (*sentio* Vat. palimps.; *adsentior* edd.); Leg. 2, 33 (*adsentio* codd.; *adsentior* edd.); Phaedr. App. 1, 8, 26. The passive *adsentiatur* must be regarded with suspicion above, § 39, and should not have been introduced by conjecture in § 20. In §§ 58, 68 adsentiri is the deponent.

5. **omnis uita tollatur**: a retort upon the *omnis uitae euersio* above.

quid enim? like *quid ergo?* (1 § 13) is regularly followed by another question.

6. **num**: for the late position of the particle cf. § 81 n.; § 86 n. on *nonne*.

7. **ex sententia**: n. on § 146.

8. **si iam**: 'if, for the sake of argument'. This noticeable use of *si iam* is common in Cic. and Lucretius. Many exx. are collected by Munro on Lucr. 1, 968, Madv. on Fin. 4, 66.

stadia triginta: the accusative of space with a verb which only means *starting* not *traversing* should be noticed.

9. **nauigio**: the words here strongly resemble those of an epigram of Nicarchus in the Anth. Gr. 11, 162 where a traveller asks a prophet how he can cross the sea in safety, and is answered that if he finds a new ship and sails in summer he will be safe—unless a pirate catches him on the way.

11. **non agendi**: n. on 1, 39.

facilior...ut probet: I know no exact parallel to this constr. of *facilis*; *ad* or *in* with the gerund might have been expected.

12. **albam...niuem etc.**: n. on § 73 niuem nigram. The statement that snow was white was often instanced as one of the most certain judgments of sense; so in Fin. 1, 30. In attacking it Anax. might well seem to be cutting the basis from knowledge. Sext. has many similar arguments about colour, as in P. H. 1 §§

quidem. Et quaecumque res eum sic attinget, ut sit uisum **101**
illud probabile neque ulla re impeditum, mouebitur. Non enim est e saxo sculptus aut e robore dolatus; habet corpus, habet animum, mouetur mente, mouetur sensibus, ut ei multa uera uideantur, neque tamen habere insignem illam et propriam percipiendi notam; eoque sapientem non adsentiri, quia possit eiusdem modi exsistere falsum aliquod, cuius modi hoc uerum. Neque nos contra sensus aliter dicimus ac Stoici, qui multa falsa esse dicunt, longeque aliter se habere ac sensibus uideantur.

XXXII. Hoc autem si ita sit, ut unum modo sensibus falsum uideatur, praesto est qui neget rem ullam percipi posse sensibus. Ita nobis tacentibus ex uno Epicuri capite, altero

16 enim est: *est enim* Beier; uid. tamen fragm. 22. 17 e robore: Nonius (fragm. 22); *ebore* codd.

44, 129 sq.; 2, 244. He calls attention to the difference in colour between a horn and shavings cut from it, between a bar of silver and a thin lamina of the same; also to the fact that people see colours differently.

id...ita esse: n. on 1 § 11.

14. **ne uideri quidem**: n. on 1 § 6.

15. **res...uisum**: equivalent here as in § 103 and often.

16. **neque...impeditum**: n. on § 33.

enim est: Cic. oftener writes *est enim*, which was probably treated as one expression, the two words falling under one accent; but there is no need here to depart from the MSS; see Madv. Fin. 1, 43.

17. **e saxo**: a sarcastic hit at the Stoic *sapiens*; who is as hard as steel (see e.g. Sen. d. 2, 14, 3). We have an evident imitation of Hom. Od. 19, 163 οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ δρυός ἐσσι παλαιφάτου, οὐδ' ἀπὸ πέτρης: so in Lael. 48 where Seyffert has an elaborate n., containing many parallels. Add Enn. trag. l. 130 Ribb. lapideo corde sunt; Ter. Hec. 214; Post red. in sen. 14; Verg. Aen. 8, 315; Tibul. 1, 10, 59. In Sext. A. M. 11, 160 and 161 we have a passage which corresponds verbally with ours, and evidently comes from the same Greek source.

sculptus...dolatus: Cic. very likely wrote here *exsculptus*, *edolatus;* cf. Att. 13, 28, 2; 13, 47 a, 1.

18. **mouetur**: Fin. 5, 56 et corpore et animo moueri; above, § 25. The Sceptics continually admit that in their view the σοφὸς cannot help being affected by his impressions, however doubtful their reality may seem to him; cf. e.g. Sext. P. H. 1, 193; n. on § 66 cedo.

19. **habere**: in ed. 1 I understood this to be *se putat habere*. It is simpler, however, to supply *uideantur* with the same subject as before.

insignem...propriam: n. on § 34.

20. **percipiendi**: 'which leads to perception'; for the loose genitive cf. n. on § 111. The gerund here is, as often, no different in sense from *perceptio;* see n. on § 26 and cf. Munro on Lucr. 1, 312; Off. 2, 14 principes inueniendi. I can by no means agree with Madv. on Fin. 1, 69, who seems to assume that the historically earliest use of the gerund is that whereby it denotes an action done by the subject of the clause in which the gerund stands, and that all other uses are to be regarded as extensions of this.

sapientem etc.: change from *or. recta* to *or. obl.*, for which see n. on § 41.

21. **eiusdem modi**: n. on § 85; so in § 40.

exsistere: n. on 1, 23.

hoc: i.e. any *uisum* you like to take.

22. **Stoici**: so N. D. 1, 70.

25. **unum modo**: n. on § 74.

26. **qui neget**: § 79 nn.

27. **n. tacentibus**: cf. nobis absentibus in § 36.

Epicuri capite: this passage supports the reading *primum caput uiri optimi* in Leg. 1, 21; cf. also Att. 9, 13, 8 illud

uestro perceptio et comprehensio tollitur. Quod est caput Epicuri? 'Si ullum sensus uisum falsum est, nihil percipi potest'. Quod uestrum? 'Sunt falsa sensus uisa'. Quid sequitur? Vt taceam, conclusio ipsa loquitur: 'nihil posse percipi'. Non concedo, inquit, Epicuro. Certa igitur cum illo, qui a te totus diuersus est: noli mecum, qui hoc quidem certe, falsi esse aliquid in sen-
102 sibus, tibi adsentior. Quamquam nihil mihi tam mirum uidetur quam ista dici, ab Antiocho quidem maxime, cui erant ea, quae paulo ante dixi, notissima. Licet enim hoc quiuis arbitratu suo reprehendat, quod negemus rem ullam percipi posse, certe leuior reprehensio est: quod tamen dicimus esse quaedam probabilia, non uidetur hoc satis esse uobis. Ne sit: illa certe debemus effugere, quae a te uel maxime agitata sunt: 'nihil igitur cernis? nihil audis? nihil tibi est perspicuom?' Explicaui paulo ante Clitomacho auctore quo modo ista Carneades diceret. Accipe

9 hoc quiuis: *haec q.* H auctore Christio, quem optime refellit M. 11 repre-

infimum caput ipsius Balbi optimi, where edd. are right in adding *uiri*.

1. **uestro**: not *uestri*; cf. n. on § 120.

2. **si ullum etc.**: for the whole argument § 68 should be closely compared. For the emphatic *ullum* 'any single' see Madv. on Fin. 3, 74.

3. **ut**: concessive.

4. **conclusio loquitur**: with the personified subject *loqui* is generally used rather than other verbs of speaking. See exx. in n. on § 5; but *dicere* will be found in Fat. 1, 1; Cato Orig. V 5 (Jordan); *inquit* in Leg. 2, 58 (I owe these exx. to Prof. Iwan Müller). For *praedicare* cf. § 5 n.

5. **inquit**: the change of subject from *uestro* should be noticed; see nn. on § 79.

6. **hoc quidem**: see n. on 1, 40 and for *quidem certe* § 22 n.

8. **ab...maxime**: for the clause cf. § 14 Empedocles quidem...uideatur; also § 86.

9. **hoc...quod**: see cr. n. and cf. n. on § 49 soritas hoc uocant. *Quod* often follows after a plural demonstrative, as in N. D. 1, 20, where see Mayor's n.

11. **tamen**: = 'but, putting that aside'; cf. § 14 n. The drift is, 'we care very little for your blame of our rejection of κατάληψις, but we do care for your discontent with our theory of probability'. I must confess myself unable to construe the sentence given by Madv. 'certe leuior reprehensio est quod dicimus esse quaedam probabilia' (Orelli ed. 2, p. 854). Madv. drops out tamen without noticing it; so Bait.; Müller accepts Madvig's punctuation, but inserts the *tamen*, thus making the sentence still more difficult.

12. **ne sit**: the ordinary negative concessive subjunctive, like the positive in § 16 fuerint and § 105 sint. See Draeger § 150.

13. **nihil cernis?** see §§ 19, 30, 31, 105.

15. **Clitomacho...Carneades**: Carneades left no writings; his opinions had to be gathered from the works of his school; see Zeller III 1, p. 499 ed. 3.

accipe: 'hear'; n. on 1, 33.

16. **eo libro etc.**: the books here named are not mentioned elsewhere. Clit. was a voluminous author: § 16. We hear of other Greek philosophers of the time dedicating books to Romans: particularly Panaetius (§ 135).

18. **consul**: in 149 B.C.

19. **igitur**: n. on 1, 26.

sunt...nota: so in § 10.

20. **institutio et q. disc.**: a double rendering of some Greek term; see above, n. on § 58.

21. **sed**: n. on 1, 41.

Academicis: cf. Sext. P. H. 1, 227 sq.

22. **dissimilitudines**: ἀνομοιότητας: so in § 43, and *similitudo* in § 84.

quem ad modum eadem dicantur a Clitomacho in eo libro, quem ad C. Lucilium scripsit poetam, cum scripsisset isdem de rebus ad L. Censorinum, eum qui consul cum M' Manilio fuit. Scripsit igitur his fere uerbis—sunt enim mihi nota, propterea quod earum ipsarum rerum, de quibus agimus, prima institutio et quasi disciplina illo libro continetur—sed scriptum est ita: 'Academicis **103**
placere esse rerum eius modi dissimilitudines, ut aliae probabiles uideantur, aliae contra: id autem non esse satis cur alia posse percipi dicas, alia non posse, propterea quod multa falsa probabilia sint, nihil autem falsi perceptum et cognitum possit esse'. Itaque ait uehementer errare eos, qui dicant ab Academia sensus eripi, a quibus numquam dictum sit aut colorem aut saporem aut sonum nullum esse, illud sit disputatum, non inesse in his propriam, quae nusquam alibi esset, ueri et certi notam. Quae cum exposuisset, adiungit dupliciter dici adsensus sustinere **104**

hensio etc.: uid. adn. 17 poetam: ut 'manifestum glossema' incl. H; etiam Bait.; cf. tamen 'Naeuius poeta', 'Archias poeta' etc.

aliae: sc. *res*, which here = 'phenomena', as in § 101.

23. **contra**: n. on 1, 37 contraria.

24. **non posse**: see n. on 1, 10 legant ...non legant.

26. **Academia...quibus**: parallel exx. will be found in Madv. Fin. 5, 16; and a number in Draeger § 100; cf. also above, 1 § 39 perturbationem...ea; Cato m. 14 with my n.; Nep. Tim. 3, 1 Laconicen ...eorum; in Livy constructions of the kind are remarkably frequent; e.g. 1, 1, 3 gens uniuersa...Veneti; 1, 1, 8 multitudinem Troianos esse; 1, 2, 4; 1, 8, 7; 2, 2, 5 etc. N. D. 1, 89 is a unique ex. (if the reading *dialecticorum quae* be right) of a neuter plural (*dialectica*) to be understood from a masc. plur. (*dialectici*).

27. **sensus eripi**: n. on § 30 lucem eripere.

dictum sit: but *errare* above; cf. n. on 1, 41 exsisteret.

28. **saporem**: *gustatu* in § 20.

nullum: as in §§ 22, 47, 106, 141 and often.

illud: adversative asyndeton; see nn. on 1 § 16; 2 §§ 2, 39, 55, 72, 98. Cf. too Madv. Fin. 5, 81.

29. **quae...esset**: in spite of *dictum sit* above. See Lieven p. 49. For the sense cf. § 33.

30. **cum exposuisset, adiungit**: not essentially different from § 80 negat, cum torsisset, where see n. Not dissimilar is Tusc. 3, 63 inuehitur quod immolauisset; Fin. 2, 4 uidit...negat. In N. D. 1, 12 exsistit illud, multa esse probabilia, quae quamquam non perciperentur, most edd. needlessly change *exsistit* to *exstitit;* they should at least have gone a step farther, and altered *perciperentur* to *percepta essent*.

sustinere: = ἐπέχειν: cf. § 59. The verb expresses the logical result of the doctrine of the ἰσοσθένεια, explained in n. on 1 § 46. All Sceptics of every kind agreed that when the abstract truth of impressions is in question, the only proper attitude for a philosopher is one of absolute neutrality. But when practical action is required, he may follow the lead of his impressions, provided that he pronounces no opinion on their truth. See further Zeller's account of Pyrrho and Arcesilas. Hirzel Unters. III 168 blames Cicero for adding *adsensus* here, on the ground that the phrase thereby becomes unsuitable to denote the first of the two kinds of ἐποχὴ mentioned immediately after. But surely the phrase 'to withhold assent' very fairly denotes the two courses (1) to withhold assent *absolutely*, (2) to withhold assent *in a modified manner*. Hirzel's objection to the word *sapientem* rests on an entire misunderstanding. He says Clitomachus only allows one kind of ἐποχὴ for the

sapientem: uno modo, cum hoc intellegatur, omnino eum rei nulli adsentiri: altero, cum se a respondendo, ut aut approbet quid aut improbet, sustineat, ut neque neget aliquid neque aiat. Id cum ita sit, alterum placere, ut numquam adsentiatur, alterum tenere, ut sequens probabilitatem, ubicumque haec aut occurrat aut deficiat, aut 'etiam' aut 'non' respondere possit. Etenim cum placeat eum qui de omnibus rebus contineat se ab adsentiendo, moueri tamen et agere aliquid, relinqui eius modi uisa, quibus ad actionem excitemur: item ea quae interrogati in utramque partem respondere possimus, sequentes tantum modo, quod ita uisum sit, dum sine adsensu; neque tamen omnia eius modi uisa
105 approbari, sed ea quae nulla re impedirentur. Haec si uobis

2 ut aut...improbet; incl. Gruter. Dau. Goer. H. Bait.; 'bene defendit O. Hein. in Philol. XV 677 et in quaest. Tull. p. 18' (M). 6 aut non: hic desinit cod. V. possit: *posset* Cant.; quod fortasse in V erat. etenim cum: ita scripsi; *nec ut*

sapiens. Surely not. He lays down that one kind of ἐποχή is for *theory*, the other for *practice*.

1. **omnino**: with *adsentiri*: 'gives his *absolute* assent to no phenomenon whatever'. The passage will become clear if the distinction between *absolute* approval and disapproval on the one hand, and *qualified* approval or disapproval on the other, be borne in mind. The first kind of ἐποχή arises when a man absolutely refuses to pronounce any opinion whatever; the second when he merely guards himself from saying what would imply absolute certitude. Sext. P. H. 1, 192 sq. draws the distinction very carefully. On speculative matters ἀφασία is the attitude of the Sceptic; but in practical things he renders a qualified assent on which action may be based. Cf. § 110, especially 'non deerit sapienti nec quid faciat nec quid respondeat'. The Sceptic can always answer ὃ φαίνεται, but not ὅ ἐστι φύσει (P. H. 1, 78). Cf. the distinction drawn in § 148 between the ἐποχή omnium rerum and the refusal to accept κατάληψις.

2. **respondendo ut**: if *ita* be understood with *respondendo*, and *approbet, improbet* be taken to refer to *absolute* approval and disapproval (cf. § 17 n., § 29 n.) there will be no need to suspect the text. [Possibly Cic. wrote *quid aut approbet aut improbet*.]

3. **ut neque**: 'the result being that...'; *neget, aiat* imply the *absolute* 'yes' and 'no'. The contrast between *nego, aio* is common: e.g. § 98, above; Naevius Ribbeck II 28 uel ai uel nega; Fin. 2, 70; Rab. post. 34.

4. **alterum placere...alterum tenere**: 'the one plan he holds in theory, the other in practice'. Note the omission of *ei* after *placere* and of *eum* before *tenere*; for the last see nn. on 1, 18 and 2, 128.

6. **etiam**: commonly used for 'yes' as in Hor. sat. 2, 3, 97.

etenim cum placeat: the em. *cum* is certain, as we need a clause parallel to *id cum ita sit* above. The *et* of *etenim* would easily be lost after the *it* of *possit*, and *enim cum* (enī cū) would readily pass into *nec ut*. Goerenz's interpretation of the MSS reading is a marvel: he begins by making *nec ut* the equivalent of *et ne*.

7. **qui...adsentiendo**: these words refer again to the refusal to give an *unqualified* answer to speculative questions.

8. **relinqui**: n. on § 34. The alteration of the MSS reading is necessitated by *approbari* below.

eius modi uisa: these are the φαντασίαι so often referred to by Sextus, which 'κινοῦσιν ἡμᾶς παθητικῶς καὶ ἀναγκαστικῶς' (P. H. 1, 193).

9. **actionem**: for the contention of the dogmatist that the sceptic must, if consistent, be inactive, see Introd. p. 56. Plutarch wrote a tract with the title εἰ ἄπρακτος ὁ περὶ πάντα ἐπέχων. Cf. also Sext. P. H. 1, 23; 1, 226; A. M. 7, 30.

non probamus, sint falsa sane, inuidiosa certe non sunt. Non enim lucem eripimus, sed ea quae uos percipi comprehendique, eadem nos, si modo probabilia sint, uideri dicimus.

XXXIII. Sic igitur inducto et constituto probabili, et eo quidem expedito soluto libero, nulla re implicato, uides profecto, Luculle, iacere iam illud tuum perspicuitatis patrocinium. Isdem enim hic sapiens, de quo loquor, oculis quibus iste uester caelum terram mare intuebitur, isdem sensibus reliqua, quae sub quemque sensum cadunt, sentiet. Mare illud, quod nunc Fauonio nascente purpureum uidetur, idem huic nostro uidebitur, nec tamen adsentietur, quia nobismet ipsis modo caeru-

uel *ne ut* codd.; *hic ut* Man.; *nam cum* Lamb.; *et cum* Dau. Bait.; *neu cui* C. F. Hermann.; *sed cum* coni. H, scr. M. 8 relinqui: Dau. Bait. M; *reliquit* uel *relinquit* codd. (*quit* in ras. A) exc. Cant. (*reliqua*). 12 approbari: *adprobauit* H.

quae...respondere: n. on § 93; Liu. 6, 13, 11 habeo quod respondeam.

interrogati: if *interroganti* be read (as has been proposed) cf. § 94 and Liu. 23, 12, 9 reticere interroganti.

in utramque partem: with *respondere;* either in the negative or the positive direction; 'aut etiam aut non'. For the expression cf. 1, 46 n. and 2, 7 n.

10. **ita**: = ita ut respondemus; *quod uisum sit* = *τὸ φαινόμενον*, *uisum*, as in §§ 52, 107. Cf. n. on § 10 id quod quaerebatur.

11. **dum sine adsensu**: sc. *respondeamus;* adsensus here = *absolute* assent.

eius modi uisa: sc. *probabilia.* Hirzel, Untersuch. z. Cicero's phil. Schriften III 166 argues that *eius modi* is a gloss, on the ground that, according to the context *all πιθαναὶ φαντασίαι* may form the foundation for action and assent. But the words *quae...impedirentur* indicate most plainly a *portion* of the *πιθαναί*, i.e. the *πιθαναὶ καὶ ἀπερίσπαστοι* (n. on § 33). To attain his aim, therefore, Hirzel should strike out these words also. I see no reason to deny that the limitation we have in our text really comes from Carneades.

13. **sint sane...certe**: § 75 dissoluerit sane...certe; § 102 ne sit...certe. Sane with the concessive subjunctive is excessively common in Cicero.

inuidiosa: like the Stoic *παράδοξα*, §§ 144, 146.

14. **lucem eripimus**: n. on § 30.

percipi comprehendique: n. on § 34.

15. **uideri**: Sext. A. M. 7, 110 *τοῦ εἰκότος ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦ παγίου ἐχόμενον.*

16. **inducto**: so § 99; **constituto** 'firmly established'. Aug. contr. Ac. 2, 12 has *inducto probabili.*

17. **expedito...nulla re implicato**: a reference to the highest kind of probability; see n. on § 33.

soluto libero: these two words are continually linked together by Latin writers, especially Cic.; cf. above, § 8; Diu. 1 §§ 4, 34; ib. 2, 100; Tusc. 1, 66; ib. 5, 43; Rep. 4, 4; Fat. 33; N. D. 1, 56; Orat. 64; Cluent. 155; Planc. 72; Rab. post. 12; Fam. 13, 63, 2; Sall. Cat. 6, 1; Liu. 8, 32, 5; Plin. ep. 2, 11, 4 and 8, 17, 4 and Pan. 80; Amm. Marc. 21, 11, 3.

18. **iacere**: n. on § 79.

patrocinium: cf. § 17 n.

19. **isdem oculis**: to the same effect the Sceptics ap. Diog. 9 §§ 62, 104. Cicero answers the question 'nihil cernis?' in § 102.

de quo loquor: cf. § 57 sapientem de quo omnis hic sermo est.

20. **caelum terram mare**: in Fin. 5, 9 Cic. makes the same enumeration and adds the words 'ut poetice loquar'.

21. **sub sensum cadunt**: cf. 1, 31 n.

22. **purpureum**: for this epithet of the sea, cf. Conington on Verg. Georg. 4, 373; also Aen. 5, 2 fluctus atros aquilone; Hor. O. 1, 5, 7 aspera nigris aequora uentis; Gell. 2, 30, 11.

23. **adsentietur**: *συγκαταθήσεται.*

leum uidebatur, mane rauom, quodque nunc, qua a sole collucet, albescit et uibrat dissimileque est proximo et continenti, ut, etiam si possis rationem reddere cur id eueniat, tamen non possis
106 id uerum esse, quod uidebatur oculis, defendere. Vnde memoria, si nihil percipimus? Sic enim quaerebas. Quid? Meminisse uisa nisi comprehensa non possumus? Quid? Polyaenus, qui magnus mathematicus fuisse dicitur, is postea quam Epicuro adsentiens totam geometriam falsam esse credidit, num illa etiam, quae sciebat, oblitus est? Atqui, falsum quod est, id percipi non potest, ut uobismet ipsis placet. Si igitur memoria perceptarum comprehensarumque rerum est, omnia, quae quisque meminit, habet ea comprehensa atque percepta. Falsi autem comprehendi nihil potest, et omnia meminit Siron Epicuri dogmata; uera igitur illa sunt nunc omnia. Hoc per me licet: sed tibi aut concedendum est ita esse, quod minime uis, aut memoriam mihi remittas oportet et fateare esse ei locum, etiam

1 rauom: *rauum* A^{1}B^1; *flauum* A^{2}B^{2}EψU; *atrum* G Cant.; *inauratum* (pro *mane rauom*) Harl.; uid. fragm. 23. quodque nunc: *quodque mare rauum, nunc* C. F. Hermann.; *quaque nunc a sole* coni. Dau.; *quodque* om. Lamb.; *quoque nunc* Cant. qua: *quia* GψU Cant. Harl. 2 dissimileque: *dissimile* Bait. de Halmii coni. et continenti: *ei c.* codd.; corr. Lamb. 12 habet ea: u. *ea* fort. delenda est. 16 fateare: *facile* uel *facere* codd.; corr. Dau. 21 lumina:

1. **rauom**: some scholars (as Victorius in the 'Castigationes' at the end of Stephanus' edition of 1538) have supposed that Cic. used *rauom* in ed. 1 and *flauom* in ed. 2. That this is possible is seen from Enn. an. 377 V mare marmore flauo caeruleum spumat; but *rauom* suits better the colour of the sea at dawn.

quodque: = et quia, if the text is right.

a sole: cf. Catul. 64, 275 undae purpureae a luce refulgent; N. D. 2, 92 conflagrare ab ardoribus; ib. 2, 129 color a sole; Prop. 5, 1, 126 murus ab ingenio notior ille tuo; Lucr. 2, 51 fulgor ab auro (see Munro's n.); Iuuen. 7, 196 a matre rubentem. The uses of *a quo intereat* in 1, 29, above, and of *a uero* in 2 §§ 41, 71, 77 are not essentially different; see also Draeger § 230. In N. D. 1, 24 quod pars earum (regionum) adpulsu solis exarserit, we should probably read *a pulsu* (the cod. Uffenbach. has *apulsu*).

2. **albescit**: often used of the sea by poets, as by Lucr. Verg. Silius; cf. too Aesch. Supp. 24 ὦ λευκὸν ὕδωρ.

uibrat: with the ἀνήριθμον γέλασμα of Aeschylus.

proximo et continenti: so Fat. 44.

ut etiam...defendere: precisely the same line is taken in § 81.

3. **rationem**: Lucr. 2, 757—787 takes great pains to explain the variations of colour in the sea and elsewhere.

4. **unde memoria**: the transition is unusually abrupt. The reference is to § 22.

6. **Polyaenus**: see Zeller III 1, 368 ed. 3.

7. **Epicuro ... geometriam**: cf. Fin. 1, 20; also n. on 1, 6.

10. **si igitur etc.**: a precisely similar argument is urged home against the dogmatists by Sext. P. H. 2 §§ 4, 5.

12. **habet...comprehensa**: like *tenemus comprehensa* in § 21, 'hold after having grasped'.

13. **Siron**: said to have been the teacher of Vergil. See Zeller, Epic. and, for the spelling of the name, Madv. Fin. 2, 119.

dogmata: n. on § 27.

14. **nunc**: = ut se res habet; cf. Leg. 1, 27.

15. **quod minime uis**: cf. n. on § 43.

si comprehensio perceptioque nulla sit. Quid fiet artibus? **107** Quibus? Eisne, quae ipsae fatentur coniectura se plus uti quam scientia, an eis, quae tantum id, quod uidetur, secuntur nec habent istam artem uestram, qua uera et falsa diiudicent?

Sed illa sunt lumina duo, quae maxime caussam istam continent. Primum enim negatis fieri posse ut quisquam nulli rei adsentiatur; et id quidem perspicuom esse. Cum Panaetius, princeps prope meo quidem iudicio Stoicorum, ea de re dubitare se dicat, quam omnes praeter eum Stoici certissimam putant, uera esse haruspicum responsa, auspicia oracula, somnia uaticinationes, seque ab adsensu sustineat, quod is potest facere uel de eis rebus, quas illi, a quibus ipse didicit, certas habuerint, cur id sapiens de reliquis rebus facere non possit? An est aliquid, quod positum uel improbare uel approbare possit, dubitare non possit? An tu in soritis poteris hoc, cum uoles: ille

uincula uel *munimina* Dau.; *columina* Bentl. 23 et...esse: *at...est* codd. edd.; uid. adn. 26 haruspicum responsa: u. *responsa* om. codd.; reposuit Ernesti; *haruspicia* Faber; *haruspicinam* coni. Ernesti. Fortasse scribendum est *h. omnia* (cf. adn. ad 1, 13 ea Philonis et infra, § 117); u. *omnia* propter uocis *somnia* uicinitatem facile excidere poterat. 27 quod is: *quod si is* Orelli. 28 uel: *ut* codd.; corr. Goer.; fort. legendum est *etiam*. habuerint: *habuerunt* Kayser. Bait. 30 dubitare: *dubitari* codd.; corr. Dau.

16. **memoriam remittas**: lit. 'let go your hold on memory'. Cf. Macrob. sat. 5, 1, 4 istam mihi necessitatem remittas uolo.

fateare: the MSS readings are indefensible, from the context, though the change from subjunctive after *oportet* to infinitive may be paralleled; see n. on § 39 adsentiatur, and, for *facere* with an infinitive, Madv. Fin. 4, 8; above, § 70.

17. **nulla**: = non; see § 103 n.

quid fiet etc.: an answer to the argument of Lucullus in § 22.

fiet artibus: n. on § 96.

18. **quibus?** For this abrupt question cf. § 74 cur? Cato m. 15; Tusc. 1, 94; ib. 3, 37.

plus: Du Mesnil on Leg. 1, 34 is wrong in saying that this is put for *magis;* the sense is '*more* than' not '*rather* than'. Cf. Diu. 1, 24 artium quae coniectura continentur et sunt opinabiles.

19. **id quod uidetur**: n. on § 104.

20. **artem**: n. on §§ 40, 57.

21. **illa...enim**: cf. Kühner on Tusc. 4, 45.

lumina: 'strong points' or, as we might say, 'shining lights'. Cf. Fin. 2, 70 negat Epicurus (hoc enim uestrum lumen est); N.D. 1, 79; Cato m. 35; above, § 43.

continent: n. on § 40.

23. **et id...esse**: the whole context proclaims the MSS reading to be wrong; Cic. obviously does not mean to admit the contention of the dogmatists. It is possible that *at...est* is a marginal gloss which has crept into the text. As to the matter cf. § 38.

Panaetius: as is well known, he was far from being an orthodox Stoic; cf. § 126 for a similar difference between leading Stoics.

26. **uera...uaticinationes**: the Stoic belief is criticised in the *De Diuinatione.*

27. **seque sustineat**: § 94 equos sustinebo.

28. **habuerint**: subj. in connexion with *eis rebus quas.*

30. **positum**: 'when laid down' or 'assumed'.

31. **poteris**: sc. facere: see n. on § 121; also § 17 uolumus.

in reliquis rebus non poterit eodem modo insistere, praesertim cum possit sine adsensione ipsam ueri similitudinem non im-
108 peditam sequi? Alterum est, quod negatis actionem ullius rei posse in eo esse, qui nullam rem adsensu suo comprobet. Primum enim uideri oportet, in quo est etiam adsensus. Dicunt enim Stoici sensus ipsos adsensus esse, quos quoniam appetitio consequatur, actionem sequi; tolli autem omnia, si uisa tollantur. XXXIV. Hac de re in utramque partem et dicta sunt et scripta multa, sed breui res potest tota confici. Ego enim etsi maximam actionem puto repugnare uisis, obsistere opinionibus, adsensus lubricos sustinere, credoque Clitomacho ita scribenti, Herculi quendam laborem exanclatum a Carneade quod, ut feram et immanem beluam, sic ex animis nostris adsensionem, id est opinationem et temeritatem extraxisset, tamen, ut ea pars defensionis relinquatur, quid impediet actionem eius, qui proba-
109 bilia sequitur, nulla re impediente? Hoc, inquit, ipsum impediet,

5 in quo est: ita scripsi; *in quo sit* codd. edd. 9 multa: *m. uide superiora* codd.; corr. Man. 11 Herculi: codd. plerique. 18 istuc: *stuc* B[1]. in cons.: *et in c.* codd.; corr. Man.; *et in n. et in c.* Cant. 25 sibi ipsum: u. *ipsum*

1. **insistere**: § 94.

3. **alterum est**: corresponding to *primum* above; see n. on § 46.

negatis etc.: on the relation of Scepticism to action see Introd. p. 56; also 2 § 24. Epictetus often taunts the Sceptics with acting like other men, though they pretend to have no sure impressions: see Diss. 1, 27, 19; ib. 2, 20, 28 sq.

actionem ullius rei: n. on § 62.

4. **primum enim etc.**: note that two successive sentences are introduced by *enim*, as not uncommonly in Cic. Müller quite rightly condemns the MSS reading as unintelligible. The position of *etiam*, the succeeding *enim*, and above all, the language used in §§ 25, 39, strongly favour my emendation. The scribes misunderstood *uideri*. Ernesti was right in suspecting *etiam* with the ordinary readings.

5. **uideri**: the true passive; see n. on § 25.

oportet: for the change from *or. obl.* to *recta* cf. n. on § 41.

6. **sensus ipsos adsensus**: Stobaeus Phys. 834 (of the Stoics) αἰσθητικὴ γὰρ φαντασία συγκατάθεσίς ἐστι: so Acad. 1, 41 sensus is defined to be *id quod est sensu comprehensum;* i.e. κατάληψις. Also in §§ 37, 38 (above) αἴσθησις and συγκατάθεσις are practically identified.

appetitio: ὁρμή: see n. on § 30.

7. **uisa**: here = καταλήψεις.

8. **in utr. partem**: nn. on 1, 46 and 2, 7.

9. **breui**: the adverbial *breui* (with which cf. *procliui*) is much less frequent than *breuiter;* it is an elliptic phrase for *breui tempore*, the sense of which it sometimes retains, while *breuiter* is used only with verbs of speaking, writing, and the like.

etsi...tamen: the question following *tamen* is slightly irregular and anacoluthic.

maximam actionem: cf. Sall. Iug. 4, 3 quibus maxima industria uidetur salutare plebem et conuiuiis gratiam quaerere; also Arist. Pol. 7 c. 3 (Bekk.), where he maintains that the θεωρητικὸς βίος deserves as well as any other to be called πρακτικός.

10. **repugnare uisis**: Fin. 3, 31 (of the Academics) summum munus sapientis obsistere uisis assensusque suos firme sustinere; the duty of the Stoic *sapiens* is strongly expounded in similar language by Epict. Diss. 1, 20, 7; ib. 2, 17, 1 τί πρῶτόν ἐστιν ἔργον τοῦ φιλοσοφοῦντος; ἀποβαλεῖν οἴησιν.

11. **lubricos**: cf. §§ 68, 92.

Clitomacho: §§ 78, 98.

quod statuet ne id quidem quod probet posse percipi. Iam istuc te quoque impediet in nauigando, in conserendo, in uxore ducenda, in liberis procreandis plurimisque in rebus, in quibus nihil sequere praeter probabile.

Et tamen illud usitatum et saepe repudiatum refers, non ut Antipater, sed, ut ais, 'pressius'. Nam Antipatrum reprehensum, quod diceret consentaneum esse ei qui adfirmaret nihil posse comprehendi, id ipsum saltem dicere posse comprehendi, quod ipsi Antiocho pingue uidebatur et sibi ipsum contrarium. Non enim potest conuenienter dici nihil comprehendi posse, si quicquam comprehendi posse dicatur. Illo modo potius putat urguendum fuisse Carneaden: cum sapientis nullum decretum esse possit nisi comprehensum perceptum cognitum, ut hoc ipsum quidem decretum, sapientis esse nihil posse percipi, fateretur esse perceptum. Proinde quasi nullum sapiens aliud decretum

om. AψU; cf. fragm. 25. 26 si...posse: om. AB. quicquam: *ipsum* EψU. 29 possit: *posset* coni. H, scr. Bait. M. 30 quidem decretum: ita scripsi; *decr. qui* ABG; *d. quod* ψUr et Orelli; *d. quidem* E; *d. quid* Cant.; *d. quo* H Bait. M (cf. § 111). Vid. adn. ad 1 § 40. esse: scripsi, ut est in ψ Cant. U; edd. *esset*.

Herculi: for the gen. cf. n. on § 16.

12. **exanclatum**: this is a genuine Latin word (though obsolete in Quintilian's time; see 1, 6, 40) connected with *ancilla*, *Ancus Martius* ('the servant of Mars'), and *anclabris*. Whether there was another verb *exantlare* from ἐξαντλεῖν is doubtful. The word *antlia* 'a pump', apparently connected with ἀντλεῖν, occurs in Martial.

13. **adsensionem...opinationem**: this identification of course is question-begging. For *op.* cf. § 78; also n. on 1, 42. *Opinatio* is properly related to *opinio* as *notio* to *nota* (§ 85 n.): i.e. as the general to the particular, but the distinction is sometimes obliterated.

14. **temeritatem**: n. on § 66.

15. **impediet...impediente**: the repetition is perhaps pointed.

18. **istuc**: the form *stuc* and similar forms certainly existed in the spoken Latin; see Lachmann on Lucr. 3, 954; Neue Form. II^2 210.

conserendo: sc. *agro*; cf. Xen. Mem. 1, 1, 8 *οὔτε γὰρ τῷ καλῶς ἀγρὸν φυτευσαμένῳ δῆλον ὅστις καρπώσεται, οὔτέ τῷ καλὴν γήμαντι ἵν' εὐφραίνηται, δῆλον εἰ διὰ ταύτην ἀνιάσεται.* Our passage is imitated and expanded by Sen. ben. 4, 33; cf. also N. Q. 4, praef. § 7. Sext. P.H. 2, 244 has a passage strikingly similar.

20. **sequere**: future, like *impediet*; see n. on § 61.

21. **tamen**: 'apart from that'; 'putting that aside'. This use of *et tamen* is common in Cic., but has often been misunderstood. See my n. on § 14, above.

22. **Antipater**: see § 28, also 143 n. The context should be carefully compared with §§ 28, 29 and the notes there.

pressius: n. on § 29.

25. **pingue**: 'stupid', as in the phrases 'pingui Minerua', etc.

uidebatur: change to *or. recta*.

sibi ipsum: n. on § 36.

26. **conuenienter**: 'consistently', as in the common Stoic formula *conuenienter naturae uiuere*.

27. **putat**: sc. Antiochus.

28. **Carneaden**: see § 28.

decretum: n. on § 27.

29. **comprehensum...cognitum**: n. on § 23.

ut: follows on *illo modo urguendum fuisse* above.

31. **nullum aliud**: 'no opinion of any other kind'; i.e. it must not be assumed that the only possible *decretum* is such as you describe; there is also the

110 habeat et sine decretis uitam agere possit! Sed ut illa habet probabilia non percepta, sic hoc ipsum, nihil posse percipi; nam si in hoc haberet cognitionis notam, eadem uteretur in ceteris. Quam quoniam non habet, utitur probabilibus; itaque non metuit ne confundere omnia uideatur et incerta reddere. Non enim quem ad modum, si quaesitum ex eo sit stellarum numerus par an impar sit, item, si de officio multisque aliis de rebus, in quibus uersatus exercitatusque sit, nescire se dicat. In incertis enim nihil probabile est, in quibus autem est, in eis non
111 deerit sapienti nec quid faciat nec quid respondeat. Ne illam quidem praetermisisti, Luculle, reprehensionem Antiochi—nec mirum, in primis enim est nobilis—qua solebat dicere Antiochus Philonem maxime perturbatum. Cum enim sumeretur unum, esse quaedam falsa uisa, alterum nihil ea differre a ueris, non

1 et sine: *nec s.* Lamb.; *aut nullum...aut s.* Durand. 8 uersatus: *uersatur* codd. paene omnes. exercitatusque: G Cant.; *que* om. ABEψ. 16 quo neget: *quod n.* Cant.; cf. Kühner. ad Tusc. 1, 52. 23 in St. d.: om. *in* codd. exc.

decretum which is based on probability merely.

1. **et sine...possit**: *nec* for *et* is certainly wrong since Cic. wishes to say that the *sapiens* must have *decreta*, only *probabilia* not *percepta*. Cf. closely N. D. 1, 12; also Quint. 12, 1, 35 neque Academici, cum in utramque disseruerunt partem, non secundum alteram uiuent. *Nec* is quite irreconcileable with the succeeding words 'ut illa habet probabilia'.

2. **hoc ipsum**: the statement of Sextus P. H. 1, 226, that the Academics διαβεβαιοῦνται τὰ πράγματα εἶναι ἀκατάληπτα, i.e. state the Sceptic doctrine dogmatically, is quite opposed to the whole tenor of the *Academica*, and is indeed a fiction caused by a desire to shew that the Sceptic and Academic schools were distinct.

3. **cognitionis notam**: see n. on § 84.

5. **confundere omnia**: § 53 n.

incerta: § 32 n.; § 54.

6. **quem ad modum...item**: for this usage see Madv. Fin. 3, 48; cf. too *quem ad modum...adaeque* in Liu. 4, 43, 5.

stellarum numerus: an echo from Lucullus (§ 32).

8. **exercitatus**: the ordinary passive participle, in the best prose, of *exercere*, as *sustentatus* of *sustinere*.

9. **non deerit...respondeat**: cf. § 104. Müller doubts whether *quid* or *quod* should be written. Either is admissible and the difference in sense is easily seen; cf. § 91 quod sit summum bonum iudicare; § 94 habes quod liqueat; Arch. 15 est certum quod respondeam; Tusc. 3, 41 nec habeo quod intellegam; Diu. 1, 9 non sane desidero quid respondeam; Fam. 7, 3, 6 ut haberes quid diceres; Liu. 6, 15, 11 quod respondeam habeo; Quint. 4, 1, 51; ib. 7, 3, 12; Wopkens, Lect. Tull. 179, ed. Hand; Wesenberg, Em. Cic. Ep. p. 51.

11. **Antiochi**: subjective genitive. The 'reprehensio' here indicated is given by Lucullus in § 44, where see n. It is most extraordinary that Hirzel, Unters. III 315 should seriously appeal to the passing mention of Philo here as a proof that §§ 90—148 are drawn from that philosopher's works.

13. **perturbatum**: for the omission of *esse* see n. on 1, 43.

14. **non attendere**: sc. Philonem; for the word cf. § 53.

16. **altero quo neget**: Cato m. 73 Solonis elogium...quo negat etc.; Tusc. 1, 52 praeceptum Apollinis, quo monet etc.

17. **nihil tam repugnare**: sc. sibi: 'no proceeding was so inconsistent as this'.

19. **probandi species**: species seems to be a rendering of φαντασία (as in Sen. ben. 4, 34, 1); 'we have an impression which leads to (qualified) approval, we

attendere superius illud ea re a se esse concessum, quod uideretur esse quaedam in uisis differentia, eam tolli altero, quo neget uisa a falsis uera differre; nihil tam repugnare. Id ita esset, si nos uerum omnino tolleremus. Non facimus; nam tam uera quam falsa cernimus. Sed probandi species est; percipiendi signum nullum habemus.

XXXV. Ac mihi uideor nimis etiam nunc agere ieiune. **112**
Cum sit enim campus in quo exsultare possit oratio, cur eam tantas in angustias et in Stoicorum dumeta compellimus? Si enim mihi cum Peripatetico res esset, qui id percipi posse diceret, 'quod impressum esset e uero', neque adhiberet illam magnam accessionem, 'quo modo imprimi non posset a falso', cum simplici homine simpliciter agerem nec magno opere contenderem atque etiam si, cum ego nihil dicerem posse compre-

G; *St. in d.* H Bait. 25 e uero: *a uero* Lamb. M; cf. 1 § 8. adhiberet: *aderere* B[1]; *adhaerere* AB[2]; *adherere* G Cant. ψ; *adhere* r et U; *adderet* H Bait. M; *neque adhaereret illa magna accessio* Kayser. Vid. adn.

have no criterion leading to absolute knowledge'. The connexion between the substantive and gerund is very loose, as often happens; cf. Fin. 1, 33 elegendi optio, with Madvig's n.; Tusc. 5, 117 receptaculum nihil sentiendi; Tac. an. 12, 24 sulcus designandi oppidi. [In Lucr. 5, 186 speciem creandi (altered to *specimen cr.*) is very possibly right, *speciem* having the sense of *ἰδέαν=exemplar*, as repeatedly in the *Orator*.]

percipiendi signum: n. on § 84 *nota*.

22. **campus...exsultare**: the metaphors are common, esp. in Cic.; cf. Off. 1, 61 rhetorum campus; De Or. 3 §§ 70, 124; Fin. 1, 54; Orat. 26; Att. 5, 15, 1; Plin. pan. 70; Sen. dial. 7, 22, 1; Ep. 82, 22; Quint. 4, 2, 39; Iuuen. 1, 19; Aug. contr. Ac. 3, 5 ne in quaestionis campis tua equitaret oratio. So § 37 latus locus.

23. **angustias**: Ael. uar. hist. 3, 23 στενοχωρία λόγου: Fin. 4, 68.

et in: the preposition is repeated for emphasis; see § 20 n.

Stoicorum dumeta: N. D. 1, 68 in dumeta conrepitis (addressed to the Stoics); Aug. c. Ac. 2, 6; so *spinae* of the Stoics in Fin. 4, 6 and elsewhere.

24. **Peripatetico etc.**: Cic. makes precisely the same remark about the Peripatetics in Fin. 5, 76; a remark in all probability derived from Clitomachus and ultimately from Carneades, who objected to nothing in the Stoic definition of κατάληψις excepting the last clause; this follows from Sext. A. M. 7, 402, a passage of great importance, because it completely disproves the theory of Hirzel, Unters. III 200, 288, that Cic. is here representing a view which is distinctively that of Philo. The same passage shews how hasty and unfounded is Madvig's censure of Cicero's 'mira leuitas' (n. on Fin. 5, 76). That the Peripatetics remained dogmatists in spite of the fact that they did not use the Stoic definition of the καταληπτικὴ φαντασία is true; but the argument of Carneades was a good enough stick wherewith to beat the Stoics in a polemical encounter. There is practically no difference between the point of view in § 112 and that criticised in § 33. The Peripatetics never laid down, like the Stoics, an infallible method for arriving at truth; see esp. Sext. A. M. 7, 216—226.

25. **quod impressum esset etc.**: for the definition see nn. on §§ 18, 33, 44.

e uero...a falso: we had a similar change from *e* to *de* in § 11.

adhiberet: the MSS readings are obviously due to a misunderstanding of a very common contraction, *adhēret* for *adhiberet*.

27. **simpliciter**: n. on 1 § 6.

hendi, diceret ille sapientem interdum opinari, non repugnarem, praesertim ne Carneade quidem huic loco ualde repugnante:
113 nunc quid facere possum? Quaero enim quid sit quod comprehendi possit. Respondet mihi non Aristoteles aut Theophrastus, ne Xenocrates quidem aut Polemo, sed qui minor est: 'tale uerum quale falsum esse non possit'. Nihil eius modi inuenio. Itaque incognito nimirum adsentiar, id est, opinabor. Hoc mihi et Peripatetici et uetus Academia concedit: uos negatis, Antiochus in primis, qui me ualde mouet, uel quod amaui hominem, sicut ille me, uel quod ita iudico, politissimum et acutissimum omnium nostrae memoriae philosophorum. A quo primum quaero quo tandem modo sit eius Academiae, cuius esse se profiteatur? Vt omittam alia, haec duo, de quibus agitur, quis umquam dixit aut ueteris Academiae aut Peripateticorum,

5 sed qui minor est: sic Cant.; *sed mihi minores* AE (*michi*); *sed mihi minor est* B (*minorē*) G (qui *sed* addit post *est*) ψU; *sed qui his minor est* Io. Clericus, tum H; *sed his minores* Guietus, tum Bait. M; *sed minutior* Durand.; *sed minutiores*

2. **Carneade**: see §§ 59, 67, 78, 148; also cf. Introd. p. 59.

5. **qui minor est**: the MSS readings come from the doubling of *mi* in *minor*, which led to *mihi minor* and caused the ejection of the relative. Cic. would never apply the phrase *minutior* to Antiochus. Lamb. and others, reading *nihil minor*, supposed Zeno to be indicated, whereas the person is certainly Antiochus, to say nothing of the context. For *minor* cf. Lucr. 1, 735. The suggestion of Davies' friend (i.e. Bentley)—*inquilinus*, referring to Zeno, elsewhere called *aduena*—is most extraordinary.

6. **tale uerum**: *uisum* omitted as in Fin. 5, 76.

nihil eius modi: cf. Sext. A. M. 7, 154.

7. **incognito**: cf. § 16 n. The dative sing. of the substantival passive participle is uncommon (§§ 114, 133).

id est opinabor: cf. closely § 68.

8. **concedit**: though the plural Peripatetici forms one of the subjects; so above 1 § 11 tenebat; cf. Kühner's Gram. II, p. 33; Draeger § 104.

9. **Antiochus**: sc. *negat*, from *negatis;* 1, 12 n.; Draeger 1² p. 215.

amaui: Introd. p. 4.

10. **ita iudico, politissimum**: there is not the slightest reason to suspect the text; cf. Fin. 2, 13 eam sic definiunt, sublationem animi, with Madvig's n.; also above § 66 sic dirigo, non ad...; § 77 ita definisse...impressum. It is surprising that Halm should suppose *eum esse* to have fallen out after *acutissimum*, and that Davies should have changed *ita* into *illum*.

12. **eius Academiae**: sc. ueteris; cf. 1, 13.

16. **certe nemo**: both in Latin and Greek rhetorical questions are commonly answered by the speaker himself. A modern speaker would generally think the question more effective if the audience were left to supply the answer for themselves.

17. **neutrum ante Zenonem**: Zeno, it is contended, was the formulator of these doctrines; cf. § 77 nemo...expresserat. The words *magno opere* constitute a sort of admission that the doctrines existed in a vague form previously; an admission not made in § 77.

18. **utrumque uerum**: cf. what is said of Arcesilas in § 77.

temporis caussa: Seyffert on Lael. § 26; Kühner on Tusc. 4, 8.

19. **ita...probo**: the adverb here takes the place of an object to *probo;* see my n. on Cato m. 16.

20. **illud...possum**: so in § 136.

21. **turpissumum**: cf. 1, 45 turpius;

uel id solum percipi posse, quod esset uerum tale, quale falsum esse non posset, uel sapientem nihil opinari? Certe nemo. Horum neutrum ante Zenonem magno opere defensum est. Ego tamen utrumque uerum puto, nec dico temporis caussa, sed ita plane probo.

XXXVI. Illud ferre non possum. Tu cum me incognito **114**
adsentiri uetes idque turpissumum esse dicas et plenissumum temeritatis, tantum tibi adroges, ut exponas disciplinam sapientiae, naturam rerum omnium euoluas, mores fingas, finis bonorum malorumque constituas, officia describas, quam uitam ingrediar definias, idemque etiam disputandi et intellegendi iudicium dicas te et artificium traditurum? Perficies ut ego ista innumerabilia complectens nusquam labar, nihil opiner? Quae tandem ea est disciplina, ad quam me deducas, si ab hac abstraxeris? Vereor

coni. H. 7 incognito nimirum: *inc. nemirum* A; *in cognitione mirum* codd. uolgo, quod corr. Lamb.; *in cognitione ni mirum* U. 10 politissimum: *p. esse* Bait. auctore Kaysero. 24 uitam: *uiam* coni. Durand.

2, 66 turpissumum.

plenissumum: *plenus* sometimes has the bad sense of *μεστός*.

22. **temeritatis**: n. on § 66.

tantum: with the old punctuation, some word like *tamen* had to be supplied here. With my text, the words cum... temeritatis are parenthetic, and 'tu...tibi adroges' is 'are you the man to take upon yourself ..?' The contrast between theory and practice is thus strongly put. For the words cf. § 61 tunc, cum...commoueris, sequere?

disciplinam sapientiae: 'a system of philosophy'.

23. **naturam euoluas**: see Georges-Mühlmann s. u. *euoluo*, and cf. Lucr. 1, 954; also nn. on 1 § 15 and 2, 26 *inuoluta*. Cic. in the context specifies the three traditional divisions of philosophy (1, 19 n.)

mores fingas: 'mould character'; cf. Nep. Att. 11, 6 (quotation from some poet) 'sui cuique mores fingunt fortunam hominibus'. So *informare*.

finis bonorum malorumque: almost precisely the title of Cicero's own work. There, however, the words mean 'different views concerning the supreme good and evil'; here and in § 129 '*a* view of the supreme good *and a* view of the supreme evil'.

24. **constituas**: the verb is often so used in connexion with the ethical *finis*; cf. § 129 and 1, 19.

officia: the detailed application of ethical principles.

quam uitam: i.e. whether *βίος θεωρητικὸς* or *πρακτικός*: one of the chief ancient ethical problems. A tempting but unnecessary conjecture would be *uitae uiam*: see Hor. ep. 1, 17, 27.

25. **idemque etiam**: *etiam* goes with the verb, as in Orat. 117 idemque etiam... partietur; see two other similar exx. in Tusc. 3, 21; Sest. 131. In good Latin, *idem* is not used with *etiam* or *ipse*.

intellegendi: n. on 1, 32 dialecticae.

iudicium: *κριτήριον*: n. on 1, 30.

26. **artificium**: 'a set of rules'; not different from *ars* in §§ 40, 57, where see n.; see also § 30 n. on *artificio*. Sen. ben. 2, 33, 2 lays down a forced distinction between the two words.

27. **labar**: 1, 45 lapsu; below § 139; § 59 eo delabi.

28. **deducas**: if the subj. is right, the sense is 'what system is there of such a nature as to induce you to convert me to it?' This is so unsatisfactory that I suspect Cic. wrote *deduces*. For the form *deduces si abstraxeris* see n. on § 64 adgrediar si dixero; and, for the verb *deducas*, n. on 1, 46.

ne subadroganter facias, si dixeris tuam; atqui ita dicas necesse
115 est. Neque uero tu solus, sed ad suam quisque rapiet. Age, restitero Peripateticis, qui sibi cum oratoribus cognationem esse, qui claros uiros a se instructos dicant rem publicam saepe rexisse, sustinuero Epicurios, tot meos familiaris, tam bonos, tam inter se amantis uiros, Diodoto quid faciam Stoico, quem a puero audiui, qui mecum uiuit tot annos, qui habitat apud me, quem et admiror et diligo, qui ista Antiochia contemnit? Nostra, inquies, sola uera sunt. Certe sola, si uera; plura enim uera discrepantia esse non possunt. Vtrum igitur nos impudentes, qui labi nolumus, an illi adrogantes, qui sibi persuaserint scire se solos omnia? Non me quidem, inquit, sed sapientem dico scire. Optime: nempe ista scire, quae sunt in tua disciplina. Hoc

8 Antiochia: fort. *Antiochi*; cf. § 98. 11 nolumus: *nolimus* Cant. H Bait. 17 uobismet: *nobismet* EG Cant. U. 19 at illud: ita scripsi

1. **subadroganter**: cf. § 126; so Sext. P. H. 1, 90 calls the dogmatists φίλαυτοι: cf. A. M. 7, 314.

2. **tu**: sc. rapies; cf. *tu* in 1, 12 with n. The line of argument Cic. pursues here belongs to scepticism in all ages: see some remarks in Arist. Met. III c. 5.

3. **restitero**: conditional clause without conditional particle; so not uncommonly in Cic. as Phil. 11, 19; see exx. in Kühner, Gram. § 178, p. 760 ed. 2. *Si* with fut. perf. ind. is the equivalent of ἐὰν with aorist subj.

4. **qui...rexisse**: so Cic. often speaks of the Peripatetics as in Fin. 4, 5 and 5, 7. *Qui dicant*='although they declare'; different from *qui dicunt*.

5. **sustinuero**: cf. § 70. The verb is sometimes used absolutely with the sense, 'to stand one's ground'; see Att. 7, 7, 5; and with a clause dependent on it in Verr. 2, 1, 10.

familiaris: Atticus, Saufeius, Torquatus, Xeno, Patro etc.

tam bonos: Cic. often uses this patronising tone about the Epicureans; see Tusc. 2, 44 and 3, 50; Fin. 1, 25. Many scholars have supposed that *boni uiri* conveys an *irrisio*, while *uiri boni* has none (Bake on Leg. 1, 21); but there is no sufficient basis for the opinion.

tam...amantis: a merit generally allowed to the Epicureans; see Fin. 1, 65 and 2, 81. Numenius ap. Eus. Pr. Eu. 14, 5, 1—3, contrasts the harmony of the Epicureans with the sectarian spirit of the Academics and Stoics.

6. **Diodoto**: may be either dat. or abl.; see n. on § 96.

7. **audiui**: 1, 34 auditor, with n.

mecum uiuit...habitat: the second clause shews that the phrase *uiuere cum aliquo* (§ 74) does not necessarily mean 'to live at some one's house'. Its usual sense is 'to be some one's intimate friend', but it is occasionally used merely of staying a day or two at a man's house, as in Att. 4, 15, 5; 10, 7, 3; 13, 45, 2. Cf. Att. 14, 20, 4 Hirtius uiuit habitatque cum Balbo.

qui...qui: for the relative repeated at the head of each clause cf. Balb. 9 and Nägelsbach, Stil. § 190, 3.

9. **plura uera**: cf. §§ 117, 147; Sen. ep. 102, 13 ueritatis una facies.

10. **impudentes**: so Varro L. L. 8, 41.

11. **nolumus...persuaserint**: for the change of mood see n. on § 22 and cf. §§ 102, 142.

scire se solos: Hor. ep. 2, 1, 87 quod mecum ignorat, solus uolt scire uideri.

12. **non me**: § 66 n.

inquit: in spite of *illi* in the preceding sentence. Cf. § 79, nn. on *dicit* and *habes...agat;* also Liu. 6, 40, 10; 31, 7, 10; 38, 49, 1.

13. **optime**: often thus used in Cic. with a stop after it; it has the same ironical tinge in Verr. 3, 196 and often.

hoc quale est: 'what are we to think

primum quale est, a non sapiente explicari sapientiam? Sed discedamus a nobismet ipsis, de sapiente loquamur, de quo, ut saepe iam dixi, omnis haec quaestio est.

In tris igitur partis et a plerisque et a uobismet ipsis distributa sapientia est. Primum ergo, si placet, quae de natura rerum sint quaesita uideamus: at illud ante. Estne quisquam tanto inflatus errore, ut sibi se illa scire persuaserit? Non quaero rationes eas, quae ex coniectura pendent, quae disputationibus huc et illuc trahuntur, nullam adhibent persuadendi necessitatem. Geometrae prouideant, qui se profitentur non persuadere, sed cogere, et qui omnia uobis, quae describunt, probant. Non quaero ex his illa initia mathematicorum, quibus non concessis digitum progredi non possunt; punctum esse quod **116**

(ut in ed. 1); *uelut i.* codd.; *uel i.* H Bait.; *uerum i.* Dau. M. 20 errore: *tumore* Bentl.

of this?' Cf. n. on § 44, also § 72; Leg. 1, 1; Lucr. 2, 122.

14. **a non sapiente etc.**: cf. n. on § 9, and, for *non—sapiente*, n. on 1, 39.

15. **discedamus**: cf. § 82 ab hoc credulo discedamus; Tusc. 2, 33 a te malo discedere.

de quo...est: § 57 sapientem de quo omnis hic sermo est; § 105.

17. **igitur**: n. on 1, 26.

partis: 1, 19 n.

18. **si placet, uideamus**: n. on § 29 sit ut opinor satis dictum.

19. **at illud ante**: 'but one thing first'; *illud* as in 1 §§ 3, 22; Off. 2, 56 etc. The MSS reading *uelut* for *at* was indefensible, as may be seen from the best attempt made to defend it, that by Wopkens, Lect. Tull. p. 58 ed. Hand. *Velut* has come from a marginal variant 'uel ut'. MSS very often mix up *uel*, *ut*, and *et*; see Madv. Fin. 1, 10; cf. too Vell. 2, 64, 4 ed. Halm. For the abrupt break in the exposition cf. § 52 sed id omittamus; § 95 sed hoc omitto: illud quaero; § 128 at paulum ante; § 40 sed prius; § 69; Tusc. 4, 47 reperiam fortasse; sed illud ante; Orat. 87 sed nunc aliud; De Or. 1, 148 uerum illa mox.

estne: for *-ne* where a negative answer is required cf. nn. on §§ 11, 75.

20. **inflatus**: often so used, as Off. 1, 91 i. opinionibus; cf. too Varro, Sat. Men. p. 96 ed. Riese 'auro aut genere aut multiplici scientia sufflatus'.

persuaserit: for the sequence after *est* cf. § 7 est...ut diffisi sint; Lieven, cons. temp. p. 40.

21. **coniectura...trahuntur**: Diu. 2, 147 coniectura quae in uarias partis duci possit.

22. **necessitatem**: 'cogency'; like *ἀνάγκη* in Plato, and *uim* in § 117; so below, *cogere*=*ἀναγκάζειν*. Sen. N. Q. 1, 4, 1 imitates this passage.

23. **profitentur**: so §§ 44, 73.

24. **uobis**: emphatic; i.e. *non nobis;* cf. § 117 uos ipsi ut dicitis.

describunt: with reference to mathematical diagrams.

25. **his**: probably with reference to *geometrae* not to *quae describunt;* 'I ask them about'.

initia: *ἀρχάς*: ultimate bases of proof, themselves naturally incapable of proof. Sextus does not refrain from attacking the definitions of mathematics; see A. M. 9, 410 sq.; ib. 3, 20.

26. **digitum progredi**: n. on § 58 transuersum digitum discedere; Sen. ep. 65, 13 sine his procedere ars non potest. For *progredi* see § 45 n.

punctum: the ordinary definition: *σημεῖόν ἐστιν οὗ μέρος οὐθὲν* (Sext. P. H. 3, 39); *στιγμὴ*=*τὸ ἀμερές* (A. M. 9, 283, 377). The order here, *point*, *surface*, *line*, is unnatural.

magnitudinem nullam habeat: extremitatem et quasi libramentum in quo nulla omnino crassitudo sit: liniamentum sine ulla latitudine. Haec cum uera esse concessero, si adigam ius iurandum sapientem, nec prius quam Archimedes eo inspectante rationes omnis descripserit eas, quibus efficitur multis partibus solem maiorem esse quam terram, iuraturum putas? Si
117 fecerit, solem ipsum, quem deum censet esse, contempserit. Quod si geometricis rationibus non est crediturus, quae uim adferunt in docendo, uos ipsi ut dicitis, ne ille longe aberit ut argumentis credat philosophorum, aut, si est crediturus, quorum potissi-

3 latitudine: uocem *carentem* in codicibus additam eieci; *lineam autem sine u. lat. currentem* Man.; *lineam similiter lat. carentem* C. F. Hermann.; *liniamentum quod sit sine ulla latitudine* coni. H. Coniecturas quibus uox *longitudo* introducitur falsas esse forma orationis docet; itaque eas omisi. adigam ius iurandum: *adiciamus iurandum* ABEGU (*adiic.*); *adiciam ius iurandum* Cant.; *adiciamus ius iurandum* ψ. 4 nec

1. **extremitatem**: a rendering of ἐπιφάνεια ('superficies', regarded as a collection of points bounding a solid) which is defined as πέρας σώματος (Sext. A. M. 9, 415—434). Cf. Diog. 3, 24 (of Plato) πρῶτος ὠνόμασε...τῶν περάτων τὴν ἐπίπεδον ἐπιφάνειαν: see also Bonitz, Ind. Arist. s. u. In Tim. 33 B Plato speaks of the τελευταὶ of a sphere, and Cic. (§ 17 ed. Müll.) renders the word by *extremitas*. The word occurs *passim* in Boetius (see Friedlein's index); also in Pliny the elder, etc.; Cic. Fin. 2, 102.

quasi libramentum: the *quasi* points (as often, see 1, 17 n.) to a rendering from the Greek; we have here a second rendering of ἐπιφάνεια. The notion of 'evenness', first applied to the scales of a balance, is here extended to denote an even (plane) surface. [In Greek ἐπιφάνεια is not confined to *plane* surfaces.] The usage is rare; Sen. N. Q. 1, 12, 1 has *sub eodem libramento stare* 'to be in the same plane'.

2. **nulla crassitudo**: this purely negative method of describing the ἐπιφάνεια is unusual; cf. Sext. P. H. 3, 43 μῆκος καὶ πλάτος ἄβαθες.

liniamentum: better attested than *lineamentum*. The word *carentem* which the MMS give is undoubtedly wrong, as are the emendations. Symmetry requires that the line should be described *by a negation merely*, like the point and the surface. The words *sine latitudine* are a rendering of ἀπλατὲς in the ordinary Euclidian definition of γραμμὴ as μῆκος ἀπλατές. Gell. 1, 20, 9 notes that there is no one word in Latin to render ἀπλατές, 'nisi audeas dicere "inlatabile"'.

3. **adigam ius iurandum sapientem**: so Caes. B. C. 1, 76, 3 idem ius iurandum adigit Afranium; ib. 2, 18, 5; Sen. ep. 95, 35 ius iurandum adactis; so Cic. Rosc. Com. 25 adigere aliquem arbitrum; also Off. 3, 66; but *ad. aliquem ius iurando*, Caes. B. G. 7, 67, 1 and *adigi sacramento*, Suet. Galb. 16; again, *adigere aliquem ad ius iurandum*, Sall. Cat. 22, 1; Plin. pan. 64 adigendum te praebes in uerba. Further cf. *cogere aliquem aliquid*, Verg. Aen. 3, 56; Liu. 4, 26, 10; see Kühnast, Liv. Synt. p. 153 ed. 2.

4. **nec prius**: the negative is absolutely necessary, since the point is that the 'sapiens' *will not swear;* cf. § 123 nec ille iurare possit.

5. **efficitur**: n. on § 90.

multis partibus: cf. § 82 duodeuiginti partibus; Munro on Lucr. 1, 735; for the sense cf. §§ 82, 123, 126, 128. The fact that Archimedes is here brought into connexion with the calculations about the sun's size may point to his being the author of the estimate given in § 82; on the other hand he may be merely mentioned here as an eminent representative of mathematics; so in Plut. non posse s. uiui c. 11. Archimedes is quoted by Suidas s. u. φιλόσοφος, who also mentions a work περὶ μεγέθους ἡλίου καὶ σε-

mum? Omnia enim physicorum licet explicare; sed longum est: quaero tamen quem sequatur. Finge aliquem nunc fieri sapientem, nondum esse, quam potissimum sententiam eliget aut disciplinam? Etsi quamcumque eliget, insipiens eliget. Sed sit ingenio diuino, quem unum e physicis potissimum probabit? Nec plus uno poterit. Non persequor quaestiones infinitas: tantum de principiis rerum, e quibus omnia constant, uideamus quem probet; est enim inter magnos homines summa dissensio.

XXXVII. Princeps Thales, unus e septem, cui sex reliquos **118**
concessisse primas ferunt, ex aqua dixit constare omnia. At hoc

prius: ABEUψ; *sapientemne prius* G Cant. et edd. pleraeque ante Halmium; *postquam* pro *priusquam* coni. Ern. al. 11 omnia: fort. *somnia*; cf. § 121. 13 eliget aut: sic Cant.; om. *aut* cett.; *el. et* edd. Ernestio auctore. Ante u. *eliget* codd. uocem insiticiam praebent *melius*. 20 concessisse: *consensisse* AEGψ Cant. U; cf. Lael. § 43 ubi codd. aliquot *consensum* praebent pro *concessum*; item Leg. 1 § 9.

λήνης by Philippus of Opus, a Platonist and voluminous author (Diog. 3, 46).

6. **iuraturum**: cf. Tusc. 1, 60 and 4, 50.

7. **deum**: § 126.

9. **uos**: emphatic; so above, uobis.

ne ille: ille is subject to *credat*, not to *aberit*, which is impersonal, as the usage of Cic. and the best writers requires. For the collocation of the words cf. Phil. 11, 36 ego tantum abest ut ornem; Liu. 5, 4, 14 legatos haud procul afuit quin uiolarent. But in Bell. Alex. c. 22 and in late works the verb *abesse* is sometimes made personal. In the best Latin the affirmative *ne* invariably accompanies a pronoun, and in the great majority of instances heads a clause which (as here) is apodosis in a conditional sentence.

argumentis: 'proofs', not 'arguments'.

10. **quorum potissimum**: this criticism is often urged by Sextus, as in P. H. 1, 88; A. M. 11, 173.

11. **omnia physicorum**: for the gen. cf. n. on 1, 13 contra ea Philonis.

longum est: the conditional indicative is regular in this phrase; only in late works do we find uses like that in Tac. h. 2, 2 fuerit longum. See Kühn. Gram. Vol. II § 44, ed. 2.

12. **sequatur**: pres. for fut.

14. **insipiens**: cf. § 9 with n.; § 115 quale est a non sapiente explicari sapientiam?

16. **nec plus uno**: cf. § 147.

quaestiones infinitas: 'vague problems', *θέσεις*, opposed to *ὑποθέσεις* or finitae quaestiones, 'limited' or 'definite problems'. Allusions to this distinction are frequent, especially in the literature of rhetoric; cf. De Or. 1, 138; 2, 65—67; 3, 109; Top. 79; Orat. 46; Fin. 4, 6; Quint. 2, 1, 9; 2, 4, 24; 3, 5, 5; 10, 5, 11.

17. **principiis**: *ἀρχαῖς*: n. on 1, 26 initia. Lucr. 1, 740 has *pr. rerum*.

e quibus omnia constant: these words occur repeatedly at the ends of lines in Lucretius; so precisely in N. D. 2, 84 and 3, 30. Note that Cic. does not avoid the dactylic rhythm in short clauses; see 1, 30 n.; also cf. fragm. 11 and 2 § 56; Sull. 15; Cato m. 14 (with my n.); and the trochaic rhythm in Sest. 45.

19. **princeps Thales**: reference must be made to Zeller's first volume for general information concerning these *physici*. A similar list, but more complete than the one we have here, will be found in in Sext. P. H. 3, 30 sq.

septem: *the* seven; like XII = *the* twelve tables. The number *seven* for the wise men was fixed as early as Plato's time (Protag. 343 A); but the same names are not always given; see Brandis, Entwick. d. Gr. Phil. p. 50.

20. **primas**: cf. Leg. 2, 26 Thales sapientissimus in septem; Diog. L. 1, 34, from Timon (Silli) *οἷόν θ' ἑπτὰ Θαλῆτα σοφῶν σοφόν, ἀστρονόμημα.* Thales is almost universally described as the chief

Anaximandro, populari et sodali suo, non persuasit; is enim infinitatem naturae dixit esse, e qua omnia gignerentur. Post eius auditor Anaximenes infinitum aera, sed ea quae ex eo orirentur, definita; gigni autem terram aquam ignem, tum ex his omnia. Anaxagoras materiam infinitam, sed ex ea particulas, similis inter se, minutas, eas primum confusas, postea in ordinem adductas a mente diuina. Xenophanes, paulo etiam antiquior, unum esse omnia neque id esse mutabile et id esse deum neque natum umquam et sempiternum, conglobata figura: Parmenides ignem, qui moueat terram, quae ab eo formetur: Leucippus plenum et inane: Democritus huic in hoc similis, uberior in ceteris: Empedocles haec peruolgata et nota quattuor: Heracli-

6 primum: *primo* desiderat M. 9 umquam: *usquam* ABEψUr; *unquam*

of the seven. In the letters to Brutus 1, 15, 3 that position is assigned to Solon; whence Markland framed an argument against the genuineness of the letters.

1. **populari**: both belonged to Miletus; Anax. was probably the younger by 25 or 30 years.

2. **naturae**: = *οὐσίας* (n. on 1, 28), i.e. material substance, for such certainly Anaximander's *ἄπειρον* was, though it is difficult to determine its nature more in detail.

omnia: = *τὸ πᾶν*, as in §§ 55, 117; cf. 1, 27 n.; N. D. 1, 67; Tusc. 1, 42.

3. **auditor**: see 1, 34 n.

4. **definita**: *πεπερασμένα*: so contrasted with *infinita* in Top. 79; *definire* for *finire* is common; see Jahn on Orat. 65.

terram etc.: there are thus three stages in the evolution of the universe; first the boundless air, then the three other elements, then the things we see (*omnia*). The process was, according to Anax., one of condensation and rarefaction.

5. **materiam**: sc. *posuit* or *excogitauit*.

similis inter se: no doubt a rendering of *ὁμοιομερῆ*, for which term see Munro on Lucr. 1, 834. Zeller 1 p. 880 n. ed. 4 proposes *dissimilis*, misquoting Aug. c. d. 8, 2, where the reading is (twice) *similibus particulis* not *dissimilibus*. The text is surely sound; the peculiarity of Anaxagoras' system was that he did not derive *any given object* from particles which were of different kinds (as Empedocles did, and Democritus) but from particles most of which were alike in kind.

6. **eas**: not really needed, but inserted for emphasis; cf. § 88 id quaeritur, with n.

confusas: a reference to the famous exordium of Anaxagoras' book: '*πάντα χρήματα ἦν ὁμοῦ· νοῦς δὲ ἐλθὼν διεκόσμησεν αὐτά.*' An. also spoke of his particles as *ἄπειρα καὶ πλῆθος καὶ σμικρότητα.*

8. **neque natum umquam**: n. on § 119 neque enim ortum.

9. **sempiternum, conglobata figura**: the words here closely correspond to those of Timon ap. Sext. P. H. 1, 224 (of Xenophanes) *θεὸν ἐπλάσατ' ἶσον ἁπάντη ἀσκηθῆ.* It is strange that Cic. does not go on to quote the utterances of X. concerning the physical development of things, for which see Zeller 1 p. 496 ed. 4.

Parmenides: he held the phenomenal world to be a delusion, but explained its origin hypothetically as the result of two principles which he sometimes called *θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρόν*, sometimes *πῦρ καὶ γῆν*. With *moueat* here cf. the phrase *κινητικὴ φύσις* used by Arist. Met. 1, c. 3 in reference to P. Many writers state that *γῆ* was to P. as a *ὕλη*: the word *formetur* is therefore used here precisely like *effici* in 1 §§ 24, 39.

11. **plenum**: *πλῆρες* is applied in Ar. Met. 1 c. 4 and often elsewhere to the atoms.

Democritus ... Pythagorii: it is perhaps hardly accidental that these philosophers are mentioned in alphabetical order.

huic similis: in Cic. *similis* generally

tus ignem: Melissus hoc, quod esset infinitum et immutabile, et fuisse semper et fore. Plato ex materia in se omnia recipiente mundum factum esse censet a deo sempiternum. Pythagorii ex numeris et mathematicorum initiis proficisci uolunt omnia. Ex his eliget uester sapiens unum aliquem, credo, quem sequatur: ceteri tot uiri et tanti repudiati ab eo condemnatique discedent. Quamcumque uero sententiam probauerit, eam sic animo **119**
comprehensam habebit, ut ea quae sensibus, nec magis approbabit nunc lucere, quam, quoniam Stoicus est, hunc mundum esse sapientem, habere mentem, quae et se et ipsum fabricata sit et omnia moderetur moueat regat. Erit ei persuasum etiam solem lunam, stellas omnis, terram mare deos esse, quod quae-

quicquam G: *quitquam* Cant. 16 ex numeris: G Cant.; om. cett. (G om. *et*). 21 nunc: *num* codd.

takes the genitive of nouns and pronouns denoting persons, but there are about a dozen passages where the dative rests on fair authority. These are enumerated by Madvig in an elaborate n. to Fin. 5, 12. Many of them may be emended by the alteration of a single letter, but in our passage and Fin. 4, 34 it is unlikely that all the MSS should give *huic* for *huius*. Even with nouns denoting things Cic. uses the gen. oftener than the dat. If we exclude the phrase *ueri similis* (which is constant in Cic.) Merguet's 'Lexikon' gives about two instances of the gen. to one of the dat. Later, as Madvig remarks, the gen. grew rarer and rarer. I have noted in Seneca Rhetor thirteen examples of dat. to one of gen. The dat. *deo* after *similitudinem* is exceptional in N. D. 1, 96.

12. **Heraclitus ignem**: so Ar. Met. 1, 3 and later authorities generally. But Zeller and others hold that this statement of Heracl. was probably more symbolical than literal. It is indeed hard to reconcile some of the fragments (cf. 22, 26 ed. Bywater) with the statement in the text.

13. **Melissus**: Arist. Met. 1, 5 *Παρμενίδης μὲν γὰρ ἔοικε τοῦ κατὰ τὸν λόγον ἑνὸς ἅπτεσθαι, Μέλισσος δὲ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὕλην· διὸ ὁ μὲν πεπερασμένον ὁ δὲ ἄπειρον φησὶν εἶναι αὐτό.*

14. **Plato**: the *Timaeus* is alone here hinted at. Cic. does not mention the *ἰδέαι* as the causes of material things (Ar. Met. 1, 6).

materia: the word *ὕλη* does not occur in Plato. The vague and metaphorical language of the *Timaeus* makes it hard to conceive clearly how Plato viewed this substratum of physical existence. It seems on the whole probable that he did not mean by it a material substance, though eminent scholars have held that opinion. It has very commonly been identified with Space. See Zeller II³ p. 608. For *materia* see n. on 1, 24.

recipiente: n. on 1, 24 efficiens, praebens.

15. **deo**: the allusion to the *Timaeus* is evident.

sempiternum: the position of the adjective makes it emphatic: 'to last for ever'; cf. § 82 credulo.

16. **initiis**: § 116.

18. **discedent**: the metaphor has reference to legal trials: cf. Hor. ep. 2, 2, 99.

20. **comprehensam**: *καταληφθεῖσαν*.

nec magis etc.: the line of argument is very much the same in § 128.

21. **nunc lucere**: §§ 96, 128.

quoniam Stoicus est: a hit at Antiochus; cf. nn. on § 132.

mundum etc.: these views are argued out in Cicero's N.D.; cf. especially 2, 39 with Mayor's nn.

22. **mentem**: the Stoic *anima mundi* accepted by Antiochus and his pupil Varro.

ipsum: n. on § 84.

fabricata: § 87 n.

dam animalis intellegentia per omnia ea permanet et transeat, fore tamen aliquando ut omnis hic mundus ardore deflagret. XXXVIII. Sint ista uera—uides enim iam me fateri aliquid esse ueri—comprehendi ea tamen et percipi nego. Cum enim tuus iste Stoicus sapiens syllabatim tibi ista dixerit, ueniet flumen orationis aureum fundens Aristoteles, qui illum desipere dicat: neque enim ortum esse umquam mundum, quod nulla fuerit nouo consilio inito tam praeclari operis inceptio, et ita esse eum undique

1 permanet: G Cant.; *permeet* cett. (sed AB in ras.), Bait. 8 inito: *initio* codd.; corr. Victorius. 9 aptum: r; *apertum* codd.; cf. adn. cr. ad 1 § 11. 10 exsistere: *efficere* coni. Walker., approbauit H, scr. Bait. 12 famam: Gr Cant.

1. **animalis intellegentia**: *quaedam* points to a close rendering from the Greek; cf. *natura sentiens* in 1, 28.

permanet: the deity is to the Stoic πνεῦμα ἐνδιῆκον δι' ὅλου τοῦ κόσμου (Plac. Phil. 1, 7, 17) or 'spiritus per omnia maxima ac minima aequali intentione diffusus' (Sen. dial. 12, 8, 3); see Zeller.

2. **hic mundus**: like *haec rerum summa* in Lucr.; cf. Sen. epigr. 7, 8 hic aliquo mundus tempore nullus erit. As to this Stoic view, see n. on 1, 29 sempiterna. Panaetius and Boethus, however, though Stoics, denied the future destruction of the world.

3. **sint ista**: § 102 n.; also (for *sint uera*) § 10 n. on si non fuerint. As to the statement see Introd. p. 13 n. 4.

iam: with *uides*, not with *fateri*.

5. **syllabatim**: cf. 'quasi dictata' in n. on § 8 quasi imperata. The same adv. is in Att. 13, 25, 3.

flumen...Aristoteles: this description is quoted in Plut. Cic. c. 24 and Amm. M. 27, 4, 8, and is the constant judgment of Cic. about Aristotle's style. Grote, Aristotle 1 p. 43 qu. Top. 3; De Or. 1, 49; Brut. 121; N.D. 2, 95; Inu. 2, 6; Fin. 1, 14; Att. 2, 1, 1 and discusses the difficulty of applying the criticism to the works we possess. The explanation, often put forward, that Cic. is speaking merely of Aristotle's popular dialogues fails; cf. Off. 1, 4 where Plato and Ar. are placed on a level as regards style; so too Quint. 10, 1, 83; passages from Greek authors to the same effect are quoted by Blass, Gesch. d. Gr. Beredsamkeit, p. 51. *Aureum* is perhaps not 'rich' referring to ornateness of style, but 'precious'; in N. D. 3, 43 Cic. calls an oration *aureola* which he afterwards styles *uetustior* and *horridior* in Brut. 83; so *aureolus libellus* below § 135; cf. Off. 3, 70. Yet in De Or. 1, 49 Ar. and Carneades are called 'suaues et ornati'. Aug. c. d. 8, 12 comes near the modern view of Ar. as stylist. The 'Aristotelia pigmenta' (Att. 2, 1, 1) and the 'Aristoteli ornamenta' (Fin. 1, 14) may refer to the rhetorical adornments *recommended* by him in his *Rhetoric;* but it is not very likely.

flumen orationis: the same expression in N. D. 2, 20; Brut. 325; De Or. 2, 62; *flumen* is thus often used in rhetorical works. In Amm. Marc. 30, 4, 7 the right reading is no doubt *Cicero orationis fluminibus* not *fulminibus*.

6. **fundens**: n. on § 74.

qui...dicat: 'bent on saying'.

desipere: a word Lucretius is fond of applying to his opponents. See below.

7. **neque enim etc.**: probably taken from Aristotle's dialogue περὶ φιλοσοφίας, for which see Bernays, Die Dialoge des Arist. pp. 95—114. Parts of it are represented in Cic. N. D.; see Bywater, Journal of Philology VII 82 sq., who however does not touch on our passage.

neque ortum esse etc.: the boast of Aristotle (De Caelo 1, 10, 279 *b* 12) that he was the first to proclaim the universe not merely to be eternal, but to have been without a beginning is carefully examined by Zeller, in the Transactions of the Berlin Academy for 1878 (also published separately). He reconciles the assertion of Ar. with what we have reported of other philosophers, particularly Heraclitus, the Pythagoreans, the Eleates, especially Melissus. It is always something else than *the present order* of the world which these declare to exist 'from everlasting'. For example Melissus (above

aptum, ut nulla uis tantos queat motus mutationemque moliri,
nulla senectus diuturnitate temporum exsistere, ut hic ornatus
umquam dilapsus occidat. Tibi hoc repudiare, illud autem
superius sicut caput et famam tuam defendere necesse erit, cum
mihi ne ut dubitem quidem relinquatur. Vt omittam leuitatem **120**
temere adsentientium, quanti libertas ipsa aestimanda est non
mihi necesse esse quod tibi est? Quaero cur deus, omnia

ψU; *flammam* AB. cum...relinquatur: om. *cum* codd., corr. Goer.; *relinquatur*? uel *relinquetur*? edd. 15 necesse esse: *nec. est esse* Cant.; uid. adn. Quaero cur: uocem *quaero* addidi; *quod tibi est, respondere, cur* H Bait.; *dicere* addit M.

§ 118) made the statement concerning τὸ ὄν, which as Z. remarks 'ist keine Welt'. Pseudo-Philo, De aet. mundi 489 M, says that (the κόσμος being a god) Arist. held it to be as impious to assume an origin for it as to foretell its destruction. Elaborate arguments on the subject are given by A. in Phys. VIII and De Caelo I. The main ground is 'deficit omne quod nascitur' (Quint. 5, 10, 79). Plin. n. h. 2 § 2 adopts the Aristotelian view, from Varro, who got it from Antiochus.

nouo consilio: the assumption practically is that the divine mind is unchangeable. The argument is very like that in Lucr. 5, 168 against the supposition of a creation by the gods of the world—quidue noui potuit tanto post ante quietos inlicere? So arguing against the Epicurean παρέγκλισις (*clinamen*) Cic. Fat. 46 says 'quae ergo noua caussa in natura est quae declinet atomum?' So N.D. 1, 20, and Aug. c. d. 11, 4 (a most interesting passage to compare with ours). Augustine ib. 11, 21 borrows from Plato Tim. 30 an answer to this particular objection of Aristotle.

8. **inceptio**: a rare word; here only in Cic.

undique aptum: 'compacted on all sides'; cf. Fin. 4, 53 omnia inter se apta et conexa.

9. **nulla uis**: see 1, 28 n.

motus mutationemque: apparently an attempt in translating to represent the two senses of κίνησις, motion and change.

10. **exsistere**: n. on 1, 23.

ornatus: an exceptional rendering of κόσμος (as in N.D. 2, 115) and one which seems peculiar to Cic.; cf. Varro, Men. Sat. ed. Riese, p. 199 appellatur a caelatura caelum, graece ab ornatu κόσμος, latine a puritia mundus—a passage reproduced by Plin. n.h. 2 § 8. We have *pulcritudo* for κόσμος in Cato m. § 81, and in Tusc. 1, 45 (where the phrase has been generally misunderstood). On the passive sense of nouns in *-tus* see Nägelsbach Stil. § 56, 3.

12. **superius**: i.e. fore ut mundus deflagret, above.

caput et famam: 'life and honour'.

13. **leuitatem**: § 66.

14. **adsentientium**: for this use (common in Cic.) of the gen. plur. pres. part. see Nägelsb. Stil. § 29, 2; above, § 43 fidentium.

quanti: 'of how great value' as in Cato m. 49 and Parad. 51, but 'of how little value' in N.D. 1, 55; Tusc. 5, 109; Rep. 6, 25. The word thus takes precisely opposite meanings, according to the context.

libertas ipsa: 'the *mere* freedom'; see nn. on § 8, and Introd. p. 12. Libertas = παρρησία, as often; cf. Quint. 9, 2, 27.

non...esse: for the infinitive clause, explanatory of the substantive *libertas* cf. Draeger II² § 445; also Tusc. 4, 83 (inf. after *una sanatio est*). Cic. deals very freely with these explanatory inf. clauses, esp. in his Letters. For a loose explan. rel. clause after *libertas* cf. Ennius trag. 259 (Ribbeck) ea libertas est qui pectus purum et firmum gestitat.

15. **quaero cur**: the form of question is very common in Cic.; cf. § 69 and *quaero quando* in § 135. If an infinitive be inserted, *defendere* is suggested by §§ 119, 137. The reading of MS Cant. (*necesse est esse*) suggests *aestimanda est! non mihi necesse est efficere etc.*; since *ss* and *ff* are often confused in MSS. So *esse* has come out of *effugere* in Att. 8, 2, 1.

cur...disperserit: qu. by Lactant. inst. 7, 4, 11 (from ed. 2), with comments.

nostra caussa cum faceret (sic enim uoltis) tantam uim natricum uiperarumque fecerit, cur mortifera tam multa ac perniciosa terra marique disperserit? Negatis haec tam polite tamque subtiliter effici potuisse sine diuina aliqua sollertia; cuius quidem uos maiestatem deducitis usque ad apium formicarumque perfectionem, ut etiam inter deos Myrmecides aliquis minutorum opusculorum
121 fabricator fuisse uideatur. Negas sine deo posse quicquam. Ecce tibi e transuerso Lampsacenus Strato, qui det isti deo im-

1 nostra: *nostri* codd. permulti. sic...fecerit: uid. fragm. 27. 2 ac perniciosa: u. *ac* addidi; u. *perniciosa* praebent codd. omnes exc. Cant.; om. codd. Lactantii et H Bait. M. 6 aliquis: U Cant. ψA²; *aliqui* edd. 7 quicquam: *q. esse*

1. **nostra caussa**: it is now generally agreed that Cic. could not have written *nostri c.*; although *sui c.* still stands (mistakenly) in good texts of Verr. 3, 121.

uoltis: Cic. here identifies the followers of Antiochus with the Stoics, who stoutly maintained that their *πρόνοια* (cf. I § 29) had designed the universe with a view to human well-being. The Sceptics, Epicureans and others continually pushed them with such arguments as we have here. A great part of N.D. II is occupied with the controversy; cf. esp. §§ 37, 91—127, 133, 154. Lucr. avers (5, 195 sq.) 'nequaquam nobis diuinitus esse paratam naturam rerum, tanta stat praedita culpa', where *nobis* = *hominibus*. Chrysippus was fain to allow that in the universe a few faults may have been overlooked like crumbs on the floor of an otherwise well-ordered house (Plut. St. R. 1051), and that some evil is necessary to the existence of good, just as there would be no truth if there were no falsehood (*κοιν. ἐνν.* 1065 sq.) Other passages bearing on this perennial controversy are Fin. 3, 67; Off. 1, 22; Diu. 2, 104 sq.; Sen. de ira 2, 27, 2, N.Q. 7, 30, 3; Plin. n.h. 7, 1; 8, 87; 18, 2; 21, 78; 23, 1; 31, 4; 36, 1; Gell. 7 (6) 1; Lactant. de ira c. 14; Epictet. D. 1, cc. 6, 14, 16; Sext. P. H. 1, 32 and 3, 9. Plut. ap. Porphyr. de abst. III 20, fragm. 95 § 4 ed. Dübner (quoting from Carneades, a fact Hirzel, Unters. III 307, vainly tries to disprove) says '*εἰ πρὸς ἀνθρώπων χρῆσιν ὁ θεὸς μεμηχάνηται τὰ ζῷα, τί χρησόμεθα μυίαις, ἐμπίσι, νυκτερίσι, κανθάροις, σκορπίοις, ἐχίδναις;*' Plutarch goes on to shew that men may by similar arguments be proved to exist for the sake of certain animals.

natricum: Luc. Müller makes a strange blunder in scanning nătrīcem in Lucil. II 21, in spite of Lucan. 9, 720 nātrix uiolator aquae.

2. **terra marique**: the usual form, not *mari terraque*; cf. however Sall. Cat. 10, 1 cuncta maria terraeque.

3. **haec**: 'our universe'; much as *haec nostra* in § 127; Lucr. 5, 503 haec omnia; 1, 235 haec rerum summa. For a similar idiomatic use of *haec* = the Roman empire see my n. on Sull. 32.

subtiliter: n. on 2, 34.

4. **effici**: n. on 1 § 24.

5. **deducitis**: here 'mislead,' 'lead astray', a sense not very uncommon in Cic. though the lexica qu. no exx. Ac. 2 § 114 given by Georges, is not an ex.; see n. there.

apium: n. on § 54. Chrysippus was often ridiculed for the way in which he pushed his theological principles in connexion with insignificant things; cf. Zeller III, 1, p. 172 ed. 3, or E. Tr. p. 177.

6. **Myrmecides**: he is chosen out of the many Greek artists of microscopic works (see Overbeck, Ant. Schr. §§ 292, 776, 777, 2192, 2193) because his name recalls *formicarum* above. It is possible that this name was originally a nickname, appropriate to his works.

aliquis: n. on § 61.

minutorum: n. on § 75. Aug. ciu. d. 7, 2 asks why the *di maiores* are so called; if because of the importance of their functions, then 'non eos inuenire debuimus inter illam quasi plebeiam numinum multitudinem minutis opusculis deputatam'—an evident reminiscence of our passage.

7. **fabricator**: the Romans denoted all hand-workers, artists as well as artisans, by the same terms; see Goehling, de

munitatem magni quidem muneris: et cum sacerdotes deorum uacationem habeant, quanto est aequius habere ipsos deos! Negat opera deorum se uti ad fabricandum mundum. Quaecumque sint, docet omnia effecta esse natura nec ut ille qui ex asperis et leuibus et hamatis uncinatisque corporibus concreta haec esse dicat interiecto inani. Somnia censet haec esse Democriti non docentis, sed optantis. Ipse autem singulas mundi partis persequens, quidquid aut sit aut fiat, naturalibus fieri aut

Dau. et Bait.; uid. adn. 9 et cum: *sed cum* codd. (*set cum* Cant.); corr. Goer. 12 ex asperis: uocem *ex* addidi. 13 corporibus: uid. fragm. 28.

Cicerone artis aestimatore, p. 50, who says that except here and Orat. 9 (artifex) the term used in Cic. of artists is *opifex*. Cf. Off. 1, 147 fabricari signa; and § 22 artificem; also, for fabricari, n. on § 87.

posse: sc. fieri; the same ellipse in 1, 19; 2, 42 and of facere in 2, 107. These ellipses are common; see Madv. Fin. 4, 48, and 5, 1; Kühner on Tusc. 1, 23.

8. **ecce tibi**: common, like *en tibi*; see Kühner, Gram. II § 76, 8c, and Wichert, Still. § 277; and cf. Att. 15, 4b (4 § 5 ed. Wes.) ecce de transuerso L. Caesar ut ueniam ad se rogat; Cornif. 4, 14. Lactant. inst. 7, 5 has a reminiscence of the phrase *e transuerso* here.

8. **Lampsacenus**: cf. § 137 n. on Stoicus Diogenes.

qui det: 'bent on giving'.

immunitatem ... muneris: the assonance is intentional.

9. **et cum**: the *sed* of the MSS could only be explained by an awkward ellipse.

10. **uacationem**: sc. muneris; the priests were freed from many public functions; see Marquardt-Mommsen 6, p. 216.

11. **opera deorum**: Lucr. 1, 158 (Munr.) et quo quaeque modo fiant opera sine diuom.

ad f. mundum: see passages qu. in n. on § 87, and cf. Tim. § 6 ille fabricator tanti operis.

12. **effecta**: n. on 1, 24.

natura: n. on 1, 15.

ex...concreta: the simple abl. in the style of Cic. would not indicate *origin*, but would merely be instrumental, which is here out of place.

13. **asperis...uncinatis**: all Lucretian words, except the last, which perhaps only occurs here. Cf. Ac. frag. 28 and N. D. 1, 66.

uncinatisque: the *que* is not parallel to the et...et preceding, but marks that the *one* class of hooked atoms is described by the *two* terms *hamatis* and *uncinatis*.

corporibus: n. on fragm. 28; also on 1 § 6.

14. **haec**: above, § 120 n.

dicat: the subj. implies that Strato compared himself with Democritus to his own advantage.

somnia: a word of controversy like *portenta* in § 123; cf. N. D. 1 §§ 39, 42, 93; also as a taunt in common life, Att. 7, 23, 1; Sen. contr. 2, 1, 33; Ter. Andr. 971 num ille somniat ea quae uigilans uoluit?

15. **optantis**: Tusc. 2, 30 optare hoc quidem est, non docere; Fat. 46; N. D. 1, 19 optata magis quam inuenta; ib. 3, 12 doceas oportet nec proferas; Leg. agr. 1, 1 cogitata sapientium an optata furiosorum; N. D. 1, 18 non disserentium philosophorum sed somniantium. *Docere* is here not 'to explain', but 'to prove' as in Off. 3, 33 and often. *Optare* differs much from *sperare*; see my n. on Balb. 9 and cf. Orat. 59 uocis bonitas optanda est 'is a thing *to be prayed for*'. Cf. Plato Rep. 540 D εὐχὰς εἰρηκέναι: Arist. Pol. IV (VII) 12 τὸ μὲν γὰρ λέγειν εὐχῆς ἐστι: Sext. A. M. 11, 208; P. H. 3, 244; Quint. 12, 5, 6 hoc uotum est et rara felicitas. The em. of Guietus—*potantis*—is quaint.

mundi partis: n. on 1, 29.

16. **naturalibus ... motibus**: these words might very well describe the atomic system. Strato was really nearer to Democritus than to Aristotle in his physical views; see Zeller II, p. 906 ed. 3. Sen. ap. Aug. c. d. 6, 10 says that while the god of Plato was without a body, the god of Strato (i.e. nature) had no soul.

factum esse docet ponderibus et motibus. Ne ille et deum opere magno liberat et me timore. Quis enim potest, cum existimet curari se a deo, non et dies et noctes diuinum numen horrere et, si quid aduersi acciderit (quod cui non accidit?) extimescere ne id iure euenerit? Nec Stratoni tamen adsentior nec uero tibi; modo hoc, modo illud probabilius uidetur.

122 XXXIX. Latent ista omnia, Luculle, crassis occultata et circumfusa tenebris, ut nulla acies humani ingeni tanta sit quae penetrare in caelum, terram intrare possit: corpora nostra non nouimus, qui sint situs partium, quam uim quaeque pars habeat ignoramus. Itaque medici ipsi, quorum intererat ea nosse, ape-

1 ne ille: *sic ille* A^2B^2 et codd. deteriores. 2 opere magno: *opera magna* Lamb.; *onere magno* C. F. Hermann.; uid. adn. 7 crassis...tenebris: uid. fragm. 29. 11 ipsi: *ipsa* H. 13 detecta: Cant. et r; *deiecta* codd. cett.; *desecta* coni. Hülsemann. 14 ecquid: *haec quid* codd. Fortasse legendum est *sed haec*

1. **ne ille etc.**: Att. 6, 1, 10 ne tu me sollicitudine magna liberaris. The syntax of the clause with *ne ille* here is exceptional; see § 117 n.

2. **opere magno**: 'a great task', as in 1, 2 and very often; cf. Plin. n. h. 17, 210 opere naturae; also (in view of *magni muneris* above) N. D. 2, 90 (*deum*) architectum tanti operis tantique muneris; Tusc. 1, 70 moderator tanti operis et muneris; Leg. 2, 6.

quis enim etc.: cf. N. D. 1, 54 quis enim non timeat omnia prouidentem et cogitantem et animaduertentem et omnia ad se pertinere putantem curiosum et plenum negoti deum?

3. **et dies et noctes**: see my n. on Cato m. § 1, and cf. Tusc. 1, 48 diurno et nocturno metu.

6. **modo hoc, modo illud**: characteristic of the Academy; see § 134 and Introd. p. 12; Lael. 13 tum hoc tum illud (of Socrates); Diu. 1, 62 Carneades ...modo ait hoc, modo illud; N. D. 1, 47 Cotta meus modo hoc, modo illud; Tim. § 13; Parad. 14; Diu. 1, 120; ib. 2, 145; Att. 13, 25, 3; ib. 2, 15, 1; Catull. 3, 9; 15, 7; 50, 5.

7. **latent**: 1, 45.

crassis occultata: changed to *magnis obscurata* in fragm. 29; cf. Fin. 5, 58 (res) a natura occultatas et latentes.

occultata: 1 § 2 n.

8. **circumfusa tenebris**: so 1 § 44 but Lucullus in 2 § 46 luce...circumfusa. Goer. imagined the words *crassis...tenebris* to be a line from some old poet. See n. on 1 § 30. Goer. also puts a stop at *tenebris* and takes *ut* as concessive = *licet*, which makes nonsense.

10. **qui situs...ignoramus**: a not very intelligible statement; anatomy in Cicero's time had certainly shewn the *positions* of the bodily parts. Possibly Cic. wrote *qui sit habitus p.* 'what is the normal condition of the parts'. For the text cf. Sen. Rh. c. 10, 5, 17 cadauerum artus rescindi, ut neruorum articulorumque positio cognosci possit. If the reading is sound, Cic. must here be thinking of the *mind* rather than the body; cf. § 124 n. on *redeo*.

uim: 'function'.

11. **ipsi**: n. on 1, 6.

12. **uiderentur**: true passive; see § 25 n. and cf. Tusc. 1, 46 medici qui ista aperta ac patefacta uiderunt.

empirici: the rise of the dogmatic and empiric schools of physicians, and the controversy between them, is traced with great clearness and fullness by Celsus I. The dogmatics or λογικοὶ ἰατροί (as Sext. calls them) not only dissected dead bodies, but vivisected criminals; with regard to this the empirics argued 'colorem laeuorem mollitiem duritiem similiaque omnia non esse talia inciso corpore qualia integro fuerint' (Cels. prooem.). Medicine and philosophy were much mingled in ancient times, and the connexion between scepticism and empiricism was very close; cf. Sext. P. H. 1, 236 sq.; also

ruerunt ut uiderentur; nec eo tamen aiunt empirici notiora
esse illa, quia possit fieri ut patefacta et detecta mutentur. Sed
ecquid nos eodem modo rerum naturas persecare aperire diui-
dere possumus, ut uideamus terra penitusne defixa sit et quasi
radicibus suis haereat an media pendeat? Habitari ait Xeno- **123**
phanes in luna eamque esse terram multarum urbium et mon-
tium. Portenta uidentur, sed tamen neque ille, qui dixit, iurare
posset ita se rem habere, neque ego non ita. Vos etiam dicitis
esse e regione nobis, e contraria parte terrae, qui aduersis uesti-
giis stent contra nostra uestigia, quos antipodas uocatis: cur mihi

quid ad nos? 18 portenta: fort. *p. haec.* 19 posset: *possit* M. neque... uestigia: uid. fragm. 30. non ita uos: *non enim* ABψE; *nonne* G; *neque ego Non ne* (sic) U; *neque ego nunc* Cant. 20 e contraria p.: *in c. p.* edd. ut est in fragm. 30.

A. M. 8 §§ 156, 191, 204, 327. The μεθοδικοὶ were a later sect.

13. **quia possit**: so Prof. Huxley was charged with arguing from the properties of dead to those of living protoplasm. Cf. Tertull. de Anima c. 10 ipsa morte mutante quae uixerant etc.

detecta: as against the conj. *desecta* cf. Tusc. 1, 45 qu. above, n. on *uiderentur.*

14. **rerum naturas**: little different from res; cf. § 44 n.

15. **penitusne...radicibus**: probably a reminiscence of Xenophanes; cf. Plac. Ph. 3, 9, 4 (γῆν) ἐκ τοῦ κάτω μέρους εἰς ἄπειρον βάθος ἐρριζῶσθαι. See Zeller I⁴ p. 494. For *radicibus haereat* cf. Lucr. 3, 325; 5, 554. Arist. de caelo II cc. 13, 14 examines the chief theories about the position, motion and shape of the earth; see also Lewis, Astron. of the Ancients p. 166.

16. **media pendeat**: so Tusc. 1, 40 (Kühner); ib. 1, 68; ib. 5, 69; N. D. 2 §§ 91, 98; De Or. 3, 178; Ovid Met. 1, 12; Lucan 1, 57. The Pythagoreans were the first to attack the common notion that the earth is the centre of the universe; they placed there a central mass of fire. Then Aristarchus of Samos made the sun the centre, but the old view held its ground till modern times, and was deemed to have been conclusively proved by mathematicians (Galen. Plac. VIII p. 654 ed. Müller).

habitari etc.: Cic. (copied by Lactantius Inst. 3, 23, 12) has here confused Xenophanes with Anaxagoras: cf. Diog. 2, 8 τὴν δὲ σελήνην οἰκήσεις ἔχειν καὶ λόφους καὶ φάραγγας. This is no doubt one of the doctrines Democritus accused Anax. of filching from his predecessors (Diog. 9, 34). Similar views were held by Philolaus (Zeller I⁴ 395) and Democritus (Stob. Phys. 550). In later times these views were common; Macrob. somn. 1, 11, 7. Cic. of course would not write *lunam habitari.*

17. **terram**: γῆν (of Anax.) Plato Apol. 26 D.

18. **portenta**: like *somnia* in § 121. Cf. Fin. 4, 70; N. D. 1, 18; ib. 1, 43; ib. 3, 91; Lucil. 575 Lachm. So *monstra* very often, as in Tusc. 4, 54.

iurare: § 116 n.

19. **non ita**: Cic. avoids *haud ita,* common elsewhere.

uos: the views here given were not peculiar to the friends of Antiochus; the point here is that they are more angry with the Sceptics who neither affirm nor deny them absolutely, than with those who absolutely reject them.

20. **e contraria p.**: but in fragm. 30 (Non.) *in c. parte.* Aug. 16, 9 has *a contraria p.*, which makes it possible that Non. has misquoted the passage from ed. 2.

aduersis...stent: Rep. 6, 20 aduersos stare uobis; ib. 21 aduersa uobis urgent uestigia; Plin. n. h. 2, 161 conuersis inter se pedibus stare.

21. **antipodas**: Cic. evidently treats the word as Latin; so Sall. h. 1, 63 Dietsch, and often later. The theory of the *antipodes* was of course a corollary

magis suscensetis, qui ista non aspernor, quam eis qui, cum audiunt, desipere uos arbitrantur? Hicetas Syracosius, ut ait Theophrastus, caelum solem lunam stellas, supera denique omnia stare censet neque praeter terram rem ullam in mundo moueri, quae cum circum axem se summa celeritate conuertat et torqueat, eadem effici omnia, quae si stante terra caelum moueretur. Atque hoc etiam Platonem in Timaeo dicere quidam arbitrantur, sed paulo obscurius. Quid tu, Epicure? Loquere. Putas solem esse tantulum? Ego ne bis quidem tantum! Et uos ab illo irridemini et ipsi illum uicissim eluditis. Liber igitur a tali irrisione Socrates, liber Aristo Chius, qui nihil istorum
124 sciri putat posse. Sed redeo ad animum et corpus. Satisne

1 quam eis: U; *q. eos* ABGψ Cant. 2 Syracosius: A[1]B; *hic et asiracocius* Cant. 6 quae si: *quasi* codd.; corr. Man. 9 ego ne bis: *ego ne uobis* codd. (etiam U) exc. Cant. (*ego ne equidem tantum*); *egone? ne bis* Lamb. Madu. H Bait. et uos: ABEUr; *sed u.* G; *set u.* Cant. 15 an ut: *aut ut*

from the theory of the globular form of the earth, and therefore, with it, fell under the censure of the early Church; see Aug. c. d. 16, 9. Diog. 3, 24 ascribes the authorship of the *word* ἀντίπους to Plato, and it seems to occur first in Tim. 63 A. Cic. Tusc. 1, 68 uses to denote the other side of the earth the word ἀντίχθων, which meant originally the counterpart of the earth which the Pythagoreans imagined in their astronomy; then ἀντίχθονες was used for ἀντίποδες, as in Plin. n. h. 6, 81 and Achil. Tat. Cf. also ἄντοικοι ap. Macr. somn. 2, 5, 33, and Plut.

1. **non aspernor**: so § 148 nec eam admodum aspernor.

2. **desipere**: a word often hurled by Lucr. at those with whom he disagrees.

Hicetas: see Zeller I p. 391 ed. 4. H. (whose precise date is unknown) seems to have given up the doctrine of the central fire and the ἀντίχθων, or perhaps he made the latter equivalent to the opposite side of the earth. The motion of the earth round the central fire was also exchanged for the axial movement. H. was followed by Ecphantus (Pythagorean) and Heraclides Ponticus. Martin, art. Astronomie in Daremberg and Saglio, Dictionnaire, n. 72, says that Hicetas really held the views of Philolaus, and points to Diog. 8, 85, and Plac. Phil. 3, 9, passages which by no means prove Cic. in the wrong. If Plac. Ph. 3, 9 be compared with 3, 11, 3 it will be seen that ἀντίχθων bears different senses in the two passages, meaning in the earlier *the other side of the earth*, while in Diog. 9, 85 the words κατὰ κύκλον are probably a gloss.

3. **Theophrastus**: probably in the φυσικὴ ἱστορία, from which later writers drew much of their information concerning the earlier physical systems.

6. **eadem quae si**: the slight ellipse is common; cf. Tusc. 1, 57 eodem perueniat quo si...where some MSS give *quasi*.

stante etc.: Sen. N. Q. 7, 2, 3.

7. **Platonem**: the controversy (which still continues) turns on the meaning of the word εἰλλομένην in Timaeus 40 B, which Aristotle understood to mean rotation. This view has been supported by very few moderns, of whom Grote is one. See Zeller II, 1 p. 682 ed. 3.

8. **quid tu**: sc. dicis; cf. § 126 quae tu.

9. **tantulum**: sc. quantus uidetur, =pedalem in § 82.

ego ne...quidem: cf. Phil. 7, 16 Antonios...nisi forte contemnitis Lucium. Ego ne Gaium quidem; also above, § 82 ne maiorem quidem. The passage is elliptic: 'far from accepting the estimates of the astronomers, I would not even allow the possibility of the sun being double its apparent size'. See n. on § 82.

tandem ea nota sunt nobis, quae neruorum natura sit, quae uenarum? Tenemusne quid sit animus, ubi sit, denique sitne an, ut Dicaearcho uisum est, ne sit quidem ullus? Si est, trisne partis habeat, ut Platoni placuit, rationis irae cupiditatis, an simplex unusque sit; si simplex, utrum sit ignis an anima an sanguis an, ut Xenocrates, numerus nullo corpore, quod intellegi quale sit uix potest; et, quidquid est, mortale sit an aeternum? Nam utramque in partem multa dicuntur. Horum aliquid uestro sapienti certum uidetur, nostro ne quid maxime quidem probabile sit occurrit: ita sunt in plerisque contrariarum rationum paria momenta. XL. Sin agis uerecundius et me accusas, non **125**
quod tuis rationibus non adsentiar, sed quod nullis, uincam

codd. (cf. § 9); corr. Lamb. trisne: cf. § 138. 16 partis: U. 17 si simplex: *si unus et simplex* Cant.; *et si u. et s. sit* G et ed. Ven. (sed Ven. om. *sit*). 18 Xenocrates: *Xenocrati* Lamb. numerus: *mens* codd.; corr. Bentl. 20 utramque in p.: Cant.; *utraque in parte* codd. uolgo.

11. **Aristo**: he said natural science was beyond human powers (ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς): Diog. 7, 160; Stob. Flor. 80, 7.

12. **redeo**: n. on § 90. The reference seems to be to § 122, where however the *animus* is not mentioned; see n. there.

satisne: the equivalent of *num*, as in 1 § 10.

13. **quae...uenarum**: see the long polemic against the Stoics in Galen. Plac. 1, 11.

14. **tenemus**: n. on § 26.

quid sit etc.: Tusc. 1, 18 quid sit animus aut ubi aut unde magna dissensio est; so Sen. ep. 121, 12; N. Q. 7, 25, 2; Plin. 7, 189. Enumerations of ancient opinions on these problems are given in Ar. de anim. 1, 2 §§ 8 sq.; Tusc. 1, 18 sq.; Macrob. somn. 1, 14, 19; Sext. A. M. 7, 113 sq., who speaks in P. H. 2, 31 of the πολλὴ καὶ ἀνήνυτος μάχη concerning the soul.

ubi sit: Lucr. 5, 135.

15. **Dicaearcho**: he held the soul to be a ἁρμονία i.e. not 'harmony' but symmetry or precise equipoise of the bodily endowments. Cf. Tusc. 1, 21; Zeller II, 2 p. 890 ed. 3.

ne sit qu. ullus: cf. Sext. P. H. 2, 57 Γοργίας...οὐδὲ διάνοιαν εἶναι φησί.

16. **Platoni**: in the *Republic*, which is, on the surface, contradicted by the *Phaedo*, where the singleness of the soul is insisted on.

17. **simplex**: Tusc. 1, 71 animis... nihil duplex.

ignis: so some Stoics, but others πνεῦμα ἔνθερμον, to which *anima* is probably a reference.

18. **sanguis**: Empedocles, followed by many later thinkers.

ut Xen.: for the ellipse cf. 1 §§ 38, 44; 2 § 17; Tusc. 5, 49; Fin. 2, 17; Diu. 1, 72. The word *Platoni* does not necessitate *Xenocrati*; see Tusc. 3, 76.

numerus: so Tusc. 1, 20; cf. Zeller II, 1 p. 871 ed. 3, and 1, 39 above. The definition of X. is more or less Pythagorean, but Cic. here leaves out the most important part of it 'ἀριθμὸν αὐτὸν αὐτὸν κινοῦντα'. Aristotle several times mentions the def. without naming its author.

quod...potest: for the words cf. N. D. 3, 34; ib. 1, 30. Cic. says of the def. in Tusc. 1, 41 quod subtiliter magis quam dilucide dicitur.

20. **utr. in p.**: n. on 1 § 46.

22. **occurrit**: see n. on § 127.

rationum momenta: so 1, 45; N. D. 1, 10 rationis momenta; Orat. 48 argumentorum m. The limitation involved in the words *in plerisque* is absent from 1, 45.

23. **uerecundius**: cf. §§ 114, 115, 126.

24. **quod nullis**: cf. § 132.

uincam animum: 'I will suppress my feelings', 'I will do violence to my inclinations'; cf. Fam. 4, 6, 2; Att. 12, 46, 1; Phil. 12, 21; Pl. Mil. 567; Sen. de ira 2, 14, 2; so Quint. 10, 1, 98 ingenio suo imperare; Sen. ep. 78, 2; ben. 5, 20, 7; Val. M. 4, 2, 4.

animum cuique adsentiar deligam...quem potissimum? quem? Democritum: semper enim, ut scitis, studiosus nobilitatis fui. Vrguebor iam omnium uestrum conuicio. Tune aut inane quicquam putes esse, cum ita completa et conferta sint omnia, ut et quidquid mouebitur corporeum cedat et qua quidque cesserit aliud ilico subsequatur? Aut atomos ullas, e quibus quidquid efficiatur, illarum sit dissimillimum? Aut sine aliqua mente rem ullam effici posse praeclaram? Et cum in uno mundo ornatus hic tam sit mirabilis, innumerabilis supra infra, dextra sinistra, ante post, alios dissimilis, alios eiusdem modi mundos esse? Et, ut nos nunc simus ad Baulos Puteolosque uideamus, sic innumerabilis paribus in locis eisdem esse nominibus honoribus, rebus gestis, ingeniis formis aetatibus, eisdem de rebus disputantis? Et, si nunc aut si etiam dormientes aliquid animo uidere uideamur, imagines extrinsecus in animos nostros per

3 conuicio: Cant. U; *conuitio* ABψ. 4 ut et: U et r; *ut* om. AB; *et* om. EG Cant. ψ Harl. 5 quidquid: ita scripsi; *quod* codd.; *quo quid* H Bait.; *qua quodque* M. corporeum: ita scripsi; *corporum* codd. H Bait.; *corpus* M. 5 cedat: *corpus c.* H Bait.; *aliud cedat* M; *cedatur* Dau. quidque: *quodque*

1. **quem potissimum**: see § 117 and cf. Sext. P. H. 2, 37.

quem? quemnam is usual in the repeated question; cf. Verr. 4, 5, and Aug. c. Ac. 3, 33, which latter passage makes it probable that Cic. wrote *quemnam* here.

2. **nobilitatis**: a jest; Dem. occupies the rank in philosophy which the great nobles occupy in the state. Some of the older edd. understand Cic. too literally, as though Dem. were really of noble birth; the like mistake has been made about Tusc. 4, 2, where the *nobilitas* of Pythagoras is mentioned. D. was wealthy (Diog. 9, 34—36, Val. M. 8, 7, ext. 4), but his intellectual rank is alone considered here. Cf. § 72 nobilissimis; § 75 numquam nisi nobilem; § 147 nobilis disciplinas; Fin. 5, 75 nobilem Peripateticum; Cato m. 77 philosophorum nobilitas.

3. **conuicio**: § 34 n.

tune...putes: § 61 n. The *conuicium* begins.

4. **completa et conferta**: for et here cf. nn. on 1 §§ 11, 17; 2, 127, and, for the matter, n. on 1, 27. We have here the Aristotelian theory of motion (Phys. 4, 7, 214 a 24 sq.); bodies can move because other bodies withdraw before them (ἐνδέχεται ὑπεξιέναι ἀλλήλοις) and leave their space. The doctrine will not stand much criticism, and Lucr. 1, 370 sq. rides over it rough-shod.

5. **quidquid mouebitur c.**: 'whatever bodily substance is set in motion' (by an impulse from without).

cedat: so N. D. 2, 83.

6. **atomos**: n. on 1 § 6.

7. **dissimillimum**: Lucr. continually insists that things are constructed *ex alienigenis*. The point of the criticism seems to be that, on the atomic theory, *all* things are unlike their elements, while, on the orthodox theory of the four elements, only some are unlike. Cf. § 118.

sine aliqua: n. on § 35.

8. **ornatus**: n. on § 119.

9. **tam sit m.**: n. on § 83.

innumerabilis: for Dem. see Zeller I 797 ed. 4. The ἄπειροι κόσμοι of D. are coexistent; those of Xenophanes (Diog. 9, 19) and others are successive.

supra infra: § 92 n.

10. **alios dissim. etc.**: so Epic. ap. Diog. 10, 45 κόσμοι ἄπειροί εἰσιν, εἴθ' ὅμοιοι τούτῳ, εἴτ' ἀνόμοιοι.

11. **ut nos nunc simus etc.**: see fragm. 13 n.

14. **animo u.**: Tusc. 1, 37 and 62; § 22 n.

corpus irrumpere? Tu uero ista ne asciueris neue fueris commenticiis rebus adsensus. Nihil sentire est melius quam tam praua sentire. Non ergo id agitur, ut aliquid adsensu meo **126**
comprobem; quae tu, uide ne impudenter etiam postules, non solum adroganter, praesertim cum ista tua mihi ne probabilia quidem uideantur. Nec enim diuinationem, quam probatis, ullam esse arbitror, fatumque illud esse, quo omnia contineri dicitis, contemno. Ne exaedificatum quidem hunc mundum diuino consilio existimo, atque haud scio an ita sit. XLI. Sed cur rapior in inuidiam? Licetne per uos nescire quod nescio? An Stoicis ipsis inter se disceptare, cum his non licebit? Zenoni et reliquis fere Stoicis aether uidetur summus deus, mente praeditus, qua omnia regantur. Cleanthes, qui quasi maiorum est gentium Stoicus, Zenonis auditor, solem dominari et rerum

Ernesti, Bait. M. 11 simus...uideamus: cf. fragm. 13; uel *sumus* uel *uidemus* uel utrumque praebent multi ex inferioribus codd. 12 eisdem esse: ita codd., sed mox *isdem de rebus* (A^1B^1) uel *iisdem* (A^2B^2 Cant.) uel *hisdem* (ψU). 19 quae tu: *quod tu* Dau.; *sed quae tu; quod uide* coni. Kayser. 22 illud esse: om. *esse* H (auctore Christio) Bait. M. 26 cum his: AG Cant. ψUr; *cum iis* B H Bait. M.

15. **uidere uideamur**: Seyffert-Müller, Lael. p. 296.

imagines: εἴδωλα (trans. *spectra* by Catius, Fam. 15, 16, 1), the foundation of the atomistic theories of vision and thought, largely discussed by Lucr. and Cic. N. D.

16. **tu ne ascieris**: part of the *conuicium*, like *tune putes etc.* above. Cf. *ne dixeris* in Hor. s. 2, 3, 220. For *asciscere* see § 141.

commenticiis: commonly used of philosophical theories, as Fin. 1, 19; N. D. 1 §§ 18, 94; 2, 70; 3, 63; Fat. §§ 23, 48; Diu. 2, 113.

18. **sentire**: n. on 1, 22.

19. **quae tu**: i.e. ut comprobem quae tu comprobas; for the ellipse cf. n. on § 72 tu.

impudenter...adroganter: § 115 impudentes...adrogantes.

21. **probatis etc.**: Cic. here identifies the Antiocheans with the Stoics.

22. **fatumque etc.**: 'and I make light of your statement that destiny exists etc.' The text is right enough; cf. 2 §§ 29, 98 and 1, 36 n.; also Diu. 2, 103 where *esse* has been wrongly suspected. For *fatum* see n. on 1, 29.

23. **hunc mundum**: above § 119 hic ornatus.

24. **atque...sit**: 'and yet it possibly may be so'. For *atque* connecting contrasted clauses (=*et tamen*) see Draeger II^2 p. 53.

25. **inuidiam**: § 105 inuidiosa; §§ 144, 146.

licetne etc.: N. D. 1, 84 confiteri potius nescire quod nescires; Tusc. 1, 60 nec me pudet, ut istos, fateri nescire quod nesciam.

an Stoicis etc.: the same complaint in Diu. 1, 6; cf. too Off. 3, 91 quasi controuersa iura Stoicorum; ib. 3, 51; also Sen. N. Q. 4, 3, 6; and below § 143; above § 107.

26. **non licebit**: possibly *nobis* has fallen out before *non*. Goer. and others insert *mihi*.

27. **summus deus**: nn. on 1, 29. For the phrase cf. Caecil. (Ribbeck) 259; Leg. 1, 22 supremus deus; Macr. somn. 1, 17, 12.

28. **maiorum gentium**: the phrase is sarcastic here, as its ordinary application is to the superior gods.

29. **auditor**: 1, 34 n.

solem: see Diog. 7, 139 who gives four Stoic views as to the part of the universe where the divine soul (ἡγεμονικὸν—see § 29 n.) resides. As to Cleanthes, see

potiri putat. Ita cogimur dissensione sapientium dominum
nostrum ignorare, quippe qui nesciamus soli an aetheri seruia-
mus. Solis autem magnitudinem (ipse enim hic radiatus me
intueri uidetur admonens ut crebro faciam mentionem sui)
uos ergo huius magnitudinem quasi decempeda permensi re-
fertis: ego huic me quasi malis architectis mensurae uestrae nego
credere. Dubium est igitur uter nostrum sit, leuiter ut dicam,
127 uerecundior? Nec tamen istas quaestiones physicorum exter-
minandas puto. Est enim animorum ingeniorumque naturale
quoddam quasi pabulum consideratio contemplatioque naturae.
Erigimur, elatiores fieri uidemur, humana despicimus, cogitan-

3 magnitudinem: ABEψ; *magnitudo* U Cant. 4 admonens: ABEψ; *admonet* U Cant. (*ammonet*) Harl. et r; *admouet* G; *ac monet* Faber. 5 decempeda...dubium: locus in codd. corruptissimus; post *decempeda* uerba *permensi refertis* omittunt; ante *me quasi* A *hic* habet, Bψ *hinc*, E *huic*, G et Cant. *huic enim* (Cant. om. *me*); post *uestrae* ita pergunt: *nego hoc* (uel *hec*) *permensi refertis ergo credere dubium.* Locum restituit H, Lamb. et Hermannum secutus. Vid. adn. 6 malis architectis: *mali architecti* Dau.; *quasi mali sitis architecti* Lamb. 7 igitur:

Zeller III, 1 p. 137 ed. 3; E. Tr. p. 141; also cf. esp. Plut. *κοιν. ἐν.* 1075 c. 31 where Cleanthes says that the sun will one day swallow up the moon and other heavenly bodies, which, being gods, will help him to destroy them.

3. **hic**: cf. *ille sol* in § 82; and De Or. 3, 209 sol me ille admonuit.

radiatus: the word is poetical; cf. Lucretius' *radiatum insigne diei*.

5. **decempeda etc.**: the disturbances in the MSS probably arose thus. In the archetype the scribe omitted the words *permensi refertis ego* and placed them on the margin; he denoted the place from which they were omitted by some mark, and put the same mark on the margin with the word *hic*, meaning 'at the place where this mark is, insert the words *permensi refertis ego*'. Succeeding scribes treated *hic* as part of the omission, and inserted all the words after *nego*, where they got partially corrupted, *hic* to *hoc* and *ego* to *ergo*.

refertis: so Lucr. 1, 75 (Epicurus) omne immensum peragrauit...unde refert nobis uictor quid possit oriri.

6. **quasi malis arch.**: there is a want of neatness about the apposition; but it seems due to Cic. and not to the copyists.

7. **leuiter**: C. F. W. Müller excellently defends this, quoting (among other passages) Tusc. 1, 95 quod leuius huic leuitati nomen imponam, and Sull. 3 grauius iudicium. Cf. § 12, and Amm. M. 29, 2, 24 ut leuius interpretemur.

8. **uerecundior**: why Halm should say that *leuiter* is intolerable without the change to *inuerecundior* I do not see; but the omission of *in* is a common mistake in MSS; cf. Leg. 1, 22 *iucundius iniucundius*; Phil. 2, 6 *pudica inpudica*; Sen. ep. 88, 8 (the same).

qu. physicorum: = naturales qu. in Seneca.

9. **animorum**: 'the mind'; see n. on 1, 20.

10. **quoddam quasi**: n. on 1, 40.

pabulum: so Cato m. 49 pabulum studi atque doctrinae; Tusc. 5, 66 pastus animorum; Fin. 5, 54 quasi quidam humanitatis cibus; Att. 12, 6, 2 scire (science)...quo uno animus alitur. Amm. Marc. 16, 5, 6 imitates our passage (Michael has overlooked this). The moral effect of the study of nature was strongly insisted on by the Stoics; see Fin. 4, 11; Tusc. 5, 71; Sen. ep. 65, 16; 88, 28; 117, 19. Hirzel, Unters. III 293—301 uses this passage in support of his argument for Philo as Cicero's authority. But surely *no* sceptic need have refrained from eulogising learning; indeed *προτρεπτικοὶ λόγοι* were written by some.

tesque supera atque caelestia haec nostra ut exigua et minima contemnimus. Indagatio ipsa rerum cum maximarum tum etiam occultissimarum habet oblectationem. Si uero aliquid occurrit quod ueri simile uideatur, humanissima completur animus uoluptate. Quaeret igitur haec et uester sapiens et 128
hic noster, sed uester ut adsentiatur credat adfirmet, noster ut uereatur temere opinari praeclareque agi secum putet, si in eius modi rebus ueri simile quod sit inuenerit. Veniamus nunc ad bonorum malorumque notionem: at paulum ante dicendum est. Non mihi uidentur considerare, cum

om. codd. edd. leuiter: *leniter* Bait. 8 uerecundior: *inuerecundior* Morgenstern. H Bait. M. 11 elatiores: *latiores* codd. uolgo; *elatiores* G; *clarioresque* Cant.; *altiores* cod. Lambini, tum H Bait. M. 12 minima: *minuta* Lamb. H Bait. 15 occurrit: *occurret* codd.; corr. Madu.; *occurret...complebitur* Lamb. humanissima: *inmanissima* A (sed *in* in ras.); *diuinissima* Bentl. 20 at paulum: ita scripsi; *et p.* codd.; *sed p.* H Bait. M. 21 considerare: *cons. se* Lamb.

consideratio contemplatioque: one of Cic.'s favourite 'doublets'; cf. Off. 1, 153; Rep. 1, 19; Tusc. 5, 9; Fin. 5 §§ 11, 58.

11. **erigimur**: sc. animo; cf. above § 11; Cato m. 82; Fin. 1, 57. A too literal interpretation of *erigimur* suggested *altiores;* this receives no real support from such passages as Fin. 2, 51 and Val. F. 2, 547 (qu. by Dav.); nor from Verg. Aen. 6, 49; Cic. Or. 119; Sen. clem. 1, 5, 5 animus...altior stetit.

despicimus: the attitude of the σοφὸς in nearly all ancient systems, but esp. the Stoic; see e.g. Rep. 1, 28; Fin. 2, 46; 5, 73; Tusc. 1, 95; 2, 11; 2, 17; 2, 30; 3, 15; 4, 61; 5, 4; Off. 1, 67, 72; Leg. 1, 61; De Or. 2, 344; Sen. dial. 6, 23, 2; Amm. 25, 4, 7; 23, 6, 53.

12. **haec nostra**: n. on § 120 haec.

exigua et minima: Madv. Fin. 5, 78 notes that except here Cic. writes *exigua et paene minima* or something of the kind. The text is protected by the imitation in Amm. 14, 6, 8 exigua haec spernentem et minima. Cf. σμικρὰ καὶ ἐλάχιστα: Orat. 52 rem difficilem atque omnium difficillimam; Leg. 3, 32 pauci atque admodum pauci. For *minuta* cf. (in re simili) Tusc. 2, 30 perexigua et minuta; Lucr. 5, 591 exigua parte breuique. For *et* introducing a stronger phrase cf. 1 § 11 n.

13. **indagatio ipsa**: Rep. 1, 19 cognitio ipsa rerum consideratioque delectat; Tusc. 5, 70; § 120 ipsa libertas.

14. **occultissimarum**: n. on 1, 19.

15. **occurrit**: probably perf. as in §§ 25, 124; see Madv. Op. 2, 282; Wesenb. on Tusc. 4, 35.

humanissima: 'most civilising'; Arch. 16 animi remissionem humanissimam. The epithet seems excellently in place.

completur: Fin. 5, 69 gaudio complerentur; Tusc. 5, 70.

18. **temere opinari**: n. on 2, 66.

praeclareque agi secum: § 80 n.; the phrase is used freely of persons all through Latin; less commonly of things, as in Sen. contr. 4, 4; Suet. Ner. 28 bene agi potuisse cum rebus humanis; cf. too the Test. porcelli (ed. Bücheler) rogo uos ut cum corpore meo bene faciatis. A less usual constr. is *illi bene actum* in Sen. dial. 6, 20, 6; and Cic. Off. 1, 46 eis in quibus praeclare agitur.

19. **quod sit**: cf. § 110, n. on deerit ...respondeat.

inuenerit: perf. subj. because dependent on *putet;* the man himself would say *puto si inuenero*. The circumstances with *cecinerit* below are similar; cf. too § 57 n.

20. **notionem**: ἔννοιαν: § 30 n.

at paulum ante: § 116 n.

21. **considerare...amittere**: for *se am.* This ellipse after verbs of thinking, speaking etc. is common; cf. § 64 ut ei respondere posse diffiderem; § 81; § 104; § 52 furere sentiant; 1 § 7; n. on 1, 18. I am unable to understand why Madv.

[physici] ista ualde adfirmant, earum etiam rerum auctoritatem, si quae illustriores uideantur, amittere. Non enim magis adsentiuntur neque approbant lucere nunc, quam, cum cornix cecinerit, tum aliquid eam aut iubere aut uetare, nec magis adfirmabunt signum illud, si erunt mensi, sex pedum esse quam solem, quem metiri non possunt, plus quam duodeuiginti partibus maiorem esse quam terram. Ex quo illa conclusio nascitur: si sol quantus sit percipi non potest, qui ceteras res eodem modo quo magnitudinem solis approbat, is eas res non percipit. Magnitudo autem solis percipi non potest. Qui igitur id approbat quasi percipiat, nullam rem percipit. Responderint posse percipi quantus sol sit. Non repugnabo, dum modo eodem pacto cetera percipi comprehendique dicant. Nec enim possunt dicere

1 [physici]: glossema uidetur; *physica* edd. post Manutium. 2 si quae: *se quae* Dau. H Bait. M. 3 nunc quam: *nunquam* Cant. (tum *nisi cum cornix* etc.); *quisquam* G; *nusquam* codd. uolgo. 8 modo quo: om. *quo* A^{1}BG Cant.; *m. quo modo* H Bait. 19 omitto: *et om.* codd.; corr. Madu. 20 ut

Em. 114 says that considerare does not belong to the class of verbs which are followed by the ellipse; nor why he says (Fin. 5, 31) that the ellipse after *puto* would be strange. His own exx. confute him.

1. **[physici]**: I doubt the Latinity of *physica affirmare.*

earum rerum si quae: 1 § 11 n.

2. **illustriores**: § 94.

3. **neque appr. lucere**: the same line of argument in § 119.

cornix: cf. *diuinationem* in § 126.

5. **illud**: δεικτικῶς (§ 82); see Introd. p. 47.

solem: § 82 n.

6. **duodeuiginti**: octodecim is not Ciceronian.

partibus: § 116 n.

7. **conclusio**: very like the arguments in §§ 77, 101.

sol quantus sit: § 91.

12. **non repugnabo**: so § 57.

14. **omnium rerum...comprehendendi**: not an ex. of a plural noun with singular gerund, but the words *una est def. compr.* form one notion on which omnium rerum depends. So Tusc. 4, 62 omnium philosophorum una est ratio medendi; De Or. 3, 156 quarum ego quid uobis inueniendi rationem ponam? Tim. 30 reliquorum siderum quae caussa collocandi fuerit; Tusc. 2, 9 Peripateticorum consuetudo dicendi; Off. 1, 50 naturae principia communitatis; Liu. 33, 13, 10 belli praeda rerum (where *rerum* depends on *belli praeda*). Other exx. in Madv. Fin. 1, 14 and Em. 198 sq.; cf. too above 1 § 33 n. Double genitives will be found above, 2 §§ 40, 53. For the phrase *una definitio* with gen. cf. *una ratio* with gen. in Diu. 1, 70; 2, 60; 2, 136; also *una depulsio* above, § 51 with n.

129 16. **quod coeperam**: there is of course ellipse of inf. as Cic. does not use the acc. with *coepi.*

quid...explorati: cf. Sext. P. H. 3, 175.

17. **fines constituendi sunt**: § 114 n.

18. **bonorum summa**: rare for *summum b.*; so Fin. 5, 21.

referatur: nn. on 1, 19 and 2, 24.

igitur: Draeger II § 355, 1 gives exx. of *igitur* as late in the clause as here, or even later; add Diu. 2, 8. The late position is common both in Cic. and in Lucr.

19. **maior dissensio**: so § 134; Fin. 1, 11; 2, 49; 3, 44; 5, 16; 5, 76; Tusc. 1, 18; N. D. 1, 2.

relicta: Erillus, Aristo, Pyrrho are usually classed together as authors of exploded systems; see Off. 1, 6; Tusc. 5, 85; Fin. 4, 40—43. In Fin. 2, 43 Chrysippus is stated to have given these systems their death-blow. Possibly *reiecta* should be read; see Fin. 2, 43 and below, § 130.

aliud alio magis minusue comprehendi, quoniam omnium rerum una est definitio comprehendendi.

XLII. Sed quod coeperam: quid habemus in rebus bonis et **129**
malis explorati? Nempe fines constituendi sunt ad quos et bonorum et malorum summa referatur: qua de re est igitur inter summos uiros maior dissensio? Omitto illa, quae relicta iam uidentur, ut Erillum, qui in cognitione et scientia summum bonum ponit; qui cum Zenonis auditor esset, uides quantum ab eo dissenserit et quam non multum a Platone. Megaricorum fuit nobilis disciplina, cuius, ut scriptum uideo, princeps Xenophanes, quem modo nominaui, deinde eum secuti Parmenides et Zeno, itaque ab his Eleatici philosophi nominabantur. Post Euclides, Socrati discipulus, Megareus, a quo idem illi Megarici dicti, qui id bonum solum esse dicebant, quod esset unum et simile et idem semper. Hi quoque multa a Platone. A Mene-

Erillum: om. *ut* ABU; *et illum* EGψ Harl.; *et nullum* Cant.; *ut Herillum* edd. post Dau. et Camerarium, qui coni. *Eryllum*. 22 Megaricorum: *megari quorum* B²Uψ. 25 Eleatici: *ereatrici* uel *eretriaci* codd.; corr. Victorius.

20. **erillum**: after *illa;* cf. § 103 Academia, a quibus, with n. For *Erillus* rather than *Herillus* see Madv. Fin. 2, 35.

in cognitione etc.: see Zeller III 1, pp. 53, 76, 236, 259 ed. 3.

22. **quam non multum**: so De Or. 3, 197; Liu. 5, 9, 5 quam non plus.

Megaricorum...Xenophanes: Cic. regards the Megarian and the Eleate school as connected like the school of Epicurus and that of Democritus. The Megarian system, by general consent, owed much to the Eleate. Cf. Diog. 2, 106 *οὗτος (Εὐκλείδης) τὰ Παρμενίδεια μετεχειρίζετο, καὶ οἱ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ Μεγαρικοὶ προσηγορεύοντο.*

23. **ut scriptum uideo**: so Diu. 1, 31; ib. 1, 89; ib. 1, 72 ut in Sullae scriptum historia uidemus; N. D. 1, 72 ut uidemus in scriptis; Off. 2, 25 ut scriptum legimus; Tusc. 3, 59 ut uideo nostrum scribere Antiochum; Fin. 4, 15; Rep. 1, 25. *Videmus* alone often means 'we read in history' (*ἀκούομεν*); so in § 13 above, and e.g. Brut. 54, 170; Rep. 1, 12. For the common phrase 'ut est apud aliquem' we occasionally have 'ut scriptum est ap. al.' as in Diu. 1, 56.

princeps: 'founder'; so often. For the omission of parts of the verb *esse* in short clauses containing a relative cf. § 131 quorum princeps Aristippus and a quo...dicta; Fin. 5, 7 Peripatetici ueteres, quorum princeps Aristoteles (where Bait. wrongly inserts *est*); ib. 2, 35 una (sententia) simplex, cuius auctor Zeno; Leg. 3, 35; Wesenberg is therefore wrong in inserting *est* in Tusc. 3, 18 qua nihil melius e terra, on the ground that it could not be omitted in a relative clause.

24. **modo**: § 123.

25. **post Euclides**: so § 13 post Epicurus, with the same ellipse.

26. **idem**: prob. the only form used by Cic. for the nom. plur. masc. Even inferior MSS frequently preserve it.

27. **unum et simile etc.**: cf. 1, 35 (of Zeno) simplex et solum et unum bonum; 1, 30 (of the Platonic *ἰδέα*) simplex et unius modi et tale quale esset; Plat. Phileb. 19 B *κατὰ παντὸς ἑνὸς καὶ ὁμοίου καὶ ταὐτοῦ.* Cf. Diog. 2, 106 *οὗτος ἓν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀπεφαίνετο πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι καλούμενον· ὅτε μὲν γὰρ φρόνησιν, ὅτε δὲ θεόν, καὶ ἄλλοτε νοῦν καὶ τὰ λοιπά.* [Possibly we should read *sui simile;* cf. Tim. 21 and tale quale esset in 1, 30.]

28. **hi quoque**: like Herillus; see above.

a Platone: for the ellipse see Draeger I² p. 201.

demo autem, quod is ex Eretria fuit, Eretriaci appellati, quorum omne bonum in mente positum et mentis acie, qua uerum cerneretur. Elii similia, sed, opinor, explicata uberius et ornatius.
130 Hos si contemnimus et iam abiectos putamus, illos certe minus despicere debemus, Aristonem, qui cum Zenonis fuisset auditor, re probauit ea quae ille uerbis, nihil esse bonum nisi uirtutem, nec malum nisi quod uirtuti esset contrarium; in mediis ea momenta, quae Zeno uoluit, nulla esse censuit. Huic summum bonum est in his rebus neutram in partem moueri, quae *ἀδιαφορία* ab ipso dicitur. Pyrrho autem ea ne sentire quidem sapientem, quae *ἀπάθεια* nominatur. Has igitur tot sententias ut omit-

1 ex Eretria: sic Cant.; *seretria* B[1]; *eretrias* EUψ Harl.; *eretria* A (sed *etria* in ras.) et edd. 3 Elii: ita scripsi; *ulli* codd. Halmii et ψ Harl.; *illi* Cant.; *illis* U; *Herilli* Madu. edd.; uid. adn. 10 Pyrrho: *Pyrrhoni* Dau. 11 *ἀπάθεια*:

1. **ex Eretria**: the ordinary reading *Eretria* gives us the simple abl. of origin, which in Cic. is extremely rare (Rosc. Am. 74). Possibly Cic. wrote *Eretrieus*, the ordinary Greek name, like *Megareus* above [Lamb. conjectured *Eretrius*].

Eretriaci: the connexion of this school with the Megarian is admittedly close; see Zeller II 1, p. 236 sq. ed. 3.

2. **mentis acie**: 'keenness of mental vision'.

3. **Elii**: referring to the school of Elis, of which the Eretrian was a continuation. The succeeding words are in favour of this emendation, as Phaedo of Elis was a writer of Socratic dialogues which were much admired, while Menedemus was a crabbed logician. The language used here is not sufficiently like that used about Erillus above, to make it probable that Cic. would go back to him, and the em. *Herilli* introduces an awkward loose apposition. The reading *illi* could only refer to the Megarians. [Possibly the right reading is Eliaci.]

4. **abiectos**: cf. *abiecti* in Fin. 2, 35; *explosus* in Off. 1, 6.

illos ... Aristonem ... Pyrrho autem: slight anacoluthon; cf. 1, 41 sed.

7. **mediis**: see nn. on 1 §§ 36, 37. *Momenta* is here the equivalent of *ἀξίαι* or *aestimationes*.

8. **uoluit**: sc. *inesse*.

nulla censuit: as to the general views of Aristo (*of Chios*) see Zeller III 1, p. 54 sq.; E. Tr. p. 58 sq. For his *ἀδιάφορα*, see Madv. Fin. 2, 43.

summum bonum: as to the Stoics so to Aristo, virtue consisted in a right attitude of mind towards the *ἀδιάφορα*. But how Aristo conceived that rightness of attitude, the ancient sources do not enable us to determine with precision. All we know is that while he would not allow that the *ἀδιάφορα* could be divided into the preferable and the non-preferable (as the Stoics divided them) yet he did not hold that the mind of the perfectly wise man would be absolutely unaffected by them, as Pyrrho held. See Fin. 4, 43 with Madvig's n.

9. **ἀδιαφορία**: more commonly applied to things than to a mental state.

10. **ab ipso**: see § 84 n.

Pyrrho: named out of order, as he was older than Aristo. For his moral system, which resembles that of Ar. not a little, see Zeller III 1, 488 sq. ed. 3. *Ἀταραξία* is the word commonly used of Pyrrho, but *ἀπάθεια* occurs in Diog. 9, 108 (he also gives *πρᾳότης*) and *μετριοπάθεια* in Sext.; see Zeller.

11. **quae**: for the attraction cf. n. on § 30.

12. **diu multumque**: see 1, 4 n.

13. **quorum etc.**: 129 n.

14. **post Ep.**: 129 n.

15. **est...consentiens**: see n. on 1 § 23. As to the differences between Arist. and Epic. see Zeller III 1, 440 sq. ed. 3 or E. Tr. p. 447 sq.

16. **uol. et hon.**: cf. § 139. For the word *honestas* see 1, 35 n.

17. **finem**: the reading *finis* is very

tamus, haec nunc uideamus quae diu multumque defensa sunt.
Alii uoluptatem finem esse uoluerunt, quorum princeps Aristip- **131**
pus, qui Socraten audierat, unde Cyrenaici. Post Epicurus, cuius est disciplina nunc notior, neque tamen cum Cyrenaicis de ipsa uoluptate consentiens. Voluptatem autem et honestatem finem esse Callipho censuit; uacare omni molestia Hieronymus; hoc idem cum honestate Diodorus; ambo hi Peripatetici. Honeste autem uiuere fruentem rebus eis, quas primas homini natura conciliet, et uetus Academia censuit, ut indicant scripta Polemonis, quem Antiochus probat maxime, et Aristoteles

apati codd. uolgo; *apathia* Cant. 12 nunc uideamus quae: *uid. q. nunc* codd.; *nunc* incl. H. 17 finem: *finis* ABU et Bait. M.

improbable, as Cic. elsewhere uses the sing. of any view of the *summum bonum* which combines two elements.

Callipho: as the Greek stem has a τ in it, this should be written Calliphon; but we probably have a survival from the old drama, where the Gk. names in *-pho* made gen. *-phonis*. See the elaborate examination of this subject in Neue, Form. I^2 pp. 149—151, 156 sq. *Calliphonem* is in the best MSS of Off. 3, 119, but our MSS give *Calliphontem* below, § 139.

Hieronymus: 'quem iam cur Peripateticum appellem nescio', Fin. 5, 14; cf. ib. 2 §§ 19, 35, 41. Hardly anything is known of him, beyond the fact that his τέλος was ἀοχλησία = uacare omni molestia (so also rendered by Sen. ep. 92, 5, by *quies* ib.; so too Aug. c. d. 19, 1). Sometimes Cic. gives the less suitable rendering 'uacuitas doloris', which however does not deserve to be called 'inepta' (as by Hoyer, de Ant. Ascal. Bonn, 1883) since the meaning of *dolor* is loose enough to represent ὄχλος.

18. **Diodorus**: see Zeller II 2, p. 934.

19. **honeste uiuere etc.**: the leading peculiarity of the Stoic ethics is the conception of 'nature' as the guide in morality. This function was first assigned to 'nature' by Polemo. [In Clem. Strom. 418 D the words τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν are evidently a gloss on Speusippus' own word ἀγαθά.] Antiochus, who attributed Polemo's doctrine to the whole of the older Academy (1 § 19) seems to have been unable to adduce documentary proof. (Plut. *κοιν. ἐνν.* 1069 repeats Antiochus.) But the phrase *βίος κατὰ φύσιν* bore very different senses to Polemo and to the Stoics. Probably Polemo merely used *φύσις* as the contrast to convention (*θέσις*) while to the Stoic the word implied the whole of the physical and theological principles of his school. It is most likely that Polemo himself stated his τέλος in the simple words—*κατὰ φύσιν ζῆν*. The numerous expansions of this which we have in Cic. are traceable to Antiochus, who glossed it with Stoic phrases. This comes out very clearly in Fin. 4, 14, where Polemo's τέλος is explained in terms confessedly Stoic 'omnibus aut maximis rebus eis quae secundum naturam sint fruentem uiuere'. (Cf. also Fin. 4, 26, 27.) In this statement virtue is evidently reckoned as one of the things 'secundum naturam', hence the doctrine as here given is identical with that attributed (by Ant.) to the Old Academy, above 1 § 22, where the things 'secundum naturam' are broken up into two divisions (1) the *prima naturae* or *πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν* and (2) the *per sese expetenda* or virtue and virtuous actions. The statements of Old Academic doctrine in Fin. 2, 34 and 5, 21 are practically the same.

21. **Aristoteles**: Antiochus argued again that the *κατὰ φύσιν ζῆν* of Polemo implied the *τριλογία τῶν ἀγαθῶν* which made up the Peripatetic τέλος, because each of these classes of *ἀγαθὰ* is *κατὰ φύσιν*. Hence the statement of the *finis* in 1, 19; also Fin. 5, 24 and 26. This Antiochean view of Peripateticism is expressed in Stob. Eth. 268. The idea of *φύσις* as the standard of morality belongs no more to early Peripateticism in general than to early Academicism.

eiusque amici huc proxime uidentur accedere. Introducebat etiam Carneades, non quo probaret, sed ut opponeret Stoicis, summum bonum esse frui rebus eis, quas primas natura conciliauisset. Honeste autem uiuere, quod ducatur a conciliatione naturae, Zeno statuit finem esse bonorum, qui inuentor et princeps Stoicorum fuit.

132 XLIII. Iam illud perspicuom est, omnibus eis finibus bonorum, quos exposui, malorum finis esse contrarios. Ad uos nunc refero quem sequar, modo ne quis illud tam ineruditum absurdumque respondeat, 'quemlibet, modo aliquem'. Nihil potest dici inconsideratius. Cupio sequi Stoicos. Licetne—omitto per

1 amici: *aemuli* Bentl. huc: Io. Scala ex cod. aliquo; *nunc* codd. 4 honeste autem uiuere: *honesta aut. uidere* G Cant.; *honesta aut. uidetur* A¹B¹ (*honestum a.* A²B²); *honestum autem quod* etc. EUψ; corr. Dau. cum uno codice. 7 omni-

1. **amici**: 'followers', or 'admirers' not necessarily contemporaries. The usage is not uncommon; see Att. 2, 16, 3 controuersia est Dicaearcho familiari tuo cum Theophrasto amico meo; so ib. 2, 7, 4; 6, 1, 18; 13, 30, 3; Fin. 2, 44; Tusc. 3, 22. Similarly γνώριμος in Ael. Var. h. 3, 17. Faber quotes the argument of Muretus that Dion. Halic. must have been contemporary with Isocrates because he called the latter his ἑταῖρος. Aemuli is used somewhat similarly, as in Mur. 61; cf. Tac. h. 3, 81; Liu. 1, 18, 2.

huc: the MSS reading *nunc* seems out of place, as the drift of the passage is to shew that the Old Peripatetics, not the New, were in harmony with the Old Academics.

2. **non quo prob.**: 'not that he held the view himself' (cf. § 139); so De Or. 1, 84 Charmadas, non quo aperiret sententiam suam. *Probaret* has a different sense from *probarit* in De Or. 2, 161 Carneades nullam umquam rem defendisse quam non probarit ('did not make good to his audience'). In nearly all the passages where this view of Carn. is quoted, he is stated to have advanced it for argument's sake, against the Stoics.

3. **frui etc.**: this view of Carn. is given in Fin. 2, 35 frui principiis naturalibus; ib. 5, 20 frui rebus eis quas primas secundum naturam esse diximus; Tusc. 5, 84 naturae primis aut omnibus aut maximis frui. If this last passage be compared with Fin. 4, 14 (qu. above) the difference between Polemo's finis (as there stated) and that of Carneades is seen to be that Polemo embraces 'τὰ κατὰ φύσιν' *generally*, while C. embraces only 'τὰ πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν', in which he did not include virtue (Fin. 2 §§ 38, 42 and 5 § 22). This important difference (see 1, 36 n. on *secundum naturam*) is often overlooked, as by Madv. on Fin. 4, 15, where he misunderstands Ac. 1, 22; also by Hirzel, Unters. II 623 n. (though he insists elsewhere on the distinction).

rebus quas primas etc.: as to the difficult subject of the πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν I can do little more than refer the reader to Zeller's exposition of Stoicism and the IVth Excursus to Madvig's De Fin. (though I hold M. to be in error on some important points). The objects so designated are, roughly, those which unperverted natural instinct prompts human beings to desire. Nature is said to *attract* us towards these things (οἰκειοῦν, conciliare) and the attraction or prompting is called ὁρμή (§ 30 n.).

4. **quod ducatur etc.**: the steps by which the Stoic system rises from the primary natural promptings to the life of virtue are shewn at length in Fin. III.

5. **inuentor et princeps**: the two words come together in Fin. 3, 5 (of Zeno); Brut. 253; Inu. 1, 43; ib. 2, 6; De Or. 1, 47; ib. 1, 91; Tusc. 1, 48.

7. **iam illud**: n. on § 86; and for *iam...perspicuom est* at the outset of a sentence cf. § 24 above; De Or. 2, 215; ib. 3, 210; Tusc. 3, 28; Fin. 1, 56; ib. 3, 59.

Aristotelen, meo iudicio in philosophia prope singularem—per ipsum Antiochum? qui appellabatur Academicus, erat quidem si perpauca mutauisset, germanissimus Stoicus. Erit igitur res iam in discrimine; nam aut Stoicus constituatur sapiens aut ueteris Academiae. Vtrumque non potest; est enim inter eos non de terminis, sed de tota possessione contentio. Nam omnis ratio uitae definitione summi boni continetur, de qua qui dissident, de omni uitae ratione dissident. Non potest igitur uterque sapiens esse, quoniam tanto opere dissentiunt, sed alter. Si Polemonius, peccat Stoicus, rei falsae adsentiens—namque idem nihil esse dicitis a sapiente tam alienum—sin uera sunt

bus: *in omn.* AUψ Cant. 11 per Arist.: *per ipsos Ar.* EUψ Cant. 15 constituatur: *constituetur* coni. Lamb. al.; post *sapiens* addit *necesse est* M. 21 namque idem: ita scripsi; *num quidem* codd. exc. B (*non q.*) et G (*uos q.*) et Cant. (*nos q.*); *nam uos quidem* edd. post. Dau.

8. **malorum finis**: τέλος in Greek was confined to things good; apart from the title of Cic.'s work 'De Finibus', Hirzel Unt. 2, 664 says that there are only two passages in Latin (ours and Varro ap. Aug. c. d. 19, 1) where *finis* has the wider sense, and only one or two passages in Greek where τέλος has that meaning. See n. on § 114.

10. **quemlibet**: cf. §§ 125, 126.

modo aliquem: cf. Ter. ad. 187 cupio, aequi modo aliquid.

11. **omitto per**: Vaucher wishes to eject *per;* cf. however Verr. 2, 183 omitto de melle.

12. **prope singularem**: Tusc. 1, 22 Aristoteles longe omnibus—Platonem semper excipio—praestans; so Fin. 5, 7; Leg. 1, 15; ib. 2, 39; Rab. post. 23.

per ipsum ant.: a similar line of argument is often taken by Sext., as in P. H. 1, 88; 2, 32.

14. **germanissimus Stoicus**: no doubt a widespread opinion about Ant. There is no need to suppose (with Hirzel III 305) that Cic. must have taken it from a book of Philo. In the interesting and important work of Kiessling and Wilamowitz-Moellendorf on Antigonus of Karystos (Philol. Unters. IV Berlin 1881) p. 285 it is insisted that the identification of Old Academicism and Old Peripateticism by Antiochus was justified by the fact that Peripatetics were often reckoned as still members of the Academic Society. But what Ant. did was not to fuse *two societies* but to fuse *two systems*, a proceeding for which the fact affords no justification.

15. **aut Stoicus aut u. Ac.**: the harmony between Stoicism and the 'Old Academicism' of Antiochus has been thoroughly assumed up to this point (cf. § 119); now Cic. takes his stand on the small differences and pronounces them irreconcileable. As these differences are in the domain of ethics they are treated as all important; cf. Fin. 5, 14 qui de summo bono dissentit, de tota philosophiae ratione dissentit; so Fin. 3, 41; Aug. c. d. 19, 1 neque enim existimat (Varro from Antiochus) ullam philosophiae sectam esse dicendam quae non eo distat a ceteris quod diuersos habeat finis bonorum et malorum. Hirzel makes this distinction between Ant. and the Stoics one of his main arguments to shew that Cic. in this section borrowed from some work of Philo. But the *line of attack* we find here had no doubt been used by Sceptics time out of mind, and Cic. only adapted it to the case of Ant. and the Stoics.

17. **terminis...possessione**: the legal phraseology should be noticed; cf. the strikingly similar passage, Leg. 1, 55.

19. **uterque**: but above *utrumque* ('both things').

20. **si Polemonius**: for the ellipse see n. on § 50.

21. **peccat**: cf. 1, 37 peccata with n.

Zenonis, eadem in ueteres Academicos et Peripateticos dicenda. 133 Hic igitur neutri adsentietur? Sin, inquam, uter est prudentior? Quid? Cum ipse Antiochus dissentit quibusdam in rebus ab his, quos amat, Stoicis, nonne iudicat non posse illa probanda esse sapienti? Placet Stoicis omnia peccata esse paria; at hoc Antiocho uehementissime displicet. Liceat tandem mihi considerare utram sententiam sequar. Praecide, inquit: statue aliquando quidlibet. Quid quod quae dicuntur et acuta mihi uidentur in utramque partem et paria? Nonne caueam ne scelus faciam? Scelus enim dicebas esse, Luculle, dogma prodere. Contineo igitur me, ne incognito adsentiar, quod mihi tecum
134 est dogma commune. Ecce multo maior etiam dissensio. Zeno

1 et Perip.: *et* om. codd.; *Peripateticosque* ψ. dicenda: *d. sunt* ψ. 2 adsentietur? sin, inquam: ita emendaui; *adsentiens si numquam* codd., quod multis modis emendatum est. 4 iudicat: Harl.; *indicat* codd. cett. et edd. posse illa probanda esse: *esse illa probanda* Lamb. Bait.; *posse esse i. p.* Cant. 8 quid quod quae d.: Guietus probante Maduigio; *quid quae dicuntur quid* ABU; *queque dicuntur que* Cant.; *que dicuntur quidem* ψ; *quaeque d. quidem* E; *quidlibet*

1. **Zenonis**: n. on 1, 13.
Academicos et Per.: but above, *ueteris Academiae* merely.
dicenda: possibly *sunt* has dropped out in the MSS exc. ψ; cf. a similar passage, Fin. 1, 68. In short emphatic clauses, however, *sunt* is often omitted with the gerundive, as above 1, 7; Fin. 1, 43 (Madv.); cf. n. on § 86.
2. **adsentietur**: prob. the final syllable first dropped out (cf. § 26 tenetur) and *adsentiet* readily passed into *adsentiens;* cf. e.g. the readings in Att. 1, 1, 1 (denegans Boot, denegat MSS); Leg. 1, 15; Vell. 2, 19, 3; also above § 126 *admonens.*
sin...prudentior: the words *uter est prudentior* are so suitable that any emendation ought to leave them untouched; cf. Diu. 2, 132; Hor. s. 2, 3, 102. The ellipse of *adsentietur* with *sin* is not harsher than many ellipses with particles; cf. esp. one with *sin* in Att. 13, 31, 3 where *sin* has the force of 'otherwise' as here; cf. too ib. 16, 13 b 2 (ed. Wes.) si pares aeque inter se, quiescendum, sin ('otherwise') latius manabit. In the latter passage the *sin* is preceded by *si*, but that makes no real difference. Somewhat similar are the ellipses with *hoc ubi* (*sc. contigerit*) in Verg. G. 2, 312 and *simul ac* (Att. 13, 21, 1); also with *sicubi, si quando* (Tusc. 3, 14); *si quidem* (Leg. 1, 12).
3. **quid?** see n. on 1 § 13.
4. **iudicat**: this verb is often used of those who make admissions to their own detriment; e.g. pro Quint. 31; and Tusc. 5, 61.
non posse...probanda esse: cf. n. on 1, 43 uerum esse etc.
5. **peccata...paria**: for this much ridiculed Stoic doctrine see Zeller, Stoics, E. Tr. p. 250.
7. **praecide**: sc. sermonem; 'cut it short'; a colloquial phrase; cf. Cato m. 57 breui praecidam; Att. 8, 4, 2 numquam...tam praecise negaui quam hic mihi; plane sine ulla exceptione praecidit.
inquit: n. on § 79.
8. **quid quod quae**: for the assonance cf. 1, 6 n.
9. **in utramque p.**: n. on 1, 46.
10. **dicebas**: § 27.
11. **incognito**: cf. § 16 n.
12. **dogma**: n. on § 27.
ecce: used very often by Cic. to draw particular attention to a new matter; e.g. Leg. 1, 6; Phil. 1, 6; cf. above 1, 6, and *ecce tibi* in § 121.
maior dissensio: § 129.
13. **beatam uitam**: n. on 1, 34.

in una uirtute positam beatam uitam putat. Quid Antiochus? Etiam, inquit, beatam, sed non beatissimam. Deus ille, qui nihil censuit deesse uirtuti, homuncio hic, qui multa putat praeter uirtutem homini partim cara esse, partim etiam necessaria. Sed ille uereor ne uirtuti plus tribuat quam natura patiatur, praesertim Theophrasto multa diserte copioseque dicente. Et hic metuo ne uix sibi constet, qui cum dicat esse quaedam et corporis et fortunae mala, tamen eum, qui in his omnibus sit, beatum fore censeat, si sapiens sit. Distrahor: tum hoc mihi probabilius, tum illud uidetur, et tamen, nisi alterutrum sit, uirtutem iacere plane puto. Verum in his discrepant.

XLIV. Quid? Illa, in quibus consentiunt num pro ueris **135**

quaelibet d. quae G; *quid? si quae* Moser. H Bait. M. 9 in utr. partem: haec uerba post u. *dicuntur* collocant H (auctore Orellio) Bait. M, nulla necessitate. 16 cara: *clara* codd. exc. E (*elata*); fort. *praeclara;* cf. *mihi praeclarum*, Verr. act. 1, 34; *tibi p.* Verr. 2, 113, *rem p. iuuentuti* Sest. 96; etc. 18 dicente: *contra d.* Goer. edd. recentiores; *multa contra* Lamb. 21 censeat: B^2G; *senseat* AB^1; *senciat* E; *sentiat* Cant. fort. recte (cf. 1 § 23 n.). 24 quid? illa: *quid illud* codd.

14. **etiam**: 'yes', as often.

beatam sed non beatissimam: there are many testimonies to this opinion of Ant.; cf. esp. above 1 § 23; Fin. 5, 81 (a passage closely resembling ours); Varro ap. Aug. c. d. 19, 1; and Sen. ep. 92, 14. In Fin. 5, 71 it is stated (from Ant.) that the *bona corporis et externa* (see above, 1, 19—21) have some, but only a very small, influence on happiness. Ant. herein held the same ground as Speusippus and Xenocrates; see Sen. ep. 85, 18 and 71, 18; also Cic. Tusc. 5, 39. It is strange that Madv. on Fin. 5, 81 should regard this view as formalised from those of Aristotle and Theophrastus and should be at a loss to point out whence Antiochus drew it.

deus ille: sc. fuit; see n. on § 86. Deus = 'superhuman'; cf. Aristotle's *ἢ θεὸς ἢ θηρίον*.

deus...homuncio: a sarcastic way of insinuating the wideness of the difference between Ant. and the Stoics. The words *deus* and *homuncio* are contrasted in Ter. Eun. 591; Iuuen. 5, 133; cf. Cic. N.D. 3, 76; Sen. ep. 116, 7 nos homunciones sumus, omnia nobis negare non possumus.

16. **necessaria**: i.e. ad uitam beatissimam.

17. **plus quam...patiatur**: § 54 n.

18. **Theophrasto**: he did not even allow that, with virtue, a man must needs be happy; bodily and external disadvantages might deprive the virtuous man of his happiness. See 1 §§ 33, 35; Fin. 5 §§ 12, 77, 85; Tusc. 5, 24.

20. **fortunae mala**: *ἐκτὸς κακά*: the word *fortunae* is perhaps chosen because Theophr. used to approve the Greek original of the line 'uitam regit fortuna non sapientia' (Tusc. 5, 25).

qui...sit: 'who is surrounded by these, and no others'. For the emphatic use of *omnibus* cf. Hor. ep. 1, 5, 2 holus omne prandere 'vegetables and nothing else'; N. D. 2, 56, 58; Fin. 3, 61 si sint in maiore parte earum rerum quas secundum naturam esse diximus.

21. **sapiens**: i.e. perfectly virtuous; so in the corresponding passage, Fin. 5, 81; see also n. on § 27, above.

tum hoc tum illud: n. on § 121.

22. **nisi...sit**: see § 10 n.

23. **iacere**: § 79 n.

uerum...discrepant: cf. 1 § 21 n. on *ergo haec animorum.*

24. **num**: for the position of *num* in the sentence cf. n. on § 100.

probare possumus? Sapientis animum numquam nec cupiditate moueri nec laetitia efferri. Age, haec probabilia sane sint: num etiam illa, numquam timere, numquam dolere? Sapiensne non timeat, ne patria deleatur, non doleat, si deleta sit? Durum, sed Zenoni necessarium, cui praeter honestum nihil est in bonis, tibi uero, Antioche, minime, cui praeter honestatem multa bona, praeter turpitudinem multa mala uidentur, quae et uenientia metuat sapiens necesse est et uenisse doleat. Sed quaero quando ista fuerint ab Academia uetere decreta, ut animum sapientis commoueri et conturbari negarent? Mediocritates illi probabant et in omni permotione naturalem uolebant esse quendam modum. Legimus omnes Crantoris ueteris Academici de luctu;

2 efferri: *ecferri* AB²; *haec ferri* B¹. 4 ne patria: *nec si p.* codd. qui alia hic habent turbata; corr. Dau. Madu. 9 ab Acad.: *ab* om. codd. H. decreta:

1. **sapientis...efferri**: the Stoic doctrine, for which see 1, 38 nn. The fact that Ant. accepted the doctrine is stated only here. It must not be forgotten, however, that the apathy even of the Stoic *sapiens* is not absolute (n. on 1, 38); and Ant. may have argued that the Stoic εὐπάθεια really comes to much the same as the moderated πάθος of the Peripatetic. See too Plato quoted in n. on 1, 38. But the Stoic *sapiens* is absolutely ἄλυπος, and it is to this point that most of the criticism against Stoic ἀπάθεια is addressed.

cupiditate: for the more usual *libidine*; see 1, 38 n.

2. **sane**: n. on § 105. It is assumed that the avoidance of passion and delight is more conceivable than that of fear and pain.

3. **sapiensne etc.**: for the form cf. Ter. Ph. 186 loquar? incendam; taceam? instigem; purgem me? laterem lauem; Att. 12, 40, 2 ne doleam? qui potest? ne iaceam? quis umquam minus? For the substance Plut. 1057 D ἄφοβος δὲ μένει (ὁ σοφὸς) καὶ ἄλυπος καὶ ἀήττητος καὶ ἀβιάστος, τιτρωσκόμενος, ἀλγῶν, στρεβλούμενος, ἐν κατασκαφαῖς πατρίδος, ἐν πάθεσι τοιούτοις: Sen. ep. 74, 31; ib. 85, 29.

4. **deleta**: cf. Fin. 4, 66 exstinctam patriam.

durum: so Tusc. 1, 107 durum hoc sane; Hor. od. 1, 24, 19 durum, sed leuius fit patientia. Short clauses in apposition to the preceding sentence are common in Cic.; see my n. on Lael. 67.

5. **in bonis**: 'in the category of the good'. For this phrase see 1, 34 n.

6. **cui...uidentur**: nn. on 1, 19 and 22.

9. **Academia uetere...illi**: n. on § 103.

decreta: n. on § 27.

ut...negarent: explanatory of *ista*.

10. **mediocritates**: μεσότητας, as often in Arist.; cf. Tusc. 3 §§ 11, 22, 74. The theory of the mean is distinctively Peripatetic, but the doctrine of the πέρας in Plato's Philebus resembles it in some respects.

11. **permotione**: see 1 § 32 n.; Cic. sometimes has *commotio animi*, as Tusc. 4, 61; cf. Quint. 5, 10, 28.

naturalem modum: Cato m. 46 uoluptatis, cuius est fortasse quidam naturalis modus; Tusc. 3, 74.

12. **Crantoris**: sc. librum; cf. 1 § 13 n. on *contra ea Philonis*. For his opinion as to ἀπάθεια see Zeller II 1, p. 898 ed. 3.

13. **aureolus libellus**: two diminutives are not often thus joined by Cic. The usage is rather colloquial; cf. Tusc. 2, 42; ib. 3, 2; N. D. 3, 43; and for *aureolus* § 119 flumen aureum, with n.; Sen. fr. § 47 (Haase) aureolus Theophrasti liber. Cic., as is well known, used this book of Crantor in writing his *Consolatio* on Tullia's death, and also in his Tusc.

Tuberoni Panaetius: we find from Fin. 4, 23 that Panaetius himself dedicated to Tubero a work 'de dolore patiendo'. Hecato also dedicated a work to him (Off. 3, 63).

est enim non magnus, uerum aureolus et, ut Tuberoni Panaetius praecipit, ad uerbum ediscendus libellus. Atque illi quidem etiam utiliter a natura dicebant permotiones istas animis nostris datas, metum cauendi causa, misericordiam aegritudinemque clementiae; ipsam iracundiam fortitudinis quasi cotem esse dicebant, recte secusne alias uiderimus. Atrocitas quidem ista tua **136**
quo modo in ueterem Academiam irruperit nescio: illa uero ferre non possum, non quo mihi displiceant (sunt enim Socratica pleraque mirabilia Stoicorum, quae *παράδοξα* nominantur) sed ubi Xenocrates, ubi Aristoteles ista tetigit? Hos enim quasi eosdem esse uoltis. Illi umquam dicerent sapientis solos reges, solos diuites, solos formosos, omnia, quae ubique essent, sapientis

E et r et edd.; *dicta* codd. (cf. § 103) exc. B (*durata*) et A (*dunt tia*); *dictata* coni. H; fort. leg. *declarata*. 22 hos enim: U (et r); *hoc en.* codd. cett.

14. **ad uerbum ed.**: so De Or. 1, 157, and cf. the common phrase *ad u. exprimere*.

illi quidem: Cic. goes back to the old Academy generally, assuming that Crantor's book has made his views familiar to everybody.

15. **utiliter...datas**: the same words in Tusc. 4, 43; cf. also 4, 79, and Sen. ep. 85, 3; 116, 3.

a natura d.: see 1, 15 n.

dicebant...dicebant: for the repetition cf. 1, 44 dixerunt...dixerunt.

17. **cotem**: so Tusc. 4, 43; and 4, 48 ardores animorum cotesque uirtutum; Sen. de ira 3, 3, 1 Aristoteles (iram) calcar ait esse uirtutis. Cf. also Philod. *περὶ ὀργῆς* (ap. Bonitz Fragm. Arist. 95) *ἔνιοι τῶν Περιπατητικῶν ἐκτέμνειν τὰ νεῦρα τῆς ψυχῆς φασὶ τοὺς τὴν ὀργὴν καὶ τὸν θυμὸν αὐτῆς ἐξαιροῦντας.* This view is combated at length by Seneca and by Cic. in Tusc. IV.

18. **recte secusne**: Michael, De Ammiani M. studiis Ciceronianis p. 32 gives exx. of this phrase from Cic. with imitations from Ammian.

alias uid.: an evident allusion to the Tusc. Disp. where the Stoic view of the emotions is elaborately argued by Cic. That view is supported casually in Fin. 2, 27.

uiderimus: n. on § 19.

ista tua: still addressing Antiochus, as above (*tibi uero, Ant.*).

19. **illa...possum**: so in § 114.

20. **Socratica pleraque**: Parad. 4 mihi ista *παράδοξα* quae appellant maxime uidentur esse Socratica longeque uerissima. Scattered utterances from the Socratic dialogues of Plato and others were easily producible in support of this assertion. See Tusc. 3, 10, where the Socratic origin of the doctrine that all fools are mad is stated, and edd. refer to the 'Second Alcibiades' and Xen. Mem. 3, 9, 6. In Parad. 23 it is stated that S. affirmed 'peccata esse paria'.

21. **mirabilia**: this rendering of *παράδοξα* occurs in Fin. 3, 48; Lael. 45; Parad. 35; but *admirabilia* in Fin. 4, 74; Parad. 4; Quint. 4, 1, 41. The work of Cic. entitled *Admiranda* seems to have been devoted to startling natural occurrences.

22. **ubi Xenocrates**: a curious admission that Xenocrates was not a close follower of Socrates. Cf. 1, 17 n., and n. on § 143.

tetigit: emphatic = 'even hinted at'.

quasi: 'almost'; see n. on § 74 and cf. Fin. 5, 21 antiquis quos eosdem Academicos et Peripateticos nominamus; above 1 §§ 18, 22.

23. **dicerent**: Roby, Gram. § 1533 (c); cf. too § 1708.

solos reges etc.: for all this see Zeller, Stoics E. Tr. p. 253 sq. and Cic. Parad. Clemens, Strom. II 367 A (see Zeller II, 1, p. 862 ed. 3 or E. Tr. Plato etc. p. 580) puts into the mouth of Speusippus the doctrine '*ὁ σοφὸς μόνος βασιλεὺς καὶ ἄρχων*', but Zeller supposes Sp. to have been employing Cynic expressions there, not his own.

esse? Neminem consulem praetorem imperatorem, nescio an ne quinqueuirum quidem quemquam nisi sapientem? Postremo, solum ciuem, solum liberum, insipientis omnis peregrinos exsules seruos furiosos? Denique scripta Lycurgi, Solonis, duodecim tabulas nostras non esse leges, ne urbis quidem aut
137 ciuitatis, nisi quae essent sapientium? Haec tibi, Luculle, si es adsensus Antiocho, familiari tuo, tam sunt defendenda quam moenia, mihi autem bono modo, tantum quantum uidebitur. XLV. Legi apud Clitomachum, cum Carneades et Stoicus Diogenes ad senatum in Capitolio starent, A. Albinum, qui tum P. Scipione et M. Marcello consulibus praetor esset, eum, qui cum auo tuo, Luculle, consul fuit, doctum sane hominem, ut

4 scripta: *scita* coni. Goerenz.; uid. adn. 5 urbis quidem: *urb. denique* codd. uolgo; *u. igitur den.* ψ. 11 et M. Marc.: *et* incl. Bait. 15 Stoico: glossema uidetur Halmio; incl. Bait. 18 ille noster: *i. uester* Dau. plane... balbutiens; uid. fragm. 31. 19 uerenti ne: codd. uolgo *ueremini;* corr. Chris-

2. **quinqueuirum**: 'constable'; a subordinate police official.

3. **liberum**: on the principle '*οὐδεὶς ἐλεύθερος ἑαυτοῦ μὴ κρατῶν*' (Epict. Fr. 114 Dübner).

4. **denique**: does not necessarily conclude a series of questions or statements, but emphasises that one with which it goes. See Munro on Lucr. 1, 17 and cf. the curious repetitions of *denique* in Orat. 74.

scripta: a strange word, at first sight, to apply to the legislation of Lycurgus etc.; but there is point in it. The Stoic regards these statutes as not strictly laws, but *writings under the hand* of the respective legislators. If em. were needed I should prefer *praescripta*, which would very well represent *ῥῆτραι*. There is little force in the objection of Goer. that Lycurgus forbade the committal of his laws to writing.

6. **si es adsensus**: i.e. ut fecisti.

7. **tam...moenia**: cf. §§ 8, 119; Diu. 2, 37 urbem philosophiae proditis dum castella defenditis.

8. **bono modo**: a colloquial phrase; see Att. 13, 23, 3; Q. Fr. 2, 6, 3; Plautine also.

9. **legi apud**: § 129, n. on *ut scriptum uideo*. The work of Cl. is probably that qu. in § 102.

Stoicus Diogenes: for the position of the epithet cf. 1, 46 Epicurio Zenone; 2, 16 Stratoniceus Metrodorus; 2, 73 Chius Metrodorus; (but in Fin. 2, 24 Diog. Stoicus); Leg. 1, 15; 2, 41; Tusc. 3, 19 Heracliotes Dionysius (cf. above § 71 Dion. ille Her.); N. D. 1, 27; 1, 34; Tusc. 5, 90; Quint. 1, 1, 9 Babylonius Diogenes; 3, 1, 10 and 16. Mommsen's account of this famous embassy is familiar to all.

10. **ad senatum starent**: 'were in waiting on the senate'; cf. *stare ad cyathos* etc.

in Capitolio: outside the temple, in which the senate met.

A. Albinum: see Teuffel, Röm. Litt. p. 196 ed. 4.

11. **consulibus**: Cic. had to ask Atticus for this information; see Att. 12, 23, 2.

14. **Carneade**: § 89, n. on Vlixe.

praetor esse non uideor etc.: the words *quia sapiens non sum* spoil the story, and are probably an insertion by half-instructed copyists. Albinus was far too well acquainted with the Greeks to confound Stoic with Academic tenets (cf. Polyb. 40, 6). He evidently rallied the Academic philosopher on his assertion that all things are uncertain: 'you do not think that what we fancy we see here is a city', i.e. it may be nothing at all, or something very different from what it appears to be. Carneades then turned the jest by saying 'It is the Stoic

indicat ipsius historia scripta Graece, iocantem dixisse Carneadi: 'ego tibi, Carneade, praetor esse non uideor [quia sapiens non sum] nec haec urbs nec in ea ciuitas'. Tum ille: 'huic Stoico non uideris'. Aristoteles aut Xenocrates, quos Antiochus sequi uolebat, non dubitauisset quin et praetor ille esset et Roma urbs et eam ciuitas incoleret. Sed ille noster est plane, ut supra dixi, Stoicus, perpauca balbutiens. Vos autem mihi uerenti ne **138**
labar ad opinionem et aliquid asciscam et comprobem incognitum, quod mimine uoltis, quid consili datis? Testatur saepe Chrysippus tris solas esse sententias, quae defendi possint, de finibus bonorum: circumcidit et amputat multitudinem; aut enim honestatem esse finem aut uoluptatem aut utrumque; nam

tius; *qui ueremini* Harl. (sed *qui* in ras.) ut coni. Bentl. 20 opinionem: *opinationem* (auctore Bentleio) H Bait. M. 22 tris: codd. plerique; *tis* B; *ty* A (item § 124 *tris* est in codd. paene omnibus). de finibus: *definitis* codd. exc. B (*definitu*) et U (*de finibus*); uid. adn.

who thinks this is no city', i.e. because it is not inhabited by wise men. Cf. esp. the following passage: Quint. 12, 2, 24 Pyrrhon quidem quas in hoc opere (the training of the orator) partes habere potest? Cui iudices esse, apud quos uerba faciat, et reum pro quo loquatur, et senatum in quo sit dicenda sententia, non liquebit. For the words (the resemblance is accidental) cf. Tac. an. 4, 19 quasi aut Varro consul aut illud res publica esset.

15. **ciuitas**: 'burgess-body'.

huic Stoico: 'our friend the Stoic'. The word *Stoico* seems emphatic and suitable.

16. **sequi uolebat**: 'made out that he followed'. For this idiomatic sense of *uelle* cf. Madv. on Fin. 5, 13 and on 2, 102.

18. **noster**: 'our friend', as in § 143; cf. § 113. There is no need to read *uester*, with Davies.

19. **Stoicus**: cf. fragm. 31.

balbutiens: ψελλίζων: cf. Diu. 1, 5; Tusc. 5, 75.

mihi uerenti: the construction *uereri, timere alicui* 'to fear *for* some one' seems not to be Ciceronian, though found in Caesar.

20. **labar**: § 59 n.; § 114 n.

asciscam et comprobem: cf. Fin. 1, 23 sciscat et probet; 3, 70 adscisci aut probari.

21. **quod min. u.**: § 18 quo minime uolt.

quid consili: cf. n. on § 25.

22. **Chrysippus**: the same enumeration of possible systems is quoted in Fin. 2, 39–43. Carneades proceeded on a very similar plan in the 'Carneadia diuisio' of the possible views concerning the *summum bonum*, which was adopted by Antiochus, and is often quoted by Cic. See Madvig's IVth Excursus to his De Fin., also an elaborate discussion in Hoyer, de Ant. Ascal. Bonn. 1883 pp. 1 sq. (who however fails to compare the *diuisio* of Chrysippus). That the classification of Chrysippus rather than that of Carneades is used here suits very well the polemic in the context.

tris solas: *solus* is common with numerals in Cic.

de finibus: i.e. 'from among possible views of the *finis*': *de* as in 1, 4 si qui de nostris. Possibly Cic. wrote *fine* and the unintelligible *tis* or *tiis* which the archetype had for *tris* in the line above got attached to the word. See cr. n.

23. **circumcidit et amputat**: these two verbs go together thus in Fin. 1, 44 and 5, 39; De Or. 1, 65; Tusc. 4, 57; cf. too Gell. 7 (6) 5, 8 decisis amputatisque falsis opinionibus. [In Fin. 3, 31 circumscriptis eis sententiis etc. (a passage of like purport with ours) we should probably read *circumcisis*; *circumscriptis* could only mean 'confined in a narrow space', while the context requires the sense 'lopped away'. In Plin. pan. 51 reicere et amputare, the true reading is no doubt *recidere et a.*]

24. **utrumque**: 'a combination of the two'; cf. § 132.

qui summum bonum dicant id esse, si uacemus omni molestia, eos inuidiosum nomen uoluptatis fugere, sed in uicinitate uersari, quod facere eos etiam, qui illud idem cum honestate coniungerent, nec multo secus eos, qui ad honestatem prima naturae commoda adiungerent: ita tris relinquit sententias, quas putet

139 probabiliter posse defendi. Sit sane ita—quamquam a Polemonis et Peripateticorum et Antiochi finibus non facile diuellor, nec quicquam habeo adhuc probabilius—uerum tamen uideo quam suauiter uoluptas sensibus nostris blandiatur. Labor eo ut adsentiar Epicuro aut Aristippo. Reuocat uirtus uel potius reprehendit manu: pecudum illos motus esse dicit, hominem iungit deo. Possum esse medius, ut, quoniam Aristippus, quasi animum nullum habeamus, corpus solum tuetur, Zeno, quasi corporis simus expertes, animum solum complectitur, ut Calliphon-

5 tris: Uψ. relinquit: codd. et H Bait. M (*reliquit* Cant.); *relinqui* Goer. putet: *putat* H Bait. M, ut est in B pr. m. et in Cant. U; cf. § 142. 9 labor eo: *laboro* codd., exc. B[1]G *labore;* corr. Gruter. 14 ut Call.: *ut* delet

1. **id esse si**: cf. § 18 ita...si, with n. **uacemus molestia**: cf. § 131.
3. **quod facere**: n. on 1, 41. **cum honestate**: Callipho §§ 131, 139.
4. **prima naturae commoda**: n. on 1, 23.
6. **sit sane ita**: so Brut. 279; more commonly *sit ita sane*, as in Leg. 1, 2 where the phrase is followed by *uerum tamen* as here.
7. **finibus**: here = fine bonorum et fine malorum; see § 114 n.
8. **adhuc**: of course purely temporal, not with *probabilius*, after the fashion of the silver writers.
9. **labor**: nn. on §§ 59, 114; also Hor. ep. 1, 1, 18 nunc in Aristippi furtim praecepta relabor.
11. **reprehendit manu**: cf. Q. Rosc. 48 ueritas ipsa mihi manum iniecit; Sen. ben. 6, 16, 7 ingenium latens et pigrum iniecta, ut ita dicam, manu extraxit; ib. 6, 42, 1 quasi manu prendere uerentis; Cic. Fin. 5, 6 rapior illuc, reuocat Antiochus. Munr. on Lucr. 6, 569.
pecudum: the supporters of pleasure were freely called in ancient times pigs, sheep, oxen, worms, fleas, etc. A great collection of abusive passages will be found in Hoyer's pamphlet, De Ant. Ascal. p. 46. Cf. 1 § 6.
12. **medius**: 'neutral'; a very favourite use in Livy, as 2, 27, 3 medium se gerere.
Aristippus...Zeno: in the *De Finibus* it is repeatedly urged that a true view of the *finis* must take account of both mind and body; see esp. 4 §§ 17, 25 sq.
14. **ut Call.**: the *ut* is repeated for the sake of clearness and is due to the length of the sentence. Similar instances occur in Fin. 3, 43; Verr. 2, 17 and 90; also 4, 51; Planc. 92; Balb. 20; Q. Fr. 1, 1, 38; Fam. 3, 3, 1. Livy has several exx., 5, 21, 15; 8, 6, 14; 22, 11, 4; 28, 9, 10. Wopkens, Lect. Tull. p. 41 qu. Gell. 3, 9, 3; Apul. Apol. p. 548. There is also a like repetition of *cur* in Diu. 1, 131; cf. too the not uncommon insertion of *tamen* after *tametsi*. See also n. on ut si in § 48; and on § 13 for similar repetitions of pronouns.
16. **probare**: § 131 n.
uideretur: 'was thought' (cf. n. on 1 § 22); probably by Metrodorus and Philo; see § 78. Cf. Rep. 3, 9 Carneades saepe optumas caussas ingeni calumnia ludificari solet. For the latitude in argument of Carneades, cf. Tusc. 5, 83; and see Hirzel, Unters. III pp. 193, 4.
18. **sed**: see n. on 1, 41.
19. **ueritas**: the confusion of *ueritas* and *seueritas* is common in MSS; so Verr.

tem sequar, cuius quidem sententiam Carneades ita studiose defensitabat, ut eam probare etiam uideretur (quamquam Clitomachus adfirmabat numquam se intellegere potuisse quid Carneadi probaretur) sed, si istum finem uelim sequi, nonne ipsa ueritas et grauis et recta ratio mihi obuersetur? Tune, cum honestas in uoluptate contemnenda consistat, honestatem cum uoluptate tamquam hominem cum belua copulabis? XLVI. **140**
Vnum igitur par quod depugnet relicum est, uoluptas cum honestate. De quo Chrysippo fuit, quantum ego sentio, non magna contentio. Alteram si sequare, multa ruunt et maxime communitas cum hominum genere, caritas amicitia iustitia, reliquae uirtutes, quarum esse nulla potest, nisi erit gratuita. Nam quae uoluptate quasi mercede aliqua ad officium impellitur,

Lamb.; incl. Bait. 18 istum f.: coni. H, scr. Bait. M; *ipsum f.* codd. (*ipsum* G). 19 ueritas: Cant.; *seueritas* cett. exc. G (*uoluntas*). obuersetur: *aduersetur* Lamb. H Bait. M. tune: ita scripsi; *tum* codd.; *tu* edd. (*tun* Guilelmus et Bait.).

Act. 1, 3; 3, 162; Leg. 1, 4. Cf. Fin. 4, 55 ipsa ueritas clamabit (*in re simili*); Q. Rosc. 48 (qu. above).

obuersetur: the text is quite right: cf. Tusc. 2, 52 obuersentur honestae species uiro; Sest. 7.

tune...copulabis: truth is supposed to address Cic.; cf. § 34 conuicio ueritatis. For the form cf. § 61 n. *Tun*, *men* and the like are probably not Ciceronian.

20. **consistat**: 'takes her stand'; to render by the Eng. phrase 'consist in' would be an error; cf. Phil. 1, 18 Pompei consulatus ... constitit in legibus, and above 1, 42.

21. **hominem cum belua copulabis**: so Off. 3, 119 (of Callipho and Dinomachus, who held the same view) Cic. uses 'hominem cum belua copulare'. This *finis* suggests Scylla to Seneca (ep. 92, 6). Hoyer, Ant. Asc. p. 43, qu. Aug. contra Iul. Pelag. 5, 50 placet tibi secta Dinomachi honestatem uoluptatemque coniungens, quod philosophi quoque huius mundi qui honestiores uidebantur, Scyllaeum bonum esse dixerunt, ex humana scilicet natura belluinaque compactum. For *copulare* cf. Sen. dial. 7, 6, 3 sq. negant posse uoluptatem a uirtute deduci... non uideo quomodo ista tam diuersa in eandem copulam coniciantur. The contrast between the whole phrase and *hominem iungit deo* above, should be noticed.

22. **uoluptas cum honestate**: these words are explanatory of *par*, so that *cum* does not depend on *depugnet*; cf. Hor. s. 1, 7, 19 Rupili et Persi par pugnat uti non compositum melius (sc. par) cum Bitho Bacchius.

23. **Chrysippo**: so Fin. 2, 44 Chr. totum discrimen summi boni in earum (*uirtutis et uoluptatis*) comparatione positum putat.

24. **magna contentio**: so Fin. 3, 41 cf. Fat. 12 and § 129 n. on *maior dissensio*.

si sequare...ruunt: for this form of the conditional sentence cf. Draeger II² p. 718 sq., where numerous exx. will be found; also above, 1 §§ 7, 10; 2 §§ 20, 23, 43.

25. **communitas**: a rendering of *κοινωνία*.

26. **reliquae**: n. on § 73.

quarum esse etc.: similar language in Fin. 3, 70.

nulla potest nisi erit: Madv. on Fin. 3, 70 'in hac coniunctione—hoc fieri non potest nisi—fere semper coniunctiuus subicitur praesentis; futuri et perfecti indicatiuus ponitur'.

gratuita: 'disinterested'; so Fin. 2, 99 g. probitas, and often.

27. **quae**: by attraction for *quod*; see § 30 n.

ea non est uirtus, sed fallax imitatio simulatioque uirtutis. Audi contra illos qui nomen honestatis a se ne intellegi quidem dicant, nisi forte, quod gloriosum sit in uolgus, id honestum uelimus dicere: fontem omnium bonorum in corpore esse, hanc normam, hanc regulam, hanc praescriptionem esse naturae, a qua qui aberrauisset, eum numquam quid in uita sequeretur habiturum.

141 Nihil igitur me putatis, haec et alia innumerabilia cum audiam, moueri? Tam moueor quam tu, Luculle, neque me minus hominem quam te putaueris. Tantum interest, quod tu, cum es commotus, adquiescis adsentiris approbas, uerum illud certum comprehensum perceptum ratum firmum fixum uis esse, deque eo nulla ratione neque pelli neque moueri potes: ego nihil eius modi esse arbitror, cui si adsensus sim, non adsentiar saepe falso, quoniam uera a falsis nullo discrimine separantur, praesertim cum iudicia ista dialecticae nulla sint.

7 putatis: *putabis* Man.; *putas* Goer. 10 adquiescis: *ad. q. escis* A (cum *i* sup. *q*), *ascriscis* B^1; *adquiescis* B^{2}Eψ; *acquiescis* U; *asciscis* G; *assisscis* Cant. 11 uis esse: ita scripsi; *fuisse uis* codd. plerique; om. *fuisse* G, quem secuti sunt H Bait. M; om. *uis* ψ; *fixum esse uis* Durand. 14 falso: Cant.; *false* cett. (*falsae* B).

2. **honestatis**: appositional or definitive genitive; above § 71 honesti inane nomen; also 1 §§ 6, 19.

ne intellegi quidem: 1, 6 n.

3. **quod gloriosum sit in u.**: a hit at Epicurus; see the very similar language quoted directly from him in Fin. 2, 48 and Tusc. 5, 73; also Tusc. 3, 42.

gloriosum in uolgus: *in uolgus* in Cic. is often the equivalent of δημοσίᾳ, both with adjectives and with verbs (in u. dicere, probari); but he does not use *ad uolgus*, *ad populum* with this sense, as later writers do (esp. Livy): the nearest approach is in Parad. 47 ad uolgi opinionem mediocris. Cf. *in publicum* (Tac. etc.). The phrase *in uolgus* has a genitive dependent on it in Tusc. 2, 63.

4. **hanc**: § 30 n.

normam: cf. fragm. 8 n.

5. **praescriptionem**: 1, 23 cr. n.

6. **aberrauisset**: plup. in spite of *praescriptionem esse* before, because that phrase implies a perfect (hoc a natura praescriptum esse). See the interesting remarks and illustrations in Lieven, Consec. Temp. p. 18 sq.

7. **putatis**: although *audi* precedes, and *tu* follows. For similar changes see §§ 32, 79, 101.

9. **cum es**: § 57 n.

10. **adquiescis**: Cic. would hardly have put *asciscis* at the beginning of the enumeration without an object (aliquid). *Asciscere* implies active partisanship (cf. Lucr. 5, 87 and 473), *acquiescere* only passive assent.

11. **ratum fixum**: cf. 27 n. and fragm. 17 n., and, for the string of synonyms, § 23 n.

uis esse: *fuisse* in the MSS seems a corruption of *uis esse*, 'make it out to be': cf. § 137 sequi uolebat; N. D. 3, 64.

12. **nihil eius modi**: cf. § 113.

14. **falso**: substantive, like *incognito* in § 133.

15. **iudicia**: κριτήρια, as in the next §; see n. on 1, 30.

16. **uenio iam**: Dialectic was already treated in §§ 91—98, but merely to shew that the boasted rules of the Stoics led to no certitude; here it is considered with a view to the choice of the supposed *sapiens*, as was Ethics in §§ 129—141 and Physics in §§ 116—128. Sextus also in A. M. 7, 48 sq. gives a list of conflicting schools.

17. **Protagorae etc.**: the words we have here are not Protagoras' own, but a generally current explanation of his principle 'πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον εἶναι ἄνθρωπον'

Venio enim iam ad tertiam partem philosophiae. Aliud iu- **142**
dicium Protagorae est, qui putet id cuique uerum esse, quod cuique uideatur: aliud Cyrenaicorum, qui praeter permotiones intimas nihil putant esse iudici: aliud Epicuri, qui omne iudicium in sensibus et in rerum notitiis et in uoluptate constituit. Plato autem omne iudicium ueritatis ueritatemque ipsam abductam ab opinionibus et a sensibus cogitationis ipsius et mentis esse uoluit. Num quid horum probat noster Antiochus? Ille uero **143**
ne maiorum quidem suorum. Vbi enim aut Xenocraten sequitur, cuius libri sunt de ratione loquendi multi et multum probati, aut ipsum Aristotelen, quo profecto nihil est acutius, nihil politius? A Chrysippo pedem nusquam. XLVII. Quid ergo Academici appellamur? An abutimur gloria nominis?

17 putet: codd.; *putat* B^2 et edd.; cf. § 138. 22 cogitationis: codd. non nulli *cognitionis;* uid. adn. 23 noster Ant.: *uester A.* Dau.; cf. § 137. 27 nusquam: Dau. e marg. cod. Regii; *numquam* codd. et edd. plerique; uid. adn. quid: *qui* codd.; corr. Manut.

so largely discussed in Plato's *Theaetetus*. See Zeller I^4 p. 982.

qui putet: but *putant* after; similar changes in §§ 102, 115. There seems no reason why Cic. should not use the causal clause in the one case and the descriptive relative clause in the other. Such slight changes in thought are natural. Wopkens, Lect. Tull. p. 108, ed. Hand discusses similar changes of mood.

18. **Cyrenaicorum**: n. on § 76. For the word *intimas* cf. *tactus intimus* in § 76 and *t. interior* in § 20.

20. **in sensibus**: see § 79 n. This statement of the κριτήριον of Epic. agrees closely with that in Diog. 10, 31 τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὰς προλήψεις καὶ τὰ πάθη (pleasure and pain). For details see Zeller III, 1 p. 386 ed. 3 or E. Tr. p. 401 n.

rerum notitiis: see n. on § 30; Zeller E. Tr. p. 403.

22. **cogit. ipsius**: 'merely of thought'. It is surprising to find no reference to the ἰδέαι here; see p. 54. The confusion between *cogitatio* and *cognitio* in MSS is common. See Wesenb. Em. to Tusc. III p. 17; Madv. on Fin. 3, 21. *Cogitationis* is better here, because *mind* is contrasted with *sense* above.

23. **num quid horum**: cf. n. on 1, 13 ea Philonis.

24. **ne maiorum q.**: for *maiorum* see § 80 n.; and for the ellipse cf. § 82 qui ne nunc quidem, with n. It is remarkable that Plato should be here plainly excluded from the number of Antiochus' intellectual progenitors. See Hirzel, Unt. 3, 242; Hoyer p. 25.

25. **ratione loquendi**: here a rendering of λογική, for which see 1, 19 n. Diog. 4, 13 names among Xenocrates' works a good many pertaining to logic.

27. **pedem nusquam**: cf. § 58 transuersum digitum, with n.; Ter. Ad. 227 pedem nusquam; Att. 7, 3, 11 mihi certum est ab honestissima sententia digitum nusquam; Fam. 10, 31, 6 nullum uestigium abs te discessurus sum; Plaut. Asin. 596. And for the ellipse Att. 5, 20, 6 interea e Cappadocia ne pilum quidem; also above, §§ 13, 71; Draeger § 116. The passages quoted shew that in the proverb *pedem nusquam* is usual; Deiot. 42 where numquam begins the clause and pedem discessisse follows at an interval, is hardly parallel to our passage.

28. **appellamur**: i.e. Old and New Academics alike. Hirzel III 304 strangely argues that Cic. *must* have taken this judgment about Ant. from a book by Philo. Surely it was a matter of notoriety.

gloria nominis: = glorioso nomine; *abuti*=καταχρῆσθαι as so often in rhetorical works, to make a wrong use of a term. Cf. Fin. 1, 61 honestum, non tam

Aut cur cogimur eos sequi, qui inter se dissident? In hoc ipso, quod in elementis dialectici docent, quo modo iudicare oporteat uerum falsumne sit, si quid ita conexum est, ut hoc, 'si dies est, lucet', quanta contentio est! Aliter Diodoro, aliter Philoni, Chrysippo aliter placet. Quid? Cum Cleanthe doctore suo quam multis rebus Chrysippus dissidet! Quid? Duo uel principes dialecticorum, Antipater et Archidemus, opiniosissimi homines,
144 nonne multis in rebus dissentiunt? Quid me igitur, Luculle, in inuidiam et tamquam in contionem uocas, et quidem, ut seditiosi tribuni solent, occludi tabernas iubes? Quo enim spectat illud, cum artificia tolli quereris a nobis, nisi ut opifices concitentur? Qui si undique omnes conuenerint, facile contra uos incitabuntur. Expromam primum illa inuidiosa, quod eos omnis, qui in contione stabunt, exsules seruos insanos esse dicatis: dein ad

7 opiniosissimi: sic uel *opinosissimi* codd.; spurium putant H Bait. M; *ingeniosissimi* coni., H, *spinosissimi* Hermann.; alii alia; uid. adn. 14 dein: ABψ; *deinde* codd. multi. 22 contraxerat: Cant. edd.; *contexerat* AEψr; *conxerat* B; *constrinx-*

solido quam splendido nomine; Tusc. 2, 33 quid philosophiae nomine gloriosi sumus?

1. **cur cogimur**: 'why is the attempt made to compel us?'

2. **elementis**: cf. § 95 fundamentum dialecticae; § 96 primum concludendi modum. For *iudicare* (?-*ri*) see § 42 n.

docent: § 96 in docendo.

3. **conexum**: n. on § 91 coniunctio.

si dies est, lucet: § 96 n. on *modum*.

4. **Diodoro ... Philoni**: Megarians; Philo was pupil of D. Their dispute is mentioned by Sext. P.H. 2, 110; A.M. 8, 113 sq.; cf. ib. 265. All these Megarians were *molesti* (§ 75) to the Stoics and Antiochus. Epict. D. 2, 19, 5—9 speaks with as great contempt as Cic. of the battles between the logicians. Some of the works of Chrys. in the list of Diog. 7, 191—194 are against Philo; cf. too Fat. 13.

5. **Cleanthe...Chrysippus**: the reference here is merely to dialectic.

7. **Ant. et Arch.**: often mentioned together, as Diog. 7, 68 and 84; Epict. D. 2, 19, 7. For Ant. see §§ 17, 28 and fragm. 1.

opiniosissimi: at first sight it seems as if a laudatory epithet were needed (and this has led edd. to suppose the passage corrupt), but the men have been sufficiently lauded in the preceding words and Cic. manufactures for the occasion a jesting phrase, which ridicules their dogmatism. These men were thorough dogmatists, and, being so, must needs, on Sceptic principles, be οἰήσιος ἔμπλεοι ἀσκοί, as Timon says. In a similar vein Epict. D. 4, 1, 140 apostrophises his imaginary opponent: σὺ ψυχρὸν καὶ ταλαίπωρον ὑποληψείδιον! The word *opiniosus* occurs elsewhere only in Tertullian adv. Marc. 4, 35, who is more likely to have got the word from Cic. than to have invented it for himself. The best of the emendations proposed is *spinosissimi*, with which cf. Anth. Gr. 11, 20, 2 ποιῆται ἀκανθολόγοι. Spinosus is continually used with reference to dialectic; see De Or. 1, 83; Orat. 114; Tusc. 1, 16; Fin. 3, 3; and *spinae* in Fin. 4, 6 and 79; Tusc. 4, 9. [In Gell. 12, 5, 6 quae fuisse dicturum puto sinuosius atque sollertius, si quis nunc adesset Stoicorum, the word *sinuosius* is evidently a false reading for *spinosius*.]

9. **in contionem uocas**: according to the fashion of tribunes. Cic. himself in argument often appeals to the crowd; see Fin. 2, 74; 4, 22; Tusc. 3, 51; N.D. 1, 61; cf. too Aug. c. d. 4, 30. We have here a retort on §§ 13, 14, where Luc. compared the Sceptics to seditious citizens; cf. too §§ 63, 72. For *uocas* cf. § 56; Fin. 5, 85 si ad populum ne uocas.

seditiosi: the senate regarded the pro-

illa ueniam, quae iam non ad multitudinem, sed ad uosmet ipsos,
qui adestis, pertinent. Negat enim uos Zeno, negat Antiochus
scire quicquam. 'Quo modo'? inquies, 'nos enim defendimus
etiam insipientem multa comprehendere'. At scire negatis quem- **145**
quam rem ullam nisi sapientem; et hoc quidem Zeno gestu
conficiebat. Nam cum extensis digitis aduersam manum ostenderat, 'uisum', inquiebat, 'huius modi est'. Deinde, cum paulum digitos contraxerat, 'adsensus huius modi'. Tum cum plane compresserat pugnumque fecerat, comprehensionem illam esse dicebat: qua ex similitudine etiam nomen ei rei, quod ante non fuerat, κατάληψιν imposuit. Cum autem laeuam manum admouerat et illum pugnum arte uehementerque compresserat, scientiam talem esse dicebat, cujus compotem nisi sapientem esse neminem. Sed qui sapiens sit aut fuerit ne ipsi quidem

erat U Harl.; *extrinxerat* G. 26 admouerat: A²B²EUψr et H Bait. M; *aduerat* A¹B¹; *aduerterat* G Cant. 28 sapiens sit aut fuerit: A²B²ψ; *sapiente sit aut fuerit* A; *sapientes aut fuerit* B¹; *sapientes aut sint aut fuerint* Cant.; hic in U non nulla sunt omissa.

clamation of a *iustitium* by magistrates as subject to its own control; see Momms. Staatsr. I 213. The reference here is probably to the well-known action of Tib. Gracchus.

11. **artificia**: n. on § 30.

tolli: see §§ 26, 38.

opifices concitentur: Flacc. 18 opifices et tabernarios quid est negoti concitare? Sall. Iug. 73, 6 plebes sic accensa ut opifices agrestesque...relictis operibus frequentarint Marium. *Opifices* includes Zeuxis etc. in § 146; see n. on § 120.

con-cit-entur...in-cit-abuntur: n. on § 18 impressum effictumque.

13. **expromam**: Cic. was very likely thinking of the use he made of the Stoic paradoxes in the *Pro Murena*, for which he professes a sort of shame in Fin. 4, 74.

inuidiosa: §§ 105, 146.

omnis etc.: so De Or. 3, 65.

14. **exsules etc.**: § 136.

18. **at scire negatis**: the Stoics held that κατάληψις when it does arise in the mind of the φαῦλος is mere δόξα not ἐπιστήμη: see Sext. A.M. 7, 153; also P.H. 2, 83, where it is said that the φαῦλος can attain to τὸ ἀληθές, but not to ἀλήθεια, which the σοφὸς alone has.

20. **conficiebat**: 'used to demonstrate'; so fragm. 34, Fin. 2, 26.

nam cum etc.: this is the only passage, so far as I know, where Zeno is described as having used the illustration of the open and the closed hand to explain the degrees of knowledge. He is elsewhere said to have been fond of comparing rhetoric to the open, and dialectic to the closed hand; see Fin. 2, 17; Orat. 113; Quint. 2, 20, 7; Sext. A.M. 2, 7; Isid. orig. 2, 23.

cum...ostenderat: § 57 n.

aduersam: i.e. opposite the spectator; cf. 123.

21. **uisum...adsensus**: see nn. on 1 § 41; 2 § 38.

22. **contraxerat**: N.D. 2, 150 digitorum contractio porrectio; Plin. 11, 94 digitum contrahens aut remittens; ib. 18, 189 digitos in pugnum contrahere.

24. **quod ante non fuerat**: καταλαμβάνειν however had been used in much the same sense.

25. **κατάληψιν**: see n. on 1 § 41.

26. **admouerat**: Cic. has not *aduertere* except in the phrase animum adu.; *admouerat* seems also more suitable 'had moved up close'.

28. **qui...dicere**: the Stoics were often rallied on the non-existence of their σοφός. Cf. Diu. 2, 61 saepius mulam peperisse arbitror quam sapientem fuisse; Sen. ep. 42, 1 ille (sapiens) fortasse tamquam phoenix semel anno quingentesimo nascitur; Quint. 12, 1,

solent dicere. Ita tu nunc, Catule, lucere nescis nec tu, Hortensi,
146 in tua uilla nos esse. Num minus haec inuidiose dicuntur? Nec tamen nimis eleganter: illa subtilius. Sed quo modo tu, si nihil comprehendi posset, artificia concidere dicebas neque mihi dabas id, quod probabile esset, satis magnam uim habere ad artis, sic ego nunc tibi refero artem sine scientia esse non posse. An pateretur hoc Zeuxis aut Phidias aut Polyclitus, nihil se scire, cum in eis esset tanta sollertia? Quod si eos docuisset aliquis quam uim habere diceretur scientia, desinerent irasci: ne nobis quidem suscenserent, cum didicissent id tollere nos, quod nusquam esset, quod autem satis esset ipsis relinquere. Quam rationem maiorum etiam comprobat diligentia, qui primum iurare 'ex sui animi sententia' quemque uoluerunt, deinde ita teneri 'si sciens falleret', quod inscientia multa uersaretur in uita, tum, qui testimonium diceret, ut 'arbitrari' se diceret etiam quod ipse uidisset, quaeque iurati iudices cognouissent, ea non ut esse facta, sed ut 'uideri' pronuntiarentur.

16 ea non ut: *ut ea non aut* ABE; *ut ea non ut* GU Cant. et r; *ut ea non esse quasi facta* ψ; *ut ea non* Man. H Bait. M. 25 tot tam: *tot et tam* Cant. et

18 even Zeno Cleanthes and Chrysippus were not *sapientes;* Cic. Tusc. 2, 51; Fin. 4, 64. Sext. P.H. 3, 240 argues in the same way as Cic.; the Stoics are not σοφοί, therefore they cannot be in possession of the true art of life; so too A.M. 7, 433; 11, 181; cf. P.H. 1, 91; Diog. 7, 91; Quint. pr. § 19. Epictetus often treats Socrates as the perfect σοφός: see Ench. 51 § 3; 33 § 12 (in the last place Zeno also is mentioned). Quint. 12, 7, 4 regards the younger Cato as the nearest approach to a sapiens; see too what Plin. ep. 3, 11, 5 says of Musonius, and cf. Mayor on Iuuen. 7, 56. Epict. D. 1, 2, 35—37 answers very curiously the questions why there are so few σοφοί and why one should strive after the state, if it is well-nigh impossible of attainment.

1. **lucere nescis**: a retort on the *lucem eripere* of § 30.

nec tu: sc. scis; the ellipse is really of the same kind as § 79 tu negas...neque (ais); cf. Tusc. 5, 116 nostri Graece fere nesciunt nec Graeci Latine; Madv. on Fin. 2, 25.

2. **tua uilla**: see Introd. p. 46.

inuidiose: § 144.

nec...subtilius: cf. N.D. 1, 70 nihil horum nimis callide; Tusc. 5, 93 non nimis fortasse subtiliter, utiliter tamen.

3. **eleganter**: 'with refinement'; *elegans* is 'choice', 'tasteful', 'neat', as in 1 § 9 and 2 § 32. The word is often even applied to legal statements or abstruse arguments if they combine clearness with compactness.

illa: i.e. the arguments used before these *inuidiosa.*

subtilius: n. on 2, 34.

quo modo...sic: so § 38; Fin. 3, 67; Leg. 1, 33; Off. 1, 136.

4. **artificia...artis**: n. on § 30.

dicebas: in § 22.

6. **refero**: 'retort'; so Caec. 84 ego nunc tibi refero.

artem sine scientia: in Cato m. 78 tot artes tantae scientiae (gen. sing.), *scientia* is made an attribute of *ars.*

7. **Zeuxis etc.**: the same three are mentioned in Fin. 2, 115, but in neither place need we imagine that Cic. puts them forward as the three indubitably greatest artists. In Fin. l.l. they are put beside Homer Archilochus and Pindar, whom Cic. certainly would not have

XLVIII. Verum, quoniam non solum nauta significat, sed 147
etiam Favonius ipse insusurrat nauigandi nobis, Luculle, tempus
esse et quoniam satis multa dixi, est mihi perorandum. Posthac
tamen, cum haec quaeremus, potius de dissensionibus tantis
summorum uirorum disseramus, de obscuritate naturae deque
errore tot philosophorum, qui de bonis contrariisque rebus tanto
opere discrepant, ut, cum plus uno uerum esse non possit, iacere
necesse sit tot tam nobilis disciplinas, quam de oculorum sen-
suumque reliquorum mendaciis et de sorite aut pseudomeno,
quas plagas ipsi contra se Stoici texuerunt'. Tum Lucullus 'non 148
moleste', inquit, 'fero nos haec contulisse. Saepius enim congre-
dientes nos, et maxime in Tusculanis nostris, si quae uidebuntur,
requiremus'. 'Optime', inquam, 'sed quid Catulus sentit, quid
Hortensius?' Tum Catulus, 'Egone?' inquit; 'ad patris reuoluor
sententiam, quam quidem ille Carneadiam esse dicebat, ut
percipi nihil putem posse, adsensurum autem non percepto, id
est, opinaturum sapientem existimem, sed ita ut intellegat se

Man. 34 intellegat se: *intelligat se* G Cant. ψ; *intelligentes* uel *intellegentes* cett. (*si int.* E).

named if bound to select the three greatest poets. The names are in fact merely specimens; the attack, therefore, made on Cic. by Goehling, de Cic. artis aest. pp. 44, 45 for naming Zeuxis as a painter along with a sculptor like Phidias is quite misplaced. Cf. De Or. 3, 26; Phaedr. v prol.

9. **ne nobis quidem**: n. on 1, 5.

10. **tollere...relinq.**: see § 34 n.

13. **ex sui an. sent.**: see the play on the phrase in De Or. 2, 260, where it receives the sense of *ex sententia* above § 100; cf. Wilkins ad loc. and Quint. 8, 5, 1.

ita...si: n. on § 18.

teneri: ἔνοχον εἶναι: sc. periuri. 'Si sciens fallo' was a usual clause in an oath.

15. **arbitrari**: cf. Font. 19 illud uerbum consideratissimum nostrae consuetudinis, arbitror, quo etiam tunc utimur cum ea dicimus iurati quae comperta habemus; Liu. 3, 13, 3; 26, 33, 7. The word however originally meant 'to be a by-stander or eyewitness'; see Corssen 1, 238.

16. **non ut**: see § 47 n.

17. **uideri**: 'fecisse uideri' is the ordinary verdict of 'guilty'. For the sense of *uideri* cf. 1, 15 n.; 1, 22; 2, 11.

18. **nauta**: see § 9.

22. **obscuritate**: 1, 15 n.; 1, 44.

24. **plus uno**: De Or. 2, 30 cum plus uno uerum esse non possit; N. D. 1, 5; Aug. c. d. 19, 2; above, §§ 115, 117.

iacere: § 79 n.

25. **nobilis**: 125 n.

27. **plagas**: cf. § 112. Cic. does not mean to imply that the Stoics were the authors of these sophisms.

28. **contulisse**: like *sermones conferre* etc.

29. **Tusculanis**: a hint at the Tusc. Disp. The scene of the De Diuin. is also at Tusculum.

30. **optime**: n. on § 94 superbe.

31. **patris...sent.**: see Introd. p. 42.

reuoluor: § 18 n.; Tac. an. 4, 9 ad uana reuolutus.

33. **adsensurum**: § 141 adsentiar saepe falso; § 113.

non-percepto: see. n. on 1, 39.

id est: n. on 1 § 8.

34. **opinaturum**: see §§ 59, 67, 78, 112.

opinari sciatque nihil esse quod comprehendi et percipi possit: qua re ἐποχὴν illam omnium rerum comprobans, illi alteri sententiae, nihil esse quod percipi possit, uehementer adsentior'. 'Habeo', inquam, 'sententiam tuam nec eam admodum aspernor. Sed tibi quid tandem uidetur, Hortensi'? Tum ille ridens 'Tollendum'. 'Teneo te', inquam, 'nam ista Academiae est propria sententia'. Ita sermone confecto Catulus remansit: nos ad nauiculas nostras descendimus.

1 sciatque: uid. adn. 2 qua re: *per* codd.; corr. Man.; uid. adn. comprobans: *conprobans* uel *comprobans* codd. (sed A *con* sup. lineam habet); *non probans* Madu. H Bait. M; *improbans* coni. Dau.; uid. adn.

1. **sciatque**: it is odd that Cic. should use *sciat* of a man '*cui nihil sciri posse uidetur*'. Prob. *sciat* is a corruption of *sentiat*, for which see 1, 23 n.

2. **ἐποχὴν omnium rerum**: i.e. the absolute refusal to state any opinion, whether as certain or as probable. The word *omnium rerum* conveys the sense of our 'absolute' or 'general'; cf. Caesar ap. Att. 9, 6*a* ope omnium rerum; Cic. Rep. 1, 62 prouocationes o. r.; Liu. 7, 1, 4 silentium o. r.; 8, 13, 18; 8, 33, 17; Plin. n. h. 10, 20 desidia rerum omnium. *Rerum* alone has a similar force in Lucr. 1, 517 inane r., and Verg. Aen. 1, 146 lacrimae rerum. The two views of ἐποχὴ contrasted here are the same as those contrasted in § 104, where see nn.

comprobans: 'although I approve' i.e. as matter of theory. A close comparison of the passage with § 104 and my nn. there will shew that there is no need to alter the text. The two views are *both* held by the Academic, but one as a speculative, the other as a practical doctrine. The negative therefore is not wanted. [If it were needed, it would be best to read *parum* (an old emendation) for *per* of the MSS, leaving *comprobans*.]

4. **habeo...nec eam etc.**: cf. what Cic. says of himself in § 66 and in § 112 and for the words § 123.

6. **tollendum**: a jest which has been much misunderstood (see e.g. Bake on Leg. 1, 5). There is a play on two senses (1) 'we must make a clean sweep' i.e. of *adsensus* (cf. n. on § 26); (2) 'we must weigh anchor'. In Varro r. r. 3, 17, 1 (qu. by Forc.) *tollere* has the sense of 'get on', 'proceed', without reference to the sea. I believe that our passage, and no other is referred to in Att. 13, 21, 3. Cic. tried to make a joke by introducing *inhibendum*, for which he substituted *tollendum* when he found out he had mistaken the sense of *inhibendum*. Krische p. 14 and Engstrand p. 10 are of a different opinion.

teneo te: cf. pro Quint. 63 'hic te', inquit, 'teneo'; Verr. 3, 107 te...tenebo. Possibly there is here an allusion to one of Varro's *saturae* entitled ἔχω σε, for which see Krahner de Varrone, Friedland 1846, p. 6 (who however does not refer to this passage).

I. GENERAL INDEX

TO THE INTRODUCTION AND NOTES.

[N.B. p. indicates a page of the Introduction; i ii denote the *Academica Posteriora* and *Priora* respectively; the numbers following these indicate the sections, in the notes to which the matters will be found; cr. means *critical note;* fr. = *frament.*]

II. INDEX OF GREEK TERMS

REFERRED TO IN THE INTRODUCTION AND NOTES.

III.

INDEX OF PASSAGES OUTSIDE THE *ACADEMICA*,

THE READINGS OF WHICH ARE REFERRED TO IN THE INTRODUCTION AND NOTES.

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